ATMATATTVAVIVEKA

BY

UDAYANĀCĀRYA

WITH
TRANSLATION, EXPLANATION
AND
ANALYTICAL-CRITICAL SURVEY

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Foreword

Ātmattatvaviveka of Udayanācārya, written nearly a thousand years ago, is a major philosophical text of the classical Indian tradition. It marks a significant stage in 'orthodox' Indian philosophy's response to Buddhism. But more valuable than its polemical interest is its subtle and, frequently profound, treatment of philosophical problems which defy history and context.

Problems of translation, as is well-known, are immense, specially translating a text across great linguistic, temporal and cultural barriers. Professor Dravid's translation of *Ātmattatvaviveka* and his explanatory notes are a marvellous example of how many of these problems can be creatively overcome and the philosophical and literary content of the original can be made available to an 'alien' audience. Professor Dravid's work is not just an excellent translation but, it is, equally importantly, a serious contribution to philosophical thought.

New Delhi
March 31, 1995

MRINAL MIRI
Director

Preface

To transalte a Sanskrit philosophical treatise in fluent idiomatic English without distorting or rendering unintelligible the import of the original text is a rather difficult job. For one thing, the precise and concise technical terms used in the philosophical treatises of Sanskrit do not have even approximately parallel synonyms in English and for another the styles of expression of the two languages differ very widely from eath other. An expression like say 'Pādārvinda' which appears natural in Sanskrit appears rather ludicrous when translated as 'Lotus-feet' in English. If a treatise happens to be polemical in character then the compactness of its logical syntax makes the task of the English translation of the treatise still more difficult. But *Ātmattatvaviveka* of Udayanācārya is not merely a philosophical treatise in Sanskirt, it is also a work of a master-stylist in Sanskrit. The charm, vigour and expressiveness of this treatise entitles it to be ranked with great Sanskrit works like Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* and Pātañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Udayanācārya's frequent use of Sanskrit proverbs with stunning effect in the course of hitting the nail of his argument on the head of the Buddhist adversary and thereby poohpooing his position is also a unique phenomenon in Sanskrit philosophical literature. To capture the beauty and philosophical content of such an extraordinary work through literal translation of it is simply a wasted effort. The next best course open to an honest translator is to give a free non literal but precise English rendering of the content of the Sanskrit original without bothering much for its literary quality. This is the course adopted by the present translator. But to help those readers who have some acquaintance with Sanskrit, the compound words – which are so frequent in Sanskrit philosophical treatises – have been split up into their component words so that such readers can verify for themselves the faithfulness of the translation to the original.

Each passagē-unit in the text is provided with an independent heading which epitomises the content of the unit thus enabling the reader to know at a glance what is being said in the passage under the heading. Each translation-piece is followed by a detailed explanation-piece. Important or difficult points discussed in the translated passage are elucidated in the explanation. Sometimes some new points are also raised and discussed in the explanation. The explanations are generally based on the most important available commentaries of *Ātmatattvaviveka*. A large number of commentaries have been written on this work by eminent scholars in the past. Only a few of these commentaries are available in full, today. The explanations given in the book are based mainly upon three published

commentaries. These are the *Kalpalatā* by Śankaramiśra, the *Prakāṣika* by Murlidhar Thakkura and the *Dīdhitī* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Of these three *Kalpalatā* is mainly expository and quite lucid in expression. Its author Śankarmiśra is quite well-known for his commentarial work. He has authored commentaries on philosophical works as varied as *Nyāyaleelavatī, Khandanakhaṇdakhādya* and so on. *Prakāṣika* of Murlidhar Thakkura is both elucidatory and innovative. It is also critical at times. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Dīdhitī* however is a most insightful commentary on the treatise. Almost on every passage some novel interpretation is presented by *Dīdhitī*. The points raised by it by way of elaborating and refining the import of the text are invariably very ingenious. This is quite natural as Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the author of the commentary is reputed to be the greatest logician and thinker of India after Gangesa of the 12th Century A.D.

A comprehensive analytical-critical survey of the whole treatise is appended at the end of the translation. In this survey the essence of each important argument and counter-argument is presented in an unbroken sequence. This has become necessary in view of the fact that because of the unusually long chain of each argumentation the reader is apt to lose the thread of the main point of an argument by the time he reaches its conclusion. The critical part of the survey is concerned with an independent critical evaluation of the author's as well as the Buddhist's position on each issue discussed in the treatise. On many points it has not been possible for the present writer to see eye to eye with Udayana. The translator has, therefore, frankly expressed the points of his disagreements with Udayana at different places for the critical consideration of scholars.

A glossary of certain important technical terms with their meanings is given at the end. Many of these terms are current in Buddhist philosophical literature only.

Lest it may be thought that *Ātmatattavaviveka*, being a work composed about a thousand years ago in an age with a totally-different philosophical ambience, its study can be only of historical interest to modern readers, it needs to be emphatically stated that the work is not only of topical interest today, it is in some respects even ahead of the current thinking on certain burning philosophical issues. For example, semantic and logical paradoxes and their various proposed solutions are a hot topic of discussions among philosophers today. This topic happens to be elaborately thrashed out in *Ātmatattaviveka* in the context of the Buddhist assertion and the Non-Buddhist denial that the unreal can be the referend of a significant proposition. To prove that what is not momentary cannot be real, in order to establish the theory of universal momentariness, the Buddhist has to make a significant reference to the non-momentary which in his view is unreal. For the non-Buddhist however neither the non-momentary nor the momentary is unreal. Certain entities like the last

sound vibration in the series of sound-vibrations emanating from a source is regarded as momentary by the non-Buddhist. The problem of paradoxical assertions and negations that arises in connection with the discussion of universal momentariness is discussed in detail by Udayana. The solution to the problem suggested by him though not quite unusual is quite ingenious.

The Buddhists do not admit the reality of the universals which they equate with other-exlusions called "Apoha" in Sanskrit. Western nominalists, both ancient and modern, do not seem to have a clear notion of what is to take the place of the universal in the universal propisitions if the reality of the universal is denied. A long tortuous and very interesting discussion of this problem is available in *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

Far more interesting and quite original is the discussion of the problem of personal identity that we have in the fourth section of the treatise. Recognition is the basis of personal identity. Can recognition be based on cause-effect relationship? If it can, then, is it the relation of the material cause or the efficient cause to its effect which sustains recognition? But can there be a material cause at all in the Buddhist view? Further, is the causal relation just the basis of recognition or both the basis and the agent of recognition? All these questions arising out of the main question of personal identity or the reality of the individual self are discussed in detail in the treatise.

The reality of the substantive locus of qualities is the problem which is considered in a chapter by itself in the treatise. The manner in which the problem is tackled in the treatise is quite unique both in Indian and Western Philosophy. Again, there is a good deal of novel reflective material in the discussions of the nature of difference, the cosmological argument for the existence of God, types of causality and so on, in the treatise. On each of these and other related topics the author has many original things to say.

It may be pointed out here that the translator was attracted to the study of and work on the treatise not simply because the treatise is philosophically very interesting but also because of his peculiar personal involvement in it. The translator's uncle the late Laxman Shastri Dravid, a great Vedantist, was, first the coeditor and later the sole editor of the first edition of the treatise brought out by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. Subsequently the Choukhamba Press of Varanasi brought out two other editions of the treatise of which the editors were the translator's brother, the Late Rajeshwar Shastri Dravid, the foremost Indian logician of his time and his well known pupil of Hariram Shastri – a great Naiyayika and the teacher of the translator. This translation may be taken as the last stage in the revival of the work lying shrouded in obscurity for a long time. The translator wishes this work of his on the treatise to be treated as a concrete expression of his immense gratitude to his uncle, brother and teacher.

In 1989 the then Director of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Professor Margaret Chatterjee invited the translator to the Institute to work there on *Ātmatattvaviveka*. The invitation was accepted and the work was started by the translator somtime in 1989 and completed in 1991. Professor J.S. Grewal who succeeded Dr. Chatterjee as Director of the Institute gave all possible help for work to the translator. The officials of the Institute, specially the Librarian, were also very helpful. All these deserve thanks for all their kindness.

The translator feels privileged that the publication of the work took place under the kind supervision of Professor Mrinal Miri the present Director of the Institute and a distinguished philosopher.

Last but not least Mr. N.K. Maini, the Asstt. Publication Officer of the Institute, without whose help and personal interest this work could not have been published expeditiously, deserves high praise for his extreme kindness and helpfulness.

It is hoped that perceptive scholars would find this work not underserving of their serious consideration.

March 1, 1995

N.S. DRAVID
Nagpur

ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

(Translation and Explanation)

SECTION I

Discussion of the Doctrine of Momentary Existence
Panegyric verse

Text : स्वाम्यं यस्य निजं जगत्सु जनितेषु आदौ ततः पालनम् ।
व्युत्पतेः करणं हित–अहित–विधि–व्यासेध–संभावनम् ।।
भूत–उक्तिः सहजा कृपा निर्–उपधिः यत्नः तत् –अर्थ–आत्मकः ।
तस्मै पूर्व–गुरु–उत्तमाय जगतां–ईशाय पित्रे नमः ।।

Translation: (henceforth abbreviated as 'Trans'.) Salutation be to the Being who is the most excellent among ancient teachers and (also) the overlord and progenitor of the worlds. The overlordship of this Being in relation to the worlds created by Him is natural. Having created the worlds He thereafter sustains their existence, initiates the beings of the world into correct usages of words and lays down for their benefit injunctions of beneficient and prohibitions of maleficient actions. His teachings to them are authentic, His compassion for them natural and His efforts for their wellbeing is unconditional.

Explanation: (henceforth abbreviated as 'Expl.') It is a time-honoured practice followed by all ancient Indian authors to insert a laudatory verse or verses addressed to God or some deity adored by them at the beginning of their literary or philosophical work. It is their considered view that over and above their special expertise and skill in composing the work the merit earned by them by addressing supplicatory verse or verses to God is also necessary for the removal of unexpected impediments in the successful completion of their work. The questions pertaining to the efficacy of prayer-verses like, 'Is the causality of these verses confined to one life or does it extend even to the future lives of the author?', 'Do the verses only help remove obstructions or do they also help bring about the successful completion of the work undertaken?', 'If several successful compositions do not contain any supplicatory verses how can their necessity be justified?' and so on, are considered in detail in the first chapter of his monumental Nyāya Treatise—*Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Gangeśa.

Udayanācārya, the author of the treatise *Ātmatattvavivēka*, starts its composition with a prayer addressed to God as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (henceforth abbreviated as 'N.V.'), himself being the most outstanding exponent of the standpoint of this school. (Throughout we shall refer to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as one school treating them as

syncretic.) The laudatory epithets applied to God in the verse are precisely those in terms of which the conception of godhood is developed by this school. God being the creator of the world is its absolute Master. God created the world by initiating certain special kinds of movements in atoms which make them constitute compounds like dyads. These in their turn by their movements produce triads and thus gradually the world of composite structure is brought into being. Along with God as the general cause of the world, time, space, destinies of selves etc. are also such causes of the world. The non-composite and eternal constituents of the world like space, time, selves, mind, generic universals etc. are uncreated and ever-existent. God's general creativity extends only to non-eternal objects. Such is the Vaiśeṣika view of God's creativity. This leaves the question 'why God alone among the general causes of the world mentioned above be regarded as the creator of the world?' unanswered. This question is taken up for detailed consideration by the author in the last section of the treatise.

Another component of the N.V. conception of godhood is God's teachership. At the start of each cycle of creation it is God who, assuming the forms of different human beings imparts instruction about grammatically correct usages of words to these beings. This implies that language has its origin in the verbal conventions laid down by God Himself. Further, the knowledge of what ought to be done and what ought not, which can be had only through the injunctive and prohibitive statements of the Vedas is imparted, as per the N.V. school, by God Himself because God is the author of the Vēdas and it is He who revives the Vēdas after each cycle of dissolution. He is also like the parent of the world as He eternally strives for the good of the beings of the world, has infinite compassion for them and communicates only truth to them through the medium of the scriptures. If it is asked why, notwithstanding its creation by an infinitely-compassionate, omniscient and omnipotent being, the world is brimful with suffering, the N.V. reply is that God is only the principle cause of the world. There are other (auxiliary) causes too without which suffering would not come into existence. Unlike the Advaita for which Brahman is both the material and the non-material cause of the world N.V. regards God only as the non-material or a special type of efficient cause of the world.

It may be noted here that although both the bodily self and God, the supreme Self are endowed with the special attributes of cognition, conation, volition, and pleasure or happiness, these attributes as characterising God are eternal while as inhering in the embodied self they are ephemeral. Besides pain, hatred, etc. also characterise the embodied self while God is devoid of them.

The subject to be discussed and the purpose of the discussion

Text: इह खलु निसर्ग–प्रतिकूल–स्वभावं सर्व–जन–संवेदन–सिद्धं दुःखं जिहासवः सर्वं एव तत्–हान–उपायं अ–विद्वांसः अनुसरंतः च सर्व–अध्यात्म–वित्*एक–वाक्यतया तत्वज्ञानं एव तत्–उपायं आकर्णयंति। न ततः अन्यम्। प्रतियोगि–अनुयोगितया च आत्मा एव तत्वतः ज्ञेयः। तथा हि यदि नैरात्म्यं यदि वा आत्मा अस्ति वस्तु–भूतः उभयथा अपि नैसर्गिकं आत्म–ज्ञानं अ–तत्वज्ञानं एव इति अत्र–अपि एकवाक्यता एव वादिनाम्। अतः आत्म–तत्वं विविच्यते।

Trans: Verily in this world everyone is of necessity (quite) keen to get rid of suffering whose reality is attested by common experience (of it) and which is intrinsically subversive (or unpleasant). But not knowing how to get rid of suffering and yet persevering in their search for the means to overcome it the suffering beings come to realise on the basis of the consensus of all adepts in spiritual matters that the knowledge of truth (or the essence of things) alone is such a means and nothing other than it. And the truth that needs to be known either as the counterpositive (to its negation or its rejection) or as the locus (of the distinction from all other things with which it is ordinarily confused) is nothing other than the self itself. This is so because whether non-existence of the self is a fact or there really is such a thing as self, in either case the instinctive (natural or commonsensical) notion of self is certainly unveridical. On this point too there is definite consensus among all disputants. Hence a rational enquiry into the essential nature of self is now being launched.

Expl: The author now provides a justification for the inquiry he intends to take up in the successive sections of this treatise. Mere curiosity to know a thing cannot be a proper justification for undertaking a serious and purposeful inquiry into the nature of the thing. By means of such an inquiry the nature of the thing enquired about can certainly be ascertained but the nature of everything is not worth ascertaining according to Indian thinkers. Unless the knowledge of the nature of a thing directly or indirectly subserves the ultimate goal of human existence it cannot be worth seeking. What is this goal? According to most Indian philosophers infinite bliss or beatitude is such a goal which results from the disruption of bondage to worldly existence. N.V. differs slightly from other schools in its view of the nature of this goal. This difference is due to the conception of self that this school upholds. According to it the self is an eternal substance which is accidentally characterised by certain special attributes like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and

residual traces of experiences. These attributes are regarded as mental by other schools. Although the self is the inherent locus and the material cause of these attributes it requires the cooperation of the body that it inhabits and the mind that is associated with it to engender the emergence of the attributes within it. In the state of its release from empirical and bodily existence everyone of the above special attributes of the self is sure to be eliminated from its being and then it is reduced to an utterly insentient and painless —euphenistically so called—state of existence. How such a painless, pleasureless and even cognitionless state can be the most desirable one and therefore the *summum bonum* of life is an important question that needs to be answered. In the last section of this work the author has dealt with this question.

The means to the release of self according to N.V. as also other orthodox schools is the knowledge of the essential nature of self. This is so because it is the false identification of self with the not-self including one's own body-mind-complex that engenders directly or indirectly sufferings of all kinds. For N.V. suffering is real but it does not characterise the body as it is the attribute of the self and not even that of mind. When the self and the mind associated with it come in contact with a suffering (so-called) limb or part of that body the self is affected by the suffering in that limb or part of the body. The self is ubiquitous but mind is atomic. So the self-mind-contact does not take place all over the body at any time, the atomic mind flitting from point to point in the body. The common identification of the self with the body-mind-complex makes one think and feel that one's body is suffering but in reality the body causes suffering and it is the self that really suffers or suffers (undergoes) suffering. In other orthodox schools like that of Sāṃkhya it is the bodily suffering that the self mistakenly imposes upon itself. So discrimination of self from not-self plays different roles in these two schools. According to Sāṃkhya the suffering pertaining in fact to the body ceases to be owned or felt by the self as soon as the discriminative knowledge arises. In N.V. however discrimination of the body from the self only dissipates the false identification of the self with the body with the result that the afflictions of the body are not experienced as different kinds of its own pain by the self. The experiences of self are—so to say—the reflections of bodily occurrences. Its cognitive experiences reflect both bodily and non-bodily occurrences and entities. In the view of Advaita the world including the body-mind-complex and even the self are the false appearances of Brahman. The suffering of the self is also mere appearance. So discrimination in this school consists in the realisation that Brahman or the absolute self is alone real everything else being its mere appearance. The Buddhists differ from all other thinkers in maintaining that the self is a fictitious entity or conceptual construct whose hypostatisation is the root of all evil. Once this construct is analysed out into its socalled mental

constituents the self-feeling which is the ground of all suffering is dissipated. There will then be neither suffering nor the sufferer. In this view discrimination consists in the rejection of self as reality. The self being a rejectable it is the counterpositive of the negation which is its rejection. In other schools the self being distinguished from everything else is the locus of this distinction. Thus whether the self is affirmed or denied in either case it requires to be critically known. The common view of self however has nothing to recommend it except the prejudices associated with the sense of embodiment which is common to every living being.

The views (or doctrines) opposed to the (N.V.) view of the nature of self

Text: तत्र बाधकं भवत् आत्मनि क्षणभङ्गः वा बाह्य–अर्थ–भङ्गः वा गुण–गुणि–भेद–भङ्गः वा अन्–उपलंभः वा इति।

Trans: There are (these) views opposed to the reality of self namely, that everything is of momentary duration, that there is nothing real apart from consciousness, that qualities and things endowed with them do not differ from each other and thät the (socalled) self is never perceived (or observed).

Expl: The first is the view upheld mainly by the Sauṭrānṭika Buddhists. The Yogācāra Buddhists who do not admit the reality of external objects treat consciousness itself as a momentary entity. There are infinitely many such momentary entities of consciousness. The second of the abovementioned views is mainly propounded by the Yogācāras (or the Buddhist idealists) according to whom everything is a form of consciousness. The third view is not specifically Buddhistic. Buddhists as well as many non-Buddhists opine that there is no real difference between qualities and their substrata. Only the N.V. school denies this. The fourth view that the self is not observed at all may be taken to deny the observation (or knowledge) of God too because in the fourth section of this treatise the author has attempted to establish the reality of both the bodily self and the absolute self. Now if the momentariness of all reals is established the eternity of the self which is real will have to be given up. If the reality of the objective world is denied the self as the substratum of and as different from consciousness will have to be denied. If the difference between qualities and their substrata is denied the self as the substratum of its qualities will also have to be denied. The denial of the knowledge of self implies obviously the denial of the self itself. Thus all these four views being opposed to the N.V. view of self need to be rebutted and it is this rebuttal which is being taken up in successive chapters of the book.

It is to be noted here that an argumentative rebuttal of any view or

doctrine in a regular debate has to conform to certain rules. One important rule to be observed by the participants in a debate is that the problem to be debated by them must be presented in the form of a disjunction with mutually-opposed alternatives. Each of the participants or disputants must defend only one of these alternatives while attacking the opposite one. Every term in the disjunctive proposition must be meaningful to both the disputants. For example the problem of the existence of God cannot be debated by a theist and an atheist in the form of a proposition like 'Does God exist or not?' To the atheist God the subject term in the proposition is meaningless. To the theist on the other hand God is as real as any other thing. So the ascription of existence to God would be tautological to the theist. The atheist may have problem even with his negative predicate term. If God is a non-entity what is it that he will predicate non-existence of? If the predication is significant there must be God for the predicate to be true of. This shows the need of properly wording the proposition in which the problem is couched for being debated. The problem of momentariness too has to be expressed in a proposition each term of which will be significant to both N.V. and Buddhism which are the parties debating the problem. The following are some of the propositions of different forms in which the problem can be posed:

1. Is the property of reality concomitant with the property of origination or not? If a thing exists at the second moment of its origination it cannot be characterised by the property of origination.
2. Are things destructible at the very next moment of their origination or not?
3. Are things that exist at one moment non-existent at other moments, or not?
4. Are things contemporaneous with their material causes or not?

(The material cause of a thing is not supposed to survive the moment of the origination of the thing.)

In all these propositions the affirmation is defended by Buddhism and the negation by N.V. The affirmation of the predicate is true of the momentary entities only but N.V. though opposed to universal momentariness admits certain things like the last sound in a series of sound-vibrations emanating from a certain source as momentary. There are certain metaphysical reasons for this admission. The negation of the predicate in all the above propositions is however true of durable entities only. So for Buddhism the negative predicates cannot be meaningful as the durable entity of which they are true is a non-entity for Buddhism. But since the Buddhists concede the rationality of the discourse about fictitious entities the negative predication in the above propositions can be meaningful in the Buddhistic view.

Syllogistic demonstration of universal momentariness and its rebuttal on the ground of unprovable concomitance

Text: तत्र न प्रथमः । यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा घटः ।
सन् च विवाद्–अध्यासितः शब्दः आदिः इति चेत? न ।
प्रतिबन्ध–अ–सिद्धेः ।

Trans : Among the four doctrines the first is untenable as there is no valid ground for it. But isn't (the syllogism) 'whatever is real is momentary as for instance is the claypot, and real in fact are things like words whose momentariness is disputed', a proof (for universal momentariness)? No! The concomitance (of the middle and the major terms) in the inference is not established.

Expl: A syllogistic demonstration consisting of only two premises namely the 'example' called '*udāharaṇa*' in Sanskrit and 'the ascription of the middle as concomitant with the major to the minor', called '*upanaya*' in Sanskrit, for establishing universal momentariness is presented here by the Buddhist. The remaining members of the orthodox five-membered syllogism are discarded as redundant by the Buddhist. In the demonstration given, the property of 'being real' is the middle term, the property of 'being momentary' the major term, the claypot is the example and 'words and things like words endowed with the property of momentariness' are the minor term. The claypot being an entity which is yet to be proved momentary, it cannot normally be cited as an example of the coexistence of the middle and major terms. But the Buddhists admit even such examples within their syllogisms. The minor term or the entities encompassed by the minor term are specially indicated by the words 'words etc.' in order to exclude fictitious entities from the purview of the minor term. The qualification 'disputed' is added to the minor term in order to exclude entities like the last sound-vibration referred to above whose momentariness is acceptable to both the disputants. The determinant of the minorness of the minor term here is the property 'Being a validly-established entity' and this is different from the property of 'significant productivity' which is the middle term in the inference. 'Being a validly-established entity' and 'being significantly-productive' are two different meanings of the world 'real' which are used here to play respectively the roles of the minorness-determinant property and the middle term. If these two were not different then the conclusion of the inference would turn out to be a repetition of what is already known at the stage of ascertaining the concomitance of the middle and the major. (Thus 'whatever is real is momentary' is a concomitance-statement and 'All reals are momentary' is the conclusion). This is an inferential fallacy known in Indian logic as *'siddhasādhana'* or proving the already proved.

An alternative strategy to avoid the fallacy is to have separate inferences for every one of the innumerable reals to establish their momentary nature. Thus the middle term viz. the property of reality would not be the same as 'potness', 'treeness' etc. which would now be the minorness-determining properties. A variant of this strategy is to have the collection of different entities as the minor term. Of course all the infinitely numerous reals cannot be named and so the minor cannot but exclude the unnamed reals. But this difficulty need not invite any fallacy in the inference. The middle whose presence has been observed in the named reals can always be extended to the unnamed ones.

As regards the example 'claypot' one may wonder how, being included among the reals which are all covered by the term it can be an example 'which is required to be different from the minor'. One solution of this difficulty is that the claypot as real (or under the property of reality) may play the role of the minor while as a claypot (that is under the property of potness) it may also play the role of the example. Another solution is that in the Buddhist view the claypot as a composite entity is unreal as it is nothing but a congeries of atoms. So as a composite (in the N.V. view) and unreal entity the claypot is a negative example. Since the 'claypot' is not momentary it is not real.

The major term—'momentariness'—in the inference needs to be clearly defined. Two definitions of the term can be considered: (1) An occasional occurrent which does not originate at a moment preceding the moment of its occurrence is momentary. (2) Anything that does not occur at any moment preceding the moment of its occurrence is momentary. A moment is defined as the time which is not the locus of the anterior negation of whatever may be occurring in it. Origination is defined as occurrence of a thing at the moment whose anterior negation does not occur at the moment at which the thing occurs. Only the very first moment of the occurrence of a thing is such that it does not precede any moment of the occurrence of the thing.

With the above definitions of momentariness it cannot be possible to prove the momentariness of a cognition of the past. Since the present cognition can be related to the past object it cannot fulfil the above definitions of momentariness. To sidetrack this difficulty it is necessary either to deny a relationship between a past object and its present cognition or require the nonexistence of a thing at different moments—which is the same as momentariness—by temporal relation—known as '*kālika*' in Sanskrit.

The inference thus formulated is rejected on the ground that the middle and major terms in the inference are not known to be concomitant. (That everything that is real is momentary is not known and if it were known there would be nothing to establish by means of the inference.)

Proof for the concomitance and its detailed consideration

Text: सामर्थ्य–अ–सामर्थ्य–लक्षण–विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गेण भेद–सिद्धौ तत्–सिद्धिः इति चेत? न। विरुद्ध–धर्म संसर्ग–अ–सिद्धेः। प्रसङ्ग–विपर्ययाभ्यां तत्–सिद्धिः–इति चेत्? न। सामर्थ्यं हि करणत्वं वा योग्यता वा? न आद्यः। साध्य–अ–विशिष्टत्व–प्रसङ्गात। व्यावृत्ति–भेदात् अयं अ–दोषः इति चेत्? न। तत अन्–उपपत्तेः। व्यावर्त्य–भेदेन विरोधः हि तत्–मूलम।

Trans: May it be that the apparent cooccurrence of the two mutually-incompatible properties of the nature of capacity and incapacity (for production) in (apparently) the same entity leads to the inference of the diversity of the latter and the diversity in its turn helps establish the said concomitance? No! The cooccurrence of incompatible properties is unprovable. But isn't the cooccurrence provable by means of inferences of the modus tollens type? ('*Prasaṅga*' is the Buddhist term for the first conditional premise in the modus tollens. *Viparyaya* is the Buddhist term for the second premise in the inference which is of the nature of the denial of the consequent of the first premise. The conclusion consists of the denial of the antecedent of the first premise). No! (It may then be asked), 'Is this capacity the same as productivity or competence?' It is not the first, for then the middle term in the inference would merge in the major (so there would not then be any inference at all). But can't this fallacy be got rid of on the basis of the distinction of the exclusions which respectively constitute the natures of the two terms? No! The basis of the distinction of the exclusions is only the (opposition) or nonidentity—determined by the mutual difference—of the excludents.

Expl: With a view to prove the concomitance of reality and momentariness the Buddhist adduces his famous argument based upon the apparent cooccurrence of incompatible properties in the socalled durable entity. Whatever appears to be endowed with incompatible properties cannot be a unitary entity. But the durable entity appears to be so endowed as it is productive at one moment and nonproductive at others. So the apparently single durable entity is not one but a series of many momentary entities. On this ground the concomitance of reality and momentariness can very well be established. The concomitance is not directly established by the cooccurrence of incompatibles. It is the diversity or momentariness of the durable that is proved by the cooccurrence of the incompatibles in the latter and since the durables are also real the concomitance of reality and momentariness is thus established. On the basis of this concomitance alone the momentariness of all reals can be established. The N.V. urges

against this that generic competence and its absence which alone are mutually-incompatible are not observed to go together while productivity and its absence which are not mutually-incompatible do appear to go together in the same entity; so diversity of the durable cannot be established. Against this the Buddhist argues that competence as well as incompetence of the durable entity for production can be proved by the following inferences of the modus tollens type:

> 'Whatever entity is competent for producing its effect at a certain time does produce it as for instance the seed accompanied by its auxiliaries is competent for producing the seedling. So the seed does produce the seedling'.

> 'Whatever is unproductive of its effect at a certain time is not competent to produce it at that time as for instance a piece of stone does not produce the seedling at any time and so it is incompetent for seedling-production. Similarly the seed in the granary being unproductive of the seedling is not competent for producing it so long as it is in the granary'.

These inference-forms are adduced by one of the commentators to prove the cooccurrence of competence and incompetence in the seed. The temporal qualification introduced in both the middle and major terms however vitiates the inferences. One can conclude from these inferences that the same entity can be both competent and incompetent at different times. Besides, *prasañga* and *viparyaya* are not two different inferences but two premises forming part of the same inference. So there is one inference consisting of both these premises to prove competence and another consisting of similar two premises to prove incompetence. The inferences are as under:

> 'If the seed in the soil were incompetent it would be unproductive. But it is productive. So it is competent'.

> 'If the seed in the granary were competent it would be productive. But it is not productive. So it is not competent'.

N.V.'s retort to these inferences is that they are vitiated by the fallacy of the collapse of the middle term into the major if competence is nothing other than productivity. To prove competence on the basis of productivity would be to prove capacity by means of itself. This difficulty may be overcome by introducing a distinction between competence and capacity on the basis of the differences of the exclusion of the incompetent from that of the incapacitated. In the conditional premises of the two inferences the exclusion of the incompetent and that of the incapacitated will respectively be the consequents. Now this distinction of exclusion can be based on the distinction of the respective excludents, that is to say the distinction will be there if the exclusions exclude each other's excludents.

Objection that mutual exclusion of each other's excludents not possible

Text: सः च न तावत् मिथः व्यावार्त्य–प्रतिक्षेपात् गोत्व–अश्वत्वः वत्। तथा सति विरोधात् अन्यतर–अपाये बाध–अ–सिद्धयोः अन्यतर–प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: The alleged difference of the (two) exclusions cannot be due to the exclusion of each other's excludents by the exclusions as is the case with cowness and horseness (two familiar exclusions of the non-cow and the non-horse respectively). If the two exclusions were so opposed mutually then one of the two is sure to be absent when the other is present (in the minor) so that (the inferences will be vitiated by) the fallacy of majorless minor or unproved middle.

Expl: The exclusions cannot differ because they exclude each other's excludents as cowness and horseness exclude each other's loci (horses and cows) or excludents, for then either the major will be excluded by the middle or the middle by the major resulting in the fallacy of majorless minor or unproved middle. It may be contended again that in a modus-tollens-type of syllogism it is by the denial of the consequent in the premise that the denial of the antecedent in the conclusion is reached. So there is nothing wrong if the consequent is denied or excluded in the conditional argument. One may say in reply to this that if the exclusions are mutually-opposed their negations too are mutually opposed. So if any thing is unproductive it would not be incompetent and similarly if something is incompetent it would not be unproductive. But it is unreasonable to hold such a view. If cowness and horseness are mutually-opposed their absences need not be so opposed. Both these properties are together absent in a camel.

The right reply to the above contention is that if the exclusions were mutually incompatible they would not be concomitant with each other and without this the inference from one to the other would not be possible.

Objection that partial mutual inclusion and exclusion between the exclusions not possible

Text: न अपि तत्–आक्षेप–प्रतिक्षेपाभ्यां वृक्षत्व–शिंशपा त्ववत्। पर–अपर–भाव–अन्–अभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा समर्थस्य अपि अ–करणं अ–समर्थस्य अपि वा करणं प्रसज्येत।

Trans: Nor is the said difference due to parti^l inclusion and partial exclusion of each other's excludents by the exclusions as is the case with the properties of treeness and Asoka-treeness. The exclusions cannot be

admitted to be mutually related as the wider and the narrower terms. If they are admitted to be so then even the competent could turn out to be unproductive or the unproductive turn out to be competent.

Expl: The exclusions cannot be mutually-related as the partial includer and partial excluder of each other's excludents. Treeness and Asoka-treeness are so related. Treeness subsumes the jack-fruit-tree under itself which is excluded by Asoka-treeness. But since the pervading or wider term can extend beyond the pervaded term, either the competent could be unproductive or the unproductive competent depending upon which of these terms is the pervader. If competence is the wider term there could be a competent entity which is not productive. If productivity is the wider term there could be an incompetent entity which is productive.

Objection that adventitious difference between the exclusions not possible

Text: न अपि उपाधि–भेदात् कार्यत्व–अ–नित्यत्ववत्। तत्–अभावात्। न च शब्दमात्रं उपाधिः। पयार्य शब्द–उच्छेद–प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: Nor is the difference due to the difference of some adventitious property as is the case with the properties of producedness and non-eternity. There is no such difference. But aren't words themselves such (adventitious) properties? No! If they were so then synonymous words would disappear.

Expl: Even the mutually-equivalent properties of producibility and non-eternity differ from each other because they involve different conditions as their respective determinants. Producibility is defined as 'being endowed by the property of existence as determined by anterior non-existence'. Non-eternity is defined as 'the property of being endowed by existenc as determined by posterior non-existence or destruction'. Thus anterior and posterior non-existences are the adventitious conditions that differentiate these equivalent properties. But there are no conditions to differentiate the exclusions. Of course the words 'competent' and 'productive' differ but if this difference is supposed to differentiate their meanings there cannot be synonymous words as the difference of these words would make their meanings different.

Objection that cognitive difference between the exclusions cannot differentiate them

Text: न अपि विकल्प–भेदः। स्वरुप–कृतस्य तस्य व्यावृत्ति–भेदकत्वे अ–समर्थ–व्यावृत्तेः अपि भेद–प्रसङ्गात्। विषय–कृतस्य तु तस्य भेदकत्वे अन्योन्य–आश्रय–प्रसङ्गात्। न च निर्–निमित्तः एव अयं

व्यावृति–भेद–व्यवहारः अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: Nor again there is cognitive difference (between the exclusions). If the cognitions (of the exclusions) by themselves made the exclusions differ from each other even the exclusion of the incompetent would differ from itself (as there can be many cognitions of this same exclusion). If however the cognitive difference as determined by the difference of the objects of the cognition is supposed to cause the exclusions to differ there would arise the fallacy of mutual dependence. Nor can this usage pertaining to the difference of exclusions be regarded as just uncaused for then a thing could be supposed to differ from itself.

Expl: Since there can be many cognitions of the same entity one and the same exclusion would differ from itself. Also no inference can ever take place as the individual middle term whose concomitance with the major is known differs from the individual middle which is observed to be present in the minor. So the same individual middle is never known to be both concomitant with the major and present in the minor.

Objection to the view that capacity is competence considered

Text: न अपि द्वितीयः। सा हि सहकारि–साकल्यं वा स्यात् प्रातिस्विकी वा? न तावत् आद्यःपक्षः। सिद्धः साधनात् पर्–अन्–अभ्युपगमेन हेतु–अ–सिद्धेः च। यत् सहकारि–समवधानवत् तत् हि करोति एव इति कःनाम न अभ्युपैति यं उद्दिश्य साध्यते? न च अ–करण–काले सहकारि–समवधानवत्वं अस्माभिः अभ्युपेयते यतः प्रसङ्ग प्रवर्तेत।

Trans: Nor is capacity the same as the second (of the above alternatives). (If it is) is capacity then the same as the totality of the auxiliary causes or is it an individualised property? As to the first alternative it cannot be upheld because this would entail the fallacy of proving the already proved and also the fallacy of unestablished middle as the opponent does not admit the presence of the middle term (collocation of auxiliaries) in the minor (the unproductive seed in the granary). Who does not admit that that which is accompanied by auxiliary causes does invariably produce its effect? For whom then is the said proof intended? Nor do we (the N.V. philosophers) maintain that when there is no production there is collocation of auxiliaries so that the counterfactual contingency (of production in the absence of capacity) can be precipitated.

Expl: Having disposed of all possible versions of the differentiating cause of the exclusions and thereby rebutted the first view of the nature of capacity the author now turns to the second view that capacity is competence. This view admits of two interpretations. On the first

interpretation the fallacies of proving the already proved and unproved middle arise. The cause which is accompanied by auxiliaries is invariably productive and that which is not so is not productive. The N.V. does not at all maintain that when the cause is not producing it has competence in the sense of being accompanied by auxiliaries. How then can the contingency be precipitated that 'If the (non-producing) cause is competent (or accompanied by auxiliaries) it should produce the effect?' In the case of the negative inference also the same two fallacies arise. The inference goes like this:

> 'If the cause is not productive it is not competent. The cause is not productive so it is not competent'.

Now when the cause is not producing it is unaccompanied by auxiliaries and so is not competent. This fact is quite obvious and known even before it is proved. Moreover when the cause is actually accompanied by auxiliaries it is productive. So the middle term in the above inference namely 'non-production' is not present in the minor, viz. the cause accompanied by auxiliaries.

The crux of the above criticism is that the non-producing cause is invariably unaccompanied by auxiliaries and this fact is known without any proof.

Three different versions of competence as individuated property

Text: प्रातिस्विकी तु योग्यता अन्वय–व्यतिरेक–विषयी–भूतं बीजत्वं वा स्यात् तत्–अवांतर–जाति–भेदः वा सहकारि–वैकल्य–प्रयुक्त–कार्य–अभाववत्त्वं वा?

Trans: As to the competence that is characteristic of the causal entity it may be either the seedness (in the case of the cause of seedling) which is known to have positive and negative association with its effect or a species of this generic property of seedness or (finally) the fact of being deprived of the effect because of the absence of the auxiliaries.

Expl: 'The generic property characteristic of the causal entity' is the first version of competence. 'Immediately-productive nature or immediate productivity' which is a species of the generic property is the second version of competence. 'The absence of the productivity of the effect as determined by the absence of the auxiliaries' is the third version of competence. According to the first version the generic property like seedness is common to the seed and its parts (from which the seedling emerges when the seed has disintegrated in the soil). According to the second version, only the productive causal entity is endowed with the unique property of immediate-productivity. As to the third version as given in the text the auxiliary cause is not deprived of the effect because it is

unaccompanied by the auxiliaries. But the productivity of the essential cause is certainly hampered if the auxiliary is absent. Hence the above modification of the third version.

Untenability of the first version of competence

Text: न तावत् आद्यः। अकुर्वतः अपि बीज–जातीयस्य प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धत्वात्। तव अपि तत्र अ–विप्रतिपत्तेः।

Trans: As to the first (version) it is inadmissible. Even a non-productive seed endowed with seedness is perceptually established. Even you (the Buddhist) do not entertain any doubt about this (the reality of such an entity).

Expl: Seedness cannot constitute the competence of the seed which is the cause of seedling as there are seeds which are unproductive.

Detailed rebuttal of the second version

Text: न द्वितीयः। तस्य कुर्वतः अपि मया अन्–अभ्युपगमेन दृष्टान्तस्य साधन–विकलवात्। कः हि नाम सुस्थ–आत्मा प्रमाण–शून्यं अभ्युपगच्छेत्? सःहि न तावत् प्रत्यक्षेण अनुभूयते तथा अन्–अवसायात्। न अपि अनुमानेन लिङ्ग–अभावात्। यदि न कश्चित् विशेषः कथं तर्हि करण–अ–करणे इति चेत? कः एवं आह न इति? परं किं जाति–भेद–रूपः सहकारि–लाभ–अ–लाभ रूपः वा इति नियामकं प्रमाणं अनुसंरतः न पश्यामः। तथा अपि यः अयं सहकारि–मध्यं–अध्यासीनः अक्षेपकरण–स्वभावः भावः सः यदि प्राक्–अपि आसीत् तर्हि प्रसह्य कार्यं कुर्वाणः गीर्वाण–शाप शातेन अपि अपहस्तयितुं न शवयते इति चेत्? युक्तं एतत्। यदि अक्षेप–करण स्वभावत्वं भावस्य प्रमाण–गोचरः स्यात्। तत् एवं कुतः सिद्धं इति न अधिगच्छामः। प्रसङ्ग–तत्–विपर्ययाभ्यां इति चेत्? न। परस्पर–आश्रय–प्रसङ्गात। एवं–स्वभावत्व–सिद्धौ हि तयोः प्रवृत्ति, तत्–प्रवृतौ च एवं–स्वभावत्व–सिद्धिः इति।

Trans: The second (version) is untenable. I do not admit it (viz. the property of immediate productivity) to be present even in the productive (cause) and so the example in the inference is devoid of the middle term. What sensible person would concede the reality of that which is not

rationally established? Certainly the property is not known through indeterminate cognition as there is not reflective awareness of this (cognition). Nor is it inferentially cognised as there is no middle term leading to the inference. But if there is no speciality how certain causes are productive and certain others are not so? Yes, but who says that there is not any speciality? But whether this (speciality) is of the nature of some special generic property or the availability or non-availability of causal auxiliaries (to the main cause) is something to decide which we do not have any clinching evidence despite our search for it. May it not however be urged that this particular object which by nature is productive without delay cannot be prevented from producing even forcibly its effect at an earlier time even by hundreds of curses of Gods if the above nature characterised the object even earlier? Yes! it would be correct to say so if production without delay as the nature of things were validly ascertained. But how this itself is ascertained we do not know. But may not this be proved by means of a modus-tollens-type of inference? No! In that case there would arise the fallacy of mutual dependence. The inference can proceed only if things are proved to be endowed with immediately-productive nature and only if the inference takes place things can be proved to be endowed with the above nature.

Expl: Since there is no perceptual or inferential evidence for the property of immediate productivity it cannot be admitted to be real. The distinction between productive and non-productive causes may be explained even on the basis of the availability or otherwise of auxiliaries to the main cause. So there is doubt on this score and the postulation of an unknown property on the basis of the above distinction is vitiated by doubt. It may however be argued that the following inferences are proofs for certain causes being immediately-productive by nature. These are the inferences like:

> 'Whatever is not immediately productive of its effect is not productive of it as is for example the pebble or the unreal entity. Even the cause that is accompanied by auxiliaries is not regarded by N.V. as of immediately-productive nature. So even such a cause should not be productive of its effect'.
>
> 'Whatever is productive of the seedling is immediately productive of it as is for example the loosening of the soil where the seed is sown. The seed sown in the soil is productive of the seedling. So it is immediately-productive'.

In these inferences immediate productivity is denied or affirmed but unless it is first established that there is a property like immediate-productivity the denial or affirmation of it cannot have any meaning. Thus the inferences become vitiated by the fallacy of mutual dependence.

Immediate-productivity may be defined as 'non-occurrence of the cause at a time which is destroyed when the anterior negation of the effect is

present'. If the cause existed even two moments earlier than the origination of its effect the destruction of the first moment of the occurrence of the cause would be contemporaneous with the anterior negation of the effect at the second moment of the existence of the cause. Only the cause which immediately preceded its effect would fulfil this condition.

Fresh proof for the property mooted and rejected

Text: स्यात् एतत। कार्य–जन्म एव अस्मिन अर्थे प्रमाणम्। विलंब–कारि स्वभाव–अनुवृत्तौ कार्य–अन्–उत्पतिः सर्वदा इति चेत्? न। विलंब–कारि–स्वभावस्य सर्वदा एव अ–करणे तत्व–व्याघातात्। ततः च विलंब–कारि इति अस्य यावत् सहकारि–अ–संनिधानं तावत् करोति इति अर्थः। एवं च कार्य–जन्म सामग्र्यां प्रमाणायितुं शक्यते न तु जाति–भेदे। ते तु किं यथा–अनुभवं विलंब–कारि–स्वभावाः परस्परं प्रत्यासन्नाः कार्यं कृतवंतः किं वा यथा त्वत्–परिकल्पनं क्षिप्र–कारि–स्वभावाः इति अर्थे कार्य–जननं अ–जागरूकं एव इति।

Trans: (Alright)! Let us then consider this: The origination of the effect is itself an authentic evidence for the fact (that the cause is immediately productive). If the nature of delayed-production of things persisted their effects would never be produced. No! (This cannot be the case). If the cause with delayed-productivity never produced its effect it would cease to be productive even by delay. So the phrase 'productive by delay' should be taken to mean 'unproductive till the availability of causal auxiliaries'. Hence the origination of the effect can be cited as evidence for the (prior) occurrence of the causal collocation, not for the existence of the novel property. Now whether these auxiliaries are—as per the testimony of common experience—by nature non-immediately productive and as such produce their effect by mutual collocation or as per your (the Buddhist's) imagination, are immediately productive by nature is an issue on which the origination of the effect has no bearing at all.

Expl: In a fresh bid to prove the property the Buddhist now argues that a cause cannot always remain productive by delay, so it must be immediately productive. The N.V. rebuts the argument by explaining the correct meaning of the phrase 'delayed production' and showing thereby that the cause can be both immediately and non-immediately productive. If it is urged against this that the causal collocation brings together only those causes which are immediately productive and hence it is itself immediately-productive the only answer to it is that such an assumption is simply baseless.

Rejection of the third version of competence

Text: न अपि तृतीयः । विरोधात्। सहकारि–अभाव–प्रयुक्त–कार्य–अभाववान् च सहकारि–विरहे कार्यवान् च इति व्याहतम्। तस्मात् यत् यत्–अभावे एव यत् न करोति तत् तत्–सद्भावे तत् करोति एव इति तु स्यात्। एतत् च स्थैर्थ–सिद्धेः एव परं बीजं सर्वस्वं इति।

Trans: The third too is not tenable as it entails contradiction. To be (competent in the third sense, that is, to be) bereft of the effect due to the absence of auxiliaries and to be associated with (or followed by) the effect when the auxiliaries are (actually) absent are mutually incompatible (facts). So what really (follows from the above and) is acceptable is (the rule) that what is unproductive only in the absence of a certain entity is necessarily productive in the presence of that entity. And this of course is a proof for the truth of durability only.

Expl: The third version of competence leads to contradiction. The conditional premise of the inference for incompetence runs like this: 'If the seed in the granary is competent in the third sense of competence it should produce'. But how can a thing which is unproductive because of the absence of auxiliaries be expected to be productive in such a condition? What this inconsistency entails is the truth that what is not productive in the absence of a certain thing only is definitely productive in its presence. This is a sure indicator of durability.

It may be noted here that the above conditional premise becomes inconsistent only if the temporal qualification is introduced into it. But even without this qualification the antecedent and the consequent properties cannot be observed to co-exist in the same entity. However an entity can be observed to be competent at one time and bereft of auxiliaries at another time. If this observation is true then the persistence of the entity at different times follows and this is a proof for durability.

Suggestion of a new middle term for the inference and its rebuttal

Text: एतेन समर्थ–व्यवहार–गोचरत्वं हेतुः इति निरस्तम। तादृक्–व्यवहार–गोचरस्य अपि बीजस्य अङ्कुर–अ–करण–दशर्नात्। न असौ मुख्यः तत्–व्यवहारः तस्य जनन–नित्तिकत्वावात्। अन्यथा तु अ–नियम–प्रसङ्गात् इतिचेत्? कीदृशं पुनः जननं मुख्य–समर्थ–व्यवहार–निमित्तम्? न तावत् अ–क्षेपकरणंम्। तस्य अ–सिद्धेः। नियमस्य च सहकारि–साकल्पे सति एव करणं करणं एव इति एवं–

स्वभावत्वेन अपि उपपत्तेः। ततः च जनन-निमित्तः एव अयं व्यवहारः न व्याप्ति-सिद्धिः इति।

Trans: By the foregoing (rebuttal) stands rebutted the (likely) contention that the (right) middle term for the inference is the property of being the object of the usage as 'competent', because even an object of such a usage, say the seed is found to be unproductive of its effect viz. the seedling. May it be urged (against this) that this usage (relating to the unproductive seed) is not a primary one as the primary usage is based upon productivity; if it were not so then there will be irregularity in usage? Well! then what kind of production is the basis of the primary usage of the word 'competent'? It cannot be immediate production. There is no proof for it. As to the rule, even if it is said to be of the form that, 'The cause is productive only if all the auxiliaries are present and it is then invariably productive' it will be quite reasonable. So the usage is based only on production. Therefore the concomitance (of reality and momentariness) remains unproved.

Expl: Since the earlier middle term has failed another middle term is adduced for the inferences. As even the unproductive seed is called competent a distinction has to be made between primary and secondary usages of the word 'competent' but since immediate productivity as a fact is not established it cannot be reckoned as the basis of the primary usage. So the usage must be based on production only. As to the unproductivity of the seed in the granary and the consequent irregularity of the usage it may be maintained that the form of the rule is different. It is to the effect that that which is the object of the primary usage of the word 'competent' necessarily produces its effect only when the casual auxiliaries are present. So even the unproductive seed can be called competent while the utterly unproductive (of seedling) pebble cannot be so called because its unproductivity is due to its own nature and not the absence of auxiliaries. The necessity mentioned above is twofold viz. the necessity of production and the necessity of auxiliaries for the production. In Sanskrit the meaning of necessity is conveyed by the indeclinable 'Eva' whose general meaning is exclusion. The association of this word in a sentence with the qualificand, the qualifier and the verb yield respectively the meanings of 'the exclusion of the other', 'the exclusion of absence' and 'the exclusion of absolute absence'. To illustrate: In the sentence पार्थ एवं धनुर्धरः the 'Eva' is associated with the qualificand 'Pārtha' and so it signifies that none other than Pārtha or Arjuna is an archer. In the example नीलं एवं कमलंम् the Eva goes with the qualifier and so it signifies that the lotus is necessarily blue, it is never any other colour. Lastly in the example नीलं सरोजं भवत्येव the Eva used with the verb signifies that it is not the case that there are not blue lotuses, that is, there can be blue lotuses.

In the above formulation of the rule of causality the 'Eva' has been used twice, once with the qualifier and next with the verb. So the whole sentence would mean that if there is no causal collocation there will not be production and that if the said collocation is present production is bound to take place.

It may be urged against the rule that just as for using the word 'blue' for a pot all that is required is that the pot be blue so, for using the word 'cause' nothing more than production of the effect be required of the claimant for the usage. This suggestion may be accepted if there were no distinction of primary and secondary usages.

Query regarding the nature of things

Text: स्यात् एतत्। एतावता अपि मावस्य कः स्वभावः समर्थितः भवति, न हि क्षेप–अक्षेपाभ्यां अन्यः प्रकारः अस्ति इति चेत्? न। दूषण–अभिधान–समये निश्चय–अभावेन एव संदिग्ध–अ–सिद्धि–निर्वाहे कथा–पूर्वरूप–पर्यवसानात्। उत्तरपक्ष–अवसरे तु सः अपि न दुर्वचः।

Trans: Let then be this (query): For all this (explanation) what is the conclusion regarding the nature of a thing? Certainly there is no alternative other than delayed or immediate production (as to the nature of things). No! While faulting the (opponent's view) the first part of its criticism is accomplished by pointing out the presence in it of (the fallacy of) the doubtful presence of the middle in the minor which is due to the mere absence of a definite cognition of the nature of things. When the occasion for stating one's own view arises it is not difficult to do it either.

Expl: If neither delayed nor immediate production constitutes the nature of things what could it be? There is no alternative other than these two. To this question part of the opponent's answer is that he has partly achieved his purpose by engendering doubt regarding the presence of the middle (competence) in the minor. Whatever may be the nature of a thing, production or nonproduction by it of its effect can well be explained on the basis of the availability or otherwise of the auxiliaries to it.

Explanation of the meaning of delay and absence of delay

Text: तथा हि करणं प्रति अःविलंब इति कः अर्थः? किं उत्पत्तेः अनंतरं एव करणं सहकारि–समवधान–अनंतरं एव वा? विलंबः इति अपि कः अर्थः? किं यावत् न सहकारि–समवधानं तावत् अ–करणं सर्वथा एव अ–करणं इति वा? तत्र प्रथम चतुर्थयोः प्रमाण–अभावात् अ–निश्चये अपि द्वितीय–तृतीययोः प्रत्यक्षं एव प्रमाणम्। बीज–जातीयस्य हि

सहकारि–समवधान–अनंतरं एव करणं करणं एव इति प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धं एव। तथा सहकरि–समवधान–रहितस्य अ–करणं इति अपि।

Trans: To explain (the foregoing): What does it mean to say that there is no delay in production? Does it mean: Production by a thing immediately after its origination or only on its accompaniment by auxiliaries? What is also the meaning of delay (in production)? Does it mean, 'Nonproduction till the auxiliaries are available or absolute nonproduction'? Of these, although the first and fourth alternatives cannot be maintained as true in the absence of any valid proof, yet perception itself is a valid proof for the truth of the second and third alternatives. That an entity endowed with seedness is immediately productive only on being associated with auxiliaries is testified by perception itself. Similarly the unproductivity of that which is unassociated with the auxiliaries is also perceptually testified.

Expl: Explaining that the causal entity is both immediately and otherwise productive depending upon the availability or otherwise of causal auxiliaries the author rules out absolute non-production and production immediately after origination of a thing as the respective meanings of the phrases 'delayed production' and 'immediate production'. Since in the Buddhist view everything is momentary, positive and negative causal association of a single entity with its effect is impossible to ascertain. So the author says that things endowed with seedness are perceived to be causally associated with their effects.

Consensus on this point and its justification

Text: अत्र च भवान् अपि न विप्रतिपद्यते एव। प्रमाण–सिद्धत्वात् विपर्यये बाधकात् च। तथा हि यदि सहकारि–विरहे अकुर्वाणः तत्–समवधाने अपि न कुर्यात् तत्–जातीयं अ–करणं एव स्यात्ः समवधान–अ–समवधायोः उभयोः अपि अ–करणात्। एवं तत्–समवधान–विरहे अपि यदि कुर्यात् सहकारिणः न कारणं स्युः, तान् अंतरेण अपि करणात्। तथा च अन्–अन्यथासिद्ध–अन्वय–व्यतिरेकवतां अपि अ–कारयत्वे कार्यस्य आकस्मिकत्व–प्रसङ्गः। तथा च कादाचित्कत्व विहतिः इति।

Trans: As to this point you (the Buddhist) too have no doubt at all because it is validly established and the opposite viewpoint is contradictable. To explain: If an entity unproductive in the absence of the auxiliaries did not produce the effect even in the presence of the latter then an entity of the same nature as this would be absolutely unproductive as it remains

unproductive both in the presence and the absence of auxiliaries. Similarly if an entity were productive even in the absence of the auxiliaries then the auxiliaries would cease to be the causes as the main cause remains productive even in their absence. Thus if even those entities which have unconditional positive and negative association with the effect cease to be its causes then the effect turns out to be accidental and this would jeopardise its occasional character.

Expl: On the Buddhist view it is the single momentary entity that is the cause and it does not need auxiliaries. Yet the entity which is unaccompanied by auxiliaries is not productive even for the Buddhist. The generic causal character—indicated by the word '*kāraṇa*'—of a causal entity is proved by the simple fact that it is productive on being associated with the auxiliaries. The auxiliaries are proved to be the causal conditions because without them the main cause does not produce its effect. Production at one time or another is the proof that the producing entity is endowed with generic causality.

Conclusion stated

Text: एवं च द्वितीय–पक्ष–विवक्षायां अ–क्षेपकारित्वं एव भावस्य स्वभावः। तृतीय–पक्ष–विवक्षायां तु क्षेप–कारित्वं एव भावस्य स्वरूपं इति न उभय–प्रकार–निवृत्तिः इति।

Trans: Thus if the second of the (above) alternatives is intended then only immediate productivity is the nature of things. If (on the other hand) the third alternative is intended then delayed productivity only will be their nature. So neither of the two alternatives is excluded.

Expl: Both delayed and non-delayed productivity can characterise a thing if nonassociation and association with auxiliaries respectively determine the presence of these properties in the thing.

The view that the productive cause alone is associated with auxiliaries mooted

Text: तथा अपि किं अ–समर्थस्य एव सहकारि–विरहः स्वरूप–लाभ–अनंतरं कर्तुः एव वा सहकारि–समवधानं अन्यथा वा इति किं नियामकं इति चेत? इदं उच्यते। कुसूलस्थ–बीजस्य अङ्कुर–अकूलः शिला–शकलात् कश्चित् अस्ति विशेषः न वा? न चेत् नियमेन एकत्र प्रवृत्तिः अन्यस्मात् निवृत्तिः च तत्–अर्थिनः न स्यात्। परंपरया अङ्कुर–प्रसव–समर्थ–बीज–क्षण–जननात् अस्ति एव इति चेत्?

कदा पुनः परंपरया अपि तथा-भूतं करिष्यति इति? तत्र संदेहः इति चेत? सः पुनः किं-आकारः?

Trans: Notwithstanding the above it may be asked, 'How can it be determined whether the immediately-unproductive entity alone is unaccompanied by auxiliaries and the immediately-productive entity alone, after coming into being is accompanied by auxiliaries or it is otherwise'? Well, we answer the question thus: We ask, 'Is or is not there some characteristic of the seed in the granary conducive to the production of the seedling and distinguishing it from the pebble?' If there is none then one who needs the seeding would not invariably turn towards the one and away from the other. But may it not be that the unproductive seed is sought after because it generates through a series of (intermediate) seed-entities the seed which is competent to produce the seedling? Yes, (It may be) so, but when does this seed produce the productive seed? If the reply is that there is doubt about this then it may be asked,'what is the form of this doubt?'

Expl: If both immediate and delayed productivity constituted—as stated above—the nature of things then they will always be both immediately and non-immediately productive. But if the nature of things being different from them were taken to exist even apart from them then things would not be required to be always productive in both ways. Now it is contended that only the immediately-productive cause is associated with the auxiliaries while the unproductive alone is not so associated. Thus production and nonproduction could be supposed to be determined only by immediate productivity and its absence. In reply it is urged that even the supposedly incompetent seed in the granary is distinguished by all from the absolutely incompetent pebble only because the seed is productive only as seed and not as one endowed with a special property. If the indirect causality of the idle seed in relation to productive seed is taken to be the cause of its being sought after then it may be asked, 'When does the unproductive produce the productive entity?' But since in respect of remote causality such a question is not pertinent the Buddhist replies to the question by saying that the matter is doubtful.

The crux of the above contention and the attempt to reply it is that a cause is even associated with the auxiliaries only as an immediately productive entity and not as an entity of a certain kind or genus. The opponent draws attention to the distinction between the unproductive cause and noncause in order to stress the point that even the unproductive cause is regarded as cause only as being endowed with its generic property, not the special property. This is again disputed by the Buddhist by trying to explain the distinction of the unproductive cause and noncause differently.

Possibility of three forms of doubt and the conclusions deducible therefrom

Text: किं सहकारिषु समवाहितेषु अपि करिष्यति न वा इति उत अ-समवहितेषु अपि तेषु करिष्यति न वा इति अथ यदा सहकारि-समवधानं तदा एव करिष्यति एव परं कदा तेषां समवधानं इति संदेहः। न तावत् पूर्वः। सामान्यतः कारणत्व-अवधारणे तस्य अन्-अवकाशात्। अवकाशे वा कारणत्व-अन्-अवधारणात्। न अपि द्वितीयः। सहकरिणां तत्व-अवधारणे तस्य अन् अवकाशात्। अवकाशे वा तेषां तत्व-अन्-अवधारणात्। तृतीये तु सर्वे एव तत्-सन्तान-अंतःपातिनः बीज-क्षणाः समान-शीलाः प्राप्नुवंत्ति यत्र तत्र सहकारि-समवधाने सति करण-नियमात्। सर्वत्र च सहकारि-समवधान-संभवात्।

Trans: What then is the form of the doubt? Is it (expressible in any one of the following three forms namely), whether the causal entity will or will not produce the effect even on being accompanied by the auxiliaries or will it or will it not produce the effect even in the absence of the auxiliaries or although the cause will definitely produce the effect only when the causal collocation is available yet it is doubtful when the collocation will be available? As to the first doubt, it cannot arise. When the generic causality of the causal entity has already been ascertained the doubt has no scope. If it has it means that the (generic) causality has not been ascertained. The second type of doubt too cannot arise. When the auxiliaries are known to be such the doubt has no scope. If it had any, then it means that the auxiliary character of the auxiliaries has not been ascertained. As to the third type of doubt, according to it all the momentary seed-entities included in the seed-series are found to be similar in nature as any one of these could necessarily produce the effect and any one of these could have the association with the auxiliaries.

Expl: The three possible doubts regarding the causality of the unproductive cause are clearly formulated above with a view to bring out by their means the generic causality of the causal entity. The Buddhist cannot refuse to admit that all the entities of the seed-genus are needed directly or indirectly for production. The determinant of this need or its causality cannot be anything other than seedness which may be the determinant either of the indirect causality or the direct causality relating to the effect. The law of parsimony requires that seedness may be regarded as the determinant of the causality.

The point of the above criticism is that although according to the Buddhist the seed is the cause only as endowed with immediate productivity he cannot deny its generic causality as any seed associated with auxiliaries is found to produce its effect.

The query that all causal entities are not alike, answered

Text: समर्थे एव क्षणे क्षिति–आदि–समवधानं इति चेत्? तन् किं अ–समर्थे सहकारि–समवधानं एव नास्ति समवधाने सनि अपि वा तस्मात् न कार्य–जन्म? न आद्यः। शिला–शकल–आदौ अपि क्षिति–सलिल–तेजः –पवन–योग–दर्शनात्। न द्वितीयः। शिला–शकल–आदौ इव कदाचित् सहकारि–साकल्यवतः अपि बीजात् अङ्कुर–अन्–उत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: Could it be that the auxiliaries are available only to the competent cause? Well, if this is so does it mean that the association is not available to the incompetent or even if it is available the effect is not produced by the incompetent? The first is not true. Even with the incompetent piece of stone the association of the soil, water, heat and air is observed. The second (too) is not true (if it were then), as from the piece of stone even from a seed associated with the totality of auxiliaries the seedling may fail to be produced.

Expl: This is a retort to the foregoing remark that all seed-entities are capable of being associated with the auxiliaries. It is contended that only the competent may be supposed to have the association with the auxiliaries. What this means is that individual seeds are competent or endowed with generic causality only under the property of immediate productivity. The answer to this retort is quite obvious.

Rejection of unacceptable contingencies

Text: एवं अपि स्यात् कः दोषः इति चेत्? न तावत् इदं उपलब्धम्। आशंक्यते इति चेत? न। तत्–समवधाने सति अपि अ–करणवत् तत्–विरहे करणं अपि आशंक्येत आशंक्यते इति चेत्? तर्हि बीज–विरहे अपि आशंक्येत। तथा च सति साध्वी प्रत्यक्ष–अन्–उपलंभ–परिशुद्धिः।

Trans: Let this too happen. What is wrong (in the assumption of such a happening)? Well! Such a thing has never been observed. True, but couldn't it be suspected to occur? Yes, but then as it is suspected that the

cause may remain unproductive even in the presence of auxiliaries so it could also be suspected that the effect may be produced by the cause even in the absence of the auxiliaries. Well! let this too be suspected to occur, Then, in that case production of seedling even without its cause, the seed could be suspected to occur. In such circumstances, the positive and negative association of the cause with the effect could very well be verified and established (an ironical remark)!

Expl: This is the argument of desperation. Despite there being several proofs against the contention that the competent alone has association with auxiliaries the Buddhist is not prepared to admit that the unproductive cause can have association with auxiliaries and then be productive. To defend his view at any cost the Buddhist goes to the extent of denying even causality. But he forgets that it is by means of positive and negative association that the generic causality of a causal entity associated with the auxiliaries has been determined. If even a part of this principle is called into question the whole principle becomes questionable. This is what has been explained above.

Preamble to a detailed consideration of evidence against the postulation of immediate productivity

Text: स्यात् एतत्। न बीज आदीनां–परस्पर–समवधानवतां एव कार्य–करणं अंगीकृत्य आशंवयते येन समवधान–अन्–नियमात् सर्वेषां एव तज्जातीयानां एकरसतानिश्चयः स्यात्। न अपि यत्र तत्र समर्थ–उत्पात्तिं अंगीकृत्य येन विकलेभ्यः अपि कदाचित् कार्य–जन्म–संभावनायां प्रत्यक्ष–अनुपलंभ–वरोधः स्यात्।

Trans: Let then be this (consideration in support of the hypothetical property): we do not raise the doubt regarding the occurrence of the collocation of the auxiliaries with the main cause presuming that the seed, soil etc. are productive only when they come together. Since (every seed could be associated with the auxiliaries) as there is no restriction of the association (to any particular seed-entity), all the seeds appear to be alike. Nor do we raise the foregoing doubts assuming that the effect will be produced whether the cause or the auxiliaries are present or not so that if the possibility of production even in the absence of the latter is envisaged the positive and negative association of the cause with the effect is jeopardised.

Expl: So far the opponent has been concerned with establishing the fact that there is no positive evidence for the hypothetical property. Now he is going to show in detail that there are positive proofs against the property.

First, the Buddhist view that is to be rebutted is being presented in a

slightly modified form. The Buddhist disowns the doubts he had raised above. He simply maintains that the seed and all the auxiliaries which are productive as endowed with the hypothetical property come together as a rule because of the operation of their respective causes and produce their joint effect.

Objections to the property

Text: किं नाम? बीज–आदिषु समवहितेषु अवांतर–जाति–विषेषं आश्रित्य अपि कार्य–जन्म संभाव्यते इति। न। दृष्ट–समवधान–मात्रेण एव उपपत्तौ तत्–कल्पनायं प्रमाण–अभावात्। कल्पना–गौरव–प्रसङ्ग–प्रतिहतत्वात्। अतींद्रिय इन्द्रिय–आदि–विलोष–प्रसङ्गात्। विकल्प–अन्–उपपत्तेः। विशेषस्य विशेषं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात् च इति।

Trans: What is really doubted is whether when the cause and the auxiliaries have come together the production of the effect may be taken to be determined by the specific property of immediate productivity (inhering in the former) or not. But (such a doubt cannot be raised because) if the occurrence of the effect can take place only by means of the collocation of the known causes there is no valid proof for postulating the unknown property. (Also) the postulation is vitiated by conceptual redundancy. Invisible sense-organs etc. (also) would disappear (on the assumption of the property). Further no (possible) interpretation (of the nature of the property) can be rationally sustained. Besides every specific property (inhering in the cause) determines a (corresponding) specific property in the effect.

Expl: The Buddhist now concludes that the doubt referred to earlier is in fact the doubt whether the property of immediate productivity inhering in the cause is the determinant of its causality or not? This fresh contention is now taken up for detailed criticism. First the doubt needs to be formulated in a debatable form in the following different ways:

1. Is or is not the property determining causality related to an effect like seedling, inherent only in the cause actually producing the latter?
2. Is or is not the characteristic of being the generic property characteristic of the seed, pervaded by the property of being perceptual?
3. Is or is not the productive seed, endowed with the generic property not characterising the seed in the state of non-production?

The first objection to the hypothetical property is that there is no valid proof for it. In the Buddhist view the reality of a thing is not *sui generis* or self-evident. It needs to be validly established. The second objection is that

if the familiar property of seedness can explain seedling-causality of the seed, the postulation of a novel property involves conceptual redundancy. According to some commentators these two objections are to be treated as one. The third objection is that on the assumption of an exotic property determining the causality of causes, invisible entities like sense-organs which are inferred as causes of sensations are rendered superfluous. The occurrence of sensations etc. could be explained with the help of some perceived agent as endowed with the said hypothetical property. Although the Buddhists do not say that the sense-organ is other than the visible organic locus of the sensation yet the mere organic locus cannot be the organ. This locus as endowed with the destiny of the person to whose organism it belongs is the sense-organ. But on the assumption of the hypothetical property there would be no need to admit any invisible sense-organ. The fourth objection is that the property cannot be conceived to be related or opposed to other familiar properties and so its reality may be called into question. Here the property is referred to as generic although the Buddhists do not admit any generic property. So the property should be regarded as one that characterises a cause which is surrounded by auxiliaries. The fifth objection is to the effect that if seedness really characterises the seed it must determine the causality of the seed in relation to some significant (productive) activity.

The first and second objection explained

Text: तथा हि उत्पत्तेः आरभ्य मुद्गर–प्रहार–पर्यंत घटंः तावत् जाति–अंतरः अन्–आक्रांतः एव अनुभूयमानः क्रमवत्–सहकारि–वैचिय्यात् कार्य–कोटीः सरू पाः विरूपाः करोति। तत्र एतावता एव सर्वस्मिन् समंजसे अन्–उपलभ्यमान–जाति–कोटि–कल्पना केन प्रमाणेन केन वा उपयोगेन येन कल्पना गौरव–प्रसंङ्ग–दोषः न स्यात्। यः यत्–अर्थ कल्प्यते तस्य अन्यथासिद्धिः एव तस्य अभावः इति भवान् एव आह इति।

Trans: To explain (the above objections): The claypot in fact, right from its origination till its destruction caused by the impact of a heavy stick upon it is observed to be not endowed with any property other than potness and as such it is found to be producing innumerable similar and dissimilar effects, on being associated with different successive auxiliaries. Thus if everything (about this multifarious productivity of an identical entity) can be satisfactorily explained then what is the (basis or) purpose of the invention of millions of invisible generic properties? Does not this (invention) lead to the fallacy of conceptual redundancy? You (the

Buddhist) yourself say that the (irrelevance or the) dispensability of a postulated thing for the purpose for which it is postulated is itself the nonexistence of the thing.

Expl: If the diverse productivity of an identical cause can be satisfactorily explained without postulating the hypothetical property it is sheer conceptual redundancy to postulate it unless the postulation served some purpose or has some valid basis.

Third objection explained

Text: दृष्टं च जाति–भेदं तिरस्कृत्य स्वभाव–भेद–कल्पनया एव कार्य–उत्पतौ सहकारिणः अपि दृष्टत्वात् कथंचित् स्वीक्रियंते अतींद्रिय–इंद्रिय–आदि–कल्पना तु विलीयेत मान–अभावात्। विकल्प–अन्–उपपत्तेः च।

Trans: (Thus) rejecting the familiar generic property (characteristic of the causal entity) and only by means of the postulation of a specific nature or property (inhering in the latter) the effect-production can be accounted for and the auxiliaries too—which are observed to be present—can somehow be admitted as necessary for the production. But then the notion of invisible sense-organs, etc. (as causes of sensations etc.) would disappear as there would be no valid basis for it (if the property is admitted). Besides the different possible views regarding the nature of the said property cannot be justified.

Expl: Seedness is the familiar property of the seeds which produce the seedling. If an invisible hypothetical property is supposed to determine the causality of the seed in relation to the seedling then all invisible entities like sense-organs etc. which are inferred as the causes of sensations etc. could be discarded in favour of some visible entity endowed with the hypothetical property as cause. But then how to account for the causality of the auxiliaries over and above the immediately productive cause? The answer is that since the auxiliaries are seen to be present at the time of the effect-production they may also somehow be treated as causes.

Fourth objection explained

Text: सः खलु जाति–विशेषः शालित्व–संग्राहकः वा स्यात् तत्–प्रतिक्षेपकः वा? आद्ये कुसूलस्थस्य अपि शालेः कथं न तत्–रूपत्वम्? द्वितीये तु अभिमतस्य अपि शालेः कथं तत्–रूपत्वम्? एवं शालित्वं अपि तस्य संग्राहकं प्रतिक्षेपकं वा ! आद्ये अ–शालेः अन्तत्व प्रसङ्ग। द्वितीये तु शालेः एव अतव–प्रसङ्गः।

Trans: As to this property it may be asked whether it is pervasive of all paddy or exclusive of it. If it is the first how then even the paddy in the granary is not immediately productive? If on the other hand the property excludes paddy how then even the productive paddy is immediately productive? Likewise it may be asked if paddyness is pervasive or exclusive of all immediately-productive entities. If it is the first, anything different from the paddy would cease to be immediately-productive. If it is the second the paddy itself would turn out to be unproductive.

Expl: If immediate productivity is a generic property it must either include or exclude the loci of other properties as is the case with substanceness and earthness. Partial inclusion and partial exclusion of the loci of other generic properties would make immediate productivity overlapping, a fallacy called '*saṃkara*' which is said to be a fallacy of genera. Immediate productivity as shown above neither includes nor excludes the loci of a property like paddyness. The same is the case with paddyness in relation to this property. The overlap of paddyness and immediate productivity is explained above from both sides in order to bring out clearly the fallacy involved in the conception of immediate productivity.

Objection to the above

Text: नः च न उभयं अपि इति वाच्यम्। विरोध–अ–विरोधयोः प्रकार–अन्तर अभावात्। व्यक्ति–भेदेन संग्रह–प्रतिक्षेपौ अपि न विरुद्धौ इति चेत्? विलीनं इदानीं तत् अतज्जातीयता–विरोधेन्। परिदृश्यमान–कतिपय–व्यक्ति–अ–प्रतिक्षेपे अपि मिथः क्वचित् तुरग–विहगयोः अपि संभेद–संभावात्।

Trans: Can't it be urged that neither (inclusion or exclusion pointed out above) is the case? No! There is no alternative other than exclusion and inclusion. But can't both inclusion and exclusion be mutually compatible in relation to different individuals? No! If it were so then the incompatibility holding between the properties of being and not being of the same genus would dissolve. Even the horse and the bird (for example) would become identical with each other despite (the fact that) the properties (of horseness and birdness) mutually exclude some of the individuals respectively characterised by them.

Expl: Against the foregoing it is now contended that a generic property need not be either absolutely inclusive or exclusive of the loci of other properties. It could be both inclusive and exclusive of the other's loci in relation to different individuals. The reply to this contention is that even horseness and birdness which exclude each other's loci could on this view overlap each other's loci. One may however argue against this reply that

goldness and potness are two generic properties which are not related as includer and included. Certain golden articles are different from pots and certain pots are other than golden and yet a golden pot is the locus of both the properties viz. potness and goldness. It may be urged against this that potness does not inhere in the golden material of which the pot is made. It inheres only in the parts that constitute the pot. But then in a stone-pot stoneness and potness—which are two generic properties—would have to exist together while separately they may exclude each other's loci. A possible reply to this is to say that potness is the property of the structure or the conjunction of the parts of the pot while goldness and stoneness are the properties that characterise what we take to be the pot, the structured entity. Another and a more convincing reply to the above is to maintain that there are many different instances of 'potness', that is to say the properties 'golden potness', 'earthen potness', etc. are quite different from each other and goldness and earthness. etc. are quite different from each other and goldness and earthness etc. are the genera under which these different potnesses are respectively subsumed. The common designation 'pot' for all these products of different materials may be explained on the basis of the similarity of the structures of the products. But then a usage like 'A large blue pot is moving' will be difficult to explain on this view of potness. In this usage potness is referred to as coexisting with a certain dimension, a certain colour and a certain movement. The structure is a conjunction of parts and so it is a quality which cannot be the locus of another quality or movement. If however goldpotness is taken to be the property of the substantive entity that is the locus of the structure which is common to all pots then the above usage can be satisfactorily explained.

Because of their overlapping nature even vividness and non-vividness-like potness cannot be regarded as generic properties. Both colours and feels are vivid and non-vivid but colours are different from feels so that vividness and colourness and vividness and the property of feels overlap each other. Similar is the case with non-vividness and these properties. Again similar to these are the properties of superiority, inferiority, excellence etc. which are also found overlapping with certain other properties.

Elucidation of the above objection

Text : यःच यस्य जातिविशेषः सःचेत् तं व्यभिचरेत् व्यभिचरेत् अपि शिंशपा पादपं अविशेषात्। तथा च गतं स्वभावहेतुना। विपर्यये बाधकं विशेषः इति चेत्? न। तस्य इह अपि सत्वात्। तत्. अभावे स्वभावत्व. अनुपपतेः। उपपत्तौ वा किं बाधक–अनुसरण–व्यसनेन इति।

Trans: If a certain generic property characteristic of a certain entity deviated from that entity then even Aśokaness would deviate from treeness (so that the Aśoka would cease to be a tree) because these facts are similar. And if this is condoned then 'nature' as middle term would go by the board. But mayn't it be urged that the opposite of the inference with nature as middle term is contradictable and this is the difference between the (above mentioned) facts? No! Such a contradiction is present in the present case too. If there were no contradictory (of the negative inference) then the generic property cannot constitute the nature (of that which it characterised). If despite this it could constitute the nature there would then be no sense in indulging in the exploration of the contradictory (of the negative inference).

Expl: In support of the foregoing argument that two generic properties cannot be both inclusive and exclusive of each other's loci it is urged here that if the property of immediate productivity which is supposed to be pervaded by paddyness deviated from it in relation to barley (say) then even Aśokness could deviate from treeness despite being pervaded by treeness. If this happened then nature cannot be the middle term in any inference. One may say however that the opposite of the inference based on nature as middle term is contradictable but the same is the case with immediate productivity too. The contradictory evidence in the present case is the counterfactual conditional that 'If the paddy which is by nature immediately productive of the seedling deviated from this nature it would cease to be itself'.

Fifth objection explained

Text: विशेषस्य विशेषं प्रति प्रयोजकात्वात् च। तथा हि कार्य–गतं अंङ्कुरत्वं प्रति बीजत्वस्य अ–प्रयोजकत्वे अ–बीजात् अपि तत्–उत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्गः। बीजस्य विशेषः कथं अ–बीजे भविष्यति इति चेत्। वर्हि शालेः विशेषः कथं अ–शालौ स्यात् इति अ–शालेः अङ्कुर–अन्–उत्पत्ति–प्रसंङ्गः। अ–शालिवत् अ–बीजे अपि असौ भवतु विशेषः तथा अपि बीजत्व–एकार्थ–समवेत एव असौ अङ्कुरे प्रति प्रयोजकः इति चेत्? न। शालित्व व्याभिचारे शालित्व–एकार्थ–समवायवत् बीजत्व–व्याभिचारे बीजत्व–एकार्थ–समवायेन अपि नियंतुं अ–शवयखात् अ–विशेषात्।

Trans: Besides a specific property (of the cause) determines the specific property (of the effect). To explain: If seedness did not determine seedlingness characterising the seedling which is the effect then this would

originate even from things other than the seed. 'But how can the property peculiar to the seed be present in anything other than the seed?', (It may here be asked). (Then it may also be asked), 'How could the property peculiar to the paddy be present in a thing other than the paddy?' And if it is not present then the seedling would not be producible by anything other than the paddy?' May it be urged (against this) that although the special property may be present in things other than the seed as it is present in things other than the paddy yet it determines seedling—production only as coinherent with seedness? No! Just as the special property cannot be qualified by the qualification of coinherence with paddyness if it deviates from it, it cannot also be qualified by the qualification of coinherence with seedness if it (sometimes) deviated from it.

Expl: Besides the (special) generic property of the cause determines the (corresponding) specifcal property of the effect. If seedness did not determine seedlingness then the seedling could be produced even by things other than the seed. But how can the specific property of the seed be present elsewhere? Yes, but then, it may also be asked, how can the property peculiar to the paddy be present anywhere other than the paddy? Seedling-production is such a property, so nothing other than the paddy can produce the seedling. It cannot be argued against this that although the speciality can be present in things other than the seed yet it determines seedlingness only as coinherent with seedness. As the speciality (the property of immediate productivity) cannot be qualified by its coinherence with paddyness as things other than the paddy are also seedling-productive so it cannot be qualified by its coinherence with seedness and as such determine seedlingness.

It may be argued by the Buddhist that although seedness may not determine seedlingness or seedling-production yet seedling-productivity is pervaded by seedness and so it cannot occur in anything other than the seed. The opponent's answer to this will be that even as pervaded by seedness the seedling-productivity should deviate from the latter as it deviates from paddyness.

The point of the above Buddhist argument and its rejoinder is that in the qualification 'coinherence with seedness' if seedness is a qualifying adjunct then seedness must be treated as the determinant of seedlingness. If however seedness is a non-qualifying adjunct then even things different from the seed could produce the seedling. Moreover if the above qualified entity is taken to be the determinant both the qualification and the qualified would have to be regarded as the determinants for lack of any clinching evidence in favour of either. Under this circumstance the law of parsimony dictates that seedness alone is regarded as the determinant.

Conclusion of the above

Text: तस्मात् यः यथाभूतः यथाभूतं आत्मनः अन्वय–व्यतिरेकौ अनुकारयति तस्य तथाभूतस्य एव तथाभूते सामर्थ्यम्। तत्–विशेषाः तु कार्य–विशेषं प्रयोजयंति शालि–आदिवत् इति युक्तं उत्पश्याम।

Trans: Hence if a thing of a certain nature determines the positive and negative association of another thing of a certain nature with itself then the former only under its own nature determines the production of the latter under its own nature. And the special instances of the determinant determine the production of the special instances of the determined.

Expl: Thus it follows that if the seed is associated (positively and negatively) as seed with the seedling as seedling then the causality of the seed in relation to the seedling is determined only by seedness and not by any hypothetical property. Production or non-production of the seedling on different occasions is however due to the availability or otherwise of the auxiliaries to the seed.

Demonstrative proof for the above

Text: कस्य पुनः प्रमाणस्य अयं व्यापार–कलापः इति चेत्? तत्–उत्पति–निश्चय–हेतोः प्रत्यक्ष–अन्–उपलंभ–आत्मकस्य इति ब्रूमः। अथ न्यायेन विना न ते परितोषः श्रुणु तं अपितदा। यत् अङ्कुर प्रति – प्रयोजकं न तत् बीज–जातीयं यथा शिला–शकलम्। अङ्कुरं प्रति अ–प्रयोजकं च कुसूल–निहितं बीजं अभ्युपेतं परैः इति व्यापक–अन्–उपलब्धिः प्रसङ्ग–हेतुः।

Trans: What is the valid proof for this group of conclusions? Our reply to the query is that the conclusions are based on positive and negative association which is the cause of the determination of the causal relationship. But if you (the Buddhist) are not satisfied without a syllogistic demonstration you may listen to that too (as it is being explained). (It is this:), 'Whatever is not needed for the seedling is not of the nature of the seed as is for example the piece of stone and the seed in the granary is considered by others (the Buddhists) to be not needed for the seedling. Thus (we have here) the non-apprehension of the pervading term (causality in relation to the seedling) as the middle term leading to the conclusion that the cause is of a different nature than that of the seed.

Expl: A syllogistic formulation of the foregoing proof is made here. The conditional premise for the inferential conclusion is this: 'If the seed in the granary is not needed for the seedling it cannot be endowed with seed-

nature or seedness'. The Buddhist maintains that the seed in the granary is not needed for the seedling. Here the concomitant middle and major terms are, 'being needed for the seedling', and 'being endowed with seedness'. The absence of the major and the absence of the middle become concomitant in the negative inference. So the seed in the granary being not needed for the seedling it would not be endowed with seedness or would cease to be the seed. In the Buddhist view the seed in the granary is not the cause of seedling.

The middle term here is a conditional term as it serves the purpose of a conditional proof.

Syllogistic proof against the contrary inference

Text: विपर्यये अपि किं बाधकं इति चेत्? अङ्कुरस्य जाति–प्रतिनियम–आकस्मिकत्व–प्रसङ्गः इति उक्तम्। बीजत्वं तस्य प्रत्यक्ष सिद्धं अ–अशक्य–अपन्हवं इति चेत्? अस्तु तर्हि विपर्ययः। यत् बीजं तत् अङ्कुरं प्रति प्रयोजकं यथा अंत्य–सामग्री–मध्यं अध्यासीनं बीजम्। बीजं च इदं विवाद–आस्पदं इति स्वभाव–हेतुः।

Trans: But what is the proof against the opposite thesis (that that which is not needed for the seedling may be endowed with seedness)? In reply to this it has already been said that (the contrary thesis) would entail the undesirable conclusion that the fact of the seedling being caused by an entity endowed with seed-genus only, would be rendered accidental. But isn't it the case that the seedness of the seed is perceptually established and so impossible to suppress? Alright! Let then there be this negative inference: 'Whatever is a seed is needed for seedling as is for instance the seed embedded in the midst of the last collocation of the auxiliaries and this thing under dispute is such a seed'. Here we have nature as middle term.

Expl: The contrary thesis can be countered by the argument that the production of the seedling by an entity endowed with seedness and not by any other property would be rendered accidental. Every seed must be reckoned as the cause of seedling, that is to say the seed-causality must be reckoned as determined by seedness only.

Elucidation of the above proof

Text: अङ्कुरस्य हि जाति–प्रतिनियमः न तावत् निर्–निमित्तः सार्वत्रिकत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। न अपि अन्य–निमित्तः तथा–भूतस्य तस्य अभावात्।

Trans: The necessary determinedness of the (effecthood) of the seedling by a certain generic property only, cannot be uncaused, for then it would extend to everything. Nor is it due to anything other than the seed because there is no entity which may determine (the production of the seedling alone).

Expl: If the seedling were not endowed with the property determining its effecthood which is causally determined by seedness alone then the property would be present even in things other than the seedling or those which are not effects at all. But there is nothing other than seedness which can determine the effecthood of the seedling (alone).

Conclusion stated

Text: सा इयं निमित्तवत्ता विपक्षात् व्यावर्तमाना स्व–व्याप्यं आदाय बीज–प्रयोजकतायां एव विश्राम्यति इति प्रतिबंध–सिद्धिः।

Trans: Thus this caused (or determined) nature of the seedling being excluded from all loci which are devoid of the major it leads by way of the affirmation of the term pervaded by it to the affirmation (only) of the character of seed-determination of the seedling. Thus the concomitance (between seedling-nature and seed-determination) is established.

Expl: The determined nature of the seedling is excluded from the undetermined and its affirmation entails first the affirmation that the seedling-nature is present in an effect only. If there is a determinant there must be a determined. The next affirmation entails the conclusion that the seedling is produced by the seed or that the seedling-production is determined by the seed only. Thus the concomitance of seedness and seedling-determination is established.

In the above the first concomitance is that between the determined nature and effecthood. The second concomitance is between seed-nature and seedling-determination.

Alternative proof for the conclusion that seedness determines seedlingness

Text: अथवा कृतं अङ्कुर–ग्रहेण। बीज–स्वभावत्वं क्वचित्–कार्य प्रयोजकं न वा? न चेत् न तत्–स्वभावं बीजं, तेन रूपेण क्वचित् अपि अन्–उपयोगात्। एवं च प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धं बीज–स्वभावत्वं नास्ति सर्वप्रमण–अ–गोचरः तु विशेषः अस्ति इति विशुद्धा बुद्धिः। क्वचित् उपयोगे अपि एकस्य, तेन रूपेण सर्वेषां अ–विशेषः ताद्रूप्यात्। तथा च कथं किंचित् एव बीजं स्वकार्यं कुर्यात् न अपराणि? न च वस्तुमात्रं तत्

कार्यम्। अ–बीजात् तत्–अन्–उत्पति–प्रसङ्गात्। न अपि बीजमात्रम्। अङ्कुर–कारिणः अपि तत्–उत्पति–प्रसङ्गात्। न अपि अङ्कुर–आदि–अन्यतममात्रम्। प्राक् अपि तत उत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: Or let us ignore the seedling. Instead we ask, "Does the fact of 'being an entity of seed-nature' determine some effect or not?" If it does not then the seed cannot be endowed with this nature because as a seed it cannot be efficacious for any (significant activity). Thus the perceptually-established seed-nature or seedness is (declared to be) nonexistent while a property not known by any valid means of knowledge whatever is (declared to be) existent. This is a sign of superior intelligence indeed! If a single seed is efficacious as seed for any effect then every seed will be likewise efficacious because it is of the same nature as the former. How can then only a certain seed produce the effect and not other seeds? But not everything is the effect of the seed for then these would not be produced by anything other than the seed. Nor is seed alone produced by a seed. If it were then even the seedling-productive seed will produce nothing but a seed. Nor again will the seed, the seedling or its cognition be producible by the seed. If this is the case these would be produced even in the absence of the auxiliaries.

Expl: To establish the causality of the seed as seed it is not necessary to fix upon the seedling to prove that its production must be due to the seed as seed. Even on the basis of the viability of the seed-nature or seedness its generic causality can be established. This is now being attempted by the opponent. As per the Buddhist criterion of reality if seedness is the nature of all seeds and it is real then it must be efficacious. In what way can it be efficacious except by being the determinant of seed-production? The Buddhist denies the perceptually-testified nature of seeds and postulates an exotic nature for them in order to account for the production of seedlings by the seeds. This is certainly a bizarre procedure. Nor can it be urged that the generic nature of seeds determines not seedling-production but the production of other seeds, seedlings or seed-cognition. If this were the case no seed will ever produce the seedling and even in the absence of the auxiliaries and before and after the production of the seedling the seed should produce other seeds as it is productive of them by nature. Moreover if everything is regarded as the product of the seed as seed nothing other than the seed would be needed for their production. The crux of the argument is that the generic seed-character and the general seed-causality cannot be other than the ones which are related to seedling-production and not to the production of other entities.

Objection that the seed with the auxiliaries is productive of its effect and its reply

Text: यदा यत् उत्पन्नं सत् यत्–कर्य–अनुकूल–सहकारि–मध्यं–अधिशेते तदा तत् एव कार्यं प्रति तस्य प्रयोजकत्वं इति चेत्? तत् किं अवांतर–जाति–भेदं उपादाय बीज–स्वभावेन एव वा? आद्ये सः एव जाति–भेदः तत्र प्रयोजकः किं आयातं बीजत्वस्य? द्वितीये तु समान–शीलानां अपि सहकारि–वैकल्यात् अ–करणं इति आयातम्। तत् तत् सहकारि–सहित्ये सति तत्–तत् कार्यं प्रति प्रयोजकस्य बीज–स्वभावस्य सर्व–साधारणत्वात् इति।

Trans: May it be urged (against the foregoing) that a causal entity after having come into being determines the production of only that object at the time when the auxiliaries necessary for the production of that object surround it? (It may be so). (But then one may ask) whether this production (of the seed for example) is under the character of the special (hypothetical) property or seedness itself? If the first is true then the specific property alone will determine seedling-production, seedness will be totally irrelevant to it. If the second is true then it will follow that things (like seed) which though quite alike are unproductive if the auxiliaries do not accompany them. It is so because the seed-nature which determines seedling-production when the auxiliaries are present is common to all seeds.

Expl: Referring to the foregoing reply the Buddhist makes the retort that of the many possible products of the seed as seed it may be urged that only that object is produced at a certain time when the auxiliaries needed for it are available to the seed. It is the relevant auxiliaries that determine which object will result from the causal operation of the seed on a certain occasion. Even this selective productivity of the seed must be determined only by seedness as otherwise the latter would be ineffective and so unreal. But if seedness is admitted to be the determinant of the causality of the seed then it being common to all seeds everyone of these would have to be regarded as the cause despite the fact that some of these would be ineffective in the absence of the auxiliaries.

Syllogistic formulation of the above reply

Text: अत्र अपि प्रयोगः। यत् येन रूपेण अर्थक्रियासु न उपयुज्यते न तत् तत् रूपम्। यथा बीजं कुंजरत्वेन किंचित् अपि अ–कुर्वत् न कुंजर–स्वरूपम्। तथा च शालि–आदयः सामग्री–प्रविष्टाः बीजत्वेन

अर्थक्रियासु न उपयुज्यंते इति व्यापक–अन्–उपलब्धिः प्रसङ्ग–हेतुः। तत्–रूपतायाः अर्थाक्रियां प्रति योग्यतया व्याप्तत्वात्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसंगात्।

Trans: This too is demonstrable thus: 'Whatever is not efficacious under a certain form for any significant activity is not of that form as for example the seed is not efficacious as an elephant for any activity and so it is not of the nature of an elephant'. And because things like paddy which are included among the auxiliaries are not efficacious as seeds for any significant activity the non-perception of the pervader is here available as the middle term in the inference of the modus tollens-type. To be of a certain nature is concomitant with (or pervaded by) the capacity to produce some significant activity (and the paddy as seed has no significant activity to produce.)

Expl: It is now being demonstrated that if a thing is not efficacious to produce significant activity under a certain form or character it cannot have that form or character. To have a certain form implies to be productive as of that form. The absence of the major term in this implication implies the absence of the middle term.

A likely question here needs to be answered. Qualities as qualities are not regarded as efficacious by the non-Buddhist and yet these have their own nature. The Buddhist does not admit this as in his view the distinction of qualities and substances is non-existent.

Objection that seed-nature of seeds is undeniable and its reply

Text: तत्–रूपत्वं एतस्य प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धत्वात् अ–शवय–अपन्हवं इति चेत्? अस्तु तर्हि विपर्ययः। यत् यत्–रूपं तत् तेन रूपेण अर्थक्रियासु उपयुज्यते यथा–स्वभावेन सामग्री–निवेशिनः भावाः। बीज–जातीयाः च एते कुसूलस्थ–आदयः इति स्वभाव–हेतुः। तत्–रूपत्व मात्र–अनुबंधित्वात योग्यतायाः।

Trans: But isn't the seed-nature of all seeds (including the ineffective one) perceptually-established and so impossible to suppress? Yes! Let then be (this negative inference to prove the above): If anything is of a certain form (or nature) it is efficacious for significant activity under that form as for example are things endowed with immediate productivity and included among the auxiliaries. And the seeds in the granary and entities like them are as a matter of fact of the generic nature of seedness, etc. This is an inference with the nature of a thing as middle term. This is so because the capacity of a thing for production depends only upon its

being of a certain nature (determining its productivity).

Expl: The above can be established even by a negative inference like the following one: 'The seed in the granary is a seed because it is efficacious only as seed. Whatever is not so is not a seed'. To establish the concomitance of the middle and major terms in the inference recourse is had to the Buddhist's own views that the seed is efficacious only as endowed with immediate productivity. In the opponent's view the generic property of seedness constitutes the nature of the seed.

A minor query and its answer

Text: ततः च अस्ति किंचित् कार्यं यत्र बीजत्वेन बीजं उपयुज्यते इति। बीज–अनुभवः एव असाधारणं कार्यं यत्र बीजत्वं प्रयोजकं तत् च सर्वस्मात् एव बीजात् भवति इति किं अन्–उपपन्नं इति चेत्? न। यौगिक–तत्–अनुभवस्य तत्–अंतरेण–अपि उपपत्तेः। लौकिकः इति चेत्? न। सत्यं एतत्। न तु इदं सर्वस्मात् बीजात् भवति इंद्रियादि–प्रत्यासत्तेः अ–सदातनत्वात् अ–सार्वत्रिकत्वात च।

Trans: Hence there certainty is some product for which the seed as seed is required. But isn't the seed-cognition itself such a special product which is produced by all the seeds; and what could be unreasonable in this assumption? No! The yogic cognition of the seeds can arise even without them. Even their normal cognitions are not invariably produced by all of them as sense-object-contacts needed for them are not always and everywhere available.

Another query and its answer

Text: ततः च योग्यं अपि सहकारि–अ–संनिधानात् न करोति इति अर्थसिद्धम्। कार्य–अंतरं एव अतींद्रियं सर्व–बीज–अ–व्यभिचरि भविष्यति इति चेत्? तत् न तावत् उपादेयं अमूर्तस्य मूर्त–अन्–उपादेयत्वात्। परिदृश्यमान–मूर्त–घटिततया मूर्त–अंतस्य तत्–देशस्य अन्–उपपत्तेः। न अपि सहकार्यम्। मिथः सहकारिणां अ–व्याभिचार–अन्–उपपत्तेः।

Trans: Hence it follows as a matter of course from this that even a competent cause is unproductive in the absence of the auxiliaries. Could then some other invisible product be associated with (or not unassociated with) all seeds? Well, if it could it cannot be an inherent product (of the

seeds) because a subtle object cannot have a gross one as its cause. (The product cannot be gross either) because the seed is already associated with a gross product (like the visible seedling) and so another gross product cannot occupy the same substratum. The product cannot also be efficiently caused (by the seed) as the different efficient causes do not necessarily go together.

Expl: If the seed-cognition of any kind cannot be a necessary product of all seeds then perhaps some invisible entity may be taken to be such a common and necessary product. This doubt is removed by the consideration that a subtle entity cannot have a gross one as its cause and if the product is a gross one then it and the seedling cannot both have the same entity as their material cause. It cannot have the seed as its efficient cause too for then there would be no certainty when it would be produced, as all the efficient causes do not come together (necessarily) for production at any particular time.

In the above argument it needs to be noted that in the Buddhist view qualities like colour etc. are themselves gross in nature. There are no gross objects like substances different from qualities. So the rule stated that the subtle cannot be the product of the gross applies in the Buddhist view too according to which both substances and qualities being alike in nature are gross.

Ironical statement of the conclusion

Text: अपि च एवं सति प्रयोजक–स्वभावः न अन्वय–व्यतिरेक–गोचरः, तत्–गोचरः न प्रयोजकः, दृश्यं च कार्य–जातं अदृश्येन एव स्वभावेन क्रियते दृश्येन तु अदृश्यं एव इति सः अयं 'यः ध्रुवाणि' इति अस्य विषयः।

Trans: Moreover if the foregoing is true then (immediate productivity) which is said to be the determinant (of production) is not known to be positively and negatively associated with the effect and that which is known to be such is not the determinant; all visible effects are (taken to be) produced by invisible (immediately productive) nature of things and the visible natures of the latter (are supposed to produce) invisible things! All this is the theme of the adage —

यो ध्रुवाणि परित्यज्य अध्रुवाणि निषेवते।
ध्रुवाणि तस्य नश्यंति अध्रुवं नष्टं एव तु।।

which says that one who rejecting the certain runs after the uncertain loses the certain while the uncertain is already lost by him!

Expl: The last objection that the auxiliaries cannot always come together

may be met by maintaining that the material and the efficient causes of an effect do always go together. This retort is answered by the above ironical remark whose purport is quite obvious.

Negative formulation of the foregoing argument

Text: अथवा व्यतिरेकेण प्रयोगः। विवाद–अध्यासितं बीजं सहकारि–वैकल्य–प्रयुक्त–अङ्कुर–आदि–कार्य–वैकल्यं, तत्–उत्पत्ति–निश्चय–विषयीभूत–बीज–जातीयत्वात्। यत् पुनः सहकारि–वैकल्य–प्रयुक्त–अंकुर–आदि–कार्य–वैकल्यं न भवति न तत् एवंभूत–बीज–जातीयं यथा शिला–शकलं इति।

Trans: Alternatively there is this negative formulation (of the foregoing argument): 'The seed under dispute is bereft of the effects (like the seedlings) due to its being unassociated with the auxiliaries because it is of the generic seed-nature which is the object of the determinate cognition of the causality relating to the seedling (which is its effect). Whatever is not bereft of its effect owing to the absence of the auxiliaries is not of the nature of such a seed as for example is a piece of stone'.

Expl: The foregoing proof is presented now in a negative form. The qualification 'disputed' attached to the seed in the inference is necessary for excluding the productive seed which is not bereft of the seedling. The absence of auxiliaries with the cause helps maintain the anterior negation (known as *pragabhāva*' in Sanskrit) of the effect. The absence of the effect in the case of the real cause like the seed is determined by the absence of the auxiliaries while a similar absence in the case of the noncause like the stone is determined by the very nature of the stone. All that this means is that the seed is productive by nature although the absence of production by it on certain occasions is due to the absence of the auxiliaries. The piece of stone however is nonproductive by nature and so the absence of the effect in its case is due to or determined by the very nature of the stone.

In the above conditional proposition if the words 'seed' and 'seedling' are removed from the major and middle terms what results is a general concomitance applicable to all causes and their generic characters.

The phrase 'object of the determinate cognition of causation' should be taken in the sense of 'positive and negative association with the effect'. If the auxiliaries are absent the cause cannot be (as specified in the middle term) the object of the cognition of the causation of the effect. The effect is not produced by the cause in the absence of the auxiliaries.

A minor doubt and its solution

Text: न च उक्त–साध्य–व्यावृतेः उक्त–साधन–व्यावृत्तिः उदाहृतात् किंवा परंपरया अपि तथाविध–प्रसव–सामर्थ्य–विरहात् इति व्यतिरेक–संदेहः इति वाच्यम्? प्राक् एव शंका–बीजस्य निराकृतत्वात् इति।

Trans: But mayn't one doubt whether the absence of the middle term mentioned above from the example is due to the absence in it of the above-mentioned major term or it is due to the absence of the competence to produce, even indirectly, in the cause? (And as a result of this doubt) mayn't even the negative concomitance of the absences of the major and middle terms, itself be the object of doubt? No! This doubt has already been nipped in the bud.

Expl: It may be doubted whether the piece of stone is unproductive of the seeding not because it is unproductive of it by nature but because it is not even remotely productive of it. This doubt engenders doubt in the truth of the negative concomitance itself. But as it has already been established that seedness itself determines seed-causality the non-production by the idle seed can be supposed to be due only to absence of auxiliaries and so the doubt cannot arise at all.

Argument that an individual cannot be both productive and non-productive

Text: स्यात् एतत्। मा भूत् सामर्थ्य–अ–सामर्थ्य–लक्षण–विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गः। अस्तु बीजत्वं एव प्रयोजकम्। भवतु च सहकारि–समवधाने सति कर्तृ–स्वभावत्वं भावस्य। तथा च तत्–अ–संनिधाने अकरणं अपि उपपद्यताम्। तथा अपि तत्–जातीये एव इयं व्यवस्था न तु एकस्यां व्यक्तौ। करण–अ–करण–लक्षण–विरूद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गस्य प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धत्वात् तस्य दुवरित्वान् इति चेत्? न। विरोध–स्वरूप–अन्–अवधारणात्।

Trans: Let there be then this argument (for the apparent cooccurrence of incompatible properties). It doesn't matter if there is no cooccurrence of incompatible properties; let seedness itself be the determinant (of causality); let also things be productive by nature when they are associated with auxiliaries and let their unproductivity too in the absence of the auxiliaries be justifiable on the basis of the absence of the auxiliaries. But all this may hold good only in the case of (a group of) objects of a certain generic character. These may not be true of single individuals because the

incompatibility of the cooccurrence of production and nonproduction in the individual is perceptually established and so it cannot be denied in its case. No! (This cannot be true). The nature of the incompatibility is not properly grasped (by the objector).

Expl: Conceding all the earlier arguments against momentariness the Buddhist now rejoins that these arguments are applicable only to a class of entities for, only in a class some entities may be productive and some not. But this cannot be true of a single individual as the same individual cannot be both productive and nonproductive. If a certain individual is productive because it is accompanied by auxiliaries it cannot be unaccompanied by them and so unproductive. Thus in the members of a class cooccurrence of productivity and nonproductivity is conceivable but not in single individuals.

In order to repudiate this argument the opponent explicates the nature of incompatibility and seeks to show in the sequel how none of the possible versions of incompatibility is applicable to the individual entity.

The above passage is explained in a different way by one of the commentators. According to him universals are exclusions and exclusions being negations which are unreal, universals are unreal in the Buddhist view. So no universal like seedness is real. The causal relation has therefore to be supposed to hold of individual causes and individual effects only (which correspond to each other). Each of these causes is endowed with productive competence only as a result of the operation of its own cause. It is only with respect to the individual cause that the possibility of the said incompatibility is now being considered.

Different types of incompatibility formulated and illustrated

Text: सः खलु धर्मयोः परस्पर-अभाव-रूपत्वं वा स्यात् नित्यत्व-अनित्यत्ववत्? धर्मिणि तत्-आपादकत्वं वा शीत-उष्णत्ववत्? तत्-वत्ता वा दंडित्व-कुंडलित्ववत्?

Trans: (As to the incompatibility) it may be of the nature of mutual exclusion of two properties as is the case with eternity and noneternity or of the nature of implication of each other's absence in certain loci as is the case with coldness and hotness or finally of the nature of mutual difference as is the case with the properties of 'being the holder of the stick' and 'being the wearer of the earring'.

Expl: Three types of incompatibility are listed here. They are mutual exclusion, implication of each other's absence or mutual difference holding between two properties which are supposed to be mutually incompatible. In the example of the first type of incompatibility noneternity is 'existence as determined by the property of destructibility.'

This is not directly opposed to eternity. Still the two may be treated as mutually exclusive because 'destructibility' forms part of non-eternity while its absence forms part of eternity. Implication of each other's absence which is the second type—is possible for the incompatibles because each of them is concomitant with the absence of the other. For example coldness is concomitant with the absence of hotness as hotness is concomitant with the absence of coldness. Again difference, the third type of incompatibility holds between two properties if each is absent in the other. Being the holder of a stick is absent in the property of being the wearer of earrings.

Repudiation of the first version

Text: न प्रथमः। निर्‌–विशेषणस्य असिद्धत्वात्‌। यावत्‌ सत्वं किंचित्‌–करणात्‌। सविशेषणस्य तु विरोध–सिद्धौ अपि अध्यास–अन्‌–उपपत्तेः। यदा यत्‌–अ–करणं हि तदा तत्‌–करणस्य अभावः न तु अन्यदा तत्‌–करणस्य। न च एतयोः एक–धर्मि–समावेशं आतिष्ठामहे।

Trans: The first (version) is not tenable. Unqualified nonproductivity of anything is unestablished as things continue to be productive of something or other as long as they exist. Qualified productivity and nonproductivity although known to be mutually-opposed are not found to occur together. Nonproduction at a certain time is absence of production at that time. It is not equivalent to the absence of production at some other time. And of these two we certainly do not admit cooccurrence.

Expl: Nothing is absolutely inactive or unproductive. A momentary entity is bound to remain productive as long as it lasts, that is, just for a moment. So absence of production must be taken with temporal qualification. In the non-Buddhist view things are durable and last longer than a moment; so at different moments they may be productive and nonproductive. There need not be therefore any incompatibility between productivity at one moment and nonproductivity at another. It shouldn't be urged against this that even durable entities are continually productive at least of their conjunction with the place where they are located if of nothing else. This is not true of qualities, movements, etc. which cannot be conjoined with anything. What are incompatible are production and nonproduction at the same time and these are never together. Moreover nonproduction at one time is not equivalent to the absence of production at another time. So as stated above production at one time and nonproduction at another time can very well go together.

Repudiation of the second version

Text: न द्वितीयः। भाव-अभाव-व्यतिरिक्तयोः करण-अ-करणयोः असिद्धेः। व्यापार-अपर-व्यपदेश-सहकारि-भाव-अभावौ हि करण-अकरणे कार्यभाव-अभावौ वा इति। अतिरेक-सिद्धौ अपि स्वकाले एव स्व-अभाव-प्रतिक्षेपवत् अ-करण-अभावं आक्षिपेत् करणं न तु अन्यदा। न हि यः यदा नास्ति सः तदा स्व-अभावं प्रतिक्षेप्तु अर्हति विरोधि-अभावं वा आक्षेप्तुम्। तथा सति न कदा अपि तत् न स्यात्। न वा कदा अपि तत्-विरोधी भवेत् इति। न असतो विद्यते भावः न अभावः विद्यते सतः इति आयातं न वा विरोधः।

Trans: The second version (too) is untenable. Production and nonproduction as different from the affirmation and negation (of production) are not known. As a matter of fact production and nonproduction are the same as the presence and absence of auxiliaries for which another designation is 'Process' or 'Instrument'. Or they are the same as the presence and absence of the effect. Even if these are proved to be different (from the presence and absence of auxiliaries or the effect) production will imply at its own time (only) the absence of non-production just as a thing, implies the exclusion of (or excludes) its absence only at the time of its occurrence. Production will never imply absence of non-production at a time when it is not occurring. Certainly a thing does not exclude its absence when it does not exist or imply (then) the absence of its opposite. If this happened then there cannot be a time when a thing did not exist or its opposite existed. From this it would follow that the nonexistent can never exist and the existent can never be nonexistent and then there would cease to be any opposition (of the existent and the nonexistent).

Expl: Productivity and non-productivity do not imply each other's absence, they are these absences themselves because they are the same as the presence and absence of the auxiliaries which are the instruments of causation. They may even be equated with the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the effect. If however they are regarded as the impliers of each other's absences even then productivity will imply the absence of nonproductivity when it occurs and not at some other time. Certainly nothing excludes its absence when it does not occur itself. Similarly nothing implies the absence of its opposite when it does not (exist or) occur. If a thing excluded its absence even when it did not exist it would mean that it existed even when it did not exist. Likewise if a thing implied the absence of its opposite even when it did not exist it would mean that

the thing itself existed always. Thus the famous remark in the Gītā that the real exists always would be vindicated as things are found to exist both when they are and also when they are not there. This only proves the eternity of things. Moreover if things can exist when they were absent they can exist even at places where they are not present. From this it would follow that things are ubiquitous.

Objection that even different dimensions may coexist in a substance, answered

Text: ननु एवं सति परिमाण–भेदः अपि काल–भेदेन न विरुद्धेयत तत्र अपि एवं सुकरत्वात्? न। बाधक–बलेन तत्रः काल–भेदस्य विवक्षिततत्वात। तथा हि न आरब्ध–द्रव्यैः–एव द्रव्य–अवयवैः द्रव्य–अंतरं आरभ्यते मूर्तत्व–समान देशत्वयोः एकदा विरोधात्। तथा च आरंभ–पक्षे–पूर्व–द्रव्य–निवृत्तिः अ–निवृतौ अन्–आरंभः इति। तत्र निवृत्तौ आश्रय–भेदात् एव परिणाम–भेदः। अ–निवृतौ संयोगि–द्रव्य–अंतर–अन्–उपचये क्व परिणाम–भेद–उपलंभः यः विरोधं आवहेत्? तत् उपचये तु क्व परिणाम–अंतर–उत्पतिः आश्रय–अन्–उत्पत्तेः। अतः एव स्यौल्य–अतिशय–प्रत्ययः अपि तत्र भ्रान्तः। तस्मात् काल–भेदेन अपि न परिणाम–भेदः। एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि उपसंहर्तुं शक्यते इति पदार्थ चिंता–आतुरैः सह विवेचनीयम।

Trans: But if this is so may not then even different dimensions be nonincompatible with each other so that they inhered in the same substance at different times? In this case too it can (very well) be urged (that one dimension excluded another only at the time of its occurrence and not at any other)? No! (The dimensions cannot be compatible.) Because of contrary evidence temporal difference has to be regarded as irrelevant to their incompatibility (and so the dimensions remain incompatible whatever the time they occur at). To explain: (It is a fact that) the components of a substance from which a composite entity has already been produced cannot produce another composite substance. This is so because grossness and cooccupancy of two or more substances cannot go together. So if a new entity were to originate from certain components then the composite entity already originated from the latter must first have been destroyed. If it is not destroyed the new entity cannot come into being. But if it is destroyed the earlier components no longer remain the same and so the new entity which originates is endowed with a new dimension simply because the components too have new dimension.

If the earlier components are not destroyed and the addition of external conjunctive material is not made to the existing component-material how can there arise the cognition of a different dimension (in the original component which may engender conflict between the cognitions of two different dimensions coexisting)? Even if external material is added where is the origination of a new dimension when no new locus for it has come into being? For this very reason even the awareness of a great increase of bulk occurring in such cases has to be treated as illusory. So even with difference in time (the same entity) cannot be supposed to be endowed with different dimensions. All this and related matters have to be thrashed out with the N.V. philosophers who are interested in the inquiry into the nature of things.

Expl: If production and nonproduction belong to the same entity, different dimensions like large and small may also characterise the same entity at different times. This objection is answered here by means of the clarification that every composite substantive entity inherits its dimension from those of its parts. The dimension cannot be imported into the entity from outside. Unless the entity which has a certain dimension is destroyed its place cannot be taken by another having a different dimension. In the same substantive components two different material entities cannot inhere. It may be asked here how the eyes and the light occupy the same place of the pot when it is being perceived by a person. Both eyes and light are material entities yet they do not exclude each other. The question may have different answers. One answer is that the rule regarding occupancy of the same place has to be taken to apply only to solid substances. The second answer is that the eyes do not directly come in contact with the pot when it is being perceived. The third answer is that the eyes and the light come into contact with the pot only alternately. A fourth answer is to hold the rule applicable only in the case of inherence of more than one material substance in the same place.

Another question that may be raised here is that a cloth woven out of a single thread (presuming that there can be such a cloth) has to be supposed to inhere in the fibers of the thread in which the thread also inheres. How can this be if the rule be true? This question too admits of more than one answer. One can say that different fibres of the thread are the inherees of the cloth and the single thread constituting the cloth. Alternately it may be urged that there is here no genesis of a cloth at all.

Increase or change in the dimension of a material object is possible only if it is replaced by another material object with a different dimension. No dimension accrues to a thing directly from a different object or it cannot be imposed upon it. Dimension being the quality of a thing it is inherited by it from its parts. This is why there is correspondence between the dimensions of the parts of a thing and the thing itself. So mere aggregation of different material substances cannot give rise to the

increase in the dimension of any of the substances. For example if a lump of clay is placed in a pot the bulk of the clay would not increase the dimension of the pot. This peculiarity of the incompatibility of dimensions is testified by common experience.

Objection against the compatibility of competence and incompetence

Text: अस्तु तर्हि इह अपि बाधकं बलं प्रसङ्ग–तत्–विपर्ययोः उक्तत्वात् इति चेत्? न। तयोः सामर्थ्य–अ–सामर्थ्य–विषयत्वात्। तस्य च उक्तत्वात्। स्तां वा। न तथा अपि ताभ्यां शक्ति–अशवत्योः अ–विवक्षित–काल–भेदः एव विरोधः साध्येत। तथा उप–संहर्तुं अ–शक्यत्वात। यदा तदा इति उपेक्ष्य यत् समर्थ तत् करोति एवं इति उपसंहर्तुं शक्यं इति चेत्? न। काल–नियम–अ–विवक्षायां यत् समर्थ तत् करोति एव इति कदाचित् स्यात्। तथा च संभव–विधेः अत्यंत–अ–योगः विराद्ध न तु अन्य–योगः नीलं सरोजं भवति एव इतिवत्।

Trans: Let then in the present case too there be the support of the contrary evidence (for the incompatibility of the cooccurrence of productivity and unproductivity). The inferences of the modus-tollens-type to prove this have already been mentioned. No! These inferences are concerned with competence and incompetence and they have already been repudiated. Perhaps there may be inferences about productivity and unproductivity but even by means of these the incompatibility of these as unqualified by temporal qualifications cannot be established as the unqualified ascription of the two properties to the same entity is not possible. But isn't it possible by ignoring the temporal qualifications, to conclude that 'whatever is competent is necessarily productive?' No! If the temporal qualifications are not intended the inference would be of the form, 'whatever is competent is necessarily productive sometimes'. Thus the inference involves emphasis on occurrence (of productivity) and so it excludes only absolute non-occurrence, not simple non-occurrence, as is illustrated in the expression, 'There necessarily is the blue lotus'.

Expl: As in the case of different dimensions so in the case of competence and incompetence too it could be contended that the incompatibility of these properties is absolute. This is the present argument of the Buddhist. The answer to this is that the inferences dealing with competence and incompetence discussed earlier were concerned with the absolute noncoexistence of competence and incompetence and not with their noncoexistence at different times. But if even such qualified

noncoexistence is sought to be established by the inferences the answer to it too is that such inferences too have been repudiated earlier. Notwithstanding this it may be contended that inferences dealing with productivity and no-productivity prove the diversity of the causal entity. The reply to this is that the temporally unqualified assertion of productivity and non-productivity cannot be made about the same entity. Of course in the absence of the temporal qualification we may perhaps have the premise, 'whatever is competent is necessarily productive'. Here there is really no need to have the temporal qualification as everything is productive of something or other as long as it exists and whatever is not productive is incompetent.

But in the above premise 'productivity' has to be qualified by 'sometimes' because even the productive cause is not always productive and this is conceded even by the Buddhist. The emphasis on the verb 'is productive' in the foregoing expression highlights this fact of occasional productivity of the productive entity. The emphasis excludes absolute nonproductivity so that the exclusion is satisfied even by occasional production. This of course is an established fact and therefore the inference entails the fallacy of proving the already proved.

The point of the above argument is this: Unqualified productivity and nonproductivity cannot be ascribed to the same entity so that their mutual incompatibility may entail the diversity of their locus. If unqualified productivity is ascribed necessarily to the competent cause that would only mean that the latter is not unproductive, not that it is always productive.

Nature of competence and incompetence elucidated

Text: ननु यत् अ–समर्थं प्रथमं आसीत् तस्य सामर्थ्यं पश्चात् अपि कुतः आगतम् प्रथमं समर्थस्य वा पश्चात् कुतः गतम्? न एतत् एवम्। तत्–तत् सहकारिमतः तत्–तत् कारकत्वं हि सामर्थ्यम्। अतत्–वतः तत्–आन्यवतः वा तत्–अ–कर्तृत्वं अ–सामर्थ्यम्। इदं च औत्पात्तिकं अस्य रूपम्। ते च सहकारिणः स्व–उपसर्पण–कारण–वशात् भिन्न–कालाः इति अर्थात् कार्याणां अपि भिन्न–कालता इति।

Trans: But how is it that what was incompetent earlier could acquire competence later or what was earlier competent lost competence later? No! (This is not the case.) Competence is in fact the productivity of its effect by the cause when it is accompanied by the auxiliaries of the latter. Contrariwise incompetence is nonproductivity of its effect by the cause if it is not accompanied by the auxiliaries of the latter or is accompanied by things other than these auxiliaries. And these are the innate properties of the causal entity. The auxiliaries however depend for their origination

upon their own respective efficient causes on account of which they occur at different times. So the ultimate product too occurs only at certain times (and not during the whole tenure of the cause).

Expl: If competence is the generic character of causal entities it will always inhere in it. So the cause must be productive throughout the span of its existence. This fresh contention is rebutted above by the opponent explaining the nature of competence in terms of production in the presence of the auxiliaries. Incompetence is likewise explained as nonproduction in the absence of auxiliaries. This is the innate nature of the cause. But this does not mean that the auxiliaries themselves form part of the nature of the cause. It is production and nonproduction under different conditions that constitute causal natures. But since the auxiliaries are different from the cause and come together only occasionally on account of the occasional nature of their respective causes the effect is produced only occasionally during the whole tenure of the cause.

The suggestion that the momentary could be productive at all times repudiated

Text: तथा अपि एक–काल–स्थ एव भावः जात–नष्टः लदा तदा तत्–कार्यं करोतु उत्पन्न–मात्रस्य तत्–स्वभावत्वात् एकदेश–स्थ–वत् इति चेत्? सा इयं एक–काल–स्थता स्वरूप–अपेक्षया सहकारि–साकल्य–अपेक्षया वा? आद्ये न किंचित् अपि अन्–उपपन्नं नित्यानां अपि एवंरूपत्वात। वर्तमान–एक–स्वभावत्वात् सर्व–भावानाम्। तत्–एव क्वचित् सावधि क्वचित निर्–अवधि इति विशेषः। द्वितीयः तु स्यात् अपि यदि तेषां यौगपद्यं भवेत्। क्रमेण तु सहकारिणः इति उक्तम्। सहकारि–सहितः स्वभावन करोति इति वक्तरि तु जात–नष्टः एव करोतु इति उत्तर–प्रसङ्गः निरर्गल–शैशवस्य इति अलं अनेन।

Trans: But can't a momentary entity (which is destroyed as soon as it originates) existing only at one moment produce its effect at all times (like the sense-organ, the impact of a bow on a musical instrument, etc. producing cognition in the self or the sound in space respectively, each existing at one place while producing its effects elsewhere) and this due to the fact that a cause is by nature productive of its effect at different times? Well ! If this is so it may be asked, 'Is this occurrence (of the cause) at the same time, relative to itself or to the collocation of the auxiliaries? If the

first is true there is nothing wrong. Even eternal entities are of this nature because all things are by nature existent at the time they exist in. But this existence is limited in the case of some and not so in the case of others. This is the difference (between the two kinds of existence). Even in the limited existence (of the cause) there are differences depending upon the long and short extension of the process and the product of the process (issuing initially from the cause). The second of the above alternatives could perhaps be maintained if the auxiliaries were simultaneously existent. But it has already been stated that the auxiliaries are only successive. So when we stated above that the cause is innately productive on being accompanied by auxiliaries the retort (of the Buddhist) that the momentary cause itself should be productive at all times is the manifestation of absolutely unrestrained puerility. Enough is enough!

Expl: Every object eternal or noneternal exists at its own time. So if existence at one time means existence at its own time then everything can be said so to exist. This existence is limited in some cases and is unlimited in others. Among the causes of limited existence some are distinguished by the fact that the processes initiated by them extend far beyond them and connect them with their ultimate effects. For example the sacrificial ritual does not lead directly to the attainment of its ultimate goal. A long intermediate process initiated by the ritual connects it with the goal.

But the existence at the same time could also be supposed to be relative to the existence of the auxiliaries and these occurring successively at different times cannot be taken to be always simultaneous with the cause. Thus the time of the occurrence of the cause will always be the same. As to the suggestion of the Buddhist that a momentary entity may produce its effect at other times, the opponent's answer is that the suggestion is quite irrelevant to the thesis maintained. The thesis entails that the time of the occurrence of the cause and that of the auxiliaries cannot always be the same because the latter have their own respective causes occurring at different times. The above suggestion has nothing to do with this conclusion.

Conclusion and a counter argument against momentariness

Text: तस्मात् कार्यस्य सः एव कालः कारणस्य तु सः च अन्यः च इति संबंधि–काल–अपेक्षया पूर्व–कालता–व्यवहारः। अपि च यदा तदा इति स्थाने यत्र तत्र इति प्रक्षिप्य तयोः एव प्रसङ्ग–तत्–बिपर्यययोः कः दोषः? न कश्चित् इति चेत्? तर्हिं देश–अद्वैतं वा कारण–भेदः वा आपद्येत। हेतु–फल–भाव–वाद वैरिणं अन्–अपोह्य तत्र प्रवेष्टुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। तत्–अपवादे वा सत्व–आख्य–साधन–शस्त्र–

संन्यासिनः तव बहिः–वाद–संग्राम–भुमौ अपि कुलः भयम?

Trans: Hence the time of the effect is its own time(when it occurs) while that of the cause is its own as well as that of the effects too. (Some causes do not last till the emergence of the effect while others continue even after the causal collocation has ceased to exist). So the usage regarding the antecedence of the cause is relative to the time at which the effect comes into being. Leaving this issue aside if we substitute the adverbs 'where' and 'there' in place of 'when' and 'then' in the conditional inferences and reformulate them (in order to prove the coexistence of incompatible properties in the momentary entity itself) what could be wrong (in the argument)? If nothing then the undeniable conclusion will follow that all places (where a cause can operate) are one or every cause (including the momentary one) is diversified. Well! we may accept these conclusions and equipped with them we may even enter the camp of the Yogācāra doctrine! No! (This is not possible). Without destroying the enemy, namely the doctrine of cause-effect relationship it is impossible to enter the Yogācāra fold. If however this doctrine is discarded then for you (the Buddhist) who has surrendered the weapon of reality too (along with causality) there is no cause for fear even in the battlefield of the reality of external objects.

Expl: It follows from the above explanation that the effect occurs only after the collocation of the causes has taken place while the cause may either antecede or coexist with the effect. Some causes go out of existence immediately after initiating the process that leads to the origination of the effect and some others like say, the yarn producing the cloth, survive the collocation of the auxiliaries and continue to exist even when the effect has come into being. (Having thus settled the issue for momentariness the opponent brings forward a serious objection against the inference for momentariness.) The inference uses premises which involve temporal qualifications for competence and productivity. If these temporal qualifications are replaced by spatial ones the resulting premises would be like these: 'If the seed sown in the soil and competent enough to produce the seedling is also competent to produce it elsewhere it should do so. But it does not do so. So if the seed productive of the seedling in the soil is not productive of it elsewhere it is not competent for this production although it is competent for the other production'. By means of these premises incompatible properties could be proved to coexist even in the momentary seed. Consequently even the momentary entity would have to be taken as split up into as many (momentary) entities as there are places of production. Again taking up any one of these entities productive only at a particular place the application of the above logic to it would lead to a further split in its being so that ultimately the causal entity would simply disintegrate into nothingness or its nature cannot be identified at all. This

difficulty can be overcome in one of two ways. It may be held that there is no place which is not the locus of the casual entity. When the seed is seen to be productive at one place it may be regarded as productive at all places. This means that all places are really one place. Alternately it may be held that all the different places are the loci of the same causal entity because it does not differ from place to place. This explanation is based on the reading of the word कारणभेद: in the text as कारणाभेद: which is accepted by some commentators. If the other reading is taken the explanation would be that the momentary entity is split up into innumerable entities and so the difficulty pointed out cannot be overcome. The argument has been adduced by the opponent mainly to highlight the point that if production and nonproduction at different places is not supposed to entail diversity of the cause then production and nonproduction at different times also cannot be supposed to entail diversity.

It may be contended against the above that the cause is only nonexistent at the places where it is not productive. On this account it need not be regarded as incompetent at one place when its competence is exhibited in production at a different place. Such a contention cannot stand as the Buddhists themselves have identified existence or reality with production of significant activity. If there is no production at certain places by a cause then at these places it has to be treated as unreal. Thus the cooccurrence of the incompatible properties of reality and unreality in the same entity cannot be avoided.

The foregoing argument can be presented even in a modified form. The seed produces the seedling in the soil in its capacity of the material cause of the latter. But the seed is also the efficient cause of certain products. If therefore the seed is competent both as a material and as an efficient cause, it should be productive of both kinds of its effects. If this became possible the loci of the two kinds of effect should be the same as there cannot be any reason for the diversity of the loci of the effects when their cause is an identical entity. Thus as a material cause the seed produces the seedling while as an efficient cause it produces its cognition. Can the soil and the self which are the respective loci of these effects be identified with each other? The Buddhist may respond to this question affirmatively by espousing the idealist position that there is no reality other than consciousness. This would imply that all the different places are identical in their ideal nature. The causal principle however cannot have any place in the ideal world. But if causality is supposed to hold good even in the world of consciousness then problems similar to those that are raised above can be raised in regard to this world too. For example a certain consciousness productive of an object (as consciousness) may or may not be productive at another time (as consciousness). If consciousness is not productive at all places simultaneously it cannot be

the same entity that it is taken to be. If on account of this difficulty the causal principle is given up while upholding idealism then the coexistence of incompatibles cannot be established by inference. Consequently momentariness too cannot be established. In such a situation the Buddhist can as well remain a realist as he would have gained nothing by espousing idealism.

The crux of the above argument is that the productivity and nonproductivity at different times are tantamount to productivity and nonproductivity at different places. If the latter pair can coexist in the causal entity the former pair also can.

The second of the above alternatives discussed and rejected

Text: ननु यावत्यः अर्थक्रियाः भिन्न–देशाः तावत्–भेदं कारणं अस्तु कः विरोधः इति चेत्? न। तेषां अपि प्रत्येकं तत्–प्रसङ्गस्य तत्–अवस्थत्वात्। एवं एकस्य जगति वस्तु–तत्वस्य अ–लाभे साध्वी क्षणभङ्ग–साधन–परिशुद्धिः।

Trans: Let then there be as many causal entities as there are the productive activities occurring in different places; what is inconsistent in such a view? Well, if this were true then each one of these (supposedly) different causal entities would have to be further differentiated (for example the seed in the soil is not productive in the granary, the seed in the granary is not productive at a different place and so on) on the basis of the conditional inferences which remain unrepudiated. Thus if no unitary entity is left in the world then the establishment of momentariness would very well be accomplished (an ironical remark)!

Expl: The Buddhist has misunderstood the purport of the objection of the opponent. He takes it to urge that the cause should execute all its productions occurring at different places at one and the same place. To this supposed objection the Buddhist's reply is that each of the activities having different causes, it cannot be expected that one and the same cause should execute all those activities occurring at different places. This is an irrelevant reply. The opponent's retort to this is that he wants to urge that a cause productive at one place and unproductive at another would by this very fact be rendered diverse. Thus even a momentary entity cannot be a single entity.

Flaw in the opponent's contention suspected

Text: अस्तु तर्हि कश्चित् दोषः एव अनयोः इति चेत्? सः पुनः कास्मिन् साध्ये? किं सामर्थ्य–अ–सामर्थ्ययोः कि वा तत्–विरूद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासेन

भेदे आहोस्वित् शक्ति–अ–शक्त्योः विरोधे ?

Trans: Let then there be some flaw (or fallacy) in the inferences (regarding production and nonproduction at different places). Well, if there is a flaw in the inferences what are their major terms? Is competence or incompetence or diversity due to cooccurrence of these or the incompatibility of productivity and unproductivity the major term in the inferences?

Expl: The Buddhist hints that the inferences adduced by the opponent may be faulty. The opponent asks him to state the inference which he suspects to be faulty. In the text productivity and nonproductivity, their coexistence and the diversity due to the latter are mentioned alike as major terms in the inferences which may appear incorrect. The point however is that the coexistence is directly to be inferred while the diversity is to be inferred indirectly.

The first of the above three alternatives rebutted

Text: न आद्यः। सर्वत्र सामर्थ्ये हि प्रसह्य करणात्, सर्वत्र अ–शक्तौ क्वाचित् अपि अ–करणात। सर्व–देश–समान–स्वभावत्वे अपि अस्य उपादान–देशे एव तत्–कार्यं करोति इति अयं अस्य स्वभावः स्व–कारणात् आयातः न नियोग–पर्यनुयोगौ अर्हति इति चेत? तर्हि सर्व–काल–समान–स्वभावत्वे अपि तत्–तत्–सहकारि–काले एव करोति इति अयं अस्य स्वभावः स्व–कारणात् आयातः इति किं न रोचयेः?

Trans: The first alternative is not tenable. If the causal entity is competent for production at all places it should enforce production at all places and if it is not so it should not produce anywhere. May it be urged that although the cause has the same nature at all places yet it has inherited from its own causes the (specific) character of producing its effect only at the place where the effect is located and that there cannot be any pros and cons about this fact? Yes, (this can be so) but then why don't you (the Buddhist) appreciate the exactly similar fact that although the cause is of the same nature at all times it produces its effect only at the time when there is collocation of the auxiliaries and this specific characteristic is inherited by the cause from its own causes?

Expl: If the inferences seeking to prove competence or incompetence at all places are faulty then the cause may be either only competent or absolutely incompetent (depending upon which of the inferences is

faulty).

In the text reference is made to the place of the material cause. This is to be taken as indicative of a specific place. In the theory of momentariness the cause can never coexist with its effect as the cause goes out of existence when the effect comes into existence.

The second alternative rebutted

Text: न द्वितीयः। विरूद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासेन अपि अ–भेदे भेद–व्यवहारस्य निर्–निमित्तकत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। अन्–ऐकांतिकः च हेतुः कालतः अपि भेदं न साधयेत्।

Trans: The second is not tenable. If notwithstanding the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties in it an entity is treated as unitary then the usage pertaining to difference would become uncaused. Moreover the middle term (incompatibility) thus rendered deviant (from the major) it would not lead to the inference of diversity even if it is qualified by temporal qualification.

Expl: If the inferences with diversity as major term are supposed to be faulty this would mean that nothing differs despite its being endowed with incompatible properties. So the usage pertaining to difference would be rendered uncaused. Moreover if coexistence of incompatible properties in respect of different places cannot prove diversity such a coexistence of incompatibles in respect of different times also cannot prove diversity.

The third alternative rebutted

Text: न तृतीयः। विरोध लक्षण–योगे बाधक–सहस्त्रेण अपि विरोधस्य अपनेतुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। अ–योगे वा तत् एव चित्यम्। यत्–विधाने यत्–निषेधः यत–निषेधे वा यस्य विधानं तयोः एकत्र धर्मिणि परस्पर–परिहार–स्यिततया विरोधः। सः च इह नास्ति। तत्–देश–कार्य–कारित्वं हि तत्–देश–कार्य–अ–कारित्वेन विरूद्धम्। तत्–विधौ तस्य नियमेन निषेवधात्। न पुनः देश–अंतरे तत–कार्य–अ–कारित्वेन। तस्य–अ–निषेधात्। न हि अन्यत्र तत्–अ–करणं अ–तत्–करणं वा तत्–करणस्य अभावः अपि तु तत्र तत्–अ–करणं इति चेत्? हन्त! एवंभूत विरोध–लक्षण–व्यावृत्तिः भिन्न–काल–शक्ति–अ–शक्तयोः अपि इति उक्त प्रायं तत् प्रतिसंदधीथाः।

Trans: The third (too) is untenable. If the sign of incompatibility is

present (in a place or an entity) thousands of contrary evidences cannot rule out the incompatibility. If however there is no such sign of incompatibility then the nature of this fact needs to be enquired into. Incompatibility consists of the mutual exclusion of two entities in the same locus when the affirmation or negation of one of them leads to the negation or affirmation of the other. Such incompatibility does not occur in the present case. The fact is that production at one place is incompatible with nonproduction at the same place. This is so because the affirmation of the first necessarily leads to the negation of the second. But production at one place is not opposed to nonproduction at a different place for the affirmation of the former does not negate the latter. Certainly nonproduction of a thing at a different place or production of a different thing at that place is not the absence of the production of the former at its own place. This nonproduction is in fact the absence of production of the thing at its own place. But if this is so then even in the case of production and nonproduction at different times by the same entity the fact of the absence of this characteristic of incompatibility has almost already been stated. This you (the Buddhist) should keep in mind.

Expl: If inferences with incompatibility as major term are faulty then there cannot be any incompatibility between competence and incompetence. But this is not the case. The two properties are incompatible because the affirmation of one of them leads to the negation of the other. This is however not the general nature of incompatibility. Cowness and horseness exclude each other but both are absent in a buffalo. So the above may be taken as the characteristic only of the incompatibility of a thing or property and its absence. Alternatively only cognitions alone may be supposed to be characterised by this kind of incompatibility. The cognition of the production of a thing at a certain place is opposed only to the cognition of nonproduction of that thing at that place and not to the cognition of the nonproduction of a different thing at a different place.

Another inference-pair to prove conccurrence of incompatibles mooted

Text: तस्मात् प्रसङ्ग–तत्–विपर्यय–स्थितौ अपि अ–सिद्धः विरू द्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः। ननु यत् एकदा यत् करोति तत् यावत् सत्वं तत् करोति एव यथा कश्चित् शब्द शब्दः–अंतरं इति प्रसङ्गः अस्तु? विपर्ययः तु यत् एकदा यत् न करोति तत् सर्वदा एव तत् न करोति यथा शिला–शकलं अङ्कुरम्। न करोति च एकदा कुसूलस्थं बीजं अङ्कुरं इति चेत्? लत् एतत् जाति–अभिप्रायेण वा स्यात् व्यँक्ति–अभि प्रायेण वां?

Trans: So even if the conditional inferences are upheld the cooccurrence of incompatibles is not established. But may there be this modus-ponens-type of inference viz. that 'whatever produces a thing at a certain time produces it necessarily throughout its existence as for example a sound-vibration (which is not immediately destructible) produces other sound-vibrations (as long as it exists)? Similarly may there be this modus-tollens-type of inference viz. that 'whatever does not produce a thing at a certain time does never produce it as for example the piece of stone does not produce the seedling and certainly the seed in the granary never produces the seedling?' Well, (If the inferences are valid it may be asked) whether the inferential proofs are concerned with a class of objects or single objects.

Expl: As explained above production and nonproduction at different times by the same entity cannot be mutually incompatible. It may be asked, 'Is a colour which is the efficient cause of pleasure in the self productive of the latter in its own locus or not? If it is not then the colour is both productive and nonproductive and there is cooccurrence of incompatibles. The question may however be answered by the stipulation that although the colour is productive of all its effects yet this productivity is restricted to certain times and places because of its own special causal ancestry. A similar answer can also be given to the inferential proof of the cooccurrence of incompatible properties in the same causal entity.

Now a different inferential proof is being adduced to prove the said cooccurrence. The example in the inference is the sound-vibration which is not on the point of fading. Such a vibration produces succeeding vibrations without fail. If no vibration followed the first vibration it would be productive only of its destruction.

In the inference cited in the text 'being productive of an effect at a certain time' is the middle term and 'being productive of the effect at all times' is the major term in the same inference, so 'not being productive at all times' will be the absence of the major term and this should be the middle term in the negative inference. But in the text 'not being productive at some time' is mentioned as the middle term in the negative inference. This is however not incorrect as 'not being productive at some time' is certainly the negation of 'being productive at all times'. 'Being productive at all times and at some times' are respectively negated or opposed by 'being non-productive at sometime or at all times'.

Objection that the inferences are fallacious

Text: प्रथमे। द्वयं अपि अन्–ऐकांतिकम्। अ–नियम दर्शनात्। द्वितीये द्वयं अपि अन्यथासिद्धम्। एकांत–अ–सामर्थ्य–प्रयुक्तत्वातं अत्यंत–अ–करणस्य। सामर्थ्ये सति सहकारि–संनिधि–प्रयुक्तत्वात् करण–नियमस्य।

Trans: On the first alternative (that is if the inferences are concerned with a class of entities) both of them are vitiated by the fallacy of deviant middle term as there is no concomitance (between the middle and major terms). On the second alternative (that is if the inferences are concerned with a single individual) then both of them are vitiated by the fallacy of irrelevant middle terms. This is due to the fact that absolute nonproduction by a cause is due to its absolute incompetence and the necessity of production by a competent cause is due to its being accompanied by its auxiliaries.

Expl: If the foregoing inferences concern a class of entities then since certain entities of a certain class are productive at some time while others of the same class are not so and again although certain entities of a certain class are not productive throughout their existence yet certain others of the same class are so the middle terms in both the inferences turn out to be deviant. So they are not concomitant with their major terms. The seed-class for example includes both the productive and non-productive seed-entities. If however the inferences are concerned with a single individual then since absolute nonproduction by a cause is due to its utter incompetence the middle term in the negative inference becomes irrelevant to the major. Again since the necessity of production by a cause is due to its competence as well as association with the auxiliaries the middle term in the positive inference turns out to be irrelevant to the major. Absolute incompetence as of the piece of stone for the seedling is intrinsic incompetence while the incompetence of the unproductive cause consists in the nonavailability of the auxiliaries to it.

Another pair of inferences rebutted

Text: एतेन यत् यत् करोति तत् तत् उत्पन्नमात्रं, यथा कर्म विभागम्। यत् उत्पन्नमात्रं यत् न करोति तत् न कदाचित् अपि, यथा शिला–शकलं अङ्कुरं इति निरस्तम। अत्र अपि पूर्ववत अन्–एकान्त–अन्यथासिद्धी दोषौ इति।

Trans: By the above rebuttal stand rebutted another pair of inferences like: 'whatever is productive is an entity which has just come into being as for instance is movement which produces disjunction immediately after its origination; whatever is not productive as soon as it has originated is never productive as the piece of stone is in relation to the seedling'. This inference-pair too is, like the earlier one afflicted by the fallacies of deviant and irrelevant middle terms.

Expl: In the N.V. view movement is supposed to exist for two moments only. In the second moment of its existence a movement produces disjunction of the moved object and in the third moment the conjunction

of the disjoined object with its original location is destroyed. The example of movement is cited because it is supposed to produce its effect as soon as it itself is produced.

These inferences too are vitiated by the very same fallacies as the earlier ones are vitiated by.

The third interpretation of incompatibility rebutted

Text: न अपि तृतीयः। कृतकत्व–अनित्यत्व–आदेः अपि परस्पर–अत्यंताभाववत्तामात्रेण एव विरोध–प्रसङ्गात् इति।

Trans: Nor is it the third. Even producibility (or artificiality) and noneternity etc. would then be mutually incompatible as they are different from each other.

Expl: Three interpretations of incompatibility were set forth earlier. Two of them had already been refuted. The third viz. difference is refuted here on the ground that different properties like artificiality and noneternity are equipollent and not mutually incompatible.

Objection that collocation of auxiliaries involves incompatibility

Text: अस्तु तर्हि तस्य एव लेन एव सहकारिणा संबंधः–अ–संबंधः च इति बिरोधः। विकल्प–अन्–उपपत्तेः। तथा हि संबंधिनः संबधि–अंतरे स्व–अभाव–स्वाभाव्यं विरूध्येत, अभाव–प्रतियोगित्वं वा तदा–एव इति सहितं वा तत्र एव इति सहितं वा उभय–सहितं वा तथा एव इति सहितं वा इति।

Trans: Let then the conjunction and non-conjunction of a cause with the same auxiliary be incompatible with each other. No! (This cannot be). No alterntive rational account (of such an incompatibility) can be given. To explain: Two relatives namely an auxiliary and its absence may be incompatible with each other because each of them is by nature the negation of the other, or any auxiliary entity is opposed to its absence (because there may not be the absence of an existent auxiliary) and therefore it is not the counterpositive of the absence, or no auxiliary is absent at a time anywhere when it is present somewhere at that time, or no auxiliary and its absence coexist at the same place or an auxiliary and its absence do not exist at the same place and time or finally these two are not contemporaneously coexistent in relation to the same patch of space.

Expl: Now the Buddhist calls in question the very possibility of the collocation of the auxiliaries on the ground that it leads to incompatibility. So six possible types of incompatibility are listed by the opponent and he seeks to show that none of these is involved in the collocation. The first type may arise thus: The conjunction of the auxiliaries is identical with the

conjuncts because the separate momentary conjuncts themselves give rise to the cognition of their being conjoined. But each of these is the negation of the other (as it excludes the other). This negation is identical with the negated according to the view (mainly advocated by Mīmāṃsā) that the locus of negation is identical with the negation. Thus the conjoined and its negation appear to coexist. For example if the pot is on the ground it is conjoined with the ground. But it is also the negation of the ground. So conjunction with the ground which is pot itself and its absence which is the same as the ground come together when the pot is located on the ground. In the case of the auxiliaries their mutual conjunction similarly involves incompatibility. Each auxiliary is the absence of the other, so if it is supposed to be conjoined with other auxiliaries both conjunction and its absence will have to be supposed to coexist. The second incompatibility arises because that which exists cannot be nonexistent. The third incompatibility is due to the fact that when an auxiliary exists somewhere its absence cannot be supposed to exist anywhere. The fourth is supposed to arise because an auxiliary cannot coexist with its absence. The fifth arises because an auxiliary and its absence are not coexistent at a certain time. The sixth and the last type of incompatibility arises because an auxiliary and its absence are not coexistent at a certain time in relation to a particular spot.

Rebuttal of the different types of incompatibility

Text: न प्रथमः, अन्–अभ्युपगमात्। न द्वितीयः। सत्कार्यवाद–प्रतिवेधात्। न तृतीयः प्राक् प्रध्वंसाभावयोः प्रतियोगि–समानकालत्व–अन्–अभ्युपगयात् न चतुर्थः। सः हि न तावत् स्थिति–यौगपद्य–नियमेन। संबेधिनोः तत्–असिद्धेः। इतः एव तत्–सिद्धौ इतरेतर–आश्रयत्वम्। नियम–सिद्धौ हि विरोध–सिद्धिः तत् सिद्धौ च भेदे सति नियम सिद्धिः इति। न च अन्यतः तत्–सिद्धिः। तत् अभावात्। अ–नियत–उपसर्पण–अपसर्पण कारण–प्रयुक्तत्वात् च सबंधं–अ–संबंधयोः। न अपि विनाशस्य अ–हेतुकवात् अयं विरोधः अर्थात् सिध्यति। तस्य अपि अ–सिद्धेः। ध्रुव–भावित्वे तु वक्ष्यामः। न अपि पंचमः। न हि तदा एव तत्र एव सः एव सहकारी अस्ति नास्ति च इति अभ्युपगच्छामः।

Trans: The first (version or cause of incompatibility) is not tenable as we do not admit (that one conjoined entity is the negation of another conjoined entity). The second is untenable as we deny the doctrine of

ever-existent effect. The third is not tenable as only the anterior and posterior negations of a thing are not admitted to be contemporaneous with it (the absolute or relational negation of a thing can certainly be contemporaneous with it). The fourth (too) is not tenable. This can be maintained only if conjoined or related entities are invariably coexistent but this is not established. If this invariable coexistence is sought to be proved on the basis of the incompatibility of a thing and its absence then the fallacy of mutual dependence arises. Only if the coexistence is proved the incompatibility is proved but only if the latter is proved the invariable coexistence is proved via the proof of (momentariness based on) diversity (of each of the auxiliaries). Nor is there any other proof for the invariability. Moreover the conjunction and nonconjunction of the auxiliaries are due to the presence and absence of their (respective) efficient causes which are only occasionally available. Nor is the incompatibility implicitly proved by the fact that the destruction of a thing must be (intrinsic to it or be) uncaused (by anything other than the thing destroyed) for this too is unproved. As to the inevitability of destruction (of things) we shall make certain observations later. Even the fifth is not tenable. Certainly we do not admit that the same auxiliary is and is not in the same place at the same time.

Expl: Since related entities are not by nature exclusive of each other the first version (or cause) of incompatibility cannot be maintained. The doctrine of the ever-existent reals (or effects) being unacceptable the second version too cannot be maintained. The anterior and posterior negations of a thing do not exist simultaneously with it but the absolute negation of the thing can certainly exist simultaneously with it. So the third version too cannot be upheld. The fourth could be maintained if all auxiliaries necessarily coexisted but this is not the case. Only if conjunction (of the auxiliaries) and its absence (in the conjoined entities) are proved mutually incompatible an entity characterised by them (at different times) can be proved to be momentary and on this basis the necessary coexistence of the auxiliaries can be proved. But such a proof involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. However if everything is admitted to be destructible by nature then universal momentariness can be established and on the basis of this the necessary togetherness of the auxiliaries for the production of their joint effect can be established. But the intrinsic destructibility of things is quite unacceptable. As to the fifth version, it is completely ruled out.

Objection based on the non-pervasive nature of collocation and its rebuttal

Text: ननु समवधानं नाम सहकारिणां धर्मः संयोगः भवद्भिः इष्यते। सः च तेभ्यः व्यतिरिक्तः अ–व्याप्यवृत्तिः च इति। तथा च सः एव तदा एव

तत्र एव अस्ति नास्ति च इति। अन्–अतिरेके स्थिर–वादिनः व्यस्तानि अपि बीज–वारि–धरणि–धामानि तानि एव इति तेभ्यः अपि कार्य–उत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्गः। व्याप्य–वृत्तित्वे च सर्वत्रं रक्त–आदि विभ्रमः शब्द–आदि–कार्य–उत्पति–प्रसङ्गः च। तस्मात् अ–संयुक्तेभ्यः अन्ये एव संयुक्त–स्वभावाः परमाणवः जाताः इति एव न्यायः। न एतत् एवम। क्षणिक–परमाणौ अपि अस्य विरोधस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। तथा हि पूर्वदिक्–अवस्थितः परमाणुः यथा परदिक्–अवस्थितेन परमाणुना अपर–दिक्–अवच्छेदेन आवृत–रूपः उत्पन्नः तथा एव किं–पुर्वदिक्–अवच्धेदेन अपि, न वा, उभयथा वा? आद्ये उभयतः अपि अन्–उपलब्धि–प्रसङ्गः। दित्तीये तु उभयतः अपि उपलंभ–आपत्तिः। तृत्तीये पुनः सः एव दुरात्मा विरोधः। सः एव तेन एव तदा एव आवृतः अन्–आवृतः च इति।

Trans: May it be that collocation is in fact admitted by you (the N.V. philosophers) to be a conjunctive property of the auxiliaries and different from them as also nonpervasive in nature, so it is quite possible that a thing both exists and does not exist at the same place and at the same time. On the other hand if collocation is nondifferent from the collocating entities then for the advocate of durability even the separate causal entities like the seeds, the water, the soil, the heat, etc. are the same as these entities in collocation and so each of these should be productive of the joint effect (the seedling). Further if collocation is pervasive in nature then a cloth (which is only partly red) should appear red all over. Similarly a sound (produced at a certain place) should pervade the whole of space. On this account it is better to admit that conjoined entities are different from the nonconjoined ones. A (composite entity like) pot for example is a group of atoms in conjunction which are quite different from themselves in the state of separation. All this however is not the truth in the matter. Even in the case of the momentary atom the incompatibility mentioned cannot be avoided. To explain: (It may be asked), 'Is an atom which has come into being (according to the Buddhist) as located in the east and therefore veiled by another atom located in the west, also veiled or not veiled or both veiled and not veiled in the east too? On the first alternative the atom would be invisible both in the east and in the west. On the second the atom would be visible in both the directions. On the third alternative however the same devil of incompatibility presents itself as the atom is to be regarded as both veiled and unveiled by the same entity.

Expl: In order to refute the sixth version of incompatibility it is necessary to prove that a thing and its absence cannot coexist simultaneously only at an identical patch of space. The discussion initiated above by the Buddhist leads him in the end to this very conclusion. The Buddhist asks whether collocation as conjunction is different from the collocating entities and is nonpervasive of its locus or not. If it is different and non-pervasive then the same entity can both be conjoined and not conjoined with its locus. If however collocation is identical with the collocating entities then conjoined and separate entities being identical with each other each of the collocating auxiliaries by itself should be able to produce the joint effect. Again if conjunction is pervasive of its locus then a partly red cloth should appear red all over the conjunction of the colouring substance being pervasive of the cloth. So also a sound produced at one place should be heard everywhere as the conjunction of the sounding substance with space which is the efficient cause of the generation of sound pervades the whole of space. On the basis of these arguments the Buddhist concludes that the conjoined or collocating entities are different from the nonconjoined ones. To demolish this conclusion the opponent argues that even in the case of the atom which has no measurable dimension conjunction engenders the same difficulty that it does in the case of gross objects. Atoms in combination are supposed to give rise to the appearance of the composite entity which is not real in the Buddhist view. These atoms are visible and also have a dimension which is measurable enough to be veiled. In the N.V. view veiling of one atom by another is not conceivable because the atomic dimension of the atom is quite different in nature from that of any gross object starting from the triad.

Reply to the contention that conjoined entities are different from the separate ones

Text: प्रकार–भेदं उपादाय अ–विरोधः इति चेत्? कः पुन असौ? दिक् – अंतर–अवच्छेदः। यदि हि यत्–दिक्–अंवच्छेदेन एव संयुक्तः तत्–दिक्–अवच्छेदेन एव असंयुक्तः अपि ततः विरोधः स्यात्। इह तु न एवं इति चेत्? हन्त! संयोग–संयोगिनोः भेद–पक्षे अपि यदि अयं सिद्धांत–वृत्तान्तः स्यात् कीदृशः दोषः इति। एतेन व्यतिरेक–पक्षः अपि निरस्तः।

Trans: Couldn't the above incompatibility involving the atom be got rid of by adopting some alternative strategy (like having different determinants for conjunction and nonconjunction)? Yes, but what is this strategy? It is the admission of different determinants. If at all an atom which happens to be conjoined (with another atom) in a certain direction is also

disjoined at the same direction then there will arise incompatibility. But it is not so in the present case. Well! If a similar theory is maintained in the case of conjunction and the conjuncts too how can there be then any fallacy? Thus even the negative concomitance (which depends upon positive concomitance) stands refuted.

Expl: The foregoing incompatibility can be removed if different determinants of conjunction and non-conjunction are admitted. The same can be said of the alleged incompatibility of the collocation of the auxiliaries. With different spatial determinants the auxiliaries may be supposed both to coexist and to remain separate.

Thus the positive concomitance of reality and momentariness having been refuted the negative one also stands refuted.

Special objections to negative concomitance based on the unreality of the terms involved

Text: अधिकं च तत्र आश्रय–हेतु–दृष्टांत–सिद्धौ प्रमाण–अभावः। अ–वस्तुनि प्रमाण–अ–प्रवृत्तेः। प्रमाण–प्रवृत्तौ अलीकत्वै–अन्–उपपत्तेः। एवं तर्हि अ–व्यवहारे स्व–वचन–विरोधः स्यात् इति चेत? तत् किं स्व–वचन–विरोधेन तत्र प्रमाणं उपदर्शितं भवति, व्यवहार–निषेध–व्यवहारः वा खंडितः स्यात, अ–प्रामाणिकः अयं व्यवहारः अवश्य–अभ्युपगंतन्यः इति वा भवेत?

Trans: In the case of the proof of the negative concomitance there are the additional fallacies of the absence of any valid proof for maintaining the reality of the minor, middle and the example. No valid proof can be concerned with the unreal. If it can then the object of the proof cannot be unreal. But if thus the unreal cannot be the object of any discourse won't this result in self-inconsistency of the opponent's own speech? Yes! But (by way of reply) it may be asked whether by pointing out inconsistency in the opponent's speech some valid proof for the unreal is presented, or the (opponent's) denial of the possibility of sensible reference to the unreal is itself denied or lastly it is sought to be maintained that even the irrational reference to (or discourse about) the unreal has necessarily to be admitted.

Expl: The negative inference for momentariness is like this: 'whatever is nonmomentary is unreal because it is not productive of any effect'. In this inference 'nonmomentary' is the minor term while 'nonproduction either successively or simultaneously' and 'the tortoise-hair' are respectively the middle term and the example. All these are fictitious entities. So the existence of the middle in the minor and the coexistence of the major and

the middle in a certain locus cited in the example which are some of the essential conditions of inference cannot be secured owing to the nonavailability of the terms involved. This is the opponent's objection to the inference to which the Buddhist's counterobjection is that if the unreal cannot be talked about then even its denial by the opponent would be rendered self-contradictory, for the unreal cannot be the object even of denial which is also a sensible discourse. Countering this objection the opponent asks three questions of the Buddhist: 1. 'Does the self-inconsistency of the denial of the unreal lead to any valid proof of the unreal?' 2. 'Is the discourse of denial ruled out by the inconstancy? and 3. 'Is this invalid discourse about the unreal to be necessarily entertained?

The first of the above questions answered negatively and the second answered affirmatively

Text: न तावत् प्रथमः। न हि विरोध–सहस्त्रेण अपि स्थिरे तस्य क्रम–आदि–विरहे वा शशशृङ्गे वा प्रत्यक्षं अनुमान वा दर्शयितुं शक्यम्। तथात्वे वा कृते भौत–कलहेन। द्वितीयः तु इत्ष्यते एव प्रामाणिकैः। अ–वचनं एव तार्हि प्राप्तम्। कि कुर्मः? यत्रं वचनं सर्वथा एव अन्–उपपन्ने तत्र अवचनं एव श्रेयः। त्वं अपि परिभावय तावत् निः–प्रामाणिके अर्थे मूक–वावदूकयोः कतरः श्रेयान्?

Trans: As to the first, the answer is 'no'. Despite thousands of self-inconsistencies no valid proof, perceptual or inferential can be adduced for the reality of the durable (in the Buddhist view) or its nonproduction successively or simultaneously or the hare's horn (the example in the inference). If some proof could be adduced then there would be no occasion for any futile debate over the issue. As to the second question, reliable persons do admit the fact (that the discourse pertaining to the denial of discourse regarding the unreal is ruled out.) Of course this admission leads only to silence. What else can one do in these circumstances? In a situation where any utterance is absolutely irrational it is best to keep mum. You (the Buddhist) too should consider whether it is better to be a dumb or talkative (person) when an irrational object is being considered.

Expl: For all the inconsistency of the denial of the unreal it cannot be proved real. If it can, then there would not be any occasion to discuss the issue. As to the contention that even the denial of the discourseablility of the unreal is not proper, the answer is that the contention is justified. Even the denial should not be made. Silence is the best course when any reference to the unreal happens to be made. This is not because one is ignorant. It is so because there is nothing worth affirming or denying on

such an occasion.

Objection that the opponent is not silent on the issue and its answer

Text: एवं विदुषा अपि भवता न मूकीभूय स्थितं अपि तु व्यवहारः प्रतिषिद्धः एव अ–सति-इति चेत्? सत्यम्। यथा अ–प्रामाणिकः स्व–वचन–विरुद्धः अर्थः मा प्रसाङ्शीत् इति मन्यमानेन त्वया अ–प्रामाणिकः एव असति व्यवहारः स्वीकृतः तथा अस्माभिः अपि प्रमाण–चिंतायां अ–प्रामाणिकः व्यवहारः मा प्रसाङ्क्षीत् इति मन्यमानैः अ–प्रामाणिकः एव स्व–वचन–विरोधः स्वीक्रियते। यदि तु उभयत्रः अपि भवान् समान–दृष्टिः स्यात् अस्मामिः अपि तदा न किंचित् उच्येत इति।

Trans: But then despite your (opponent's) awareness of this (undiscourseability of the unreal) you have not kept mum. Instead you have certainly denied the possibility of discourse about the unreal. (How to account for this?) Yes, (it is true). But just as you (the Buddhist) entertain discourse about the unreal with a view to ward off the possibility of acceptance of a position opposed to what you have stated so we (the non-Buddhists) too, in the course of our query into the proof for momentariness entertain selfinconsistent discourse which is only invalid. The purpose in doing this is (only) to ward off any irrational discourse about the unreal. If you view both the kinds of discourse impartially then we too shall not say anything against you.

Expl: If the unreal is not a fit subject of discourse how does the non-Buddhist engage in the negative discourse about the unreal? To this question the non-Buddhist gives the reply that both he and the Buddhist are obliged to take recourse to the discourse about the irrational or the unreal. The Buddhist's object in doing this is to rule out by means of it any view opposed to his own. But the non-Buddhist does this only to instruct his students. The Buddhist has propounded the concomitance of reality and momentariness. Now someone may point out that the hare's horn is not momentary. To answer such an objection the Buddhist may point out that the hare's horn if nonmomentary is unreal and so the concomitance of reality and momentariness is not affected. Thus the Buddhist's discourse about the unreal though irrational is essential. Similarly the non-Buddhist too has to engage in the irrational discourse about the unreal in order to instruct his students that the Buddhist's inference is not the right kind of inference. No inference is possible with unreal minor, and middle examples. If the Buddhist does not try to establish the negative concomitance of unreality and nonmomentariness with the help of the unreal example the non-Buddhist too will have no occasion to refute him

and thus get indirectly involved in irrational discourse.

The third alternative refuted

Text: तृतीये तु अ–प्रामाणिकः च अपि अवश्य–अभ्युपगंतव्यः च इति कस्य इयं आज्ञा इति भवान् एव प्रष्टव्यः। व्यवहारस्य सुदृढ–निरूढत्वात् इति चेत? अ–प्रामाणिकः च सुदृढ–निरूढ़ च इति व्याघातः। कथंचित् अपि व्यवस्थितत्वात् इति चेत्? अ–प्रामाणिकः चेत् न कथंचित् अपि व्यवतिष्ठते। प्रामाणिकः चेत् तत् एव उच्यतां इति वादे व्यवस्था।

Trans: As to the third (alternative), you (the Buddhist) alone should be asked to tell us as to who laid it down that a usage which is irrational has necessarily to be accepted. May it be that it is so because such a usage is firmly established? No! Irrationality and being firmly established cannot go together. Could the usage be somehow (through ignorance or misconception) established? No! If the usage is irrational it cannot be established in any manner. If however it is rational then you should state the reasons themselves sustaining the validity of the usage. This is the way one has to proceed in a discourse which is aimed at the ascertainment of truth about the object of the discussion.

Expl: The third alternative states that even irrational usages are necessarily acceptable. This however cannot be conceded as what the usage is concerned with can never be accepted. Prejudice or ignorance may be behind a usage but it cannot be firmly established by means of these. No amount of prejudice can sustain a usage for long. Only a valid proof can help establish a usage. So if there is such a proof for the usage it has to be explained. Of the three types of discussions mentioned earlier, the one called Vāda whose object is to explore truth proceeds only by the use of valid proofs.

Refutation continued

Text: जल्प–वितंडयोः तु पक्ष–आदिषु प्रमाण–प्रश्न–मात्र–प्रवृत्तस्य न स्व–वचन–विरोधः। तत्र प्रमाणेन उत्तरं अनिष्टं अ–शक्यं च। अ–प्रमाणेन एव तु उत्तरे स्व–वचनेन एव भङ्गः। मत्–उक्तेषु पक्ष–आदिषु प्रमाणं नास्ति इति स्वयं एव स्वीकारात्। अन्–उत्तरे तु अ–प्रतिभा एव इति।

Trans: So far as the other two kinds of discussion known as *'jalpa'* and

'*vitaṇḍā*' are concerned the opponent (of the Buddhist position) in these discussions has only to ascertain the proof for what the Buddhist maintains. (The opponent is not interested in stating his own views in these discussions.) So the opponent cannot be charged of inconsistent speech. The Buddhist cannot meet the opponent's demand by means of a rational statement. Such an attempt on his part would be undesirable. If however the Buddhist seeks recourse only to irrational discourse to answer his opponent then he is convicted out of his own mouth as he himself would have confessed that whatever view he has stated is (irrational or) without proof. But if he doesn't give any answer and keeps mum then he is chargeable as ignorant.

Expl: In the other two kinds of discussions whose main object is only to defeat the opponent the non-Buddhist is interested—not in stating his own view—but only in ascertaining the proof for the Buddhist's view. So he cannot be charged of inconsistent speech. With regard to the referends of words like 'hare's horn' used by the Buddhist in the inference the non-Buddhist may ask, if a hare can be horned or horns can be associated with the hare. Thus he can avoid inconsistent and irrational speech. But the Buddhist cannot so avoid irrational speech. He cannot but refer to the unreal in his inference and if he confesses that the referends of his statement are unreal he is convicted out of his own mouth. But if he doesn't say anything in reply to his opponent's question even then he will be convicted of being ignorant.

The usage regarding the unreal shown to be inconsistent

Text: यदि च व्यवहार–स्वीकारे विरोध–परिहारः स्यात् असौ स्वीक्रियेत आपि। न तु एवम्। न खलु सकल–व्यवहार–अ–भाजनं च तत्–निषेध–व्यवहार–भाजनं च इति वचनं परस्परं अ–विरोधि।

Trans: If however by admitting the usage the inconsistency could be avoided then one would even admit it but this is not the case. Certainly the two statements that 'the unreal is not the object of any usage' and 'it is the object of a negative usage' are not mutually noncontradictory.

Expl: It is not that the unreal cannot be the object of positive discourse only. Even negative discourse regarding it is ruled out. The unreal is as a matter of fact beyond any discourse. So to treat it as an object of negative discourse is to invite the charge of inconsistency.

An objection to the above and its reply

Text: विधि–व्यवहारमात्र–अभिप्रायेण अभाजनत्व–वादे कुतः विरोधः इति चेत्? हन्त! सकल–विधि–निषेध–व्यवहार–अ–भाजनत्वेन किंचित्

व्यवह्रियते न वा? उभयथा अपि स्व–वचन–विरोधः । उभयथा अपि अ–वस्तुना एव तेन भवितत्यम्। वस्तुनः सर्व–व्यवहार–विरह–अन्–उपपत्तेः।

Trans: But if the unreal is regarded inaccessible only to positive usage or discourse how can there be then any inconsistency? No! (This cannot be). It may then be asked, 'Is there anything or not which is (referred to as the object of the usage *as a thing which is beyond all positive and negative usages'? Both the alternative replies to this question entail self-contradiction in the reply. On either alternative the referend of the usage must be a nonentity as an entity cannot be beyond the purview of all usages.

Expl: It may be contended that the unreal is inaccessible only to positive usage or discourse. So negative usage about it need not be denied. In reply to this contention the non-Buddhist poses a dilemma to the Buddhist. He asks if there is anything which could be characterised as inaccessible to positive and negative usages. If the answer to this poser is 'yes' then there must be something which is beyond all usages and so it must be a nonentity. But if the answer is 'no' then the negation to be significant its counterpositive must be a known entity but because it is beyond all usage it must be a nonentity.

Elucidation of the above

Text: न इति पक्षे सकल–विधि–निषेध–व्यवहार–विरहि इति अनेन एव व्यवहारेण विरोधात्। अ–व्यवहृतस्य निषेद्धुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। व्यवह्रियते इति पक्षे अपि विषय–स्वरूप–पर्यालोचनया एव विरोधात्। न हि सर्व–व्यवहार–अ–विषयः च व्यवह्रियते च इति।

Trans: If the answer (to the above question) is 'no' then since nothing which is not the object of any usage can be negated there has to be some usage about the unreal but this contradicts the characterisation of the subject term as what is inaccessible to all positive and negative usages. But even if the answer is 'yes' the contradiction becomes obvious simply by examining the nature of that which is affirmed. Certainly it cannot be the case that something is beyond the purview of all usage (as signified by the subject term) and is also the object of the positive usage.

Expl: The contradiction involved in both the positive and negative answers to the above question is brought out here. What is recognised as inaccessible to all positive and negative usages is by this recognition itself rendered accessible to a usage embodied in this recognition. So there is

contradiction even in the negation of that which is inaccessible to all usages. Unless the nature of the term negated is properly apprehended it cannot be negated and this apprehension involves the recognition that the subject of denial is inaccessible to any usage. But, for that matter even the positive answer to the above question is bound to involve the apprehension of the inaccessibility of the subject to all usages. Now this inaccessibility militates against the affirmation representing a usage which is embodied in the positive answer. Thus by means of the above dilemma the unreality of that which is inaccessible to all usages is established. Whether we affirm or deny the discourseability of what is inaccessible to all discourse, in either case it has to be regarded as unreal.

Objection that negative usage regarding the unreal is justifiable and its rejoinder

Text: यदि च अन्वस्तुनः निषेध–व्यवहार–गोचरत्वं विधि–व्यवहार–गोचरत्वं अपि किं न स्यात् प्रमाणं भावस्य उभयत्र–अपि तुल्यत्वात्? वंध्या–सुवस्य अ–वक्तृत्वे अ–चेतनत्व–आदिकं एव प्रमाणत् वक्तृत्वे तु न किंचित् इति चेत् ? हन्त ! तत्र अपि सुतत्वस्य विधमानत्वान्। न हि–वंध्यायाः सुतः न सुतः तथा सति स्व–वचन–विरोधात्। वचनमात्रं एव एतत् न तु परमार्थतः सुत एव असौ इति चेत्? न। अ–चैतन्यस्य अपि एवं रूपत्वात्। चेतनात् अन्मत् स्वभाव–अंतरं एव हि अ–चैतन्यं इति उच्मते। चैतन्य–निवृत्तिमात्रं एव इह विवक्षितं तत् च संभवति एव इति चेत् न? तत्र अपि असुतत्व–निवृत्ति मात्रस्य एव विवाक्षितत्वात्।

Trans: If the unreal is (supposed to be) something that may be the object of the negative usage why shouldn't it be supposed to be the object of the positive usage too? So far as the rational basis of the usage is concerned it is alike absent in both cases. But isn't it the case that (for example) the absence of speakership in the barren woman's son is provable by means of the presence of unconsciousness in him but his speakership cannot be proved by means of any middle term? No! Even in the barren woman's son sonness is present and by its means his speakership can be established. Certainly it is not the case that the barren women's son is not a son. If it were so then your own statement about him would become self-contradictory. But couldn't it be urged that this statement is simply meaningless and the barren woman's son is not in reality a son at all? No! (If it were so then) even unconsciousness does not characterise the barren woman's son. This is so because unconsciousness is spoken of as a certain

positive property other than consciousness (and this cannot characterise an unreal entity). But couldn't it be urged that only the exclusion of consciousness is meant by this word and that this exclusion is certainly present in the barren woman's son? No! In the other case too only the exclusion of the property of not being a son may be supposed to be meant by the word 'son' (and so this exclusion could very well be present in the barren woman's son).

Expl: To prove that even the unreal can be the object of denial the Buddhist gives the reason that a negative middle term can prove the denial but no positive middle term present in the unreal being available the unreal cannot be the object of any affirmation. This argument is being countered here. If a predicate can be meaningfully negated of the unreal some predicate—specially that by means of the designation of which reference is made to it—can also be meaningfully affirmed of it. If a positive predicate cannot be ascribed to the unreal the negative too cannot. Here it should be noted that a negative predicate like 'Being unconscious' may be understood in two ways namely, positively and negatively. As understood positively the predicate stands for a property other than that which is indicated by the predicate-word excluding the negative particle. But understood negatively the predicate stands for the mere absence of the property which the predicate-word without the negative particle indicates. These two modes of understanding the negative predicate are known as '*paryudāsa*' and '*prasajyapratiṣedha*' respectively. The argument of the opponent is that just as the apparently negative predicate can be viewed both negatively and positively so the apparently positive predicate also can be viewed both negatively and positively. Therefore both meaningful denial and meaningful affirmation of a predicate can be made in regard to the unreal.

Another objection that the positive predicate is ascribable to the unreal answered

Text: असुतत्व–निवृत्तिमात्रस्य स्वरूपेण कुति–ज्ञस्योः अ–सामर्थ्ये समर्थ अर्थ–अंतरं अध्यवसेयं अन्–अंतर्भाव्य कुतः हेतुत्वं इति चेत् न। अ–चैतन्ये अपि अस्य न्यायस्य समानत्वात्। व्यावृत्ति–रूपं अपि तत् एव गमकं यत् अ–तस्मात् एव। यथा शिंशापात्वम। वंध्या–सुतः तु असुत्तात् इव घट आदेः सुतात् अपि देवदत्त–आदे व्यावर्तते अतः न हेतुः इति चेत्? ननु इदं अ–चैतन्ये अपि अस्य एवंरूपं एव। न हि वंध्या–सुतः चेतनात् इव देवदत्त–आदेः अ–चेतन–आदि–काष्ठ–आदेः न व्यावर्तते।

Trans: But mere negation of the property of not being a son is not competent to produce any activity or cognition and so how can it act as a middle term if it does not incorporate within itself some competent and recognisable property? Well Such a criticism applies even in the case of 'unconsciousness' (used as middle term). But couldn't it be urged that among things which are of the nature of exclusion only that can act as middle term (leading to the cognition of the major) which is excluded only by what is other than it, as for example is the property of Aśoka-treeness which is excluded by everything other than the Aśoka-tree: but the barren woman's son is excluded as much from things like the pot which are other than a son as from persons like Devadutta who are sons and so it cannot be a middle term? Well ! Even this unconsciousness of the barren woman's son is just like this (the exclusion of not being a son). Certainly it is not the case that the barren woman's son is not excluded from both the conscious Devadutta and other persons and unconscious objects like stocks and stones.

Expl: Sonness as the exclusion of nonsonness (as per the doctrine of 'Apōha') is not different from the property of unconsciousness. Both the exclusions are unreal according to the Buddhist who earlier objected that the mere exclusion of nonsonness is incompetent to produce any action or cognition and so unless some positive property cognised in indeterminate cognition (which alone is a true cognition) is a part of the exclusion of nonsonness, nonsonness cannot act as middle term to prove the speakership of the barren woman's son. If the two exclusions are equally unreal no discrimination can be made between them as to their being treated as valid middle terms. The Buddhist contends against this that the sonness peculiar to the barren woman's son is such that it is excluded both from sons and things other than sons. The sonness characteristic of real persons is not such as it excludes only things other than sons. Such is also the case with properties like Aśoka-treeness which excludes only things other than Aśoka-trees. Since the barren woman's son is neither a son nor anything other than a son the sonness or the exclusion of nonsonness peculiar to it cannot act as a middle term as it will be afflicted by the fallacy of being too restricted in scope. To this contention the simple answer of the opponent is that even unconsciousness peculiar to the barren woman's son is excluded from both conscious and unconscious entities and as such it is restricted in scope. So it too cannot act as middle term. The real and the unreal being quite different from each other the exclusions characterising the real and the unreal cannot be the same.

Another objection refuted

Text: वक्तृत्वं वस्तु–एक नियतः धर्मः सः कथं अवस्तुनि साध्ये विरोधात्

इति चेत्? सः पुनः अयं विरोधः कुतः प्रमाणात् सिद्धः? किं वक्तृत्व-विविक्तस्य अ-वस्तुनः नियमेन उपलंभात् आहोस्वित् वस्तु-विविक्तस्य वक्तृत्वस्य अन्-उपलंभात् इति? न तावत् अ-वस्तु केन-अपि प्रमाणेन उपलंभ-गोचरः। तथात्वे वा न अवस्तु न अपि उत्तरः। समानत्वात्। न हि वक्तृत्वं इव अवक्तृत्व अपि वस्तु विविक्तं कस्यचित् प्रमाणस्य विषयः।

Trans: But mayn't it be contended (against this) that speakership is a property peculiar to real entities only and as such it cannot be proved of the unreal when the two—the unreal and the property—are incompatible with each other. Yes! But by what valid proof is this incompatibility established? Is it established by means of the regular cognition (as proof) of the unreal as bereft of speakership or the regular noncognition of speakership as dissociated from the real? Certainly the unreal is not apprehended by any true cognition. If it were, it cannot be unreal. Nor is the second (alternative) tenable for the same reason. Just like speakership nonspeakership too as dissociated from the real is not the object of any valid cognition.

Expl: Earlier it was shown that a positive property like sonness can act as middle term for proving the speakership of the unreal barren woman's son. Now it is being shown that spearkership too can play the role of the major term in the inference and so there cannot arise the fallacy of absent major. The opposition of speakership and the unreal may be established either by the regular apprehension of the unreal as bereft of speakership or the regular nonapprehension of speakership as disassociated from the real. The first is not true as the unreal is not validly apprehended. The second (nonapprehension) too is not true. There is no valid ground for this nonapprehension. Just like speakership nonspeakership as dissociated from the real is not validly proved to be apprehensible. Mere (unproved) apprehension of nonspeakership cannot prove anything. So non-speakership too cannot be proved of the unreal if speakership cannot. Just as speakership is not apprehended in the unreal and so it is supposed to be concomitant with the property of reality so nonspeakership too is not apprehended in the unreal because of which it too has to be regarded as concomitant with the property of reality.

In the text 'dissociated from the real' is to be interpreted as 'associated with that which is other than the real.'

Objection that false cognition of absence of speakership in the unreal is possible, refuted

Text: नत्–विविक्त–विकल्पमात्रं तावत् अस्ति इति चेत्? तत्–संसृष्ट–विकल्पने अपि कः वारयिता? ननु वक्तृत्वं वचनं प्रति कर्तृत्वं तत् कथं अ–वस्तुनि तस्य सर्व–सामर्थ्य–विरह्–लक्षणत्वात् इति चेत? अ–वक्तृत्वं अपि कथं तत्र तस्य वचन–इतर–कर्तृत्यत्व–लक्षणत्वात इति? सर्व–सार्मथ्य–विरहे वचन–सामर्थ्य–विरहः न विरूद्धः इति चेत्? अथ सर्व–सासर्थ्य–विरहः वंध्या–सुतस्य कुतः प्रमाणात् सिद्धः? अ–वस्तुत्वात एव इति चेत्? ननु एतत् अपिकुतः सिद्धम्? सर्व–सामर्थ्य – विरहात् इति चेत्? सः अयं इतस्ततः केवलैः वचनः निर्धन–आधमर्णिकः इव साधून् भ्रामयन् परस्पर–आश्रय– दोषं अपि न पश्यति।

Trans: But isn't it true that there can be mere (illusory) cognition of nonspeakership as dissociated from the real (so that there could arise the cognition that the barren woman's son is a speaker)? Yes, (it is true) but then who can deny the similar illusory cognition of the unreal as characterised by speakership? (This too must be deemed as possible.) But is it not a fact that speakership is agency in relation to speaking and this cannot occur in the unreal which by nature is devoid of all competence? Yes, but then how can nonspeakership too occur in the unreal when this property is the same as agency in relation to things other than speaking? May it be that the absence of competence for speaking is not incompatible with the absence of all competence (in the unreal)? Well! If it is so we ask, 'By what valid proof is it established that the barren woman's son is devoid of all competence?' If the answer is that this is established by the barren woman's son's unreality itself, then again we ask,'How this too is established'? Then the answer will be, 'By means of absence of all competence in the barren woman's son'. Thus it is quite evident that this debater —the Buddhist —is behaving like an insolvent debtor who just goes on dodging his decent creditors without repaying their debts. The Buddhist too goes on arguing in a vicious circle without realising that the fallacy of mutual dependence is vitiating all his arguments.

Expl: Now the Buddhist argues that even if there is no valid cognition of nonspeakership as dissociated from the unreal there can certainly be such a false cognition and that is sufficient for the negative usage regarding the unreal. This however will not do as there can be such a cognition of the positive property too. If again it is argued that speakership is a special type

of competence and this cannot occur in the unreal which is devoid of all competence then it can be counterargued that nonspeakership is (on the '*paryudāsa*' interpretation of negation) agency in relation to an activity different from that of speaking and this cannot be present in the unreal. This may be challenged if the other interpretation of negation is adopted and nonspeakership is construed as the mere absence of speakership which is a special type of competence. The unreal being absolutely incompetent it could be apprehended as being devoid of this special competence. But the total incompetence of the unreal cannot be apprehended as shown above without incurring the fallacy of mutual dependence.

Another minor objection and its rebuttal

Text: क्रम–यौगेपध–विरहात् इति चेत? न। तत्–विरह–सिद्धौ अपि प्रमाण–अनुयोगस्य अनुवृत्ते। सुतत्वे च परामृश्यमाणे तत्–अ–विना–भूत–सकल–वक्तृत्व–आदि–धर्म–प्रसक्तौ कुतः क्रम–यौगपद्य–साधनस्य अवकाशः? कुतस्तरां च अ–वक्तृत्व–साधनस्य? कुतस्तमां च अ–वक्तृत्व–आदि–साधनानाम्? तस्मात् प्रमाणं एव सीमा व्यवहार–नियमस्य। तत्–अतिक्रमे तु अ–नियमः एव इति।

Trans: (Couldn't the absence of all competence in the unreal be proved) by its inability for production either successively or simultaneously? No! Even if this inability is proved of the unreal the argument will not stop there (for pushing the argument through intermediate inferences we shall be brought back to this inability itself). Moreover by means of the positive middle term 'sonness' we can prove at one stroke the speakership, successive and simultaneous productivity, reality etc. of the unreal so that there will not arise any occasion to prove absence of this kind of productivity in the latter. And if this is not proved of the unreal how at all can unreality be proved of it? In the absence of this proof there is least possibility of the proof of nonspeakership of the unreal. So (it has to be admitted that) all usage is regulated by (valid) reason only. If reason is contravened there will be nothing but confusion.

Expl: To the above objection of the non-Buddhist that the proof of absolute incompetence of the unreal involves mutual dependence, the Buddhist gives the reply that by means of the middle term 'nonproduction either successively or simultaneously, absolute incompetence of the unreal can very well be proved. This is countered by the opponent by showing how this proof too involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. Nonproduction proves incompetence which proves unreality which in its turn proves nonproduction (successive or simultaneous). Thus circularity

infects this proof also. On the other hand the positive middle term 'sonness' can be used to prove at one stroke all the properties associated with it so that there will not occur any circularity in this proof. There will also be no occasion for proving nonproduction etc. and thereby nonspeakership of the unreal, once all positive properties are proved of the unreal. Thus there appears to be greater reason for making the positive predication than the negative one about the unreal. The right conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that the unreal cannot be the object of either positive or negative predication. All predication or usage is strictly governed by reason. If reason is contravened there will result only confusion.

The confusion resulting from irrational discourse illustrated

Text: न हि अ–प्रतीते देवदत–आदौ सः किं गौरः कृष्णः वा इति वैयात्यं विना प्रश्नः। तत्र अपि यदि एकः अ–प्रतीत–परामर्श–विषयः एव उत्तरं ददाति न गौरः इति अपरः अपि किं न दद्यात् न कृष्णः इति? न च एवं सति काचित् अर्थसिद्धिः प्रमाणा–भाव–विरोधयोः उभयत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात् इति।

Trans: Certainly if (for example) Devadutta is not seen none can ask whether he is fair or dark without impudence (or brazeness). Even if such a question is asked by someone and a certain listener answers it without ascertaining who the object of the reference of the demonstrative term is, that 'he is not fair', then another too may answer the question by saying that 'he is not dark'. But nothing will be known from such statements as absence of valid proof and inconsistency will be common to both (the answers).

Expl: If the limit imposed by reason is crossed in our usages or discourses only confusion results. This is illustrated in the above example. The unknown Devadutta is just like the unreal entity. One cannot make any positive or negative statement about him; if one dares to make a certain negative statement about him another can also make an opposite kind of statement. Neither can be challenged. So regarding the unreal or the irrational neither a positive nor a negative statement or predication can be made.

The objection that usage is determined by simple cognition discussed and refuted

Text: ननु अ–प्रतीते व्यवहार–अभावः इति युक्तम्। कूर्म–रोम–आदयः तु प्रतीयंते एव। न हि एते विकल्पाः कंचित् अर्थ–भेदं अन्–उल्लिखंतः

एव उत्पद्यंते। न च प्रमाण–आस्पदं एव व्यवहार–आस्पदं इति। तत् न युक्तम्। तथा हि शश–विषाणं इति ज्ञानं अन्यथारख्यातिः वा स्यात असत्ख्यातिः वा? न तावतः आद्यः ते रोचते। तथा सति हि किंचित् आरोप्यं किचित् आरोप–विषयः इति स्यात्। तथा च आरोप–विषयः तत्र एव अस्ति आरोपणीयः तु अन्यत्र एव इति जितं नैयायिकैः। न अपि द्वितीयः। कारण–अन्–उपपत्तेः। इंद्रियस्य ज्ञान–जनने विषय–आधिपत्येन एव व्यापारात्। लिङ्ग–शब्द–आभासयोः अन्ययारख्याति मात्र जनकत्वात्। अपहस्तित स्वार्थयोः च असत्रख्याति –जनकत्वे शशविशाणं–शब्दात् कूर्मरोमादि–विकाल्पानां अपि उत्पति–प्रसङ्गात् नियामक–अभावात्।

Trans: May it be that only that which is not cognisable is not the object of any usage or discourse? Things like tortoise-hair etc. are certainly cognised (falsely of course). Certainly the cognitions having the form of tortoise-hair etc. do not emerge without apprehending some special (object or) content. And certainly it is not the rule that only what is validly cognisable is discoursable? No! (This is not correct). To explain: We ask, 'Is the cognition of the form, "this is hare's horn" a mistaken cognition or a cognition of the non-existent?' The first alternative does not appeal to you. If it were correct then there will be in the cognition something which is mistaken and something else which it is mistaken as. So the object of the mistake or the mistaken thing exists at the very place (where the cognition takes place) and that which the latter is mistaken as also exists at some other place. Thus it is the view of the Nyāya thinkers that comes to prevail (if the first alternative is accepted). The second alternative however cannot be upheld. There cannot be any cause for the cognition of the unreal. The senses produce the cognition of their objects only with their (essential) cooperation. False inferences or inferential middle terms and false verbal statements produce only false or mistaken cognitions of their respective objects. If however these produced the cognitions of those things that are not their objects at all then words like 'hare's horn' would produce the cognition of the tortoise-hair etc. as there is nothing to regulate the meanings of words.

Expl: In order to justify their discourse about the unreal the Buddhist argues that mere cognition—valid or invalid—suffices for the sensible usage or discourse about a thing. Otherwise words like 'hare's horn' would be rendered meaningless. The opponent (N.V.) meets the argument by urging that the words cited produce only false cognition of the real and

not the cognition of the unreal. In regard to this cognition of the unreal the debatable propositions are these:

1. Is objectivity relating to illusory cognition pervaded by the objectivity relating to valid cognition or not?
2. Does the cognition having the form 'this is silver' have or not have as its object only that which is other than a qualifier and whose absence is universal in scope?

Since for those who maintain that only the real appears in a cognition the objects both of a false cognition and a valid cognition cannot be other than real, only the combination of the real objects will be unreal in the false cognition. In the second debatable proposition mentioned the unreal being absolutely nonexistent its absence is universal in scope. So if the illusory cognition has the nonexistent as its object it has a real entity too as its object but this entity is the same as the qualifier 'silverness'. In the view of the realists the illusory cognition has only reals as its objects and so the negative alternative holds good in their case.

If the illusory cognition is mistaken cognition, as the N.V. thinkers maintain, then every object of this cognition must be real. So if the Buddhist thinks that the cognition 'this is not non-momentary' is false and mistaken then 'non-momentariness' which is one of the objects of this cognition must be a real property. The Buddhist cannot deny therefore the existence of non-momentary entities.

If however the illusory cognition is regarded as the cognition of the unreal then it must be explained how such a cognition arises. Sense-object-contact is necessary for sensory cognition. If the object is non-existent there cannot be any contact with it and so it will not be apprehended by the senses. If the qualifying property or object in the determinate false cognition is not in contact with the sense at the time when the cognition arises it must have been in contact with it earlier. In inference and verbal false cognitions too only real entities are mistaken as middle terms and meanings of words respectively and only thus the mistaken inferences and verbal cognitions arise. A real duststorm may be mistaken for a real column of smoke present elsewhere and the presence of fire on the hill inferred by its means. A real pot may by mistake be taken to be meant by the word 'tree' and thus the word may produce the verbal cognition of a pot. If however the inference did not require the recollection of the concomitance between the middle and the major for its genesis or words did not need the recall of their conventional meaning to generate verbal cognition then any middle term can lead to any inference and any word can denote any object.

The determinants of meaning stated and discussed

Text: सः हि संकेतः वा स्यात् शब्द–स्वाभाव्यं वा। आद्यः तावत् संकेत–

विषय–अ–प्रतीतेः एव पराहतः। ततः एव तत्–प्रतीतौ इतरेतराश्रयत्वम्। पद्–संकेत–बलेन एव प्रतीतौ स्वार्थ–अ–परित्यामात्। तथा च अन्–अन्विता पदार्थोः एव अन्विततया स्फुरंति इति विपरीतख्यातिः एव अनुवर्तते। स्वार्थ–परित्यागेतु पुनः अपि अ–नियमः अ–सामायिक–अर्थ–प्रत्यायनात्। शब्द–स्वाभाव्यात् तु नियमे व्युत्पत्यभावत् अ–व्युत्पन्नस्य अपि तथाविध–विकल्प–उदय–प्रसङ्गात् इति।

Trans: This regulator or determinant of word-meanings is either convention or the intrinsic nature of words. The first alternative is ruled out by the very fact that the object of convention in the case of the word 'hare's horn' is not knowable at all. If this convention is supposed to be known through the word itself and then through this convention the object of the convention is supposed to be known then there will be circularity (in the explanation. The object is known after the convention is known and the convention is known when the object of the convention is known). If the meaning of the compound word 'hare's horn' is known only on the basis of the knowledge of the meanings of the component words then these meanings cannot be ignored. It will have to be admitted then that the separate meanings of each of the words appear as combined in the meaning of the compound word. Thus it follows that in the meaning of the word 'hare's horn' we have only a case of mistaking one thing for another. If however the individual words are not supposed to contribute their separate meanings to the compound meaning then again there will be irregularity of meanings as words would then denote even those things with which they are not conventionally associated. But if the very intrinsic nature of words is supposed to regulate word-meanings then like one who is trained in the use of words even an untrained person should be able to learn the correct meanings of words.

Expl: Earlier it was stated that if words meant things with which they are not conventionally associated there would be nothing to regulate the meanings of words. Now the nature of this regulating factor is being considered. This factor cannot be convention in the case of words like 'hare's horn' as there is nothing like the hare's horn with which the word could be known to be associated. If the nonexistent hare's horn is supposed to be known through the word itself and the convention is known only after this knowledge has taken place there will be circularity. The hare's horn cannot be known in the first instance without the knowledge of the conventional association of the word and the meaning. If however the meaning of the compound word is supposed to be compounded from the separate meanings of the component words then

we cannot but have the wrong combination of things which exist (like the hare and the horn). But if words mean something to which their component words do not make any contribution then again there will be no regularity in word-meaning as the words would mean that with which they are not conventionally associated. The very nature of words also cannot be regarded as the regulator as this nature will be known to everybody as soon as the word is uttered and then even one to whom the word is not introduced will know its meaning on hearing it.

The view that the transcendental urge is the determinant of meaning discussed and refuted

Text: वासना–विशेषात् इति चेत्? अत्र असत्–उल्लेखिनः प्रत्यक्षस्य वासना एव कारणं उत् वासना अपि? न तावत् आद्यः। शशविषाणादि–प्रत्ययानां सदातनत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। कदाचित् प्रबोधात् कदाचित् इति चेत्? न। प्रबोधः अपि सहकारि अंतरं वा अतिशेय–परंपरा–परिपाकः वा? आद्ये वासना एव इति पक्ष–अन्–उपपत्तिः। द्वितीये अपि यदि अर्थान्तर–प्रत्यासत्तेः तदा पूर्ववत्। स्व–सन्तति–मात्र अधीनत्वे तु बाह्यवाद–व्याघातः। नीलादि–बुद्धीनां अपि वासना–परिपाकात् एव उत्पादात्। वासना अपि इति पक्षे तु तत्–अन्यः अपि हेतुः कश्चित् वक्तव्य। सः च विचार्यमाणः पूर्व–न्यायं नं अतिवर्तते इति।

Trans: Could certain transcendental urges be supposed to regulate the meanings of words? (Well!) if this is so it may be asked, 'Is the cause of the cognition of the unreal the said urge alone or it also?' The first cannot be the case because then the cognitions of hare's horn etc. would become eternal (the said urge being continually present and no other cause being needed for the cognition). But couldn't it be urged that the cognitions arise occasionally because the urges are revived only occasionally? No! In that case we ask again, 'Is this revival of the urges some external accessory to them or the same as the maturation of a series of similar urges? On the first alternative the earlier one that the urge alone causes the cognition of the unreal cannot be upheld. On the second alternative too, if the maturation is supposed to be dependent upon the cooperation of some other object with the urges then as before the earlier alternative cannot be upheld. If however the maturation is (supposed to be) dependent upon its own causes in the series (of which it is a member) then the doctrine of external reality will be jeopardised (the differences of different cognitions could then be internally explained). The cognitions of the yellow, blue etc. could well be supposed to be due to the maturation of different urges.

If the second of the earlier alternatives namely that the urge is only one of the causes is espoused then the causes other than the urge would have to be named and these would be subject to the same drawback that was pointed out in the case of false perceptual and other cognitions.

Expl: Some transcendental urge may be supposed to cause the cognitions of the unreal. This is the fresh contention of the Buddhist. Now if these urges remain latent for some time and become manifest only occasionally there must be some cause bringing about their manifestation. So the urges alone cannot cause the cognition. If the manifestation is supposed to be due to causes which are included in the series of which the manifestation itself is a member then all external cognitions could be regarded as caused by causes internal to them and so the reality of the external world would be jeopardised.

The view that the conventional relation between the unreal and words like 'hare's horn' can be known, refuted

Text: न च शशनिषाणादि–शब्दानां असत्–अर्थैः सह संबंध–अवगमः अपि। तथा हि पर–बुद्धीनां अन्–उल्लेखात् तत्–विषयस्य अपि अन्–उल्लेख एव। न च अर्थ क्रिया–विशेषः अपि अस्ति यतः विषय–विशेषं उन्नीय तत्र, संकेतः गृह्यताम्। न च संकेतयितुः एव वचेनात् तत् अवगतिः। तत्–विषयाणां सर्वेषां वचनानां अ–प्रतीत–विषयत्वेन अ–गृहीत–समय–तया अ–प्रतिपादकत्वात्।

Trans: And words like 'hare's horn', etc. cannot be known to be conventionally associated with unreal entities (like hare's horn etc.). To explain: The knowledge of the other person who formulates the convention (regarding the meaning of words like hare's horn) is not known to the listener of the word and so the object of this knowledge also is unknown to him. Thus the listener cannot learn the convention by knowing the (unreal) object as it enters the other person's knowledge. Nor again is there any special activity connected with the unreal by means of which the unreal could be inferred and thence its conventional relation with the word could be known. It is also not possible to know the convention (and conventional relationship of the unreal with the word) from the words of the person who lays down the convention (as for example the convention of the word 'pot' is known from the words, 'The object with a conch-like neck is denoted by the word 'pot' as uttered by a reliable person'). All the words used by such a person are such that their conventional meanings are unknown and so they cannot help understand the convention pertaining to words like 'hare's horn.'

Expl: Earlier it was stated that the unreal as the object of verbal convention cannot be known and so through words there cannot arise the knowledge of the unreal. Now it is being argued that even if there may be the cognition of the unreal the convention pertaining to it cannot be known. The Buddhist may contend that even if there is no sensory cognition of the unreal there could be mental cognition of it and its conventional relation with the word. But this mental cognition can be only of the other person who lays down the convention and so both the cognition and its object will remain unknown to all other persons. However by observing the special behaviour of a person on hearing the words of another person the conventional relation of the word with the object of the special behaviour can be ascertained. This is possible only in the case of real objects which give rise to some productive activity. There is no activity associated with the unreal. No other words also can lead to the knowledge of the convention. Every word used to contribute to this knowledge cannot but be a word of unknown meaning.

The view that the convention can be known otherwise refuted

Text: न च शशविषाणं उच्चारयतः कश्चित् अभिप्रायः वृत्तः इति तत्–विषयः अस्य वाच्यः इति सुग्रहः समयः इति वाच्यम्। न हि एवं–आकारः समय–ग्रहः। गां बधान इति उक्ते अ–प्रतीत–शब्द–अर्थस्य अपि अभिप्राय–मात्र–प्रतीतो समय–ग्रह–प्रसङ्गात्। न च विशेष–अंतर–विनाकृतः कल्पनामात्र–विषयः अस्य वाच्यः इति सांप्रतम्। धट–कूर्मरोमः आदीनां अपि तत्–अर्थत्व–प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: Nor can it be urged that the convention can be known as what is the object of the intentional meaning of the words 'hare's horn' as used by a speaker. (The speaker cannot have used these words without intending something by means of them.) Certainly the cognition of the convention of such a form is not of use for verbal knowledge. If it were then on hearing the sentence 'tether the cow' without knowing the meaning of the individual words in the sentence and only knowing the import of the whole sentence one should be able to know the conventional meaning of the words in the sentence. But couldn't it be urged against this that the object of the conventional meaning of words like 'hare's horn' is a characterless and only imaginary object and so it should not be difficult to know its conventional association with the words? Well! If so then even tortoise's hare, pot or such other things could be (known to be) conventionally associated with the words 'hare's horn'.

Expl: The cognition of the said convention could be of the general form namely, that 'the utterer of the word must intend something by the word

uttered and that which is intended is meant by the word'. Thus the convention could be supposed to be known under the general form 'being associated with an object intended by the use of the word 'hare's horn' by a speaker'. But no convention pertaining to a word is cognised in this form. If such a general cognition of convention were possible then the knowledge of the general import of the sentence 'tether the cow' unaccompanied by the knowledge of the meanings of individual words in the sentence could yield the knowledge of the conventional meaning of the latter. If it is urged against this that the actual object meant need not be known for the convention to be known and so even the imaginary or the illusory could be cognised as being the object of the convention, then even the tortoise hair or a pot (as a composite entity it is unreal in Buddhist view) could be conventionally associated with the words 'hare's horn'. The point of the argument is that without actually knowing the unreal and merely on the basis of the speaker's import in using the words 'hare's horn' these could be conventionally associated with the unreal. The argument is countered by showing that the general import of a sentence cannot help determine the conventional meaning of a word.

The objection that every one's use of the words, 'hare's horn' may be supposed to be determined by his or her own transcendental urge, refuted

Text: न च सर्वे प्रतिपचारः स्व–स्व–वासनया असन्–अर्थ–शब्द्–संबंध–प्रतिपत्ति भाजः इति सांप्रतम। परस्पर–वार्ता–अन्–अभिज्ञतया अ–पर–अर्थ त्व–प्रसङ्गात। न हि स्वयं कुतं समयं अ–ग्राहयित्वा परः व्यवहारयितुं शवयते। न च व्यवहार–उपदेशौ अंतरेण ग्राहयितुं अपि। न च गां बधान इतिवत् शशविषाण–पदार्थ–व्यवहारः। न च अयं असौ अश्वः इतिकत् उपदेशः। न च यथा गौः तथा गवयः इति वत् उपलक्षण–अतिदेशः। न च इह प्रभिन्न–कमल–उदरे मधूनि मधुकरः पिबति इतिवत् प्रसिद्ध–पद–सामानाधिकराण्यम्।

Trans: Wouldn't it then be proper to hold that all those who know the meaning of the words 'hare's horn' come to know of it when their own different individual urges present them with the unreal and thus the association of the unreal with the said words is apprehended by them? No! (This cannot be). The speaker and the listener of the words would not then be able to communicate with each other and so one person's meaning of the words would not be the same as author person's. Certainly

one person cannot communicate with another without bringing home to the other the convention created by oneself (for one's own use) and without actual usage (of a word or words) or instruction (or exhortation), one cannot even communicate one's own convention to another person. But there cannot be any usage in relation to the meaning of the words 'hare's horn' as there is in regard to the statement 'tether the cow'. There can also be no instruction in this case like the one we find embodied in the sentence, 'This animal is a horse'. Nor can there be in the present case the ascription of the nonqualifying property of similarity (to one thing) to another as is conveyed by the sentence, 'Like cow, like yak'. Nor again can there be coordination in meaning with words of known meaning as is found in the case of the word 'honeybee' when it is used in the sentence, 'The honeybee sucks plenty of honey from within the fully-blossomed lotus'.

Expl: It may be said that in the foregoing the point of the Buddhist contention was that the intentional association of the words 'hare's horn' with the hare's horn is known by the users of the words by means of their own urges. Now it is being urged that the unreal itself is presented by the different urges of the different users of the words. Since the user of the words and their individual urges are different none can communicate his meaning to another. Nor is it possible to communicate one's own convention relating to the meaning to another without actual (common) usage or the imparting of instruction relating to the usage to that person. There cannot be any usage of the words as there is no object of the usage and there cannot be any activity towards or away from the unreal. As to instruction, that cannot be given in the present case. One cannot say that 'this thing is a hare's horn' as the very words whose meaning is to be conveyed occur in this sentence. Even by means of the analogical statement the instruction cannot be imparted here. There is no analogy available to explain the nature of the unreal. Even inference based on coordination in meaning with other known words can be of no help in associating the words, 'hare's horn' with the unreal. It is by means of such inference that the exact meaning of the word 'Madhuker' in Sanskrit as honeybee is known.

Conclusion of the above arguments

Text: तत् अमुः शशविणाणादि–विकल्पाः न असत्ख्याति रूपाः। तथात्वे कारण–अभावात्। मुक–स्वप्नवत् अ–सांव्यवहारिकत्व–प्रसङ्गात् च। तस्मात् अन्यथाख्याति रूपाः एव इति। न एतत्–अनुरोधेन अपि अ–वस्तुनः निषेध–व्यवहार–गौचरत्वं इति। भवतु वा असत्ख्यातिः तथा अपि न ततः व्यतिरेकः प्रामाणिकः।

Trans: For these reasons the cognition of things like hare's horn cannot be of the nature of the cognition of the unreal. If they were such there cannot be anything to produce such a cognition. Besides (if everyone apprehended his own meaning of the words 'hare's horn) the cognition of the unreal that each individual would have would be simply incommunicable to others like the dreams of a dumb person; so these cognitions are only (of the nature of) false or mistaken cognitions. Thus even on the basis of this cognition it cannot be maintained that the unreal is the object of negative usage. Or let there be the cognition of the unreal yet even then the absence of successive and simultaneous productivity in the durable entity cannot be validly established.

Expl: Concluding the foregoing argument the author says that the cognitions of the hare's horn etc. cannot have the unreal as their objects for there is no cause as shown above to engender such cognitions and if there were really such cognitions they would be as incommunicable as the dreams of a dumb person. They are in reality false or distorted cognitions. Thus the unreal durable entity (in the Buddhist view) cannot be inferentially proved to be nonmomentary (which too is unreal in the Buddhist view) by means of nonproduction either in succession or simultaneity (with another unreal entity). Here it is contended by Dharmakīrtī that for negative concomitance of the absence of major and middle terms a real minor is not needed to instantiate the concomitance. As he says in the following verse of his:

तस्मात् वैधर्म्य़-दृष्टान्ते न इष्टः अवश्यं इह आश्रयः ।
तत्-अभावे अपि तत् न इति वचनात् एव तत्-गतेः ॥

'There is no necessity of a real locus in the negative example', that is to say, for illustrating the negative concomitance no real locus is needed. 'If the major is absent then the middle is absent' is the complete statement of the concomitance which does not contain any reference to the locus.

Regarding the above rejection of the theory of the cognition of the unreal it may perhaps be objected that even the theory of distorted cognition does not avoid the admission of the unreal. In the illusory cognition the object of illusion and the object of illusory imposition upon this object may both be real but what of the relation of identity between the two? It cannot be real. If it were, the cognition will be transformed into a valid cognition. The reply of the N.V. to this is that even if all the contents of the illusory cognition are real the cognition could be illusory as the object of imposition does not qualify the object of illusion.

But even if it is conceded that the unreal locus appears in the negative inference or the negative concomitance the said inference of the Buddhist cannot be valid as both the absences of the major and the middle are unreal (for the Buddhist). What kind of negative statement is it of which

every component is unreal?

Nature of negation or absence examined

Text: तया हि कः अयं व्यतिरेकः नाम? यत् यतः व्यतिरिच्यते तस्य तत्र अभावः वा तत्-अभाव-स्वभावत्वं वा? तत्र न तावत्, क्रम-यौगपद्ययोः शशविषाणे अभावः प्रमाण-गोचरः वृक्ष-रहित-भभृत्-क्टक्वत् क्रम-यौगपद्य-रहितस्य शशविषाणस्य प्रमाण-अ-गौचरत्वात्।

Trans: To explain: What is this absence (or negation of a thing)? Is it the nonoccurrence of an object in another from which it differs (as for example the pot differing from the floor does not occur in it when it occurs elsewhere) or the identity of the absence of a thing with its locus (where it occurs)? Of these two (versions of negation) the first type of negation of successive and simultaneous productivity in the hare's horn cannot be validly known as is known the negation of trees on the spur of the mountain. The hare's horn as devoid of successive and simultaneous productivity is not known by any valid cognition.

Expl: To show that the negative concomitance cannot be had the question of the nature of negation which is the object of the concomitance and the inference depending upon it is now taken up for consideration. Two views of negation are possible. The first view is that, of two entities if one excludes the other or one does not occur in the other then its absence may be supposed to occur in the other. The second view is that which the followers of Prabhākara, the great Mīmānsaka uphold. According to it the absence of one thing in another is identical with the latter. Of these the first view does not apply to the supposed absence of successive and simultaneous productivity in the hare's horn. By no valid mode of cognition can such an absence be ever cognised.

The second view of negation mentioned above refuted

Text: न अपि क्रम-यौगपद्य-अभाव रूपत्वे शशविषाणस्य प्रामाणिकं घट-आभावत् शशाविषाणस्य प्रमाणेन अन-उपलंभात्। घट-अभावः अपि न प्रमाण-गोचरः इति चेत् ? न। तस्य तत्-विविक्त -इतर-स्वभावस्य अपि प्रमाणतः एव सिद्धेः। असिद्धौ वा तत्र अपि व्यवहारः एव।

Trans: Nor is the identity of hare's horn with the absence of successive and simultaneous productivity a real thing as it is not known by any valid

cognition. But isn't the absence of the pot also not validly known? No! The absence of pot as distinct in nature from everything that differs from the pot is known by a valid cognition itself. If it were not so known then we shall not concede any valid usage about it.

Expl: Even according to the second view absence of successive and simultaneous productivity cannot be treated as identical with the unreal as this is not cognised by any valid cognition. As to the ordinary absences of pot, tree etc. there cannot be any doubt regarding their knowability by valid cognition. Such absences as distinct from their counterpositives are quite well known. Of course in the Mīmānsā (Prabhākara's) view the absence is not different from its locus. If it is known it is known as nondifferent from its locus.

Objection that even absence not known validly may be the object of usage refuted

Text: धटः तावत स्व–अभाव–विरह्–स्वभावः प्रमाण–सिद्धः ताद्रूप्येण कदाचित् अपि अन्–उपलंभात्। एतावत्ता एव तत्–अभावः अपि धट–विरह्–स्वभावः सिद्धः इति चेत? न। घट–भावस्य तत्–अभाव–विरह्–स्वभावत्व–अन्–अभ्युपगमात्। न च अन्यस्य स्वभावे प्रमाण–गौचरे तत्–अन्यः अपि सिद्धः स्यात् अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: (Now the Buddhist contends that absences even of familiar objects although not known validly may be objects of usage or discourse). But the fact is that the pot (for example) as of the nature of the absence of its (absence or) exclusion is validly established. It is never known to be the same as its absence. Because of this fact itself the absence of pot also may be taken to be proved as of the nature of the exclusion of the pot. (There is no necessity to admit the independent reality of the absence.) No! (Such a view is not acceptable). The nature of the pot cannot be supposed to be the same as the exclusion of its absence. Moreover when the nature of one thing is being established by a valid means, the nature of no other thing is also established by that means. If such a thing happened anything can be established by any proof.

Expl: Again the Buddhist contends that the reality of absence is not at all validly established. Only the positive nature of a positive entity is so established. This nature excludes the absence of the positive thing because of which it is identified with the exclusion of the absence of the thing. By this very fact the absence of a thing is also known to be exclusive of that thing. If a thing excluded its absence the absence also would exclude the thing. Thus absence does not have a separate existence of its own. This

contention is rebutted by the N.V. by pointing out that absence being a nonentity the positive nature of a thing cannot be identified with it.

Objection that the positive and the negative are of the nature of mutual exclusion refuted

Text: एवभूतौ एव धट–तत्– अभावौ यत् एकस्य परिच्छित्तिः अपरस्य व्यवच्छित्तिः इति चेत् ? न। घटवत् घटाभावस्य अपि प्रामाणिकत्व–अन्–अभ्युपगमे स्वभाव–वाद–अन्–अवकाशात्। प्रमाण–सिद्धे हि वस्तुनि स्वभाव–वाद–अवलंबनं न तु स्वभाव–वाद–अवलंबनेन एव वस्तुनः सिद्धिः इति भवतां एव तत्र तत्र जय–दुंदुभिः।

Trans: Could it be urged (against the above) that both the pot and its absence (for example) are such that the affirmation of one of them is the negation of the other? No! If like the pot its absence also is not regarded as a validly-established object then the doctrine that things are endowed with definite natures would be inapplicable to anything. Certainly only if a certain thing is validly established the nature of that thing is also sought to be established. It is not merely by postulating a certain nature that the thing endowed by that nature can be established. You (the Buddhist) yourself have so often declared triumphantly the truth of this principle.

Expl: It may be argued against the conclusion of the last argument that a positive entity and its absence are of such natures that the affirmation of one of them is the exclusion of the other, so there is no necessity to admit the reality of the absence of a thing. Even that which is not validly established can be excluded. The views of one's opponent for example are sought to be excluded only because they are taken to be not validly established. The answer to this argument is that if both an entity and its absence do not have their different respective natures their respective negation and affirmation cannot be identical with each other. But these natures of things can be affirmed only if the things are validly established.

Proof that both an entity and its negation are validly established

Text: तत् किं इदानीं स्व–अभाव–विरह–स्वभावः घटः प्रमाणात् न एवं सिद्धः? तव दृष्ट्या एवं एतत्। घटः हि यादृक्–तादृक्–स्वभावः तावत् प्रमाण–पथं अवतीर्णः। तस्य तु यदि परमार्थतः अभावः अपि कश्चित् स्यात् स्यात् परमार्थतः सः अपि तत्–विरह–स्वभावः इति तथा एव प्रमाणेन आवेदितः स्यात्। न च एतत् अभ्युपगम्यते भवता। तस्मात् घटवत् तत्–अभावस्य अपि प्रामाणिकत्वेन एव अनयोः

परस्पर–विरह–लक्षण–व्यतिरेक–सिद्धिः। अ–प्रामाणिकत्वे तु अनयोः अपि न तथाभावः इति। शशविषाणादिषु अपि इयं एव गतिः।

Trans: Then is it the case that the pot (for example) is not validly known to be of the nature of the exclusion of its absence? Well, this is so from your own point of view. (The Buddhist does not admit the reality of absence, so the positive entity cannot be of the nature of the negation of its absence). The fact is that the pot (for example) is validly known as composite or atomic in nature. If there is really an absence of this pot then the pot will be known to be of the nature of the absence of its absence and it will be validly established as such. But certainly you do not admit this. So both the pot and its absence can be proved to be by nature mutually exclusive only if both of them are validly established. If these are not validly established then these too cannot be mutually exclusive. In the case of unreals like hare's horn also this very principle holds good.

Expl: If the affirmation of the positive is not the same as the exclusion of the negative then the positive cannot be by nature exclusive of its absence or its negative. But this is not the case. The fact is that only if the positive is endowed with its own nature, and only if the absence of it is also endowed with its own nature, only then the positive could be supposed to be exclusive of its absence. If both the positive and the negative are not established as independently real their mutual opposition cannot be established. This mutual opposition does not entail mutual dependence of the positive and the negative. The knowledge of the pot as pot for example does not depend upon the knowledge of the exclusion of its absence by the pot. Similarly the knowledge of the absence of the pot as a knowable object does not depend upon the knowledge of the exclusion of the pot by the absence. So both the positive and its negative can be known and established quite independently of each other. In the case of the unreal too it can be maintained that only if it is validly established, the absence of productivity can be predicated of it, not otherwise.

Objection that imaginary qualifications of the middle term should suffice for the inference, refuted

Text: ननु काल्पनिक–रूप–संपत्तिः एव अस्तु अनुमान–अङ्गंम्? तत् न। तस्याः सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात। ननु पक्ष–सपक्ष–विपक्षाः तावत वस्तु–अ–वस्तु–भेदेन द्विरूपाः। तत्र ये कल्पना–उपनीताः तत्र काल्पनिकाः एव पक्षधर्म–अन्वय–व्यतिरेकाः प्रमाण–उपनीतेषु तु प्रामाणिकाः एव इति विभागः। तत् इह काल्पनिकात्–निर्–अग्रेः यद्यपि प्रमेयत्व–आदेः व्यावृत्तिः काल्पनिकी सिद्धा तथा अपि

प्रामाणिकात् जलहदादेः प्रामाणिकी एव एषितव्या। साच न सिद्धा इति कुतः तस्य हेतुत्वम? एवं प्रामाणिके शब्दे पक्षीकृते प्रामाणिकः एव हेतु–सद्भावः वक्तव्यः। न च असौ चाक्षुषत्वस्य अस्ति इति सः अपि कथं हेतुः? एवं कृतकत्वस्य अपि वस्तु–एक–नियतस्य धर्मस्य वास्तवः एव अन्वयः वक्तव्यः वस्तुनः विपक्षात् च वास्तवः एव व्यतिरेकः।

Trans: Let then the presence of only imaginary qualifications in the middle term be sufficient for the inference (so even the imaginary absences of the properties of reality and momentariness would serve the purpose of the inference in the unreal as earlier cited)! No! (This cannot be). Such imaginary qualifications are available everywhere. But it may be urged (here) that the minor, cominor and contraminor terms are of two kinds. Of these those that are conjured up only by imagination are endowed only by the imaginary presence or absence of the middle. And those that are presented by valid proofs are endowed only with validly-established middle terms or their absences. This is the distinction between these two kinds of terms. So in the inference 'this hill is fiery because it is a knowable thing', although the middle term 'knowability' is imaginarily absent from the imaginary locus of the absence of the fire which is the major term; yet only a real absence of the middle term from water-reservoir which is the real locus of the absence of fire, the major term, has to be sought in this inference and this is not available. How can then the property of knowability be a valid term in the inference? Similarly in the inference, 'words are ephemeral because they are visually-sensible' if the real words are the minor term then there has to be only a real presence of the middle term in it. But visual-sensibility, the middle term in the inference is not present in the minor. So how this too can be a valid middle term? So also in the inference, 'words are eternal because they are artificial products' the middle term—a property which is associated with reals only has to have only real presence in the minor and its absence too from things other than the minor must be required to be real only.

Expl: It is now contended by the Buddhist that for the inference in the unreal of nonmomentariness imaginary qualifications of the middle term like presence in the minor and the cominor and the absence in the contraminor should do. It is not necessary to have for such an inference real qualifications of the unreal middle term. This could be objected to on the ground that in the fallacious inferences like, 'The hill is fiery because it is a knowable entity', words are noneternal because they are visually-sensed', and 'words are eternal because they are artificially-produced', the middle terms although afflicted respectively by the fallacies of deviation,

unestablishedness and contrariness, can yet be freed of these fallacies. The first middle term can be endowed with the imaginary absence of deviation, the second with the imaginary absence of unestablishedness and the third with the imaginary absence of contrariness. But when the terms in the inference are real the absence of fallacies to be sought must also be real and not imaginary; but real absences of fallacies are not present in the middle terms of the above inferences. In the inference of unreality of the nonmomentary however only imaginary qualifications of the unreal middle term can be sought.

The refutation continued

Text: न च तस्य तौ स्तः, तत् कथं असौ अपि हेतुः इति प्रलपितं एतत्। न हि नियामकं अंतरेण संपदं प्रति कल्पना त्वरते विपदं प्रति तु विलंबते इति शक्यं वक्तुम। तथा च निराग्निः अपि कूर्मरोम स–धूमं इति कल्पना–मात्रेण विपक्ष–वृत्तिलात् धूमः अपि न अग्निं गमयेत्। वास्तव्यां रूप संपतौ किं अनेन काल्पनिकेन दौषेण इति चेत्? तर्हि वासाव्यां अ–संपतौ किं काल्पनिक्या तया इति समानम्? विरोध–अ–विरोधौ विशेषः इति चेत्? कुतः एषः? उभयोः एकत्र वस्तु–अ–वस्तुत्वात् इति चेत्? तत् किं काल्पनिकः अपि धूमः वस्तुभूतः येन कूमरोम्नः तेन सह विरोधः स्यात्? क्वाचित् वस्तुभूतः एव इति चेत्? निर्–धूमत्वं अपि क्वचित् वस्तुभूतं इति तेन अपि विरोध एव। तस्मात् यथा काल्पनिकी विपत्तिः न दोषाय तथा काल्पनिकी संपत्तिः अपि न गुणाय इति व्यतिरेक भङ्गाः।

Trans: And the real presence in the minor and the real absence in the contraminor of the respective middle terms in the two aforementioned inferences are not to be had. How then can the middle terms be valid? To this contention the opponent makes the retort that all this is simply meaningless talk. It cannot be maintained that in the absence of any determinant, imagination contributes to the presence of the necessary qualifications in the middle term in the inference about the unreal while it prevents the nonavailability of the qualifications in the case of valid middle terms in valid inferences. On account of this (impossibility of discrimination by imagination) the valid middle term smoke—in the inference of fire in the mountain—would not lead to the inference of fire because even the tortoise-hair which is devoid of fire has the imaginary presence of smoke in it. But couldn't it be urged against this that when the real presence of the necessary qualifications in the middle term is available

what harm would the presence of the imaginary fallacy in the middle do? Yes! But then similarly in the case of the inference about the unreal if the necessary qualifications are really absent in the middle term what would the presence of imaginary qualifications in the latter do? The answer to this may be that the two cases are not similar. In the first, the middle term smoke is real but the locus in which it is said to be absent namely the tortoise-hair is unreal. So the two are incompatible in nature. But in the second case the hare's horn and non-production either successively or simultaneously are both unreal. So there is no incompatibility between the natures of the two. But then is the imaginary smoke too real so that it would be incompatible in nature with the unreal tortoise-hair? Yes! The smoke (as present in the hill) is certainly real. In that case the absence of smoke is also real (as present in water) and so it would be incompatible in nature with tortoise-hair. From this it follows that just as imaginary absence of necessary qualifications is not fallacious so even imaginary presence of the qualifications in the middle term is not conducive to the validity of the inference. Thus the said negative concomitance fails to be established.

Expl: Above it has been argued that even imaginary qualifications of the unreal middle term like its presence in the minor and cominor and absence in contraminor can validate it for the inference of the unreality of the nonmomentary. It has also been argued that in ordinary valid inferences the imaginary absence of these qualifications in the real middle terms of these inferences would not invalidate them as real qualifications would necessarily be present in them. The opponent counters these arguments by maintaining that the imaginary qualifications cannot be supposed to play such opposite roles in invalid and valid inferences. If presence of real qualifications in the ordinary valid middle term is deemed sufficient to validate it then the similar absence of real qualifications in the unreal middle term of the Buddhist's inferences should also be deemed sufficient to invalidate it. Perhaps the incompatibility of the real smoke and the unreal tortoise-hair which is devoid of fire may be taken as the proof that the smoke is not present in the unreal tortoise-hair. But in the inference of the unreal both the middle and the minor terms are unreal. So there being no incompatibility between their natures the middle may be supposed to be present in the minor. This defence however cannot rule out the presence of the imaginary smoke in the unreal tortoise-hair which is bereft of fire thus giving rise to the fallacy of the presence of middle term in the contraminor. If the presence of imaginary smoke in the tortoise-hair is affirmed because both of them are imaginary it could also be denied because the smoke in the hill is not imaginary. But then the absence of smoke in the tortoise-hair may also be denied because this absence occurring in water is real. All that these bizarre arguments show is that

neither imaginary absence of qualifications in the middle term invalidates it nor their imaginary presence validates it.

Fresh proof for non momentariness based on the necessary occurrence of destruction considered

Text: अस्तु तर्हि ध्रुव–भावित्वेन विनाशस्य अ–हेतुकत्वे सिद्धे क्षणभङ्गः। न। विकल्प–अन्–उपपत्तेः। तत् हि तादात्म्यं वा, निर्–उपाख्यत्वं वा, तत्–कार्यत्वं वा, तत् व्यापकत्वं वा, अभावत्वं वा इति। न पूर्वः। निषेध्य–निषेधयोः एकत्व–अन्–उपपत्तेः। उपपत्तौ वा विश्वस्य वैश्वरूप्य–अन्–उपपत्तेः।

Trans: Let then the necessary occurrence of destruction establish its uncaused nature which in its turn may lead to the establishment of momentariness. No! (This cannot be). The different versions of this necessity of occurrence cannot be rationally defended. This necessity of the destruction could be understood as identity of the destruction with the destroyed or its unreality or its being caused by its counterpositive or its pervasion of the conterpositive or its non-existential nature itself. The first (of these alternatives) cannot be entertained. The destroyed and the destruction cannot be treated as identical. If they can then the world cannot be multifarious in nature.

Expl: Earlier it was stated that the view of the necessity of destruction would be considered later. Now this consideration is taken up as the Buddhist starts a fresh argument for momentariness based on the necessary occurrence of destruction. This necessity of the occurrence of destruction could be understood in five different ways which are listed here. The first is identity of the destroyed with the destruction. This cannot be entertained because if these mutually opposed entities were really identical all opposition would cease to exist and the multifarious character of the world would be rendered false.

The second version of necessity of destruction is 'being devoid of a nature of its own'. Destruction as nonexistence is nonentity and as such it has no nature of its own. Notwithstanding this it may be supposed to have a specific spatio-temporal location.

The third version of necessity is 'being the effect of its counterpositive or the thing that is destroyed'. Being such an effect destruction would immediately follow the origination of a thing.

According to the fourth version the said necessity consists in the pervasion of the destroyed by its destruction. Such a pervader cannot need any cause other than the occurrence of the destroyed for its occurrence.

On the last version destruction is necessary because it is mere non-

existence of its counterpositive or the destroyed entity.

Justification of the identity of the destruction and the destroyed and its rebuttal

Text: ननु काल–अंतरे अर्थक्रियां प्रति अ–शक्तिः एव अस्य नास्तिता। सा च काल–अंतरे समर्थ–इतर–स्वभावत्वं एवं इति चेत्? ननु अयं एव क्षणभङ्गः। तथा च अ–सिद्धं अ–सिद्धेन साधयतः कः ते प्रतिनन्दः?

Trans: May it be that the incompetence of a thing for producing the effect at a different time is itself its' nonexistence and this is nothing but its noncompetent nature in relation to a different time? No! This noncompetence at a different time or moment is itself momentariness. So you (the Buddhist) are trying to prove (the thesis of) the unproved identity of a thing with its destruction by means of another unproved thesis namely the thesis of momentariness. Who can refute you in such an argument?

Expl: Identity of the destroyed and its destruction can be justified on the ground that at a time different from its time of production a thing is unproductive. This unproductivity itself may be taken to be the non-existence of the thing which was productive at a different time.

But here one may ask whether the thing existing at a different moment without production (and competence) is the destruction of the earlier productive and competent thing, as different from it or as nondifferent? On the first alternative the momentariness of things is presupposed, as the same thing is taken to differ from moment to moment (because of productivity at one moment and nonproductivity at another). But when momentariness itself is unproved how can it be used to prove another thesis? Besides this goes against the identity-thesis which is sought to be justified here.

In the above, nonexistence is taken to be the same as nonproductive or incompetent nature and this is to be established by the foregoing inferences only whose validity has already been called into question.

The rebuttal continued

Text: अपि च देश– अंतर–काल–अंतर–अनुषंगिणी अस्य नास्तिता यदि अयं एव नूनं अन्–अक्षरं उक्तं यत् अयं एव देश अंतरं–काल–अतरं अनुषंगी इति। यदि वा स्वदेश–कालवत् काल–अतरं–देश–अंतरे अपि नास्तित्ता–अन्–अनुषंगे अस्तित्व–प्रसंगः। अ–शक्तेः कथं अस्तु शक्तेः सत्ता–लक्षणत्वात् इति चेत्? अथ काल–अंतर कार्यं प्रति

स्वकाले अशक्तिः असत्वं किं वा स्वकार्यं अपि प्रति काल-अंतरे अशक्तिः असत्वम्?

Trans: Moreover if the nonexistence of a thing at a different place and time is its own self then it is the same as to say that it exists at those places and times. Alternatively if the absence of a thing does not exist at another place and time as it does not at its own place and time then it follows that the thing itself exists at other places and times. But can a thing which is incompetent for production at other places and times (when it is productive) exist at those places and times? Isn't existence the same as competence for production? Yes! But what is this competence for production? Is it the same as incompetence for the production of the effect of a different time at its own time or incompetence for production of its own effect at a different time?

Expl: The second alternative mentioned above that the incompetent entity of a latter moment is identical with the earlier competent entity and is also its destruction is now taken up for criticism. The Buddhist intending to prove the momentariness of everything has by the above contention proved only the eternity and ubiquitousness of everything. If the incompetent thing of another time and place differs from the same thing as competent at its own time and place then this difference may be supposed to be due to certain external causes. This supposition would land the Buddhist in the nonmomentarist position only.

Again the Buddhist rejoins by saying that absence of competence at a different time and place is not incompetent nature pertaining to that time and place but is mere absence of competence and therefore of reality itself. In reply the opponent spells out two different forms of this incompetence and asks the Buddhist to specify as to which of these he admits to be the nature of the latter.

The first of the last two alternatives rejected

Text: आद्ये स्वकाले अपि असत्व-प्रसङ्गः। तदानीं अपि तस्य ताद्रूप्यात्। काल-अंतर-कार्यं प्रति एवं एतत् इति चेत्? किम् अयं मन्त्रपाठः? न हि यः यत्र अशक्तः सः तत् अपेक्षया नास्ति इति व्यवह्रियते। न हि रासभ-अपेक्षया धुमः जगति नास्ति। तत् कस्य हेतोः? न हि अशक्तस्य स्वरूपं निवर्तते इति।

Trans: On the first (alternative) a thing would become non-existent even at its own time as it is supposed to be incompetent even then. But isn't it the case that a thing is (incompetent for the production of an effect

belonging to another time and so) unreal in relation to the effect of another time? Well, is it an incantation that something which is real at its own time could be treated as unreal in relation to the production of the effect at a time at which it is incompetent for the production? Certainly it is not the case that the smoke for example (though existent in itself) is non-existent in relation to the donkey (of which it is not the producer)! Why is it so? Certainly it is not true that something incompetent for an effect forfeits its nature itself.

Expl: Countering the first of the last two alternatives the opponent argues that if incompetence in relation to the effects of other times and places is the same as nonexistence then things will be always and everywhere nonexistent. But it is simply meaningless or inconsistent to say that a thing exists and yet does not exist in relation to other things and times when it is nonproductive.

The second alternative rejected

Text: द्वितीये तु यदि काल–अंतर–आधारा अशक्तिः कथं तत् आत्मिका? तत्–आधारा चेत्, तदा एव असत्त्व–प्रसङ्गः काल–अंतरे तु विर्व्ययः। तस्मात्–

विधिः आत्मा अस्य भावस्य निषेधः तु ततः परः।
स अपि च आत्मा इति क प्रेक्षः श्रृण्वन् अपि न लज्जते॥

Trans: On the second alternative if the incompetence is based in a time different from the time of the object how can it be identical with the object? If however it is based in the time at which the object occurs the latter would become nonexistent at its own time and existent at other times (because the incompetence is not based in these times). Thus it follows that things are endowed with a positive nature or existence only. Nonexistence is quite other than this. How can a sensible person not feel ashamed even to hear the statement that nonexistence and existence are identical and they together constitute the nature of a thing?

Expl: The incompetence cannot be grounded in a time different from the time when the object exists for then it would not be identical with the object. Nor can it be grounded in the very time of the object. The object would then be nonexistent at its own time and existent at times when it is nonexistent. The upshot of all this discussion is that an object is by nature existent only. It can never be both existent and nonexistent.

The second version of necessity of nonexistence rebutted

Text: अस्तु तर्हि भावस्वरूप–अतिरिक्ता निवृत्तिः नस्ति इति वांक्यस्य

सोपाख्या इति शेषः। ननु अयं अपि क्षणभङ्गस्य उद्गारः। सः च कफोणिगुडायितः वर्तते। भवतु वा निवृत्तिः असमर्था, तथा अपि अ-हेतुकत्वे तस्याः किं आमायातम्? तुच्छस्य कीदृशं जन्म इति चेत् ? यादृशः काल–देश–नियमः। सः अपि तस्य कीदृशः इति चेत् ? एवं तर्हि न घट–निवृत्तिः क्व अपि कदा अपि सर्वत्र एव सदा एव वा इति स्यात्।

Trans: Let then the statement (of Dharmakīrtī, a great Buddhist logician) that, 'There is no nonexistence (or destruction) other than the existent' (its counterpositive) be supplemented by the qualification (as introduced by Prajnakara (in his commentary on Dharmakīrtī's work) of the nonexistence as 'determinate' (thus leading to the view that there is no nonexistence of a thing other than it) which is determinate in nature. But this too is the expression of the doctrine of momentariness and this doctrine has been amply criticised earlier. It is just like the jaggery-juice which has trickled down from the palm of the hand to the elbow (of the person seeking the jaggery) where it is not possible to lick it. (Just as this is not possible so also it is not possible to take up the much-discussed issue of momentariness to discuss it again). Or let the nonexistence be incompetent (and so indeterminate) but how is this relevant to its uncausedness? But how can nonentity be caused (or originated)? 'Just as it is spatio-temporally restricted in its existences', it may be replied. 'But how this too is possible'? Well! the reply to this will be that if this were not possible then the nonexistence of a pot (for example) will be nowhere and at no time or be everywhere and at all times!

Expl: Taking up the second version of the necessity of nonexistence the Buddhist maintains that nonexistence as different from existence does not have a nature of its own. As such it is a nonentity. Prajñākara has elaborated thus the view stated by Dharmakīrtī. But if this nonexistence is nothing it can neither be caused nor spatio-temporally restricted. If the latter is admitted the former too will have to be admitted. If not then the nonexistence will either be nowhere and at no time or be everywhere and at all times.

The first of the last-mentioned alternatives repudiated

Text: ननु अस्तु प्रथमः एव इति चेत्? सः अयं भाव–नास्तित्व–स्वरूप प्रतिषेधः वा, भाव–प्रतिषेधेन निवृत्ति–स्वरूप–निरूक्तिः वा इति? आद्ये भावस्य एव सदातनत्व–प्रसङ्गः। द्वितीये तु निवृत्तेः एव इति।

Trans: Let then the first alternative itself be maintained. If so then it may be asked whether this is the negation of the very nature of the nonexistence of a thing or the elucidation of the nature of the nonexistence of a thing by negating the (existence of the) thing? If the first then the thing (whose nonexistence is negated) will become eternal. If the second then the very negation(or absence of the thing) will become eternal.

Expl: If spatio-temporal restriction of the absence of a positive entity is not admitted then the absence will not occur at any time or anywhere. This negation of occurrence of the absence being the negation of absence as a qualified entity it could be due either to the negation of the relation to space and time or to the negation of the absence itself. If the first is true then the absence being unrelated to space and time it will not be opposed to the presence of that of which it is the absence. So the counterpositive of the absence will become universal and eternal. But if the second is true then the negation may be either the specification of the nature of absence by denying its occasional character or the denial of the very nature of absence. This specification could be made by means of the absolute denial of the counterpositive of the absence. On the first alternative absence will be universal and eternal and on the second the counterpositive itself will become universal and eternal.

The third version of necessity rebutted

Text: अस्तु तर्हि तत्–कार्यत्वं एव ध्रुवभावित्वम्। न। तस्य अपि कार्यः इति पक्षे विरोधात्। तस्य एव कार्यः इति असिद्धेः। यत् किचित् उत्पन्नमात्रस्य सः एव तस्य नाशः इति चेत्? तर्हि यस्याः सामग्याः यत् कार्यं तत् तत्–अतिरिक्त–अन्–अपेक्षं इति साधन–अर्थः। तं इमं कः नाम न अनुमन्यते कार्यं एव विनाशः इति तु केन अनुरोधेन व्यवहर्तब्यम्? कि तत्–विरहवत्त्वात् कार्यस्य किं वा तत्–विरहरूपत्वात्?

Trans: Let then the necessity of occurrence (of destruction) be the same as its being the very effect of its counterpositive. No! If 'being the effect of' means 'being the effect also of' then it militates against the necessity of occurrence. But if it means 'being the effect only of' then it is unproved. But couldn't this (expression) be taken to mean that whatever is caused by a thing as soon as it comes into being is the same as its destruction? Well, in that case what this amounts to is that the effect does not depend upon anything other than its causal collocation (and this is the meaning of 'necessity of occurrence'). Who does not concede this (proposition)? As

to the effect itself being identified with the destruction of the cause (as stated) what basis is there for such a usage? Is it so because the effect is different from the cause or is identical with the absence of the cause?

Expl: Countering the third version of necessity the opponent says that if being the effect of the counterpositive means being the effect only of the latter then this is unproved. Destruction cannot be supposed to be caused by its counterpositive. Thus on this ground it cannot be proved as necessary. But if the counterpositive is treated as one of the causes of its destruction then the latter cannot be necessary and so the above property will be incompatible with necessity. However neither of these meanings need be maintained. Instead it may simply be stated that whatever is produced by an entity as soon as it originates is its destruction. Then the resulting meaning of necessity will be that 'the effect does not depend upon anything other than the cause' Here if 'cause' means 'causal collocation' then this kind of necessity of destruction as of other things is an established fact. It does not need to be proved. But if 'cause' means just one of the causal conditions then nothing can have such a necessity and so the inference of necessity will be vitiated by the fallacy of absent major. The second part of the meaning of the above statement is that the effect itself is the destruction of the cause. If this is true it may be due either to the fact that the effect is different from the cause or the fact that it is identical with the absence of the cause.

The last two alternatives rejected

Text: न तावत् पूर्वः। सहकारिषु अपि तथा प्रसङ्गात्। विरह–स्वरूप–अ–निरूक्तेः च। न द्वितीयः। सः हि कार्य–काले–कारणस्य योग्य–अन्–उपसंभ–नियमात् वा भवेत् व्यवहार–अनुरोधात् वा अतिरिक्त विनाशे वाधक–अनुरोधात् वा इति।

Trans: Certainly the first alternative is not tenable. Even the auxiliary causes could then be regarded as of the nature of the destruction of the cause as they differ from it. (If the nonexistence of the cause is a nonentity because absence is a nonentity how can the effect be endowed with it?) The nature of absence here is not definable at all. The second alternative is (also) not tenable. This can be maintained if, when the effects arises, the cause is necessarily not perceived to be present although it is capable of being perceived if present or if there is a usage (to the effect that the absence of the cause is the same as its effect) or if there is some evidence to contradict the distinction of the effect from the destruction of the cause.

Expl: The effect cannot be the destruction of the cause because it differs

from it. If this were so, the auxiliary conditions being different from the cause, they could be regarded as the same as the destruction of the latter. Moreover nonexistence (of the cause) is merely a nonentity. How can it characterise the real effect? Or if the causal nonexistence is identical with the effect how can the latter be endowed with it? Next, the absence of the cause when the effect has originated can be maintained only if this absence is necessarily perceived as associated with the effect or if there is usage regarding this association or there is evidence opposed to the contrary thesis.

The first and second alternatives rejected

Text: न प्रथमः, उपलभ्यन्ते हि धटकाले वेम–आदयः। न ते ते इति चेत? किं अत्र प्रमाणम्? अभेदे अपि किं प्रमाणं इति चेत्? मा भूत् तावत्। सन्देह–स्थितौ–अपि अन्–उपलब्धि–बल–आलंबन–बिलयात्। न द्वितीयः। न हि पटः जात इति उक्ते तंतवः नष्टा इति कश्चित् व्यवहरति। पटस्य अन्–अतिरेकात् तेन्तुमात्र–जन्मनि भेद–अ–ग्रहात् अ–व्यावहारः इति चेत? न तर्हि व्यवहार–वलं अपि। विसभाग–सन्ततौ तावत् व्यवहार–वलं अस्ति इति चेत्? न एतत् एवम्।

Trans: The first (of the above three alternatives) is not tenable. When for instance the effect-cloth is produced, looms etc. (which are the auxiliary causes) are certainly perceived to be present. But could one say that these looms etc. are not the same (as those that precede the origination of the cloth)? No! If they were so what is the proof for it? Well! what is the proof for their identity either? (Alright!)! Let there not be any proof but even if there is doubt regarding this, the support of the argument based on nonperception (of the cause at the time of the effect) will disappear! The second alternative too is untenable. Certainly when it is said that the cloth has been produced nobody takes the statement to mean that the yarn is destroyed. May it be that the components and their composite product being the same the yarns and the cloth are not different from each other, so the yarns themselves are the cloth (in a certain formation) and because of this fact there is no usage (that the yarns are destroyed when the cloth is produced)? Well! if this is so then there is no support of usage too for the view. But isn't it the case that (when a cloth is torn giving rise to pieces of yarn or threads) then in relation to the dissimilar series of effects that arise there does occur the above usage (pertaining to destruction of the cause)? No, this is not so.

Expl: The first proof for the view that the effect is the absence of the cause is given as the nonperception of the cause when the effect comes into existence. Perhaps some causes disappear when the effect comes into being but this is not the case with all causes. The loom is the cause of the production of the cloth but it continues to exist even when the cloth has been produced. It cannot be said against this that the loom which helped produce the cloth is different from that which appears to persist even when the cloth has come into being. Such an answer is not convincing at all.

The second proof for the above thesis is usage but there is no usage pertaining to destruction of yarn when the cloth has been produced. To account for this absence of usage it may be urged that the cloth is the same as the yarns from which it is supposed to be produced. So there is no realisation that the cloth is really generated by the yarns. The cloth is therefore taken to be nondifferent from the yarns and so there is not here the usage that the yarns are destroyed. But such a usage is prevalent in cases where the effect-series generated by causal-series is quite dissimilar to it. For example the burning coal is quite dissimilar to the firewood from which it results. Here one can quite well say that the effect and the destruction of the cause are identical. On analogy with this, in cases where the effect-series is not unlike the causal-series it can be urged that the cause goes out of existence when the effect comes into existence.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: यदि हि तंतुमाला एव पट–निवृत्तिः, कथं तत्–आश्रयः तत्–आत्मकः वा पटः प्राक् ? अन्यः एव असौ इति चेत् ? न तावत् जाति–कृतं अन्यत्वं उपलभ्याते। व्यक्ति–कृतं तु न अद्य अपि सिध्यति। इतं एव तत्–सिद्धौ इतरेतर–आश्रयः। तथा अपि यदि एवं स्यात् कीदृशः दोषः इति चेत? न कश्चित्। केवलं प्रमाण–अभावः व्यवहार–अन्–अनुरोधः च। तत्–सिद्धौ अपि सिध्यतः तस्य निमित्त–अंतर–अपेक्षणात्।

Trans: If at all the unravelled yarn itself is the destruction of the cloth how can the latter be inherent in it (as per the N.V. view) or be identical with it (as per the Buddhist view)? (The cloth being the effect of the yarns is their destruction and the yarns resulting from the destruction of the cloth are also the sàme as this destruction. So there arises the incompatibility that both the cloth and its destruction turn out to be the same entity.) Could one say against this that the later yarns are different from the earlier ones? No! No generic difference between the two is cognisable. Individual difference however is yet to be established (on the basis of their momentariness which is not proved). If the later yarns are supposed to be

identical with the destruction of the cloth only because they may be supposed to differ from the earlier yarns then this difference too will have to be explained on the basis of the identity of the later yarns with the destruction of the cloth. Thus the explanation of the difference involves circularity. But despite this why not assume that the later yarns are the same as the destruction of the earlier yarns? What is wrong in such a view? Nothing except that there is no valid basis for the view and it is not in accordance with common usage. Moreover if the cloth is destroyed as a result of the destruction of its material cause namely the yarns, the cloth is not survived by yarns. The usage of destruction in this case is determined by other factors causing the destruction. So the yarns cannot be identified with the destruction of the cloth.

Expl: If it is admitted that the effect is the same as the destruction of the cause then the yarns resulting from the destruction of a cloth would be identical with this destruction. But the yarns are also the material cause of the cloth. So the cloth will have its own destruction as its locus. How could this be the case? It cannot be urged in reply to this that the earlier and later yarns are different from each other, for there is no experiential proof for this. If the supposed fact that the later yarn is the destruction of the cloth is regarded as the proof for the difference then because the difference itself is based on the supposed fact the explanation is vitiated by circularity. Moreover the destruction of a thing does not always result in its disintegration into its parts. If a thing is destroyed because its parts are destroyed the parts cannot survive it and so they cannot be identified with its destruction. Further when the cloth is produced by the yarns there does not arise the cognition or usage that the yarn is destroyed.

The reply continued

Text: अपि च तेतु–विनाशः सामान्यतः तेतु–विरह्–स्वभावः वा स्यात तत्–विपरीतः वा? आद्ये कथं तंत्–अंतरम्? न हि सामान्यतः नीलं अ–नीलं–विरुद्ध–स्वभावं–अनील–अंतरम्। द्वितीये कथं तत्–विरोधी। न हि नीलं सामान्यतः अपि नील–अंतर–विरोधि। विशेषमात्रे एव अयं विरोधः इति चेत्? तत् किं सामान्यतः अन्–उभय–स्वभावः एव विनाशः? ओं इति ब्रुवतः अन्यतरं उपादाय विनश–व्यवहार–अन् उप्रपत्तिः। सामान्यस्य अलीकत्वात् तत्र विरोधः अपि किं करिष्यति इति चेत्? विलीनं इदानीं विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासेन भेद–प्रत्याशया। तस्य तन्–आश्रयत्वात्।

Trans: Moreover the destruction that is identical with the yarn may be

generically excludent or opposed to other yarns (the latter opposed to the earlier) or it may be otherwise. If it is the first how can it be itself the yarn (being opposed to others of its own kind)? Certainly the blue which is generically of a nature which is opposed to the non-blue is not an instance of another non-blue (or a non-blue entity). If on the other hand the yarn is not generically opposed to another yarn how can it then be the destruction or the opposite of the earlier yarn? Certainly one blue is not even generically opposed to another blue. Could it then be urged that the opposition obtains only between the yarns as individual entities (and not as representatives of a generic type)? Well, if so then it may be asked whether generically the yarn is neither opposed nor unopposed in nature to anything (whatsoever) so that as a yarn it is neither opposed nor unopposed to a yarn or anything else)? If the answer to the question is 'yes' then because the generic opposition between the yarns is denied and it is one of the thesis maintained above, the thesis that the effect is the destruction of the cause cannot be rationally sustained. But 'if the genus is a fictitious entity what is this generic opposition going to do'? one may ask. The answer (to the question) is that if there is no opposition then the expectation to prove diversity by means of coexistence of incompatible generic properties simply evaporates as the diversity is based on the coexistence of the latter.

Expl: Another argument against the foregoing is adduced here. The latter yarn cannot be generically opposed or unopposed to the earlier yarn. If opposed it cannot be a yarn, and if unopposed it cannot be the destruction of the cloth. The said opposition cannot also be peculiar to the individual yarns for then there cannot be any usage regarding generic opposition of the effect to the cause. But if the very reality of the generic property is denied then the proof for diversity of things based on the coexistence of incompatible generic properties simply disappears as there are no generic properties.

It may be noted here that the above argument is addressed against the supposition that the cause and the effect are constitutive of a similar series.

Regarding the opposition it could be argued that the usage relating to destruction of a cloth for example is not determined by the yarns but by the series of similar or dissimilar entities of which the cloth and the yarns are constituents. But the nature of 'series' is hard to define, and so this suggestion cannot be entertained.

Another objection and its reply

Text: ननु अतिरिक्त–आभाव–पक्षे–यथा पटः पट–अंन्तर–अभाववांन् च
तत्–जातीयः च, अभावः वा पट–विरोधी पट–अंतर–सहवृत्तिः च

इति न काश्चित् विरोधः तथा कार्य–अभाव–पक्षे अपि भविष्यति इति? न एतत् एवम्। प्रतियोगिना हि तादात्म्य, संसर्गं, एक जातीयत्वानि न इष्यन्ते, अ–प्रतियोगित्व–प्रसङ्गात्, भिन–कालत्वात् सामान्यतः विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गात् च। अ–प्रतियोगिना तु संसर्गे कः दोषः? न हि भेद–विजातीय–एककालताः संसर्ग–विरोधिन्यः। तादात्म्यं हि संसर्गित्वे–विरूद्धं विरोधित्वं च। ते च न इष्येते एव। न अपि बाधक–अनुरोधः तत्–अभावात्।

Trans: May it be that just as in the (opponent's) view that destruction or nonexistence is different from its counterpositive it is admitted that although a certain piece of cloth (for example) could be devoid of another cloth and is yet of the nature of cloth or the absence that is opposed to a certain pot is yet coexistent with another pot and there is no opposition between the members of each of these pairs so also is the case with the destruction that is identical with the effect? (The effect could be of the same nature as the cause and yet be destructive of it.) No, this is not so. We do not admit identity, coexistence and common generic nature in nonexistence or destruction and its counterpositive. If these are admitted then the counterpositive (being identical with its destruction) it will cease to be its counterpositive, it will not be noncontemporaneous with the destruction and there will not be general incompatibility of nature between the two. But what is wrong in admitting relationship between a destruction and something which is not its counterpositive? Certainly individual differences, difference of generic nature and contemporaneity of two things are not opposed to their relationship. What are opposed to the relationship (of two things) are their identity and incompatibility. But these two we do not admit here at all.

There is also no evidence opposed to the admission of difference between a thing and its destruction.

Expl: Arguing against the foregoing contention of the opponent that there cannot be generic opposition between the earlier and latter yarn because they are of like nature the Buddhist now counterargues that such an opposition is quite conceivable. A piece of cloth is different from another and yet it coexists with it and is also of the same generic nature with it. Similar could be the opposition between one yarn and another. The opponent's reply to this is that if a thing and its destruction are related as a counterpositive and its nonexistence then they cannot be mutually identical, coexistent and of identical generic nature. But a destruction can have relationship with that which is not its counterpositive because difference, simultaneity and dissimilar nature of things are not

opposed to their relationship. One may however argue against this that a yarn and its destruction could somehow be considered identical in nature. There are properties like 'productness' common to both of them. So a certain destruction could be opposed to a yarn and yet be identical with another yarn. The reply to this argument may be this. Let there be a series of yarns originating successively. The first of these will have the second as its effect and therefore also as its destruction. The second will have the third as its effect and destruction. Now when the third yarn has emerged the second is gone and gone also is the destruction of the first as the second is identical with the destruction of the first. In such a situation the occurrence of the destruction of the first cannot be accounted for. It would not be a proper explanation of the occurrence of the destruction to say that all the yarns subsequent to the first are its destruction. Then the yarns subsequent to the second cannot be its destruction. Moreover if a later term in a series occurs at a quite distant place from that where an earlier term of the series has first occurred and then ceased to exist, then the cessation could be supposed to occur at the distant place too as the later term occurs there.

One more objection and its reply

Text: ननु घटाभावे धटः अस्ति न वा? आद्ये घटवति तत्–अभावः, कपाले घटः अस्ति इति तानि अपि तत्–वंति प्रसज्येरन्। नास्ति इति पक्षे अन्–अवस्था–प्रसङ्गः। अभाव–अंतर–अंतरेण तत्र नास्तिता–व्यवहारे भाव–अंतरं अपि तथा प्रसङ्गः? न। भाव–अंतरस्य सजातीयत्वेन अ–विरूद्ध–जातीयत्वात्। विरुद्ध–जीतियस्य वा समान–जातीयत्व–अन्–उपपत्तेः। अन्यत्व–मात्रेण तथा व्यवहारे तत्–वति अपि प्रसङ्गात्। अभावस्य तु विरुद्ध–स्वभावतया एव अभाव–अंतर–अनुभव–तर्क्योः अभावात् इति।

Trans: If nonexistence is different from its counterpositive it may be asked, 'Does the pot (for example) exist in the potsherds together with its anterior and posterior negations or not? (These negations are supposed to exist in the potsherds, so if nonexistence is different from its counterpositive it should coexist with the former and be coeval with them.) If it does then even the pot in which the nonexistence of the pot is located (as in the potsherds) should have a pot located in it. If however the pot does not exist where the nonexistence exists then there arises infinite regress (because the nonexistence of the pot exists where the nonexistence exists, but in the nonexistence itself the pot does not exist, so in one nonexistence another nonexistence exists and in this again

another. Thus infinite regress is entailed). If however the usage pertaining to the nonexistence of a pot in its nonexistence is explained without admitting a second nonexistence then even the nonexistence of a thing in another could be explained without admitting the nonexistence as different from the thing in which it is (supposed to be) located. No! (Such an argument will not do.) The positive locus of the negation is positive in nature and so it is not opposite in nature to the positive. If it were opposite in nature to the positive it cannot be positive in nature. However if the locus is equated with a certain nonexistence simply because it differs from the counterpositive of the nonexistence then even in the presence of a pot in a locus its nonexistence should be present there. As to the occurrence of nonexistence in a nonexistence there is no need to postulate a second nonexistence to explain the experience of the fact. The natural incompatibility of nonexistence (with existence) should by itself suffice to explain this experience. There is neither any experience nor any counterfactual reasoning to support the admission of an infinite series of nonexistences one located in the other.

Expl: If nonexistence is different from its counterpositive then the anterior and posterior negations of the pot for example would coexist with the pot in the potsherds at the same time. Similarly since the pot exists where the nonexistence of pot exists (in the potsherds) it would exist even in itself where the nonexistence exists. Thus there will be an infinite series of pots existing one upon another. If on the other hand the pot does not exist where its nonexistence exists then its nonexistence would exist there. So nonexistence would exist even in nonexistence and these nonexistences would differ from each other. Thus there will be an infinite series of nonexistences one existing in the other. If this usage of nonexistence existing in nonexistence is explained without admitting more than one nonexistence then the existence in a positive locus of the nonexistence of something should also be accountable without admitting the nonexistence to be different from the locus. Here the separate identity of the nonexistence is maintained because the positive locus is of a different nature than the nonexistence located in it. The positive locus by itself cannot account for the experience of the location of nonexistence in it simply because it is other than the object which is nonexistent in it. If this were the case then the nonexistence of a thing would appear even where the thing is itself present. But the nonexistence of a thing in its nonexistence need not require the postulation of more than one nonexistence which is the locus. The very fact that this nonexistence is by nature opposed to the existence of its counterpositive should be adequate to explain the experience of one nonexistence appearing as located in another.

Objection to the foregoing reply and its rejoinder

Text: भिन्न–अभाव–जन्मनि घट–तादवस्थ्यं दोषः इति चेत्? न। घट–तादवस्थ्यं हि यदि घटत्वं एव अभिमतं एव–तत्। न हि अभाव–जन्मनि घट : अ–घटतां उपैति इति अभ्युपगच्छामः । तत्–काल–सत्त्वं चेत् न तर्हि अभावः जातः। काल–अंतरे घट–अन्–अवस्थान–स्वभावः एव हि तत्–अभावः। अस्तु तर्हि निर् –उपादानत्वं बाधकं जन्मनः उपादान–व्याप्तत्वात् इति चेत्? न। धर्मि–ग्राहक–प्रमाण–बाधात्, भाव–अवच्छेदात् च व्याप्तेः। एतेन निर् –उपादेयत्वं व्याख्यातम्। गुण–आदि सिद्धौ च अन्–ऐकांतिकत्वात इति ।

Trans: Isn't it the case that in the view that nonexistence is different from its counterpositive the pot for example should continue to exist even when its destruction exists (for the two are different from each other and so the existence of one should not prevent the existence of the other)? And isn't this the fallacy in this view? Well, if the continuance in existence of the pot is nothing but its being of the nature of pot; then this is certainly acceptable to us. Certainly when the nonexistence (or destruction) of a pot comes into being the pot does not cease to be a pot; we do not admit this at all. If the pot is in existence it means that the destruction has not come into existence at all. It is so because the destruction or nonexistence of the pot is in its nature necessarily noncontemporary with the pot. Alright! Let then destruction be uncaused (and so necessary) because it has no material cause. This fact is opposed to destruction being a product as every product has a material cause. No! (This is not correct). Valid cognitive evidence like that of the cognition of the form, 'Now the pot is destroyed' which testifies to the reality of destruction also testifies to its producibility. Moreover the concomitance of the middle and the major in the inference that 'Destruction is not produced because it has no material cause' is vitiated by the fallacy of conditionality, the condition being 'positive nature'. All unproduced entities are positive in nature while negations which do not have any material cause are other than positive in nature. By this refutation also stands refuted the inference of the necessity of destruction based on the middle term 'Not being itself the material cause of anything'. (This too is vitiated by the fallacies afflicting the above inference.) Moreover if the difference between qualities and their substantive loci is established the middle term 'not being the material cause of anything' will be found to be deviant. No quality is the material cause of anything although qualities are producible.

Expl: Another argument against the thesis of the non-necessary nature of

destruction that, even when the destruction of an entity has occurred that entity could exist with it is repudiated here by the opponent. If the continued existence of a pot consists in its persistence as a pot endowed with potness none need deny it. But if the pot is supposed to be existent even after its destruction this implies that the destruction has not taken place when the pot is there. Destruction is by nature noncontemporaneous with the destroyed entity. Other arguments based on the fact of 'having no material cause' or 'not being itself a material cause' to prove the necessary nature of destruction cannot also be entertained. The fallacy of conditionality—the condition being 'positivity in nature'—afflicts these arguments. Of course certain negations like the anterior negation are unproduced but they are not positive in nature. So the condition is nonpervasive of the major term and thus does not fulfil the definition of a condition (as the pervader of the major but nonpervader of the middle). The condition therefore afflicting the inferences should be taken to be 'the mere difference from the minor term'. In the inferences destruction is the minor term, so 'difference from destruction' is pervasive of the major term 'nonproducedness' in all entities which are known to be nonproduced.

The fourth version of necessity refuted

Text: अस्तु तर्हि व्यापकत्वं ध्रुवभावित्वं इति चेत? न। अ–तादात्म्यात् अ–तत्–कारणत्वात् च। अस्मत्–दिशा अपि व्याप्ति–ग्रहः न साहित्य–नियमेन, विरोधितया विषम–समयत्वात्। न अपि जन्म–आनंतर्य–नियमेन, तत्–अ–सिद्धेः। सिद्धौ वा ततः एव क्षणभङ्ग–सिद्धेः किं अनेन? भविष्यत्ता–मात्रेण व्यापकत्वं अस्ति इति चेत्? अस्तु न तु एतावता हेतु–अंतर–अन्–अपेक्षत्व–सिद्धिः। अद्यतन–घटस्य श्वस्तन–कपाल–मालया एव अन–ऐकांतिकांत्वात् इति।

Trans: Let then the necessity of destruction be the same as the pervasion by destruction of its counterpositive. No! (This cannot be) because (as per the Buddhist view) only what is identical with or the product of another can be pervaded by it but destruction is neither identical with nor the product of its counterpositive. Even in our own (the non-Buddhist) view the concomitance of the two cannot be known by means of their necessary coexistence as the two, being mutually opposed occur only at different times. Nor can the concomitance be maintained on the basis of the necessity of the occurrence of destruction immediately after the genesis of its counterpositive as this is unproved. If it were already proved then momentariness could be proved by this very fact. There would then be no

need to prove momentariness (in a roundabout way). But couldn't the pervasion of destruction be maintained merely on the basis of the latter's being subsequent to its counterpositive? Yes, this may be done, but because of this it cannot be proved that destruction does not need any other cause than its counterpositive. If this were the case then even tomorrow's potsherds resulting from the destruction of today's pot by the impact of a stick on it would prove the deviant nature of this middle term as the impact is a cause of the destruction over and above the pot itself.

Expl: Destruction is neither identical with nor the cause of the destroyed. Only these two can be the pervaders (of that which is identical with or caused by them) according to the Buddhist view. Nor is there necessary coexistence between destruction and the destroyed. The coexistence may be spatial or temporal. The space where the coexistence occurs may be the conjoined or the inherently-related space. The first is not the case as something which originated inside a house may be destroyed outside it. The second too is not the case. A thing is destroyed even by the destruction of its parts so that the thing and its destruction cannot be supposed to coexist in the parts. The alternative that the two occur simultaneously cannot also be true as they are opposed to each other. Mere futurity of destruction cannot also ensure its necessity as shown by the example of tomorrow's potsherds resulting from the destruction of the pot existing today.

The last version of necessity rebutted

Text: एतेन सापेक्षत्वे व्यभिचारः अपि स्यात् विनाश–हेतूनां प्रतिबंध वैकल्यात् इति परास्तम्। कपाल–संतति–तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वान् विनाशस्य इति।

अस्तु तर्हि चरमः पक्षः। तथा हि विनाशः न जायते अभावत्वात् प्रागभाववत्, जातः अपि वा निवर्तते जातत्वात् घटवत् इति। न एतत् एवम्। प्रागभावो जायते अभावत्वात् वा ध्वंसवत् घटवत् वा। अ–जातः वा न निवर्तते अ–जातत्वात् आकाशवत् , शशविषाणवत् वा इतिवत् अ–साधनत्वात्।

Trans: By the above rebuttal stands rebutted the (likely) objection that if destruction requires causes other than its counterpositive then it may not arise at all (so that no object would ever be destroyed) because the several causes may be obstructed from arising (or coming together). If such an eventuality can arise then the potsherds too cannot arise from the destruction of the pot. The causality of destruction has to be understood

in the same manner as that of the potsherds. Let us then accept the last of the aforementioned alternatives. To explain: (The inferences for the necessity of destruction are): 'Destruction does not originate because it is an absence like the anterior absence of a thing. Or if it originates it also goes out of existence because it is originated like a pot'. No! These inferences are not valid (because there can then be these counterinferences): 'The anterior absence does originate because it is an absence or because it is destructible like destruction and a pot. Alternatively, 'The anterior absence if unborn is not destroyed because it is unborn like the sky or the hare's horn'. Just as these inferences are invalid so the foregoing inferences also are invalid.

Expl: If destruction depended upon causes different from the destroyed these causes may even be obstructed from coming together so destruction may not take place at all. This likely objection of the opponent is met by what has already been stated about the future potsherds. Just as the potsherds—though a necessary future product of the destruction of the pot—does depend upon causes other than the destroyed pot so the genesis of destruction also depends upon various causes despite being a necessary occurrence.

On the basis of the last alternative the inferences that are adduced by the Buddhist to prove that destruction is either not producible or if producible not destructible are countered by the opponent by means of other inferences seeking to prove the producibility or nondestructibility of anterior negation. Here the middle terms are the properties of 'being a negation' and 'nonproducibility' respectively. These inferences are vitiated by the fallacy of conditionality. Being of positive nature is the condition which is pervasive of nonproductibility but nonpervasive of 'negativity' the middle term in the first inference. Thus the middle by itself is found to be irrelevant to the major. Likewise in the inferences of the Buddhist also the middle is irrelevant to the major and so the necessity of destruction cannot be proved by its means.

In the first inference of the opponent two middle terms viz. 'being negation' and 'being destruction' are cited. The examples cited viz. destruction and the pot respectively correspond to these two middle terms. In the second inference only one middle term is cited but two examples viz. the sky and the hare's horn corresponding to it are cited.

Fallacies in the inferences of the Buddhist pointed out and polemically justified

Text: किं एतेषां दूषणं इति चेत्? भाव–अवाच्छिन्न–व्याप्तिकत्वात् अ–प्रयोजकत्वं, प्राक्र–प्रध्वसाभाव–ग्राहक–प्रत्यक्ष–बाध, प्राक्र पश्चात् च कार्य–उन्मज्जान–प्रसेङ्ग–लक्षण–प्रतिकूल–तर्कः च। अथ

उन्मेज्जने कः दोष इति चेत? काल–विच्छेद–प्रत्ययस्य अन्–उभय–आत्मकत्व–प्रसङ्ग :। अ–यथार्थत्वे तस्य द्वि–चंद्र–दर्शन–काले, चंद्र–देश–विच्छेदवत् तत्–वत्तः काल–अ–विच्छेदे भावस्य प्राक्–प्रध्वंस–सहवृत्तित्वेन अ–विरोध–प्र–सङ्गात्। यथार्थत्वे तु भेद–स्थितौ ततै उन्मज्जन–अनुषपत्तेः। एतेन प्रागभावे प्रध्वंस–उन्मज्जानं तत्काले च प्रागभाव–उन्मज्जानं अपास्तम्। भाववत् अभावयोः अपि उभयविरोधि–स्वभावत्वात् इति।

Trans: But what are the fallacies in all these inferences (both of the Buddhist as well as the non-Buddhist)? Well, (the fallacies are): 'Irrelevance of the middle term to the major because its concomitance with the major is determined by the condition of positivity; (Positivity pervades the major term 'nonproducible' in the first inference as only positive entities are supposed to be included in the class of nonproducibles. Being endowed with the universal '*sattā*' is an adjunct to this major term. Negation is not endowed with the universal); 'Conflict of the inference with the perceptions testifying to the reality of anterior and posterior negations and also the contrary evidence of the counterfactual conditional that an effect could come into being both before its anterior negation and after its posterior negation have come into being'. (If the anterior negation of a thing does itself come into being the thing should come into being before this negation came into being. Similarly if destruction is destructible the destroyed thing should emerge into existence.) But what is wrong in assuming the emergence into being (of a thing under both these conditions)? Well, if this happened then the experience of termporal interruption in the existence of an entity (after its destruction and before its genesis) would turn out to be neither veridical nor unveridical. If the experience were unveridical then as in the false perception of double moon the perceived displacement of the moon is found to be false so (in the present case too the temporal interruption in the existence of an entity would be found to be false and the entity could coexist even with its anterior and posterior negations. As a result the opposition between these would cease to exist. If however the experience is veridical then the negations will have to be regarded as different from each other and then the emergence into being of an entity both before and after the occurrence of these negations cannot be maintained. By this argument stands refuted a possible argument like this: "If a pot for example does not exist when its anterior negation exists then the destruction of the pot which is opposed to it should exist. Similarly if when the destruction exists the pot does not exist then the anterior negation

which is opposed to the pot should exist". This argument is ruled out by the fact that just as both its anterior and posterior negations are opposed to the pot so both the pot and its destruction are opposed to its anterior negation and likewise both the pot and its anterior negation are opposed to its posterior negation.

Expl: The foregoing arguments for proving the necessity of destruction based on its negative character were opposed by counterarguments seeking to prove the opposite of the example cited. The object of this was to bring out the irrelevance of the middle to the major in both the arguments and the counterargument. As already explained the concomitance of the middle with the major in all the inferences is afflicted by the fallacy of conditionality. Moreover the testimony of experiences like 'Now the pot is destroyed', 'The pot will be produced in the potsherds', etc. also establishes the producibility of destruction and the non-producibility of the anterior negation. If an anterior negation is supposed to be producible its genesis will be preceded by its own anterior negation. This too will have its own anterior negation preceding it. Thus there will result an infinite series of anterior negations if the perceptual testimony testifying to the beginninglessness of anterior negation is disregarded. Same will be the case if the perceptual testimony in favour of the nondestructibility of destruction is ignored. Besides as both these negations are opposed to their counterpositive, an entity would preexist its anterior negation and also survive its posterior negation or destruction if the anterior negation is supposed to have genesis and the posterior negation is supposed to have destruction. It would not be proper to say against this objection that like the anterior negation the anterior negation of the anterior negation and so on are also opposed to the counterpositive of the first anterior negation and similarly the destruction of destruction like the destruction of a thing and the further destructions are also opposed to the counterpositive of the first destruction. Without such gratuitous assumptions it is possible to meet the above-mentioned difficulty by denying genesis of the anterior negation and the destruction of the posterior negation. Perhaps one may urge here that a thing though pre-existing its anterior negation and surviving its posterior negation is however only not cognised to be such. But if such were the case then the experience, of interruption in the existence of a thing when it succumbs to destruction cannot be treated either as valid or as invalid (as explained above). Could it be urged against this that there are innumerable anterior and posterior negations of a thing and these are also opposed to its existence, so the experience of interruption mentioned is somehow accounted for? No! The postulation of more than one anterior and one posterior negation of a thing has no justification at all.

At this the Buddhist raises one serious difficulty. When there is the destruction of the pot the destruction of the anterior negation of the pot

cannot be supposed to exist for then the anterior negation of this destruction too would have to be admitted (to exist at some other time). So the destruction of the anterior negation being nonexistent the anterior negation which is the counterpositive of the destruction must be supposed to coexist with the destruction of the pot. Likewise when the anterior negation of a pot exists the anterior negation of the destruction of the pot cannot be supposed to exist as then even the destruction of this negation would have to be supposed to exist. So it will have to be admitted that the destruction of the pot coexists with the anterior negation of the pot.

This difficulty is met by the non-Buddhist by maintaining that just as an entity is opposed by its anterior and posterior negations so the anterior negation of a thing is opposed by both the thing and its destruction and likewise the destruction of a thing is opposed both by the thing and its anterior negation. Thus the coexistences mentioned above can be avoided.

Positive proof for the durability of things

Text: क्तः पुनः स्थिर–सिद्धिः? प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् क्षणिकत्व–अन्–उपपत्तेः च। लक्षण–अभेदेन व्यभिचारि–जातीयत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञा न प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। अवांतर–ळक्षण. भेदेन अ–व्यभिचार–नियमात्। किं तत् इति चेत्? विरुद्ध–धर्म–अ–संसृष्ट–विषयत्वम्। सिद्धं च तत् अत्र। एवंभूतं अपि कदाचित् व्यभिचरेत् इति चेत्? न। विरुद्ध–धर्म–अन्–आस्कंदितस्य एकत्व–प्रत्ययस्य व्यभिचारे सर्वत्र एकत्व–उच्छेद–प्रसङ्गात्। तथा च एकत्वं अपि न स्यात् इति भव निःकिंचनः। तस्मात् भेद प्रवृत्तौ अवश्यं विरू द्ध–धर्म–संसर्गः। तत्–संसर्गे वा अवश्यं भेद–व्यावृत्तिः इति भेद–अभेद–व्यवहार–मर्यादा।

Trans: But how can the durability of things be established? It can be established on the basis of recognition and the impossibility of the universals being momentary. But isn't it the case that the definition of recognition is common to the recognition of cognitions which differ from moment to moment and so the recognition of (other) things as durable cannot be valid as it is of the same nature as the invalid recognition of cognitions? No. There cannot be deviation in the definition of the special type of recognition which is valid. What is this definition? It is, 'the property of having a thing as its object which is not endowed with incompatible characteristics', and this is already proved to be true of the recognition of durable things. But isn't it likely that even the recognition

endowed by the above property may be false? No. If the recognition of identity of even that which is not endowed with in compatible properties were false then there will not be identity in anything and as a result there will not also be diversity in things (as diversity is the same as the exclusion of identity) and thus you (the Buddhist) will be left with nothingness. So if there is cognition of diversity in things there necessarily is coexistence of incompatible properties in them. If there is not such a coexistence (in a thing) then diversity also is not present there. This is the rule governing the usage of identity and diversity.

Expl: Can there by any positive proof for nonmomentariness even if there is no negative proof against it? Answering this likely question the non-Buddhist adduces recognition as the positive proof for non-momentariness. Of course some recognitions are false but those that are veridical are distinguished by the fact that their objects are not endowed with incompatible properties. Such recognitions can be treated as false only at the risk of regarding all cognitions of identity as false. True cognition of diversity is necessarily associated with the coexistence of incompatible properties in the object of the cognition.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: निष्कंप–प्रदीप–कुड्मलेषु निपुणं निभालयंतः अपि न विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गं ईक्षामहे अथ च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं अवधूय तत्र भेदः एव पद विधत्ते इति चेत? कस्य प्रमाणस्य वलेन? आश्रय–नाशस्य हुताशन–नाश–हेतुत्वेन विज्ञातत्वात तस्य च अत्र प्रतिक्षणं उपलब्धेः। वर्ति–तैलयोः उत्तरोत्तरं अपचीयमानत्वात पूर्वस्य नाशः उत्तर–उत्पादः च न्याय–सिद्धः इति चेत्? ननु अयं प्रत्यनीक–धर्म–संसर्गः एव, नष्टत्व–अ–नष्टत्वयोः आश्रय–नाश–अनाशयोः वा एकत्र तेजसि अन्–उपपत्तेः।

Trans: But isn't it a fact that despite careful observation of the unwavering and spreading flame of a lamp we do not find in it the coexistence of any incompatible properties and yet only diversity defying recognition characterises it? Yes, but on what valid basis is it concluded that the flame is not a single entity. Well! This basis is the knowledge of the rule that the cause of the extinction of fire is the burning out of the fuel, that is, the oil is seen burning every moment. The wick and the oil are seen growing less and less every moment. So one can rightly conclude that the earlier wick and oil are replaced by the later ones continually. But this is nothing but cooccurrence of incompatible properties. Destruction (of the earlier) and origination (of the later) or the changing efficient-causality are not

properties which can characterise the same flame.

Expl: Recognition is found to be deceptive in the case of the continually-changing flame of fire. The explanation of this deceptive appearance of identity is the non-cognition of the continual replacement of earlier wick, and oil by the later ones. Thus the incompatible properties of destruction and nondestruction of its causes namely the oil and the wick characterise the flame although this is not quite obvious to ordinary observation. It can't be urged against this that only the last flame is destructible by the total consumption of the oil while the earlier flames are not so destructible and consequently there is no coexistence of incompatible properties to account for diversity. The fact is that the flame as flame is known to be destructible by the destruction of its fuel. So every flame in the series of flames must be supposed to be endowed with incompatible properties.

Objection to the reply and its answer

Text: सः अयं शतं शिरः–छेदे अपि न ददाति विंशति–पंचकं तु प्रयच्छति इति किं अत्र ब्रूमः? भविष्यति तर्हि इह अपि विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्गः दुरूह : इति चेत्? अथ सः एव अयं स्फटिकः इति अत्र प्रमाण–प्रतीत संसर्गाणां विरोधः आशङ्क्यते, तत् प्रतीत–विरोधानां संसर्गः अथ अ–प्रतीत–स्वरूप– विरोध–संसर्गाः एव केचित् विरुद्धतया संसृष्टतया वा इति?

Trans: What should one say of a person who is not prepared to part with a hundred coins even on pain of being decapitated but is quite ready to give away five times twenty coins? But can't there be in the present case (of the socalled veridical recognition) too the coexistence of incompatible properties although it is not easily detectable? Well, if it can be so then we ask, 'In the recognition (of a piece of crystal as) 'It is the same crystal' do we suspect the incompatibility of properties whose relationship has already been validly established or suspect the coexistence of the properties whose incompatibility has already been validly established? Alternatively is it that in the case of the said recognition certain properties whose nature, incompatibility and relationship have not already been established are suspected to be incompatible or coexistent?

Expl: In the case of the flame the Buddhist concedes the destruction of the wick and the oil every moment yet he is not prepared to concede the coexistence of incompatible properties in the flame. This is sheer perversity on his part. However he may contend that in the case of the admittedly-valid recognition too there could be undetected coexistence of

incompatibles. If so the nature of the object of this suspicion needs to be specified. This could be the incompatibility of those whose coexistence has been validly established or the coexistence of those whose incompatibility has been validly established or the incompatibility of coexistence of those whose nature, incompatibility and coexistence have not been established.

The possibility of the alternative forms of suspicion refuted

Text: न प्रथमः। प्राक् एव निराकृतत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। योग्यानां अन्–उपलंभ–बाधितत्वात। अ–योग्यानां अपि कारण–आदि–व्याप्य–व्यापक–विगम–विलोकन–व्यावर्तितत्वात्। न तृतीयः। तस्य अतिप्रसंजकतया सर्वत्र एकत्व–उच्छेद–प्रसङ्गः।

एतेन प्रत्याभिनात् एव लक्षण–भागं आकृष्य अनुमानेन स्थैर्य–सिद्धिः। तथा हि विवाद–अध्यासितः भावः काल–भेदे अपि न भिद्यते, तत् भेदे अपि विरुद्ध–धर्म–अ–संसृष्टत्वात्। यः यत्–भेदे अपि न विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसृष्टः न असौ तत्–भेदे अपि भिद्यते यथा प्रति–संबंधि–परमाणु–भेदे अपि एकः परमाणुः। तथा च अयं विवाद–अध्यासितः भावः। तस्मात् काल–भेदे अपि न भिधते इति।

Trans: The first (of the above alternatives) is not tenable as it has already been rebutted (by the rebuttal of the thesis of noncoexistence of competence, incompetence, etc.). The second is not tenable because the perceptible properties which are known to coexist are not known to be incompatible with each other. The possibility of such nonperceptible properties is ruled out by the fact that when the absence of the effect is seen at a place the corresponding absence of the cause is also seen at that place (so that the coexistence of the cause and the absence of its effect is never seen). The third is not tenable because the suspicion of noncoexistence or coexistence of those properties whose nature, incompatibility etc. are all unknown is possible in every case of recognition so that even identity would be ruled out as the object of recognition everywhere. Thus as it has been proved that in valid recognition there is no coexistence of incompatible properties in the object of recognition the durability of reals is provable by means of the presence of the defining property of recognition abstracted from the definition and posited in the former. To explain: (The inference of durability is like this): 'The object under dispute does not differ despite difference in the times (of its occurrence), because notwithstanding this difference it is not endowed with incompatible properties; whatever is not endowed with incompatible

properties despite there being difference in a certain thing (related to it) does not differ in itself as for example the atom does not differ in itself despite the diversity of the atoms with which it may be conjoined. Similar to the atom is the object under dispute. So it does not differ despite there being difference in the times of its occurrence'.

Expl: The first of the above-mentioned alternatives is untenable. Its untenability has been established in the arguments adduced against the incompatibility of competence and incompetence. As to the second, perceptible properties whose incompatibility is established are automatically ruled out. Those that are not perceptible like the generic properties of mind, self, etc. are also ruled out as in the absence of the effect the absence of the cause is also known to be present, so the coexistence of the effect with the absence of the cause cannot be suspected to occur. Here the effect is to be taken as equipollent to the cause as for example a special feel, a quality peculiar to air is equipollent or invariably coexistent with the generic property airness inherent in air. The third alternative is obviously overextensive, so it has to be discarded.

Now isolating the defining property of recognition, viz. 'not being endowed with incompatible properties' and using it as middle term it is possible to prove the nondiversity of a thing despite the diversity of the times of its occurrence. Since recognition itself is not necessary to be included in the middle term, only its definition is used here as middle term. Further even a momentary entity does not differ from itself, so the said inference would be vitiated by the fallacy of proving the already proved if the qualification 'despite the difference in times of its occurrence' is not inserted in the body of the major term. Conjunction, disjunction etc. as characterising a thing like the seed are not incompatible with each other as they can occur in the same thing at different times.

Like the above inference there can also be inferences like the following: 'This pot under dispute does not go out of existence till it disintegrates into potsherds as it is not accompanied by the causes of its destruction, or it does not appear as destroyed or appears as the same till it's disintegration'. 'The moments at which the seed exists are moments pertaining to a single seed-entity because they are conjoined with a thing which is not endowed with incompatible properties as is the case with the collocation of auxiliaries associated with the productive seed-entity'.

Justification of the above inferences

Text: अय व्याप्तौ न कश्चित् विप्रतिपद्यते। पक्षधर्मता तु प्रसाधिता एव।
क्षणिकत्व–अन्–उपपत्तिः च अनुगत–व्यवहार–अन्–अन्यथा सिद्धेः।
शब्द–लिङ्ग–विकल्पा : हि साधारणं रूपं अन्–उपस्थापयंतः न तृण–

कुब्जीकरणे अपि समर्थाः इति अ–विवादम्। बाह्य–अर्थ–स्थितौ स्थिर–अ–स्थिर–विचारात्।

Trans: In the above inference nobody can have any doubt regarding the validity of the concomitance of the middle and major terms. As to the presence of the middle in the minor (the noncoexistence of incompatible properties in reals) it has already been established. That the reals cannot be momentary is proved by the fact that cognition of (and usage relating to) uniformity cannot be accounted for by means of momentary entities. Words (or the verbal cognition), the middle term (or the inferential cognition) and the determinate cognition cannot produce the slightest result (as slight as bending the lowly grass) without having some general feature of things as their object. This is an undisputed fact. (Of course cognition alone could be regarded as this common feature so that generic properties would not have to be accepted) but the discussion of nonmomentariness or momentariness has relevance only if external reality is admitted.

Expl: The foregoing inference is free from all fallacies. If things were all momentary there cannot be any cognition or usage relating to uniformity and in the absence of these no concomitance of any middle and major terms can be apprehended so that even the concomitance of momentariness with reality cannot be apprehended. Thus even to establish momentariness cognition of uniformity is essential. The possibility of this cognition itself disproves momentariness. The durable entity cannot therefore be regarded as endowed with incompatible properties as the Buddhist does regard it. All the three means of cognition also are effective only because they have as their objects the general features and properties of things. Words designate the objects meant by them because they are conventionally associated with different types of objects. Middle terms lead to the inference of major terms in the minor only on the basis of their general concomitance with the major terms. Determinate perceptions of things also apprehend their objects as endowed with their generic properties. This general feature or property of things cannot be identified with cognition itself as is done by the idealists. The question of momentariness of reals is pertinent only if reality external to consciousness is admitted. In the idealistic theory a cognition is only self-cognitive while the durability and nondurability are concerned with different entities. So these properties have no place in the idealistic theory.

The nature of the common feature or form of things taken up for discussion

Text: तत् च अलीकं वा, आकारः वा, बाह्यं वस्तु वा इति त्रयः पक्षाः। तत्र न प्रथमः पक्षः। तत् हि न तावत् अनुभवात् एव तथा व्यवस्थाप्यं, तस्य अलीकत्व–अन्–उल्लेखात्। न हि अलीकंएव तत् इति अनुभवे अपि अर्थक्रिया–अर्थी प्रवर्तते। अन्य–निवृत्ति–स्फुरणात् न एषः दोषः इति चेत्? एतत् एव असत्। विधि–रूपस्य एव स्फुरणात्। न हि शब्द–लिङ्गाभ्यां इह महीधर–उद्देशे अन्–अग्निः न भवति इति स्फुरणं अपि तु अग्निः अस्ति इति।

Trans: As to the nature of the common feature or form of things, there are three different views, namely that it is a fictitious entity, a general form or an eternal object. Among these the first is not acceptable. This view cannot be maintained on the basis of experience itself because no experience apprehends fictitiousness. If it did then it would be inconsistent with the action prompted by it (which is directed towards reality and not a fictitious entity). Certainly no one seeking some significant result goes after a thing while realising that it is a nonentity. But can't we say that in the determinate cognition of things it is the mere exclusion of those that are other than the thing that appears as the object (the fictitious nature of this exclusion does not appear in the congnition) and thus the difficulty pointed out can also be avoided? No. (This is not the truth about the determinate cognition.) Only the positive feature of a thing appears in its determinate cognition. Certainly words and middle terms do not lead to a negative cognition like, 'on the spur of this mountain there is no non-fire'. Instead they lead to the positive cognition like, 'on the spur of this mountain there is fire'.

Expl: What is this general feature of things? Is it a fiction or nonentity, a form or some external object? The general feature of cognitions need not be considered here. If we go by the testimony of experience then the first of the above alternatives cannot be upheld. None has the experience of a fiction. If it is urged that there is experience of the fictitious character of the exclusion of the other which appears as the general feature of things in a cognition then it may be asked whether this fictitiousness is the absolute absence or just the difference from exclusion. It cannot be the first because the cognition of the absolute absence of exclusion does not prompt anybody to move towards an object. Could it then be urged that mere exclusion without its fictitious character appears in a cognition? No. If this were the case the reflective awareness of the cognition would testify to this but it does not. If a pot is cognised the reflective awareness of the

cognition has the form 'I know the pot' and not 'I know what is other than nonpot'. Even by means of words and middle terms we have cognition only of the positive and not of the negative. That the difference from exclusion is not ordinarily apprehended is also evident from this reply.

Objection to the above that exclusion is apprehended in determinate cognitions and its rejoinder

Text: यदि अपि निवृत्ति अहं प्रत्येमि इति न विकल्प, तथा अपि निवृत्ति-पदार्थ-उल्लेखः एव निवृत्ति-उल्लेखः। न हि अन्-अंतर्भावित-विशेषणा विशिष्ट-प्रतीतिः नाम। ततः यथा सामान्य अहं प्रत्येमि इति अनुव्यवसाय-अभावे अपि साधारण-आकार-स्फुरणात् विकल्प-धीः सामान्य-बुद्धिः परेषां तथा निवृत्त-प्रत्यय-आक्षिप्ता निवृत्ति-बुद्धिः अस्माकं इति चेत्। हन्त! साधारण-आकार-परि-स्फुरणे विधि-रूपतया यदि सामान्य-बोंध-व्यवस्था, किंआयातं अस्फुरत्-अभाव-आकारे चेतसि निवृत्ति-प्रतीति-व्यवस्थायाः?

Trans: (Against the above one may argue that) 'although there is no reflective awareness (of the cognition of a thing) having the form 'I cognise an exclusion' yet the cognition of the excluding entity is itself the cognition of the exclusion. Certainly there cannot be the cognition of the qualified without the cognition of the qualifier. So just as in the opinion of the N.V. philosophers, although there is no reflective awareness of the form 'I cognise the generic property (when an object is cognised)' yet the general form of things appears in their cognition and on this account the determinate cognition of things is treated to be the cognition of the generic property, so also may be the case with the cognition of the excluder. This cognition will entail the cognition of exclusion. This argument is however not correct. (The example of the cognition of the generic property is not appropriate.) In the general cognition of a thing, only the generic property is involved as object and not the fact of its being a generic property. The cognition of a cow for example does not have as its object the excluder of the non-cow so that exclusion could be involved as object in the cognition.

Expl: Countering the foregoing argument the Buddhist urges that exclusion as exclusion need not appear as object in any cognition if the reflective awareness of the cognition does not testify to such an appearance of it in the cognition. But the object that appears in the cognition is itself the excluder of what is other than it and so the cognition is a determinate cognition of the excluder of the other. As such a determinate cognition entails the cognition of the determinant, namely

the exclusion. The determined is not cognised unless the determinant is cognised. This is just like the involvement of the generic property in the general cognition of an object although the reflective awareness of this cognition does not have the form 'I cognise such and such a generic property'. This counterargument of the Buddhist is met by the rejoinder that it is the thing which is the excluder that appears in the general cognition. The thing does not appear in the cognition in the capacity of the excluder so that exclusion as its qualification could be involved in the cognition. But it is quite otherwise with the generic property which is actually cognised in the general cognition. Exclusion as an entity or a qualifier does not appear at all in the general cognition whose object is positive in nature.

Rejoinder continued

Text: न हि अन्गो–अपोढ़: अयं इति विकल्प: किं तु गौ: इति: । वत: अन्य–निवृत्तिं अहं प्रत्येमि इति आकार–अभावे अपि निवृत्ति–आकार–स्फुरणं यदि स्यात् क: निवृत्ति–प्रतीतिं अपन्हुवीत? अन्यथा तु अतत्–प्रतिभासे तत्–प्रतीति–व्यवहृति: इति गौ–आकारे चेतसि तुरग–बोध: इति अस्तु। न च निवृत्ति–मात्र–प्रतिभासे अपि प्रवृत्ति–संभव: । न हि अ–घट: नास्ति इति एव घट–अर्थी प्रवर्तते अपि तु धट: अस्ति इति।

Trans: Certainly the determinate cognition of the cow is not of the form, 'This thing is exclusive of non-cow' but is of the form 'This is a cow'. So if despite the reflective cognition not being of the form 'I apprehend the exclusion of what is other than the cow' the determinate cognition is supposed to apprehend the exclusion then nobody can deny the occurrence of the cognition of exclusion. Otherwise even a cognition which does not apprehend a certain object could be treated as the cognition of that object so that the cognition having the form of a cow could have the horse as its object. Nor can there be any urge towards an object simply by the apprehension of exclusion. Certainly the seeker of the pot does not move towards the pot simply by knowing that there is non-pot. He is prompted only by knowing that there is a pot.

Expl: Moreover the determinate cognition of a thing does not apprehend exclusion either as a primary or as a secondary object. Notwithstanding this fact if the exclusion is regarded as the object of the cognition of a positive entity then any cognition will have any object as its own. Also the cognition of mere exclusion (not as qualifying the real because the unreal cannot qualify the real) cannot pinpoint any activity. Nobody goes after the absence of a non-pot.

Another objection and its rejoinder

Text: अघटस्य एव निवृत्तिः इति प्रतीतौ न अयं दोषः इति चेत्? न, घट–निवृत्ति–अ–प्रतिक्षेपे नियमस्य एव अ–सिद्धेः। तत् प्रतिक्षेपे तु क ततः अन्यः विधिः, निषेध–प्रतिक्षेपस्य एव विधित्वात्। निवृत्तेः अ–परिस्फुरणे गां बधान इति देशितः अश्वं अपि बध्नीयात् इति चेत्? न! भवेत् अपि एवं यदि अश्वः अपि गौः स्यात्। किंतु गौः गौः अश्वः अश्व इति। अन्यथा निवृत्तौ अपि कुतः ते सामाश्वासः इति? निवृत्ति–अंतरात् चेत् अनवस्था। निवर्त्य–निवृत्ति–तदधिकरणानां स्वरूप–साङ्कर्ये प्रवृत्ति–सङ्करः स्यात्। स्वरूप–भेदेन एव नियमे विधि–मात्र–प्रतिभासे अपि तथा किं न स्यात्?

Trans: But the above drawback (of the cognition of the exclusion of the non-pot in the general cognition) can be overcome if the object of the cognition is taken to be the exclusion of the non-pot alone (otherwise even a certain pot being other than a certain other pot will be a non-pot and so it too will be excluded by the exclusion). No! If the exclusion or negation of the pot is not rejected by the said exclusion the necessity associated with the non-pot in the above expression will not be upheld at all. And if the non-pot is rejected there is no positive generic nature other than this rejection. The rejection of the exclusion of the pot is itself the positive generic nature. But can't it be urged that if exclusion of the other does not appear as the object in general cognition then the sentence 'Tether the cow' should make the person who is thus ordered to tether even the horse (as the exclusion of the horse is not signified by the word 'cow')? Yes, it could be if the horse itself were the cow but a horse is a horse and a cow is a cow. Otherwise how could you depend even upon exclusion for right knowledge? If one exclusion is excluded from other exclusions then these other exclusions too would have to be excluded from still others and thus there would result infinite regress. If the exclusion is not excluded from its locus and counterpositive then any word could prompt action towards any object (as the exclusion of the non-pot for example would not be distinguishable from the exclusion of the non-cloth). If however each exclusion is supposed to be sui generis and so the cognition of one exclusion is not supposed to extend to another exclusion as its object then even the positive nature of things could be so regarded and the rule pertaining to the determination of action by cognition could be upheld.

Expl: The cognition of the exclusion of the non-pot may not necessarily

have a pot as its object. Even a certain pot is a non-pot in relation to another pot. So the exclusion is to be understood as the exclusion of the non-pot alone, not of the pot too. Now if the exclusion of the non-pot does not exclude the absence of the pot then the exclusion cannot be of the non-pot alone. If it does then it is nothing other than potness. This potness is other than the pot which in the Buddhist view is a self-defined real. The potness is not the object of any indeterminate cognition which is the only true cognition. Potness is unreal and is the object of determinate cognition. Now it may be asked whether the verbal cognition generated by the word 'cow' has the exclusion of the horse as its object or not. Since this cognition does not lead to any action relating to the horse it must have the exclusion from the horse also as its object. So it must be admitted that even verbal cognition has exclusion as its object. The answer to this is that for any cognition to prompt activity in relation to the horse what is necessary is that it should have the horse itself as its object. Since the cognition generated by the word 'cow' has only the cow as its object it does not prompt activity in relation to the horse. Moreover exclusion by itself cannot restrict the scope of its cognition. The exclusion needs to be excluded from its locus as well as its counterpositive. Otherwise the activity prompted by the cognition cannot be confined to the excluding entity only. But this second exclusion would itself have to be excluded to avoid its being confused with its locus, etc. Thus there will result circularity. If therefore exclusion is regarded as sui generic the positive generic nature itself could be so regarded.

The objection that the universal itself is the exclusion of the other rebutted

Text: स्वरूप–भेदः एव–अन्य–अपोहः, अन्य–अपोढ–स्वरूपत्वात् विधेः इति चेत्? न। अलीक–पक्षे तत्–अभावात्। तस्य स्वरूप–विधौ अन्–अलीकत्व–प्रसङ्गात। स्वलथ्तणस्य च विकल्प–अन्–आरोहात्। अपि च गां बधान इति देशितः गवि प्रवृत्तः न अश्वे, तत् अपतीतेः। यदा तु अश्वं उपलप्स्यते तदा तत्र प्रवृत्ति–उन्मुखः अपि गोः अभावं प्रतीत्य एव निवर्त्स्यति इति किं अन्–उपपन्नम्?

Trans: May it be that exclusion is nothing other than the universal and it is self-excluded and the positive entity is the counterpositive of exclusion which is its form No! If the universal is fictitious how can it be the form of the positive real? If it is the form of the real it cannot be fictitious. Moreover if the universal which is the same as exclusion were identical with the positive real then it will be a real, how can it then be the object of determinate cognition which is false? Further a person asked to tether a

cow does not move towards a horse for tethering it only because the cognition generated by the words 'tether the cow' is not concerned with the horse. Even if a horse is seen by the person ordered and he may have inclination to move towards the horse he turns away from it knowing that it is not a cow. What is untenable in all this?

Expl: Exclusion has no form and it is self-excluded without depending upon any other exclusion to exclude it from its locus. The universal is identical with exclusion. The positive real however has a form which is the same as exclusion. So when the positive is cognised its form viz. the exclusion is also cognised. Now it may be asked, 'Does the positive appearing as other than the form appear as an unreal or as a real in its cognition? If the former, then the unreal being formless the positive cannot have any form. If it has form it cannot be unreal. But if the latter alternative is upheld then the positive is the self-contained real and as such it cannot be the object of determinate cognition. Moreover what is the purpose of the cognition of the exclusion of the other from words like cow (as is maintained by the Buddhist)? Is it to prompt action towards the cow or dissuade action towards say, the horse? Neither of these is true. On listening to the word 'cow' and seeing the cow the listener moves towards the cow, not the horse because it is not seen. If somehow the listener turns his attention towards the horse—if it is present with the cow in front of him—he immediately discovers that the animal is other than a cow and turns away from it. The inclusion of 'exclusion of the horse, etc., as part-meaning in the full meaning of the word 'cow' is not therefore called for to explain the non-attention to the horse by a person hearing the word 'cow'.

Gñānasrī's contention that exclusion is the secondary object of cognition discussed and refuted

Text: स्यात् एतत्। न हि अनुभवं अबधूय भवितुं क्षमं इति कः विधि–स्फुरणं अपन्हुताम्? तत्–उपसर्जनीभूतः तत्–निषेधः अपि स्फुरति एव। अन्यथा विधेः अवच्छेदकत्व–अन्–उपपत्तेः। न हि अन्यतः विशेष्यं अ–व्यावर्तयतः विशेषणत्वं नाम। न च अन्यतः व्यावर्तनं व्यवच्छित्ति–प्रत्ययात् अन्यत्। ततः यथा इंदीवर–पुंडरीक–आदि–शब्देभ्यः गुणीभूत–नील–धवल–आदि–विधि–शेखरा प्रीतितिः, तत्–अन्य–व्यवच्छेदः तु तत्–गर्भ–अर्भकायमाणः, तथा सर्वत्र इति चेत्? अस्तु तावत् एवम्। विधिः तु स्फुरति इति अत्र संप्रति न नः निर्बंधः। अन्यथा अवच्छेद्य–अवच्छेदकयोः अ–प्रतीतेः अवाच्छिन्त्तिः

अपि न स्यात् यथा उत्पल–आदौ एव नीलत्व–आदि अ–प्रतीतौ ।

Trans: Let then there be this argument:. Certainly no theory can afford to ignore experiential testimony. Who can dare deny the appearance of the positive (real) in cognition? But (when the positive appears in cognition) the negative too does appear as subsidiary to the latter in the cognition. If this were not the case then the positive (property) cannot be the determinant or the qualifier. Surely what does not distinguish the qualified entity from those other than it cannot be a qualifier and to distinguish a thing from others is nothing other than its determination or qualification. So just as from the Sanskrit words 'Indīvara' and 'Puṇḍarīka' we get the verbal cognition of lotuses as characterised by the qualities of blueness and whiteness respectively which are subsidiary to the (substantive) lotuses and the resulting exclusion of non-blue and non-white lotuses is however included as object in the cognition just like a foetus in an embryo, so it may be in all other cases too. Alright! let this be so, but now there is no difference of view between us regarding the appearance of the positive in cognition. If the appearance of the positive is not admitted, that is, if the qualified and the qualifier do not appear, even the qualification (of the qualified entity) would not be cognised. If for example blueness and lotusness did not appear in the cognition of the blue-lotus then the distinction of the latter from the non-blue and the non-lotus would not at all be known in the cognition.

Expl: Buddhist scholars like Diṇnāga and Dharmakīrtī simply deny the appearance of the positive real in the (determinate) cognition like that of a cow but Gñānasrī, another great Buddhist scholar is of the view that the positive appears in the cognition but along with it the negative, that is, the exclusion of the other also appears as subsidiary to the positive in the cognition. Without the appearance of exclusion the cognition cannot be of the nature of a determinate cognition of a certain thing qualified by a certain quality. Qualification is nothing other than the exclusion of the qualified from things other than itself. To this contention the reply of N.V. is that although the qualifier and the qualified appear in the cognition yet the qualificatory nature of the qualifier consisting in the exclusion of the qualified from the unqualified does not appear in the cognition. This qualificatory nature is known only after the determinate cognition has taken place. It cannot be contended against this that if the qualificatory nature of the qualification did not appear in the determinate cognition then the latter cannot be distinguished from the collective cognition of the contents of the determinate cognition. In the collective cognition of a stick, its conjunction and the man (the holder of the stick) which are the different contents of the determinate cognition of a man holding the stick are present as objects yet it is different from the latter because in it the

qualificatory nature of the qualifier—stick—does not appear. But this contention is wrong. In the collective cognition neither the stick appears as the qualifier nor the man as the qualified entity. For this simple reason it cannot be equated with a determinate cognition. There is no necessity to admit the appearance of the qualificatory nature too in the determinate cognition.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: न च निषेध्यं अ–स्पृशती प्रतीतिः निषेधं स्प्रष्टुं अर्हति। तस्य तत्–निरूपण–अधीन–निरूपणत्वात। न च निषेध–अंतरं एव निषेध्यं इतरेतर–आश्रय–प्रसङ्गात्। पर–अन्–अपेक्ष–निरूपणौ तु विधौ न अयं दोषः इति। तः प्रतीतौ इतरेतर–आश्रयत्वं उक्तं संकेते संचार्य यत् परिहृतं ज्ञानश्रिया तत् एतत् ग्राम्य–जन–धंधीकरणं गोलक–आदिवत् स्थान–अंतर–संचारात्।

Trans: But certainly without apprehending the excluded a cognition cannot apprehend the exclusion itself because the cognition of the latter is dependent upon the cognition of the former? Could it be urged against this that (it is not the positive that is excluded by the qualification like cowness but) the exclusion of the buffalo etc. by cowness is the qualified and the exclusion as characterising the cow is the qualifier so that no positive entity could be said to be involved in any determinate cognition? No! This cannot be conceded because such a view would entail circularity (as the cognition of the cow depends upon the cognition of the exclusion of the non-cow and this latter upon the cognition of the cow). As to the cognition the pure positive no such circularity vitiates it (A cow as cow need not always be apprehended as the negation of the non-cow). Thus the opponent urged the fallacy of vicious circle in the Buddhist view of the determinate cognition of things. Gñānasrī however misinterpreted this objection as one concerned with the conventional meaning of words and tried to answer it (by explaining that, for example the word 'cow' means the cow and not the buffalo or any other animal which are meant by other words). This is just cheap jugglery which is practised by common jugglers. Only boorish persons can be taken in by such a sleight of hand.

Expl: It cannot be urged against the above that only the exclusion of something other than a cow appears in the cow-cognition for then even a tree for example could be the object of this cognition. Everything other than a cow is excluded by the cow-cognition because all non-cows can never be cognised individually and their general cognition as certain things would not be of any use in the exclusive cognition of the cow. So the non-cows have to be known as all those that are other than the cow. In

this cognition cowness is necessarily involved as the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the exclusion and so the appearance of the positive real in the cognition cannot be denied. If however one argues against this that cowness is nothing other than the difference from that which is different from the cow then there arises the fallacy of circularity. This is explained in the following verse:

सिद्धः च अगौः अपोह्येत् गो–निषेध–आत्मकः तु सः ।
तदा गौः एव वक्तव्यः नञा यः प्रतिषिध्यते । ।

'Only when the cow is cognised it can be negated but the cow itself is the negation of this negation. So there is mutual dependence in the cognitions of the cow and the non-cow'. The conventional meaning of the word 'cow' is grasped from the statement (of a knowledgeable person) that 'that which excludes the non-cow is the meaning of the word 'cow'. But this statement itself can be significant to the listener (who is to be introduced to the meaning of the word 'cow') only after he has known the meaning of the word 'cow' as it occurs in the statement. Thus the explanation involves circularity. But such a circularity is involved even in the statement (elucidator of the meaning of the word like 'the cow is the meaning of the word 'cow'. 'However' if the meaning is taken to be conveyed simply by uttering the word 'cow' or the sentence 'this is a cow' in the presence of a 'cow' then such an instruction without involving circularity is possible if the exclusion of the non-cow is taken to be meant by the word 'cow'. Somehow 'the exclusion of the non-cow' too could be supposed to be directly present to a person and his interlocutor when the former utters the word 'cow'. Gñānasrī has tried to remove the fallacy of circularity vitiating the cognition of the meaning of a word (if the exclusion of the other is taken to be the meaning). But the N.V. does not intend to object to the possibility of the cognition of the meaning of words. It objects to the very possibility of the determinate cognitions of things. Gñānsrī deliberately misreads N.V.'s objection so that it would be easy for him to answer the objection supposed to be made by the N.V.

The objection of circularity could be presented in a slightly different fashion also. The exclusion of the non-cow is known only if the non-cow is known. But this is known if the meanings of the words 'buffalo', etc. which designate animals other than the cow are known. Now the meanings of these words are 'the animals which exclude the non-buffalo etc. and these are other than the cow. Thus the meanings of the words 'cow' and 'buffalo', etc. cannot be known unless each of the meanings is known. This circularity can be avoided by the stipulation that for the cognition of the meaning of the word 'cow' only the cognition of things other than the cow is necessary, not the cognition of the meanings of the words designating these things. Alternatively as explained above even from actual

usage in the presence of the meant entity it is quite possible to grasp the meaning of the word designating the thing. There is no need to refer to another word to get at the meaning of the word whose meaning is to be ascertained.

It may also be argued that all the non-cows although not known individually could somehow be apprehended by means of some innate transcendental urge rooted in the mind but this would not do as a reply to the charge of circularity. Even if an infinite number of non-cows are thus apprehended the cow cannot be known as the excluder of all non-cows unless the cowness is apprehended as the determinant of the counter-positive of the exclusion. Otherwise the non-cows apprehended simply as certain knowable entities could also be regarded as things other than the cow. Thus the cognition of cowness is essential for the determinate cognition of the cow.

Another objection and its reply

Text: स्फ़रतु विधि–अलीकं इति चेत्? न । व्याघातात्। किंचित् इति विधि–अर्थः, न किंचित् इति च अलीक–अर्थः। अतत्–रूप–परावृत्ति–मात्रेण अलीकत्वे स्वलक्षणस्य अपि अलीकत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। रू प–मात्र परावृत्तौ तु कथं विधिः नाम?

Trans: Let then the positive which is unreal be the object of the determinate cognition. No! This view is self-contradictory. The positive is something and the unreal is nothing (How then the two could be the same)? If the positive is supposed to be invested with unreality on account of its being the excluder of the other then even the real (self-contained momentary entity) would be rendered unreal as it too excludes what is other than itself. However the universals could be taken to exclude everything and so to be unreal. But then how could they remain positive?

Expl: The real momentary entity and the unreal universal cannot be distinguished as excluders of others. Both exclude whatever is other than them. The universal cannot be supposed to exclude even its own form for then it cannot retain even its positive character.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: विधि–अंशस्य आरोपितत्वात अयं अ–दोषः इति चेत्? न। स्वलक्षण–विधेः विकल्प–अ–संस्पशात्। सामान्य–विधेः अन्–उपगमात्। परिशेषात् अलीक–विधौ विरोधस्य एव स्यितेः।

Trans: May it be that positivity or reality is imposed upon the unreal (universal etc.) and so the above difficulty is avoidable? No! The positive

that is momentary cannot be the object of any determinate cognition (which is false). And the universal as positive or real is not acceptable to you (the Buddhist). So by elimination the positive itself has to be treated as unreal but this is to maintain a self-contradictory view.

Expl: Reality or positivity cannot be imposed upon the unreal. If reality is the same as self-containedness then it cannot be the object of indeterminate cognition. The universal however cannot be real to the Buddhist.

Another objection to the above and its reply

Text: भेद–अग्रहात् विधि–व्यवहारमाचं इति चेत्। सभवेत् अपि एतत् यदि स्वळ्क्षणं अपि विधित्वं अपहाय स्फुरेत्। यदि च अलीकं अपि निषेध–रूपतां परिहृत्य प्रकाशेत। न च एवम्। उभयोः अपि निर्–अंशतया प्रकार–अंतरं उपादाय अ–प्रथनात्। अ–प्रथमान–रूप–अ–संभवात् च। काल्पनिकस्य अंश–अंशि–भावस्य मूले एवं निहितः कुठारः।

Trans: Could it be that there is usage of positivity or reality in the case of the unreal universals because of the non-cognition of their difference from the real (the self-contained entity)? No! This could be the case, if at all, if the self-contained ever appeared bereft of its positive real nature or alternatively the unreal appeared as divested of its negative nature. Neither however is the case. Both these are devoid of any characteristic feature (charactering them). So either can appear under any form or character not belonging to it. And there cannot be any form of these that does not appear in cognitions. As to the view that some imaginary form is inferred in the real it is to be noted that the view has already been nipped in the bud (because the basis of imposition is non-cognition of difference of the imposed character and the object of imposition and in the present case the possibility of the non-cognition is ruled out).

Expl: If there cannot be imposition of positivity or reality on the unreal can't usage be explained simply on the basis of the noncognition of the non-difference of the two? No! This could be possible only if the real and the unreal appeared under a common form but if each appeared without any form of its own how can there be non-cognition of their difference? They are self-distinguished and do not appear under any common form. In the absence of any real form of the real and the unreal can an imaginary form be conceived to be imposed upon the two? No! This too is not possible, for this imposition too depends upon noncognition of the difference of the real and the unreal.

Appearance of the real in determinate cognition justified

Text: साधारणं च रूपं विकल्प–गोचरः। न च अलीकं तथा भवितं अर्हति। तस्य हि देश–काल–अनुगमः न स्वाभाविक, तुच्छत्वात्। न काल्पनिकः, तस्याः क्षणिकत्वात्। न आरोपितः, अन्यत्र अपि अप्रसिद्धेः।

Trans: That which is the object of the determinate cognition is the form which is common to many things. Certainly the unreal cannot be such. The unreal cannot be by nature uniformly present in different times and places as it is a nonentity. The said uniformity cannot also be imaginary as imagination is momentary (and so cannot last for more than a moment or exist at different places). The uniformity cannot also be an imposed one becuase even elsewhere the uniformity is not present and real so that it could be available for imposition in the case of the real.

Expl: The object of the determinate cognition is a form which is uniformly present in many things but the unreal is not such as it is not by nature present in many times and places. If imagination itself is said to be uniformly connected with different times and places and because of its association with it the unreal is said to be uniform then the momentariness of the imagination will be a serious objection to this view. The unreal cannot also be a direct object of the imaginative imposition of uniformity upon it as explained above.

Cognition of uniformity explained by means of the non-cognition of difference

Text: भेद–अग्रहात् एकत्व–मात्रं अनुसंधीयते इति चेत्? न। भाविकस्य भेदस्य अभावात्। भावे वा काल्पनिकत्वस्य व्याघातात्। परमार्थ–असतः परमार्थ–अभेद–पर्यवसायित्वात्।आरोपितस्य अ–ग्रह–अन्–उपपत्तेः अ– भेद–आरोप–अन्–अवकाशात् च। आरोपित–अ–सत्वस्य परमार्थ–सत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। चतुः कोटि–निर्मुक्तस्य च अतिप्रसंजकत्वात्। तत्–अ–ग्रहस्य त्रैलोक्ये अपि सुलभत्वात्। अन्यत्र पारमार्थिक–भेद–प्रतीतौ कथं–अ–भेदः आरोप्यतां इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि यस्य प्रतिभासे यत् न आरोप्यते नियमेन तस्य एव अप्रकाशे तत् आरोप्यम्। न तु तत् नामक–मात्रस्य, अतिप्रसंजकत्वात्। अतः एव न व्यधिकरणस्य अपि सतः अ–सतः वा भेदस्य अग्रहः अभेद–आरोप–उपयोगी इति।

Trans: Could it be the case that the different unreal objects of the determinate cognition are not apprehended as different from each other and so only their identity (not spatio-temporal uniformity) is cognised (which explains the cognition of uniformity relating to them)? No! This cannot be the case as there is no real difference among the unreals. If there is, then the differents cannot be unreal (as real differences characterise only reals). Could then their difference be truly non-existent? Well, if it could then it would amount to real non-difference of the objects of the determinate cognition. May it then be the case that it is the difference imposed upon these objects whose nonapprehension leads to the uniformity-cognition? No! This cannot be the case as that which is imposed cannot remain unapprehended. Moreover if difference is imposed (upon the objects) non-difference cannot have any scope to be imposed upon them. Could then the nonapprehension be of that difference whose absence is being imposed upon the said objects? No! If the absence (or nonexistence) of the difference is the object of (mere) imposition then it follows that the difference is real. If the said difference is not of any of these four types but is an ineffable one then its non-apprehension as the cause of false imposition would be available everywhere (thus leading to the cognition of nondifference of all things). But couldn't it be contended that elsewhere the real difference of things is certainly the object of cognition so nondifference is not imposed upon them? Well! If this is so then it follows that if the cognition of a certain difference being present a certain imposition is not possible then necessarily in the absence of the cognition of this very difference the said imposition can be made, not in the absence of the cognition of a mere nominal difference because the latter absence may be available everywhere. For this very reason the noncognition of a real or unreal difference existent elsewhere cannot be regarded as of any use for the imposition of non-difference.

Expl: It is now contended by the Buddhist that the nonapprehension of the difference of the unreal objects of the determinate cognition leads to the cognition of their uniform character. In reply to this it may be asked, 'Is the difference of the unreals a real object, or an object whose nonexistence is real or which is itself unreal or not coexistent with the unreal? If the difference is real the supposedly unreal loci of the difference will be turned into reals. If the nonexistence of the difference is unreal then the nondifference becomes real with the result that the objects of the determinate cognition turn out to be spatiotemporally uniform. If the difference is imposed it cannot remain uncognised because imposition itself is a cognition. If the nonexistence of the difference is the object of imposition then the difference turns out to be real. If however an unreal noncognition of the difference is supposed to engender the imposition of the nondifference then such a nondifference

being available everywhere the imposition would be a universal phenomenon. The cognition of difference could be supposed to oppose the cognition of unreal nondifference in cases where real difference obtains and thus the imposition of nondifference in such cases may be denied. If this is accepted as a rule determining the cognition of nondifference then the noncognition of the unreal or ineffable difference cannot lead to the imposition of nondifference. According to this rule if an object, say silver, is apprehended as other than silver the difference from silver as characterising nacre etc. is imposed upon the silver and thus the false cognition of silver as other than silver may be supposed to arise. Likewise the tortoise's hair and the hare's horn are cognised as different from each other because the real hair and horn as the objects of the imposition of the relationship with the tortoise and the hare respectively are cognised as really different from each other. The last alternative that the non-cognition of any real or unreal difference of certain things is conducive to the cognition of non-difference of things other than these is ruled out by the fact that such a non-cognition may be present even where the cognition of difference is present.

Proof for the doctrine of apoha discussed

Text: न अपि न्ययात् अन्य–अपोह सिद्धिः तत् अ–भावात्। यत् भाव–अभाव–साधारणं तत् अन्य–व्यावृत्ति–निष्ठं यथा अ–मूर्तत्वं, यत् च अत्यंत–विलक्षणानां सालक्षण्य–व्यवहार–हेतुः तत् अन्य–व्यावृत्ति–रू पं इति न्यायौ स्तः इति चेत्? न। काल–अत्यय–अपदेशात्। न हि प्रथमानस्य निष्ठा न्याय–साध्या नाम। प्रथनं शरीरं तु चिंतितं एव इति निष्फलः प्रयासः। यदा च अन्–अलीके एव ध्रुवं न्यायस्य अनुभव–आभासः तदा का एव कथा अलीके ? न हि तस्य अ–प्रतीयमानत्वं अपि किंचित् अस्ति यत् न्यायेन साध्यं इति उत्तम्।

Trans: Nor can the doctrine be established by means of a syllogism. There is no such syllogism. But couldn't there be this syllogism or inference to prove the doctrine that 'whatever is the object of the cognitions of affirmation and negation (or is not destructible despite the destruction or nondestruction of its material cause) is of the nature of the exclusion of the other as is 'the property of not having a definite shape' and that, 'whatever is the cause of the usage or cognition of uniformity in regard to things which are quite unlike each other is of the nature of the exclusion of the other', could be another syllogism to prove the doctrine? No! Both these syllogisms or inferences are vitiated by the fallacy of absent major. Certainly whatever is perceptually attested as positive in nature cannot be

proved to be otherwise by means of inference. The nature of the perceptual testimony has already been discussed. So this attempt to prove the universal to be otherwise is futile. And if an inference seeking to prove the supposedly real is countered by the perception of what is opposed to the latter then nothing need be said of the contradiction of that which is avowedly unreal. Certainly there is nothing like the unreal inaccessible to perception which could be supposed to be only inferentially knowable.

Expl: One may think that by means of certain inferences the universal can be proved to be of the nature of exclusion. But the inferences will be found to be fallacious as the positive nature of the universal is perceptually established. If perception shows the universal to be negative in nature even then there is no need for inference to prove this. The supposedly unreal universal is not accessible to any means of cognition. Inference can have access only to the real. If the real is apprehended by perception as endowed with one character it may not be so as endowed with another character and this latter only supposed to be accessible to inference. But the unreal is totally inaccessible to all types of cognition.

The discussion continued

Text: किंच इदं भाव–अभाव–साधारण्यम्? न तावत् उभय– पत्वं विरोधात्। न तत्–धर्मत्वं अन्–अभ्युपगमात्। न हि गोत्वं अभावस्य अपि धर्मः इति अभ्युपगम्यते। न तत्–धर्मित्वं अन्–एकान्तात्। न तत् उभय–सादृश्यं असंभवात्। अ–तत्–निवृत्त्या एव तथात्वे साध्य–अ–विशेषात्। न अपि अस्ति–नास्ति–सामानाधिकरण्यं विरोधात् अन्यथा सिध्देः च। न हि यत् अस्ति तत् एव नास्ति इति प्रत्यय–गोचर स्यात्। प्रकार अंतरं आश्रित्य स्यात् एव इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि तं एंव प्रकार–भेदं आदाय विधि–व्यवस्यायां को विरोधः येन प्रतिबंधः सिद्धयेत्? तस्य विधिरूपतायां अस्तिना किं अधिकं उपनेयं इति चेत्? निषेध–रूपत्वे अपि नास्तिना कि अधिकं उपनेयं इति समानम्? अत एव साधारण्यं इति चेत्? तथा अपि कि तत्–उभय–आत्मकत्वं उभय–परिहारो वा इति अशक्यं एतत्।

Trans: Moreover what is this property of being common to both existence and nonexistence (taking the literal meaning of the phrase)? Certainly it cannot be the same as 'being of the nature of both' for the two are incompatible with each other. Nor is it the same as 'being the property of both the positive and the negative'? Certainly we do not admit that a

universal like cowness characterises even a negation. The said property cannot also be the same as 'being endowed by both the positive and the negative.' Even an individual real as endowed by both the positive and negative properties is not regarded as of absolutely negative nature and so the former is a deviant middle term (in the inference of the negative character of universals). The property cannot be the same as resemblance to both the positive and the negative. There cannot be such a resemblance in the universal. If the universal is supposed to resemble both because both of these and the universal too exclude what is other than them then this exclusion not being identical with the major term of the inference (unless the universal is proved to be of the nature of exclusion) the resemblance cannot be admitted). Nor is this property the same as being the object of a positive and negative cognition, as this involves contradiction and the fallacy of irrelevance. Certainly nothing that is the object of affirmative cognition as 'is' is also the object of the negative condition as 'is not'? But may it not be that one and the same thing which is the object of the affirmation under one form is also the object of negation under a different form (or is at one place and is not at a different place)? O yes, but then even the universal could similarly be treated as the object of affirmation or as positive (without its being of the nature of exclusion) and then the concomitance of the middle and the major terms in the foregoing inference cannot be established if the positive and the negative natures of things are not proved to be incompatible. But one may now ask, 'If the universal is positive (and is the object of affirmation) what more is to be stated about it by the verb of affirmation?' 'Well! then one can also ask a counter-question namely, that 'if the universal is itself negative in nature what could be taken away from (or denied of) it by the negation?' But couldn't one say that for these very reasons the universal is (supposed to be) endowed with a nature that is common to both the positive and the negative? No, such a (hypothetical) common nature cannot be either both positive and negative or the exclusion of both as the positive and the negative are incompatible with each other.

Expl: The middle term in the foregoing inference is being shown here to be not concomitant with the major viz. 'being of the nature of exclusion of the other'. The universal cannot be an object of both the affirmative and the negative cognitions. If somehow it could be regarded as the object of negative cognition (because it does not inhere in things not characterised by it) then in the same manner it could also be regarded as the object of affirmative cognition and so a positive entity. How then can it be looked upon as of the nature of exclusion? It may be urged against this that if the universal is positive in nature the verb of affirmation would be rendered superfluous as it designates only existence or the positive nature of its subject. So the universal has to be something different from a positive

entity. Moreover the verb of negation associated with the positive subject would become incompatible with it as the same thing cannot be both positive and negative. But then this difficulty afflicts the opposite view also. If the universal is negative the negation attached to it is rendered redundant.

The recapitulation of the whole discussion

Text: तस्मात् अस्ति नास्तिभ्यां उपाधि–अंतर–उपसंप्राप्तिः प्राप्त–उपाधि–नियमः वा इति सार्थकत्वं तयोः। तत् एतत् विधौ अपि तुल्यम्। शांत–अशेष–विशेषत्वात् अलीक–पक्षे क्व उपाधि–अंतर–विधिः तत्–नियमः वा इति विशेष–दोषः। ततः गौ–शब्दः गोत्व–विशिष्ट–व्यक्ति–मात्र–अभिधायी पर्यवसितः। ताः तु विप्रकीर्ण देश–कालतया न अर्थक्रिया–अर्थि–प्रार्थनां अनुभवितुं ईशते इति प्रतिपत्ता विशेष–आकांक्षं। सा च तस्य आकांक्षा अस्ति गोष्ठे काल–अक्षी थेनुः घटोध्नी महा–धंटा नंदिनी इत्यादिभिः नियामकैः विधायकैः वा निवार्यते इति विधौ न कश्चित् दोषः। गोत्व–विशिष्ट–सत्–असत्–व्यक्ति–मात्र–प्रतीतेः ततः एव अस्ति–आदि–पद–प्रयोग–वैफल्यं इति चेत्? तावत्–मात्र–प्रतिपति–अर्थं एव तत्। अधिक–प्रतिपत्ति–अर्थं तु तत् उपयोगः तस्य प्राक् अ–प्रतीतेः इति उक्तम्।

Trans: So the affirmative and negative verbs associated with a subject (in a sentence) connote respectively the presence and absence of some property other than the generic universal in the subject or the necessity of the presence and absence of these if these are otherwise indicated. Thus both the verbs are meaningful. These two functions of the verbs hold good even if the universal is held to be a purely positive entity. But in the view that the universal is fictitious no property is ascribable to the universal and so how can there be ascription of any new property to the fictitious or the necessitation of a property already ascribed? Thus this view is vitiated by a special fallacy. On this account the word 'cow' for example is found to be designative only of the (individual or) entity that is endowed with cowness but such an entity may be situated in a distant place and at a different time and so it cannot by itself fulfil the expectation of a person seeking some significant result (or action). This person wants to know definite facts about the cow. This desire of his is gratified by providing the information that 'there is in the cowshed a beautiful cow with black eyes and udders like a jar and a large bell round its neck'. These various adjectives are either generally predicated of the cow or if already predicated the

predication is qualified as necessary. Thus the view that the positive universal is meant by the word (noun) is found to be faultless. But if the word 'cow' itself produces the cognition of a real or unreal animal characterised by cowness isn't the use of the verb 'is' with the word 'cow' to designate this individual superfluous? No! The verb denotes existence and so it is used only to generate the cognition of existence which is not generated by the word 'cow'. (So there is no redundancy in meaning). The verb is needed to convey the additional meaning which is not conveyed by the word 'cow'.

Expl: Concluding the foregoing discussion the N.V. philosopher says that the verbs of affirmation and negation associated with a subject are not redundant. Affirmation denotes present existence which is different from the being of the subject. If the subject-term presents or denotes the subject in a general way as occurring at some time or place then the verb of affirmation helps to specify this occurrence as the occurrence at a particular time and a particular place. Not only this. A general cognition of a subject like 'cow' is not likely to meet the expectations of anyone interested in a cow (for a certain purpose). To fulfil these expectations the general description of the cow needs to be supplemented by the specification of the general characters presented in the description. The cow for example is qualified as black-eyed, having udders like a big jar and as standing in the cowshed. The verb 'is' occurring with these adjectives helps specify the nature of the cow in terms of the qualifications stated. The verb of negation too helps this specification by way of excluding cows which do not fulfil the expectations of a person interested in the cow. Thus it will be evident that affirmation and negation neither repeat what the subject says nor contradict it. The word 'cow' by itself denotes only an animal of the cow-genus. The presence of certain special properties in this animal is indicated by the verb 'is' used along with certain adjectives. The absence of unwanted properties is indicated by the verb 'is not' used with certain other adjectives not applicable to the specific cow. It may be contended against this that since cowness and the cow are the same and the existence of the cow is not different from the cow the verb denoting existence cannot but be redundant. This contention will be ruled out if it is noted that a property and the thing endowed by it are not identical nor are the thing and its existence identical.

Gñānasrī's objection to the above and its reply

Text: य तु निपुणंमन्यः विकल्पं एव पंक्षयति स्म. यत् ज्ञानं भाव–अभाव–साधारणं न तेन तस्यं विषयित्वं यथा गो–ज्ञानस्य अश्वेन इत्यादि, तत् यदि गो–विकल्पस्य अश्व–अ–विषयित्वं एव तत्–भाव–अभाव–

साधारण्यं, गवि अपि बाह्ये तथा। ततः साध्य–अ–विशिष्टत्वम्।

Trans: As to the inference put forward by the self-styled expert Gñānasrī having the cognition of the universal itself as the minor term and of the form that 'if cognition has the appearance of being concerned both with the existence and the nonexistence of a certain thing it can not have that thing as its object as for example the cow-cognition does not have the horse as its object', it is found that the inference is vitiated by the fallacy of the conflation of the middle with the major term. If the said property (which is the major term) of the universal cow for example viz. its being concerned with both the existence and the nonexistence of a thing like the horse is the same as its not having the horse, as its object then its being concerned with both the existence and the nonexistence of the cow also will be the same as its not having the cow as its object. So there results the conflation of the above middle and major terms in the inference.

Expl: The usual inference having the (cow) universal as minor term is vitiated by fallacies. If this universal is supposed to be of the nature of exclusion there is nothing to be inferentially established. If therefore the universal is regarded as positive in nature the Buddhist cannot admit it and so for him the inference will be afflicted by the fallacy of unestablished minor. If the positive universal is admitted the major term cannot be present in it and so there will arise the fallacy of absent major. To avoid all these fallacies the great Buddhist scholar Gñānasrī showed his expertise by having the cognition of the universal as the minor term. Whether the universal is positive or negative the cognition of it cannot be denied to be real and positive in nature. Gñānasrī however failed to realise the fact that a cognition is defined by its object and if the object is positive the cognition cannot be concerned with both the positive and the negative. If the universal is negative and unreal there cannot be any cognition of it for the N.V. If it is the momentary real there cannot be any determinate cognition of it. So the fallacies cannot be avoided even by this strategy.

In the text it is stated that the cow-cognition does not have the horse as its object which suggests that the horse cognition for example — does not have the cow as its object. Now if this property of not having the horse as its object is nothing other than the property of being concerned with both the presence and absence of the horse then similar is the case with the property of not having the cow as its object for the cow-cognition. Thus the middle term in the above inference would be conflated with its major term.

The middle term however can be so defined as to avoid its conflation with the major term. One definition is: 'To be produced both when the object is present and when it is absent'. But the determinate cognition does not depend upon the real object according to the Buddhist. Even an

object — which is not productive (as an object) of its cognition can be its object. This is why the unreal or the form of the cognition is supposed to be the object of the latter by the Buddhist. Another definition of the middle term is: 'Not to apprehend the existence and the nonexistence (as they are in themselves) of the object'. But this is the same as the major term.

The third definition of the middle term rebutted

Text: अथ अस्ति–आदि–विशेष–आकांक्षा तदा–अ–साधारण्यम्। न हि उदाहृतः गो–विकल्पः अश्व–अस्तित्व–आदि–विशेषं आकांक्षति। नियम–विधौ तु विरोध एव। न हि अ–तत्–विषयस्य तत् विशेष–नियम–आकांक्षा नाम। गो–ज्ञानस्य–अश्व–विशेष–नियम–आकांक्षा प्रसङ्गात्।

Trans: If the middle term is the property of engendering desire for the existence (or nonexistence) of the object then it is afflicted by the fallacy of being too narrow or confined to the minor term itself. Certainly the instanced cow-cognition does not induce any desire regarding the existence (or nonexistence) of a horse (so that as it does not have the horse as its object it would not have the cow too as its object). If the desire engendered is supposed to be specific so as to be concerned with the existence or nonexistence at a particular space or time of the object then the middle will be simply incompatible with the major. Certainly what does not have a certain thing as its object does not induce any desire for the determination of its special type of existence or nonexistence. If it were so then the cow-cognition (for example) would induce desire for the determination of the horse's existence.

Expl: The third definition of the middle has two versions: It may be the property of engendering desire regarding the general existence or nonexistence of the object or the property of engendering desire regarding the spatio-temporally determined existence of the object. Both these versions are untenable. The cow-cognition does not have the horse as its object but it does not engender any desire regarding the general or particular existence or non-existence of the horse. Certainly a cognition does not produce any desire regarding an entity which is not its object at all. The idea underlying this definition of the above middle term seems to be this that a cognition does not produce any desire about the existence or nonexistence of the thing which it directly apprehends.

The fourth definition of the middle term rebutted

Text: तदीय सत्–असत्त्व–अन्–उपदर्शनं चेत्? तत् यदि स्वरूपं एव ततः–अ–सिद्धिः दोषः। न हि गो–विकल्पः गो–स्वरूपं न उपदर्शयति इति मम वद्वा अपि सिद्धम्, तव च अद्य अपि। उपाधि–अंतरं चेत् अन्–एकांतः। न हि यस्य उपाधि–अंतरं न उपदर्शयेत् न असौ तत् अपि इति नियमः।

Trans: Could it then be the same as the nonapprehension of the existence and nonexistence of the object? No! If the existence and nonexistence of a thing are the same as the thing itself then the cognition cannot but apprehend it. Certainly in the view of N.V. it is not admitted that the cow-cognition does not apprehend the cow nor is it established in the Buddhist view even now. If however the existence and nonexistence of an object are different from it there results the fallacy of deviation. Certainly there is no such rule that whatever does not apprehend properties inherent in a thing but different from it does not also apprehend the thing.

Expl: Since the cognition is the determinate cognition of the object, if the qualified object is not apprehended by the cognition it cannot be determinate. If the qualifications and the qualified are the same then the existence and nonexistence cannot remain unapprehended.

Objection to the above rebuttal and its reply

Text: ननु नियमः एव। तथा हि यत् न यत् –समवेत्–धर्म–बोधनं न तत् तत्–स्वरू प–बोधंन यथा गो–विकल्प–शब्दौ तुरगे। तथा च तौ गवि अपि नीलत्व–आदि अपेक्षया इति व्यापक–अन्–उपलब्धिः। धर्मि–बोधे अपि हि धर्माणा कस्याचित् बोधः कस्य–चित् अ–बोधः च इति उपकार–भेदात् नियमः स्यात्। उपकार–भेदः च शक्ति–भेदात् भवेत्। न च एवं प्रकृते। अनवस्या–प्रसङ्गात्। ततः शक्तेः अभेदात्–उपकार–अभेदे सर्व–उपाधि–सहित–बौधः अ–बोधः वा इति द्वयी गतिः इति प्रतिबंध–सिद्धि। दुः–प्रयुक्तं एतत्। उपाधि–तत्–वतां भेदे प्रति–नियत–सामाग्री–बौध्यत्वस्य अपि स्वभाव–वैचित्र्य–निवंधतत्वात्। तस्य अपि स्व–कारण–अधीनत्वात्। तस्य अपि अन्वय व्यतिरेक–सिद्धत्वात्। तस्य अपि कार्य–उन्नेयत्वात् इति।

Trans: But there certainly is the rule. To elucidate (the rule): 'What does not apprehend the properties inherent in a thing does not apprehend the thing as for example the cow-cognition and the word 'cow' do not apprehend or denote the properties of a horse and so they do not apprehend or denote the horse. Such are the cow-cognition and the word 'cow' in respect of the property 'blueness' etc. of the 'cow.' They do not apprehend or denote the blueness of the cow. Thus the pervader in the concomitance (stated above) being absent the pervaded (viz. the cognition of the thing) will also be absent. The fact is that the cognition of some properties and the non-cognition of others pertaining to a thing when the thing itself is apprehended is possible to maintain if the cognitions were differently influenced and the difference in influence was due to difference in capacity of the causes. But such an explanation is not possible in the present case as it would lead to infinite regress (the difference in capacity would itself have to be explained by positing a difference of capacity in the capacity itself). So if the capacities do not differ the influences or effects produced by them would also not differ so that there will arise the cognition of a thing with all its properties or no cognition of it at all. Only these two alternatives are tenable. Thus the concomitance (of the cognitions) is established.

All this is wrongly stated. If a property or properties and the thing in which they inhere are different from each other the cognition of one and the noncognition of the other can be explained on the basis of the non-simultaneity of the collocation of the causes respectively determining their occurrences. That the cognitions of the properties and the thing endowed with them are due to their respective causal collocations is due to the fact that the said cognitions are different in nature and this difference in nature is due to the difference of their respective causes. This causal difference is established on the basis of the positive and the negative association of the causes with their respective effects. This association too is established on the basis of the occurrence of the cognition and noncognition of the thing and its properties which is the effect of the association (positive and negative).

Expl: Objecting to the last contention of the opponent the Buddhist maintains that there certainly is a rule to the effect that if a word like cow and a cognition like the cognition of the cow do not apprehend the properties of the cow they do not apprehend the cow too. There are many properties like blueness, brownness etc. of the cow which the cow-cognition does not apprehend and the word cow does not denote. So it must be admitted that these two do not apprehend or denote the cow-individual. Of course it could be argued that the causal conditions of the two cognitions are different and so even if the cognition of properties is there the cognition of the thing endowed with the properties does not arise. But then the difference in causal conditions will have to be

explained on the basis of the difference of the capacities of the latter. The difference of capacities in its turn would have to be explained on the basis of the difference of other capacities needed to generate these capacities and this would lead to infinite regress. So it is more logical to regard the causal conditions for the cognitions of the thing and all its properties as identical so that there will be either the cognition of the thing endowed with all its properties if the causal condition are present or no cognition of the thing and its properties if the latter are absent. The point of this argument may be pressed in a different way also. The cognition of the properties of a thing when the thing is to be cognised cannot be supposed to arise simply because the properties inhere in the thing for then all the properties inherent in the thing will be simultaneously cognised. Nor can the said cognition be supposed to be conducive to the cognition of the thing and so to precede it because the cognition of every property could be so conducive. It is better therefore to admit that words and determinate cognitions do not apprehend or denote the thing at all. This point has been tersely stated in the following verse by a Buddhist savant

एक–उपकारके ग्राह्यये न उपकाराः ततः परे।
दृष्टे तस्मिन् अदृष्टाः ये तत्–ग्रहे सकल–ग्रहः ॥

'If the causal conditions of the cognitions of a thing and its properties are identical then the apprehension of a thing as endowed with one property would entail the apprehension of the thing as endowed with all its properties'.

This argument is countered by the opponent by urging that when the thing and its properties are different the causal conditions of their respective cognitions too must be different. The objects of the two are different from each other because their respective causes are different and this difference in the case of imperceptible causes is known through the different effects produced by them.

Reply continued

Text: यत्तु तु शक्तेः अभेदात् इत्यादि तत् तदा शोभेत यदि धर्मि–मात्र–अधीनः तत्–बोध–मात्र–अधीनः वा तावत्–मात्र–बोध–सामग्री–अधीनः वा यावत्–उपाधि–बोधः स्यात्। न च एवम्।

Trans: As to the foregoing contention (that if the capacities and the consequent results are respectively the same then either a thing will be known as endowed with all its properties or it will not be known at all), it could have been appropriate if the cognition of all the properties of a thing were dependent upon either the thing itself or only its cognition or finally only on the causal collocation relating to the cognition of the thing

alone. But certainly such is not the case.

Expl: Having presented his own view towards the end of the last passage the opponent now criticises the argument earlier adduced by the Buddhist. The Buddhist has pleaded for the simultaneity of the cognitions and non-cognitions. The present criticism of the Buddhist's argument is not addressed against the simultaneity. The one-sided dependence between the cognitions is not conceded by the non-Buddhist and the criticism states this fact.

Implied rebuttal of another likely argument of the Buddhist

Text: एतेन भेदात् धर्मिण : प्रतीतौ अपि शब्द–लिङ्ग–द्वारा धर्मणिं चेत् अ–प्रतीतिः इंद्रिय–द्वारा अपि मा भूत् इत्या दिकं तु कर्ण–स्पर्शे कटि–चालनं अपास्तम्। तत्–तत्–उपाधि–उपलंभ–सामग्री–विरह–काले प्रसंजितस्य इष्टत्वात्। विचित्र–शक्तित्वात् च प्रमाणनाम्। लिङ्गस्य प्रसिद्ध–प्रतिबंध–प्रतिसंधान–शक्तिकत्वात्। शब्दस्य समय–सीम–विकम त्वात् इंद्रियस्य तु अर्थ–शक्तेः अपि अपेक्षणात्। न तु संबद्धः अर्थः इति एव प्रमाणैः प्रमाप्यते। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। यस्य तु उपाधेः उपलंभे एव येन प्रमाणेन धर्मी उपलभ्यते तस्य अन्–उपलंभे सः तेन न उपलभ्यते इति परं युज्यते सर्व–उपधि–अन्–उपलंभे वा। तथा च सिद्ध–साधनं इति संक्षेपः।

Trans: By the foregoing criticism stands refuted another possible argumentative move which may be likened to the movement of the waist on touching the ear. The argument is to the effect that if because of the difference of things and their properties, when there is the inferential or verbal cognition of a thing there does not (necessarily) arise the inferential or verbal cognition of the properties of the thing then the same should be the case in the sensory cognition of things too. When a certain thing is sensorily cognised its properties need not be sensorily cognised. Such a contingency is acceptable to the non-Buddhists in all those cases where the causal collocations related to the cognitions of specific properties of the thing sensed are not present. This is so because the different means of cognition are endowed with their peculiar respective capacities. For example the middle term in inference has the capacity to lead to the valid cognition of the invariable concomitance (of itself with the major term); words have their capacity or power circumscribed by conventions and as regards the sense-organs, they require even the presence of their objects (for their operation). It is not that because a

certain object is related to a valid means of cognition that it is validly cognised. If such were the case then there would result the cognition of anything whatsoever. The correct principle however is that that which is cognised only on the cognition of certain (of its) properties by a valid means of cognition is not cognised if the latter are not cognised or no property is cognised. (So in the absence of the inferential or verbal cognitions of the property or properties of a thing there cannot arise the cognition of the thing and thus) the contingency referred to above is just a case of the fallacy of proving what is already acceptable. This is the gist of the whole argument.

Expl: Against the foregoing rejoinder the Buddhist makes the retort that as in inference and verbal cognition the various qualities and properties of the object that is cognised are not (necessarily) cognised so in perception too its object should be cognisable without any of its qualities or properties. The reply to this is that such a retort is quite irrelevant as the different means of valid cognition possess different capacities. So far as sense-perception is concerned its capacity to produce cognition is limited to the things and properties that come within its ken. So all the qualities and properties endowed with which a thing comes in contact with the sense-organs are apprehended by them. Similar is not the case of inferential or verbal cognitions. In the inference of fire from smoke, the concomitance of smoke with fire which is the basis of the inference is not determined by the various qualities or properties of fire. Similarly the word 'fire' does not denote 'an entity that is hot and yellow in colour'. So these properties of fire are neither inferred nor verbally cognised. Could then there arise the cognition of an object devoid of any property? No, at least the property of 'being' is sure to be cognised when a thing is cognised.

Objection to the above

Text: स्यात् एतत्। यदि इंद्रियेण समान–विषयौ एव लिङ्ग–शब्दौ ततः प्रतिभास–भेदः अन्–उपपन्नः। एक–विषयत्वं हि प्रतिभास–भेदेन व्याप्तं सव्य–इतर–नयनवत् दृष्टं, न च इह तथा। यथा हि प्रत्यक्षे चेतसि देश–काल–अवस्था–नियतानि–परिस्फुट–रूपाणि स्व–लक्षणानि प्रतिभांति न तथा शब्दे लैङ्गिक–विकल्पे अपि। तत्र हि विजातीय–व्यावृत्तं इव परस्पर–अ–संकीर्णं इव अ–स्फुटं इव प्रत्यक्ष–अ–परिचितं किंचित्–रूपं आभासमानं अनुभव–विषयः। न च उपाय–भेद मात्रेण प्रतिभास–भेदः उपपद्यते। न हि प्रतिपत्ति–

उपायाः प्रतिपत्ति–आकारं परिर्वतयितुं इशते। न च एकं वस्तु द्वि–आकारं इति प्रतिबंध–सिद्धिः। अस्य प्रयोगः, 'यः अयं क्वाचित् वस्तुनि प्रत्यक्ष–'प्रतिभासात् विपरीतः प्रतिभासः न असौ तेन एक–विषयः यथा घट–ग्रहात् पट–प्रतिभासः। तथा च गवि प्रत्यक्ष–प्रतिभासात् विपरीतः प्रतिभासः विकल्प–काले इति।

Trans: Let there be then this objection (to the above rejoinder): If the object of the middle term or reason in inference and words and sense-organs were of the same nature as are the objects of the right and left eye, then these cognitions cannot be of different character. But this is not the case. In verbal and inferential cognitions things do not appear in the same manner as they do in perceptual cognition in which the objects appear as self-defined, distinct and determinate in respect of their spatial, temporal and other conditions. In the nonperceptual cognitions on the other hand the objects cognised appear as if they are distinguished from dissimilar objects but not distinguished from similar ones and not vivid or perceptually familiar. Certainly this difference in cognition cannot be explained on the basis of the difference of the means of the cognitions. The means or causes of cognitions cannot bring about any difference in the forms of the cognitions. Nor is a single entity—the cognition—endowed with two different forms. So the aforementioned invariable concomitance that that which is common to being and non-being is concerned with exclusion (of the other) is established. This conclusion may be demonstrated thus: 'This particular cognition of a certain object which is opposed to its perceptual cognition cannot have the same object as the latter as for example the cognition of the cloth does not have the object of the pot-cognition as its own object. The cognition of the cow (for example) (occurring) in its determinate perception is opposed to its indeterminate perception and so it must have as its object some thing quite different from the object of its indeterminate perception'.

Expl: Now another argument is advanced by the Buddhist to prove that perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions cannot have an identical entity or entities of the same nature as their objects as the respective objects of these cognitions appear to differ from each other in many respects. The difference of the means of these cognitions cannot account for their difference. Perhaps the nature of the cognitions may differ if the means differ but the objects cannot be made to differ because of this difference. So this (objective) difference of the cognitions has to be accounted for on the basis of the difference of the natures of the objects, perception cognising the real and inference etc. cognising the unreal mental construct.

Reply to the objection

Text: इदं अपि अवद्यम्। चित्र–अचित्र–प्रतिभासाभ्यां मिथः विरुद्धाभ्यां एक–नील–विषयाभ्यां अन्–ऐकांतात्। न हि चित्र–अध्यक्षे यत् नीलं चकास्ति तत् एव पश्चात् न केवलं तदा एव वा पुरुष–अंतरस्य। येन आकारेण एक–विषयत्वं तेन एव न तयोः विरोधः येन च विरोधः न तेन एक–विषयत्वम्। धर्म–अंतर–आकारेण विरोधः नील–मात्र–आकारेण च एक–विषयता इति चेत्? ननु इह अपि धर्म–अंतर–आकारेण विरोधः गोत्ववत्–पिंड–मात्र–आकारेण च एक–विषयता इति तावत्–मात्र–निराकरणे अ सिद्धः हेतु। पूर्वत्र सिद्ध साधनम्। नहि शाब्द–लैङ्गिक–विकल्प–काले देश–काल–नियम–आदयः अपि सर्वे एव धर्म–विशेषाः विषय–भावं आसादयंति इति अभ्युपगच्छामः।

Trans: This (retort) too is defective. The invariable concomitance mentioned is afflicted by the fallacy of deviation in the case of the mutually-opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth which is variegated on one side and not so on the other and these sides are respectively apprehended by the cognitions. Certainly it is not the case that the blue cloth that appears in a certain cognition to a man (at a certain moment) does not appear to him as such latter or to another man. But can't it be urged against this that the cognitions are not opposed to each other under the very form which determines the identity of their respective objects while the forms which determine their opposition also determine the diversity of their respective objects? In the instant case (we find that) the cognitions are opposed mutually under the different forms of variegatedness and non-variegatedness but as cognitions of the blue (object) itself they (may be supposed to) have the same object. (Such a rejoinder will not do because) in the case of the inferential and the verbal cognitions too it could equally be urged that these are co-objective with perception so far as the individual cow characterised by cowness is concerned while in respect of the spatio-temporal determinations of the perceived cow-individual the former need not be co-objective with the latter. So the reason (or middle term) mentioned above to prove non-coobjectivity of inference and verbal cognition with perception is found to be absent in the minor (that is to say, all these cognitions have the same object). So far as the determinations (spatio-temporal) of the perceived individual are concerned, the cognitions are not coobjective with perception in which the former appear as objects (characterising the

perceived individual). Thus the proof of non-coobjectivity in respect of the spatio-temporal individuals is no better than a proof of what is already established. We do not admit that everything appearing in perception also appears in non-perceptual cognitions.

Expl: The afore-mentioned concomitance between diversity of cognitions and diversity of the corresponding objects is now shown to fail in the case of the cognitions of variegated and non-variegated surfaces of the same piece of cloth which is variegated on one side and just plain on the other. It is the same piece of cloth that appears as blue (for example) or variegated to the same person at different times and to different persons at the same time. Can't it be argued against this that the cognitions of the cloth apprehending its blueness are not opposed to each other while those that apprehend variegatedness and non-variegatedness respectively are opposed to each other because the forms determining the objectivity of the objects of the cognitions are the same in the first case and different in the second? Yes, but then in the cases of perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions too the same rule could be applied and then it could as well be urged that so far as the individual with its generic property is concerned all these cognitions apprehend the same object while in respect of the spatio-temporal determinations of the individual, it is only perception that could be said to apprehend them as in non-perceptual cognitions the individual appears only under its generic form.

A query and its answer

Text: ननु धर्मिणि एव स्फुट-अ-स्फुट-प्रतिभास-भेदः कथम्? न कथंचित्। यथा यथा हि धर्माः प्रतिभांति तथा तथा स्फुटः इति प्रतिभास-व्यवहारः। यथा यथा च धर्माणां अ-प्रतिपत्तिः तथा तथा प्रतिभासस्य मांद्य-व्यवहारः दूर-अंतिक-आदौ प्रत्यक्षे अपि लोकानाम्। न तु सर्वथा एव अप्रतिपत्तौ।

Trans: How then there arises the difference of vivid and hazy cognitions in respect of the individual (locus of generic and other properties)? The answer is: 'There does not arise any such difference'. (The fact is that) as more and more properties of an object are apprehended the cognition of that object is reckoned as vivid, and as less and less of these properties are apprehended the cognition of the object is reckoned as less vivid. Such vividness and non-vividness are respectively experienced in cognitions of objects which are near and far but not if no object is cognised at all.

Expl: Regarding the foregoing explanation it is asked how certain cognitions are vivid and others not vivid if both apprehend objects. In reply it is stated that vividness of cognitions is due to the appearance of a

large number of properties of its object in the cognition. As less and less of these properties appear in the cognition it becomes less and less vivid. It is not due to absence of any (real) object that a cognition is regarded as less vivid.

The foregoing query reformulated and its reply

Text: विदूर–आदि–प्रत्ययः अपि पक्षः एव इति चेत्? अस्तु न तु तावता अपि धर्म–धर्मि–भेद–सिद्धौ प्रत्यक्ष–बाधस्य, तत् संदेहे अपि सन्दिग्ध–अन्–ऐकांतिकस्य वा परिहारः। तावता अपि प्रतिभास–भेदस्य उपपत्तेः।

Trans: But it may be urged that the cognitions of (more and more) distant objects are also not known to be concerned with real objects and so they too are included in the minor term of the foregoing inference (in which non-apprehension of the real by non-perceptual cognitions is sought to be established). But even this contention does not avoid contradiction by the reflective cognition of the form 'I perceive that very object that I first inferred' concerning the object of perception. (If an object and its properties were identical then the non-cognition of a property may entail the non-cognition of the object endowed with the properties). Since the properties and the object are known to be different from each other the above inference is contradicted by the testimony of the above reflective cognition. Even if there is doubt regarding the difference of objects and their properties the fallacy of doubtful deviation of the middle term cannot be avoided. The difference in the cognitions of the same object can be accounted for even on the basis of the non-apprehension of some of its properties.

Expl: Now it is argued that even the cognitions of distant objects does not apprehend the real. The reply to this is that it is intuitively evident that cognitions of distant objects and other non-perceptual cognitions do apprehend the real individual as the perceptual cognitions do. This can be denied only on the assumption that objects and their properties are identical so that if even a single property is not apprehended the individual endowed with the properties would have to be taken to be unapprehended. But since the properties are different from the individuals perception and other cognitions can well be supposed to apprehend the same object although some of its properties may remain unapprehended by non-perceptual cognition even when they are apprehended by perception.

Justification of the reply

Text: यदि च न एवं, दूरतम–आदि–प्रत्ययेषु कः समाश्वास–विषयः? यस्य अर्थः लभ्यते इति चेत्? ननु लाभः अपि पूर्व–पुर्व–उपलब्ध अन्–उपमर्दनेन एव। न हि सत्व–द्रव्यत्व–पार्थिवत्व–वृक्षत्व–आदिकं परिभूय शिंशपा लभ्यते।

Trans: If this is not the case (that is, if the objects of the cognitions 'as distant and more and more distant') were not identical then which of these can be treated as the real and guaranteed object of the different cognitions? Could it be said that that is the real object which is actually apprehended? Yes, but then this apprehension of the object would never occur by suppressing the properties under which the object appears in the earlier cognitions. Certainly the object like the teak is not apprehended as divested of its properties like reality, substantiality, earthiness, treeness etc. under which it appears in the cognitions concerned with more and more proximate objects.

Expl: If the cognitions that arise while approaching an object from a distance didn't apprehend the same object under the properties of reality, substantiality, earthiness etc. then they cannot all be valid. If any one of them is singled out as valid there is no justification for thus singling out this particular cognition. If the actual apprehension (or grasping) of the object by a cognition be the ground for its validity then this cognition or apprehension must be supposed to occur without suppressing the properties under which the object appeared in the earlier cognitions. Certainly the (last) object—the teak—that is (actually) apprehended by the cognition is not apprehended as divested of all its properties like reality, substantiality, earthiness, etc. Thus it cannot be maintained that a thing and its properties are non-different from each other and that the apprehension of the object, while one gradually approaches it does not have an identical entity as object (as characterised by various properties).

Objection to the reply that cognitive validity can be determined by the criterion of significant activity and reply to the objection

Text: यत्र अर्थक्रिया–सिद्धिः इति चेत्? न। सर्वेषां अनुवृत्तेः कस्य अर्थ–क्रिया इति किं निश्चायकम्? न किञ्चित्। किन्तु संकीर्ण–अर्थक्रिया–विरहात् एकं एव तत्र वस्तु। न च एकस्मिन् प्रतिभास–भेदः इति एकः एव प्रत्यय तत्र स–आलंबनः इति ब्रूमः इति चेत्? तत्र अपि कतमः इति अ–निश्चये सः एव अन्–आश्वासः। असंकीर्णा अपि च अर्थक्रिया

न व्यक्तितः, सामग्रीतः सर्व–संभवात्। अतः एव न संतानतः। न हि एक संतान–नियता काचित् अर्थक्रिया नाम। कांचित् अर्थक्रियां प्रति प्रत्यक्ष–अन्–उपलंभ–गोचरः एव तथा व्यवस्थाप्यते इति चेत्? तर्हि दूरतम–आदि–उपलब्धाः अपि तथा व्यवस्थाप्याः। सर्वेषां एव तेषां तां तां अर्थाक्रियां प्रति प्रयोजकतायाः अन्वय–गोचरत्वात् इति।

Trans: Couldn't it be urged (against the above reply) that only that one of the several cognitions is valid which leads to significant activity in relation to the object? No! (This is not correct). If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not suppressed how can it be determined that the significant activity pertains to a particular object among the different ones successively cognised? (But) could it be said in reply that there is no such determinant and because there is no complex significant activity at the place (but only a single one pertaining to a single object) there is only one apprehended object and only its cognition which is one (of the many cognitions and) is objective and valid? Yes, if this is the case, how to decide which one of the cognitions is objective and if this decision is not possible there will be uncertainty again. Even simple (uncompounded) significant activity results not from a single object. It results only from a collocation of (causal) entities because only the collocation of causes is productive of any effect. For this very reason the significant activity cannot (be supposed to) result from a series of momentary entities. Certainly no significant activity is invariably associated with a single series (of momentary entities). Could it be the case that for some significant activity the seed as seed (in the present example) is known by means of positive and negative association to be the primary cause and so the entity perceived is determined to be a seed (and not something else)? Well! if this is so then even the distantly-observed properties like substantiality, earthiness, treeness etc. of the perceived entity are severally effective for different significant activities and so they too must be supposed to be apprehended. The entity perceived is causally effective in the production of different significant activities

Expl: Objecting to the foregoing reply the Buddhist urges that although different properties inhere in a perceived object yet it appears under that property only which is connected with a significant activity. Now a thing appearing as real, as a substance, as an earthy object (viewed from different distances) is connected with a particular significant activity, only as a tree and not as a real or as a substance. So the perception of the object as a certain tree is alone real. But since the tree is also all these things it cannot be denied that the significant activity is connected with a real which is an earthy substance. If one argues against this that there is no

miscellaneous cause of a significant activity each of which must be positively and negatively associated with a single cause only there can be two retorts to the argument. One, no significant activity results from a single causal entity. Only a collocation of causes produces any activity. Two, an entity real as substance, as earth, as tree etc. is severally productive of different significant activities. For example, as real a thing is productive of its cognition, as substance it produces its conjunction with some other thing, as an earthy object it gives rise to its attribute—smell and so on. Thus since all these properties of the perceived object are connected with some significant activity or other they should all be apprehended when the thing is apprehended.

Distinction between perceptual and other cognitions based on their respective characteristics urged

Text: स्यात् एतत्। धर्म–अंतर–आकारेण प्रतिभास–भेदः भेद–हेतुः कितु परोक्ष अ–परोक्ष–रूपतया। सा हि न धर्म–भेदान् अपि उपादाय समर्थयितुं शक्या। तेषु अपि परोक्ष–अ–परोक्ष–ज्ञान–उदयात्। तत्र अपि धर्म–अंतर–अनुसरणे अन्–अवस्थानात् इति चेत्?

Trans: Let then be this argument (for the cognitive distinction). The difference of the properties of their respective objects is not (to be taken as) the cause of the distinction of the cognitions. It is the properties of mediacy and immediacy characterising the cognitions that (are to be taken as the bases of their distinction. The mediacy and immediacy of the different cognitions cannot be maintained on the basis of the mediacy and immediacy of the objects themselves (of the cognitions) for even the mediate and immediate characteristics (as characterising the different objects) are themselves mediately or immediately cognised. If therefore even mediate properties are taken to be endowed with the property of immediacy and immediate properties are taken to be endowed with the property of mediacy then there would result infinite regress. (So cognitions themselves are to be regarded as mediate and immediate.)

Expl: Now it is contended that perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions differ because they are themselves immediate and mediate respectively. The difference of the cognitions is not due to the mediacy and immediacy of the objects because even objective mediacy and immediacy could be immediately or mediately cognised according to the non-Buddhist. So the objective properties would themselves have to be supposed to be endowed with other properties of mediacy and immediacy and thus there would result an infinite regress. It is best therefore to regard the cognitions themselves as mediate and immediate.

According to one interpretation of the text mediacy and immediacy

cannot be taken to be the natures of the different types of cognition. Even mediate objects are immediately cognised by yogins and immediate objects are mediately cognised through inference and verbal testimony. So the immediate may be characterised by mediacy and the mediate by immediacy. The same again can be said of the second-level properties of mediacy and immediacy.

Reply to the above that mediacy and immediacy cannot be the properties of cognitive objects

Text: न। तयोः अ–विषय–आकारत्वात्। द्विविधः हि ज्ञान–धर्मः विषय–अवच्छेदः जाति–भेदः च। तत्र विषय–अवच्छेदेन भेदे विषयस्य भेद–स्थितिः अ–भेद निराकरणं वा। न तु द्वितीयेन। तस्य कारण भेदेन एव उपपत्तेः। श्रुति–अनुमिति –स्मृतिवत्। यथा च विषय–भेदे अपि कारण–भेदात् एव अ–परोक्ष–जातीयं इंद्रियजं ज्ञानं तथा विषय–अभेदे अपि कारण–भेदात् एव परोक्ष–अ–परोक्ष–जातीयं इंद्रिय–लिङ्ग–ज्ञानं भवत् केन वार्यते? वारणे वा कार्य–भेदं प्रति कारण–भेदः अ–प्रयोजकः स्यात् तथा च आकस्मिकः सः आपद्येत्। जाति–भेदः अयं न तु उपाधि–भेदः इति किं अत्र निष्टंकं कारणं इति चेत्? अनुभवः एव। न हि व्यवसाय–काले–पारोक्ष्य–अ–पारोक्ष्य–स्मृसित्व–अनुभवत्वानि परिस्फुरंति। असौ अग्निमान् अयं अग्निमान् सः अग्निमान् इति स्फुरणात्। अनुव्यवसाय–काले तु तत्–प्रतिभासः। अमुं अनुमिनोमि, इमं पश्यामि, तं स्मरामि इति उल्लेखात्। कथं तर्हि परोक्षः अर्थः प्रत्यक्षः च इति व्यवहारः ? यथा अनुमितः दृष्टः स्मृतः इति।

Trans: No! The two properties of mediacy and immediacy do not involve the objects of the cognition (to which they are supposed to belong). There are in fact two kinds of properties of cognition namely the property of being determined by objects and by different generic properties like 'being a perception', 'being an inference', 'being a recollection' etc. Of these two the difference in cognitions due to the difference in the objective determination of the cognitions is caused by the difference of the objects of cognition (from each other) or the elimination of their identity but in the difference of cognitions due to the difference of their generic properties (as that of perception and inference) this is not the case because this difference is caused by the difference of the respective causes of the cognitions. Such is the case with verbal, inferential and recollective cognitions. Who can prevent the occurrence of the same

perceptual cognition generated by the senses regarding different objects like the pot, the cloth, etc. and also the occurrence of the different perceptual and inferential cognitions respectively generated by the senses and the middle term with regard to the same object? It is mainly the different causes that determine the occurrences of these different cognitions irrespective of the fact that the objects of the cognitions are the same or different. If causal determination of the cognitions is denied then causal difference would not be the determinant of the difference in effect and so this difference would be rendered accidental. But couldn't it be asked, 'what is the clinching evidence that immediacy or perceptuality and mediacy or non-perceptuality are generic properties and not just adventitious characteristics depending upon cognitive relations to objects? Well! the evidence for the generic nature of the properties is experience itself. Certainly in the perceptual, inferential, recollective and other cognitions, immediacy, mediacy, recollectiveness and other properties do not appear along with their respective objects. When the fire is cognised the forms of the cognitions are: 'This is fiery', 'That was fiery' and so on (and these do not involve the properties of the cognitions). But in the reflective awareness of these cognitions however these different properties make their appearance. That is why the reflective cognitions are of the form: 'I infer this', 'I see this', 'I recollect this', and so on. But how then do we refer to the cognitive object as mediate or immediate? The answer is that such a reference is just like the reference to the object as the object of inference, perception, recollection, etc.

Expl: Replying to the foregoing contention the non-Buddhist maintains that mediacy and immediacy of cognitions are not determined by the different natures of their objects. It is by their causes that cognitions are made mediate or immediate. This is why the cognitions of pot and cloth for example may both be immediate if caused by the senses despite the difference of their objects while the same object like pot may be cognised perceptually as well as non-perceptually. Even the Buddhist admits that a mediate cognition of an object may be either inferential or verbal depending upon the different causal conditions that produce the inference and the verbal cognition. Difference of (or different nature of) objects has nothing to do with this cognitive difference. That this difference is not accidental and also not due to objective difference is proved by the fact that these properties do not appear in the cognitions just as their objects do. The perceptual, inferential, recollective etc. characters of objects should otherwise have appeared in the cognitions of the objects along with them. Only in the reflective cognitions of the objective cognitions having the form, 'I perceive, infer, have verbal cognition of this (a certain object) etc.' do the perceptual, inferential etc. properties—which belong to the cognitions—appear.

Rebuttal of the second of the two earlier proofs of the doctrine of apoha

Text: यत् अपि अत्यतं विलक्षणानां इत्यादि, तत् अपि संदिग्ध–अन्–ऐकांतिकम्। विधिना अपि तथा–भूतेन सालक्षण्य–व्यवहारस्य निर्वाहात्। तथा हि अयं व्यवहारः न निर्–निमित्तः, न अपि अनेक–निमित्तः न अपि अनेक–संसर्ग एक–निमित्तः, अतिप्रसङ्गात। ततः अनेक–संसर्ग–एक् –निमित्तः अयं परिशिष्यते। तथा च तादृशस्य विधि–रूपत्वे कः विरोधः येन व्यप्तिः स्यात्? प्रत्युत निषेध–रूपतायां एव विरोधः दर्शितः प्राक् इति कृतं पल्लव–समुल्लासैः।

Trans: As to the proof for apoha based on the aforementioned middle term namely, 'whatever is the ground of the similarity–usage with regard to objects absolutely disparate in nature, must be of the nature of the exclusion of the other', it has to be said that this middle term is afflicted by the fallacy of doubtful concomitance. Even a positive property can account for and so be the ground of the similarity-usage. The fact is this This similarity-usage is not uncaused nor is it due to the operation of many different entities (or properties) or only the absence of relationship with many entities. Such assumptions lead to overextensive or wrong similarity-usages. Hence it is concluded by elimination that the usage is due to the relationship of one (the generic property) with the many. What is wrong in assuming the one—which is the basis of the similarity-usage—as a positive entity so that the concomitance (with exclusion, a negative entity) maintained earlier by the Buddhist could be upheld? On the other hand we have already shown how the assumption of the negative (exclusion) character of the basis of the usage leads to inconsistency. So let us stop with this imaginative frivolity.

Expl: Having refuted the first middle term for the inference of apoha the non-Buddhist takes up the second middle term mentioned earlier and argues against it that even a positive entity or property can very well account for the usage of similarity regarding different entities. This usage cannot be based on a diversity of properties or just the absence of relation with diversity. So only the relation of one with many can be the basis of it.

Another defence of the apoha doctrine considered

Text: न अपि प्रवृत्ति–अदि–व्यवहार–निर्वाहकत्वं अपोह–कल्पनायाः। अन्य–अवभासात् अन्यत्र प्रवृत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्। अध्यवसायात् अयं अदोषः इति चेत्? अथ कः अयं अध्यवसाय? किं अलीकस्य वस्तु–धर्मतया अवभासः किं वा वस्तु–आत्मकतया, ततः भेद–अग्रहः

वस्तु–वासना–समुत्थं वा इति?

Trans: Nor is the concept of apoha (or exclusion) conducive to the usage concerning disposition towards or urge etc. for action. If it were so then one would be disposed to act towards one thing while apprehending quite another thing and thus there would result discrepancy between cognition and action. Could one urge against this that this discrepancy can be overcome by means of a (complex) determinate cognition? Well! What is then this (complex) determinate cognition? Is it the cognition of the unreal (exclusion) as characterising the real, or as identical with the real or the fact of being generated by the instinctive urge for the real?

Expl: Since the apoha is quite other than the real object towards which all our voluntary actions are directed the concept of apoha cannot explain the motivation of our actions. It may however be urged that apoha or exclusion as involved in a determinate cognition of the real gives rise to action directed towards it. The different possible forms of this (hypothetical) determinate cognition are therefore mooted for critical consideration.

The first and second of the above four alternatives rebutted

Text: न प्रथमः। विकल्पे तत्–अन्–अवभासनात्। न द्वितीयः। अ–साधारण–विषयतया शब्द–विकल्पयोः अ–प्रवृत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्। तस्य अ–सामयिकत्वात्। तस्मात् विकल्प–वस्तुनोः चक्षू–रसवत् सर्वथा विरोधः एव। साधारण–विषयत्वे तु वस्तुत्व–अ–प्रतिभासनम्। तस्य अ–साधारणत्वात्।

Trans: The first (of the above alternatives) is not tenable. The real (or the self-defined momentary entity) does not appear in the determinate cognition (according to the Buddhist). The second (alternative) too is not tenable. The real being the particular, verbal and other determinate cognitions cannot have anything to do with it. The particular is not the object of any verbal convention. So the determinate cognition and the real are like the eye and the taste-sensation which are quite opposed to each other. If however the complex cognition has a general object then reality cannot appear in it as it is particular in nature.

Expl: The first two of the foregoing alternatives cannot be accepted because the particular which is the object of indeterminate cognition only cannot be apprehended by verbal and other cognitions which are determinate in nature. Even verbal conventions have to do with things in their general character. This general character has nothing to do with the absolute particular which is the real.

The third alternative rebutted

Text: न तृतीयः। प्रवृत्ति–सामानाधिकरण्य–नियम–अन्–उपपत्तेः। भेद–अ–ग्रहस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्। अतेभ्यः भेदः गृहीतः इति चेत्? किं–अतेषु गृह्यमाणेषु अ–गृह्यमाणेषु वा? न आद्यः। अ–तेषां अपि स्वलक्षणानां विकल्प–अ–गौचरत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। अ–विज्ञात–अवधेः भेदस्य अ–प्रयनात्। प्रथने वा अध्यवसेय–अभिमत–स्वलक्षणात् अपि भेदः गृह्येत। अविशेषाात्। गृहीतात् अ–ग्रहः भेदस्य, अ–गृहीतेभ्यः तु तत्–ग्रहः इति चेत्? यदि धर्म–लक्षणः भेदः तदा विपर्ययः। स्वरूप–लक्षणः चेत् अ–विशेषात् सर्वतः तत्–ग्रहः अन्यत्र तादात्म्य–ग्रहात्। निः स्वरूपत्वात तस्य क्व स्वरूप–लक्षणः भेदः इति चेत्? अ–गृहीतात् अपि तथा स्यात् अ–विशेषात्। निः स्वरूपं अपि स–स्वरूपं इव भिन्नं इव प्रथितं इति चेत्? तत् किं अध्यवसेय–अपेक्षया स–स्वरूपं इव न प्रथितं अध्यवसेय–स्वरूपं इव वा स्फुरितम्? आद्ये अ–प्रतिपत्तिः वा स्यात् अविशेषात्। निः स्वरूप–प्रतिपत्तिः वा स्यात्? उभयथा अपि सामानाधिकरण्य–प्रवृत्ती न स्याताम्। द्वितीयः तु प्राक् एव दूषितः।

Trans: The third alternative is not tenable. The disposition to action and the verbal cognition (of the object of action) cannot then invariably go together as the nonapprehension of the difference between the unreal exclusion and the real is available (as cause) everywhere. But isn't it the case that in the complex determinate cognition of the cow for example the difference of the cow from the non-cows does not go uncognised (so that the cow-cognition cannot dispose one towards the non-cow)? Yes, but then it may be asked, 'Are these now-cows known or unknown? If the answer is 'known', then all the self-defined entities being beyond the ken of any determinate cognition even the real non-cow cannot be known as different from the cow (and so the said non-apprehension of the difference cannot be had). If however the answer to the question is that the 'noncows are unknown', then the difference from the latter will also be unknown so that we cannot think of the difference at all. Unless the counterpositive of a difference is known the difference cannot be known. But if the knowledge of the counterpositive is not supposed to be needed for the knowledge of its difference then the cow-concept may be known as different even from the real cow (the self-defined cow-entity) as it is so

known from the non-cows (as both the differences as differences are alike). It may be said against this that the cow-concept (for example) cannot be differentiated from the real cow as its cognition which is determinate follows the indeterminate cognition of the cow. This cannot be the case with the cow-concept in relation to non-cows because the determinate cognition of the cow is not preceded by any indeterminate cognition of the non-cow. In this reply the difficulty is that if the said difference is a real character or property then exclusion being unreal the difference from the real cannot be known to characterise it (as the difference is real and the exclusion is unreal). If on the other hand the difference is identical with the different then the nature of the different not being determined by any counterpositive the exclusion could be known to be different from everything. Only the cognition of the identity of the exclusion with a thing can obstruct the cognition of its difference from that thing (but exclusion is not identical with anything and it is not so known). But can it not be said that exclusion (being negation) is devoid of a nature of its own and so it does not have any difference (from anything) constituting its nature? No! in that case a certain exclusion or the cow-concept for example would not have difference even from the non-cow as this difference and the difference from the cow are alike in not constituting the nature of the concept. Could it be said then that though the concept of exclusion is devoid of any nature it yet appears to be endowed with a nature of its own and also different from certain reals? Well! if so then one may ask whether the exclusion does not appear to have a nature in relation to the real with which it is identified or it appears to be identified with the real (with which it is identified)? On the first alternative exclusion will remain either totally unknown because there is nothing to distinguish it from anything or it would be known only as devoid of any nature of its own. In either case no statement or disposition to act would be directed towards it. As to the second alternative, it has already been rebutted earlier.

Expl: 'The concept or exclusion not known as different from the real leads to its cognition'. This third alternative is being criticised here on the ground that the reals differing from the concept cannot be the object of any determinate cognition. So the concept cannot be differentiated even from those reals with which it is not concerned. Thus the cow-concept cannot be differentiated even from the horse. And for differentiation the knowledge of the counterpositive of the difference is an essential prerequisite. One could meet this difficulty by saying that the concept is undifferentiated only from that real whose indeterminate cognition precedes its cognition. But then if the difference is real it cannot characterise the concept or exclusion which is unreal. If the difference is regarded as identical with the different then no counterpositive can be supposed to determine its nature so that a concept could be taken to be

different from every real, no real being the counterpositive of the difference. If this difficulty is sought to be avoided by urging that the exclusion having no nature cannot be characterised by difference as its nature then it would follow that the exclusion would differ from every real, even that towards which it is supposed to be directed. Against this it may be contended that the exclusion appears as if it has a distinctive nature vis-a-via the real whose indeterminate cognition does not precede it. This would mean that vis-a-vis the real whose cognition precedes it the exclusion does not appear to have any nature with the result that the exclusion either doesn't appear at all (or is not cognised) or appears as devoid of any nature. On both these assumptions there cannot arise any verbal cognition of or urge to act in relation to the real. Here it may be noted that the exclusion or concept being unreal all disposition for action is directed towards the real only and this is made possible because of the fact that the difference from the real which is the nature of the different remains unknown in the case of the exclusion as it is devoid of any nature. Thus the view that exclusion is natureless in relation to its own real can be upheld. But the main difficulty of this view is that the same exclusion cannot be reasonably supposed to appear as endowed with nature in relation to one kind of real and devoid of it in relation to another kind of real. Moreover the non-apprehension of the difference of an unknown entity or an entity which is known to be devoid of any nature cannot lead to any action. If it did then even the cognition that 'this is a fictitious entity' could lead to action towards such an entity.

The fourth alternative rebutted

Text: न अपि चतुर्थः। नील–अनूभव–वासना–समुत्थस्य पीत–अनुभवस्य नीले प्रवर्तकत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। न अनुभवः प्रवर्तकः अपि तु विकल्पः, स च यस्मात् तस्य एव विषय इति चेत्? यस्मात् इति साक्षात् परंपरया वा? प्रथमे शाब्द–लैङ्गिक–ज्ञानानां अ–प्रवर्तकत्व–प्रसङ्गः। द्वितीये तु सः एव अतिप्रसङ्गः।

Trans: The fourth too is not tenable. The indeterminate cognition of the yellow entity resulting from the urge which is the same as the indeterminate cognition of the blue entity should dispose one towards the blue entity if the fourth alternative view is correct. But isn't it the case that the indeterminate cognition does not dispose one to action, it is the determinate cognition that does it and this causes disposition for action towards that entity only whose indeterminate cognition generates it? Yes, but is this generation of the determinate direct or indirect? If it is the first then the verbal and inferential cognitions not being generated directly by the indeterminate cognition they would cease to produce the (above-

mentioned) disposition. If however the second (alternative) is true then the foregoing fallacy itself will be entailed.

Expl: According to the fourth of the above alternatives the complex determinate cognition arises from the urge for the real. The Buddhist does not admit any invisible durable impression of an experience to be the nature of the urge. One experience resulting from another experience is itself the urge. Now in an experience-sequence a yellow experience may come after a blue experience and so it should be able to produce the urge for the blue. It may be urged against this that only the determinate cognition disposes one to act and the object of the act is that which is apprehended by the indeterminate cognition which generates the determinate cognition. But any indeterminate cognition may generate indirectly any determinate cognition. As to direct generation even verbal and inferential cognitions cannot be generated directly by any indeterminate cognition as some determinate cognition has to precede the latter before they are produced. Even the determinate perceptual cognition of an object following its indeterminate cognition would cease to produce the disposition towards the object on the above view but it is not mentioned by the critic because the determinate perceptual cognition is not generated by the indeterminate cognition. Only its perceptual (imposed) character is determined by the preceding indeterminate cognition.

A defence of the fourth alternative (view) and its rebuttal

Text: अनुभव–व्यापार–पुरस्कारात् नियमः इति चेत्? कः पुरस्कार–अर्थः? न तावत् अनुभव–एक–विषयत्वम्? विकल्पेन तत् अ–संस्पर्शात्। न अपि अनुभवत्व–आरोपः। स्व–आत्मनि काल्पना–अपोढ–अ–भ्रांतत्वात्। विषये च अभिलाप–संसर्ग–योग्य–प्रतिभासत्वात्। तथा अन्–अवभासे वा विकल्पत्व–व्याघातात्। विशेष–उपलब्धौ च आरौप–असंभवात्।

Trans: Couldn't it be said that the determinate cognition being invested with the instrumentality of the indeterminate cognition, there obtains the necessary correspondence between the determinate cognition and the ensuing action (or disposition to act) in respect of their object? (Well! if so) then what is the meaning of 'being invested with instrumentality?' Certainly it does not mean 'having the same entity as object as the indeterminate cognition' because the determinate cognition cannot have the object of the indeterminate (the real) as its object. Nor again can the above mean 'the imposition of the generic property of indeterminate cognition on the determinate cognition' for the latter is, in relation to

itself veridical and so neither illusory nor concept-ridden. As to its object, its appearance is such as to admit verbalisation (as it is conceptual) and so it cannot be the basis of any imposition. If the object did not appear verbalisable its cognition cannot be determinate. And when such an appearance or cognition of this object obtains no false imposition on it is possible.

Expl: Replying to the foregoing objection the Buddhist urges that the necessary co-objectivity of determinate and indeterminate cognitions and the resulting disposition for action can be explained on the ground that the determinate cognition acts as the instrument of the indeterminate cognition. Acting as the instrument is either having the same object as the indeterminate cognition or being the basis of the false imposition of the nature of the indeterminate cognition. The first is ruled out because the objects of the two cognitions are quite different in nature.

The second is not acceptable because according to the Buddhist every cognition is itself a real self-conscious entity which cannot be the subject of any false imposition. The object of the determinate cognition cannot also be imposed upon as it is known to be a conceptual and verbal construct and as such a fictitious entity. In the presence of this knowledge no false imposition upon the object can be made. Even if the determinate cognition or its conceptual object can be the subject of false imposition, the restriction of disposition to act cannot be satisfactorily explained because the generic property of 'being an indeterminate cognition' which is sought to be imposed is common to all indeterminate cognitions and is not tied down to any particular indeterminate cognition. So this imposition cannot ensure that a certain determinate cognition like that of the blue will prompt action only towards the blue object and not any other.

Another defence and its rebuttal

Text: न अपि तत्–धर्म–प्रामाण्य–आरोपः। तस्य अ–नियत–विषयत्वे प्रवृत्ति–नियम–अन्–उपपत्तेः। परमार्थ–सत्–विषयत्वे च तस्य विकल्प–ससर्ग–प्रसङ्गात्। अलीक–विषयत्वे च अ–प्रवृत्तेः। अलीकस्य अन्–अलीकतया स्फुरणं तु निषिद्धम्।

Trans: Nor can there be the imposition of the veridicity of the indeterminate cognition on the determinate. If this veridicity did not necessarily involve the object of the cognition the necessary co-objectivity of the determinate cognition and the disposition to act cannot be accounted for. If however veridicity involved the absolutely real entity then the determinate cognition too will have the former as its object (because the determinate cognition cannot be conscious of its veridicity without

apprehending the real which is involved in its veridicity). If however veridicity involved the unreal then there cannot result from the cognition any urge for action (directed towards the unreal). As to the appearance of the unreal as real, it is simply ruled out as the unreal nature of the real is quite obvious.

Expl: Upholding the same plea of imposition the Buddhist urges that perhaps it is the veridicity of the indeterminate cognition that is imposed on the determinate. This imposition of veridicity may involve the veridicity itself or the exclusion of everything other than the veridicity or the veridicity as involving the real object of the veridical cognition or involving exclusion as object. Now mere veridicity is common to all veridical cognitions. So a determinate cognition of blue may dispose one even towards the yellow. The exclusion of things other than veridicity is also common to all veridical cognitions. If veridicity involved the self-defined real the determinate cognition on which the veridicity is imposed would have to have the real as its object in order to be conscious of its veridicity. Further, veridicity cannot involve the exclusion because it is unreal and no indeterminate cognition can have the unreal as its object. Moreover, the unreal can appear as real only if the determinate cognition had the unreal as its object but this is denied by the Buddhist.

A third defence and its rebuttal

Text: न अपि अनुभवात् स्व–आत्मनः भेद–अ–ग्रहः एव तत्–व्यापार–पुरस्कारः। स्वरूपस्य स्वतः अवगतेः। विषय–भेदस्य च प्राक् एव निरूपणात्। न अपि अ–पारोक्ष्यम्। तस्य अपि स्व–आत्मनि सर्व–ज्ञान–साधारणत्वात्। विषये च विकल्पस्य तत्–अभावात्। तथाभावे अपि अन्यत्र नियत–प्रवृत्ति–अन्–उपपत्तेः।

Trans: Nor again this instrumentality is the same as the non- apprehension of difference of itself or the determinate cognition from the indeterminate cognition. The determinate cognition as cognition is self-conscious (and) as such (its distinctive nature cannot be confused with that of the indeterminate cognition). As to the object of the determinate cognition, it being unreal there cannot be a real difference related to the unreal as (its counterpositive and thus) this alternative has already been disposed of earlier. Nor again is it the immediacy of the indeterminate cognition characterising the determinate cognition for every cognition is immediate in regard to itself as it is self-conscious. As to the object of the determinate cognition it is not immediate. And even if these objects were endowed with immediacy the objects of the cognitions being different the cognition of one object cannot dispose one to act with regard to another.

Expl: The instrumentality of the determinate cognition cannot be defined either in terms of the non-apprehension of the difference of the former from the indeterminate cognition or the object of the former and of the indeterminate cognition. The determinate cognition as cognition is self-conscious and so it is distinctly known. The object of this cognition is however false and so there cannot be a real difference of this object. Immediacy of the indeterminate cognition as imposed upon the mediate cannot also define the latter's instrumentality. All cognitions are immediate in relation to themselves. If the immediacy of the object of the indeterminate cognition is imposed upon that of the determinate then this immediacy not involving any real object the cognition of any object may dispose one towards any other object (the immediacy being common to a certain real and any conceptual object).

Fourth defence and its rebuttal

Text: न अपि विषय–सारूप्यं तत्–अभावात्। का हि परमार्थ–सत्–अलीकयोः समान–रूपता नाम? यदि रूप–शब्दः धर्मि–वाचकः समान–शब्दः च एक–पर्यायः क्व अर्थ–संगतिः प्रकृते? यदि वा रूपं धर्मः समानः च एकः वा एक–जातीयः वा इति तथा अपि क्व अर्थ–संगतिः प्रकृते? अ–तत्–व्यावृत्तिः इति चेत्? न। तस्य च अलीक–अन्–अलीक–निष्ठतया एकत्व–एक–जातीयत्वयोः अभावात्। आभिमानिकः अयं सारूप्य–व्यवहारः न पारमार्थिकः इति चेत्? न। अभिमानस्य एव चिंत्यमान्त्वात्। न हि चिंनित–प्रकारान् परिभ्य अपरः अभिमानः–नाम।

Trans: Nor also the instrumentality is the same as the identity of nature of the objects of the cognitions for there is no such identical nature. What after all can be the identical nature of the ultimately real and the fictitious entities? If the word 'nature' (in Sanskrit 'rūpa') means the characterised object and the word 'common' or identical, (in Sanskrit 'samana') means or is synonymous with) one or the same then where is the consistency in the meanings of the words in the present case? Alternatively if 'nature' is 'property' and 'identical' is that which is one or is of identical generic character then again where is consistency in meaning in the present case? (There is no common locus of the objects of the indeterminate and determinate cognitions nor is there any identity of nature between these two as they are real and unreal respectively.) Could then the exclusion from the other be the common nature of both these entities? No. If exclusion is present in the real it cannot be unreal and if it is not unreal it

cannot be present in the unreal. So there cannot be one exclusion common to the real and the unreal. Could then this usage regarding 'community of nature of the objects of the cognitions' be notional and not real? No. The nature of this notion itself is being inquired into. Certainly there cannot be a notion of this usage which is exclusive of all the alternatives we have gone into.

Expl: The objects of the two cognitions do not have an identical locus or an identical property or nature on account of which the determinate cognition could be supposed to be invested with instrumentality relating to the indeterminate cognition. Even a property like 'being' cannot be common to the real and the unreal. Apoha or exclusion too cannot be a property common to the real and the unreal. If exclusion is unreal it cannot characterise the real and if it is real it cannot characterise the unreal. So it cannot be one property.

Gñānasrī's explanation of the causality of the determinate cognition in relation to action being examined

Text: स्वभावात् एव कश्चित् विकल्पः कास्मिश्चित् एव अ–स्फुरिते अपि प्रवर्तयति। कि अत्र क्रियताम्? स च अस्य स्वभाव–भेदः स्व–कारणात् एव आयातः। तम् कः पर्युनुयोज्यतां इति चेत्? तत् कि अ–प्रत्यासन्नः एव विकल्पः तत् प्रवर्तयति प्रत्यासत्ति–अंतर–अभावात् स्वभाव–प्रस्यासन्नः वा, व्यवहृतिः एव वा प्रत्यासत्तिः? न प्रथमः अति–प्रसंगात्। द्वितीये तु स्वभावेन उत्तरं स्यात्। किंतु तत् एव स्फुरणम्। न हि व्यवहारे प्रवर्तयितव्ये स्वभाव–प्रत्यासत्तिं अवधूय ज्ञान–ज्ञेययां:–अपरः कश्चित् विषय–विषयिभावः। सत्–असत्–अनिर्वचनीय–ख्याति–वादिभिः अपि स्वभाव–प्रत्यासत्तेः अवर्जनीयत्वात् इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। तृतीये तु व्यक्तं आत्म–आश्रयः। स्व–व्यवहारं प्रति एव निमित्त–अनुसरणात्।

Trans: Couldn't it be maintained that some determinate cognition does by nature dispose us (to act) towards a real which is not even its object? What can we do (or say) about this? This peculiar nature of the cognition has been handed down to it by its causes only. Whom should we hold responsible for it? Well, if this is so we ask, 'Does the cognition produce the disposition towards the real without coming in contact with the latter or in the absence of any (other) contact with the real the cognition is connected by nature with the real or lastly usage (or causing relevant usage in relation to the real) itself is the contact of the cognition with the

real? The first of these alternatives will not do for it would lead to the fallacy of over-extension. (Any cognition would cause disposition towards any real). On the second alternative nature would account for the relationship of cognition and the real but this natural relationship is itself the cognitive relationship. Certainly in common usage the relationship of cognition and its object is not regarded as anything other than a natural relationship. Even the advocates of the occurrence of the cognition of an entity which is inexplicable as real or unreal cannot do without the (admission of this) natural relationship. This is going to be elaborated later. On the third alternative mentioned above however there results clearly the fallacy of self-dependence because it is for usage (regarding the disposition towards the real) that a (rational) basis is being sought (and this basis is here said to be usage itself).

Expl: The great Buddhist scholar Gñānasrī has argued that a determinate cognition causes disposition towards a real just by nature and there is no other explanation for it. This nature the cognition inherits from its causes. In reply the non-Buddhist argues that without coming in contact with the real the cognition cannot produce any disposition towards it. If there is any relationship it must be either a natural one or just the causation of usage in relation to the real. The natural relationship is the same as the cognitive relationship of subject and object. Usage however cannot be the basis of relationship because it is usage itself pertaining to objectivity that is being sought to be explained. Usage cannot be explained by usage.

The crux of the foregoing argument of the non-Buddhist is the point that the causality of cognition, volition and conation is based on their having an identical entity as object and there being no proof for admitting any special nature in determinate cognition it cannot be denied that a determinate cognition and the volition produced by it must be directed towards the same object. So the real must be the object of the determinate cognition.

A defence of the doctrine that the concept can lead to action and its rebuttal

Text: कारण–शक्तेः असत्–उत्पत्तिवत् नियमः इति चेत्? सत्यम्। एतत् चिंतनीयम्। कारण–शक्त्या अपि नियत–जालि–नियतया भवितव्यम्। अन्यथा ज्वलन–विकल्पात् जले अपि प्रवृत्ति–प्रसंङ्गात्।

Trans: Could it be the case that like the capacity of the cause which produces the effect which is nonexistent the concept too produces the disposition towards the real with which it is not connected? Yes, but it should be noted in this connection that even the causality of the capacity of the cause has to be strictly confined to objects of a particular generic

character. Otherwise even the cognition of the flame may lead one towards water.

Expl: It is objected that just as the cause is naturally productive of its non-existent effect so the determinate cognition too may produce disposition towards the real unconnected with it. This is controverted by urging that even the causality of cognition in respect of the unconnected real must be regulated by a property which determines the positive and negative association of the cognition with the real. If it were not so even the cognition of flame may turn one towards water.

Objection to the reply and its rebuttal

Text: दाह्–आदि–समर्थ–अर्थ–आकार–विकल्प–जातीयं तात्विके वन्हौ प्रवर्तयति इति जातिः वा उपाधिः वा नियामकः इति चेत्? न तर्हि रत्न–मरीचि–निचये ततः प्रवर्तेत। तत्–जातीयस्य दहने एव प्रवर्तन–सामर्थ्यात्। ताद्रूप्येण तस्य एव प्रथनात् इति चेत्? प्रथताम्। न तु तस्य प्रवर्तन–योग्यता तत्र प्रथन–नियता। वन्हि–स्वलक्षणे वन्हि–विकल्पात् अ–प्रवृत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्। स्वीकुरु वा तस्य अपि तत्र स्फुरणं परिहर वा वन्हि–विकल्पात् अ–वन्हौ प्रवृत्तिं इति।

Trans: Couldn't it be urged that (for example) any determinate cognition whose form determines its capacity to burn is the cause of action in relation to the real fire and thus either a generic or adventitious property like cognitionness determines the causality of the cognition? No! If this were so then the cognition would not impel one towards the sparkle of a diamond-cluster (appearing as bright as fire) because such a cognition has capacity to impel only towards fire. But doesn't the sparkle of diamonds itself appear as fire (under the form of fire)? Yes, let it appear, but its capacity to induce action does certainly not depend upon its appearance. If it did then the determinate cognition of fire (the unreal) would not produce the urge to action towards the real fire (which does not appear in the cognition). So either admit the appearance of the real fire in the determinate cognition or deny the occurrence of the urge towards anything other than fire through the causality of the fire-cognition.

Expl: Now it is contended that without apprehending the real the determinate cognition urges one towards it provided it has the form determining the productivity of the result peculiar to the real. The generic or adventitious property is such a form. This contention is refuted on the ground that the cognition of fire would not produce the urge for the sparkle of diamonds which look like fire because the cognition is supposed to impel one towards the fire only. It is true that here the

sparkle itself appears as fire but the appearance is quite irrelevant to the urge because the real does not appear in any determinate cognition (as per the Buddhist) and yet the latter produces the urge for it. So it must be admitted that the real appears in cognition or it has to be denied that the fire-cognition causes the urge for non-fire.

Rejection of Gñānasrī's view that identity of form of the cognition with the real is the regulator of the disposition to act

Text: एतेन आकार–सारूप्यं नियम–हेतुः अपास्तः। अर्थनीय–सारूप्य–अभावे अपि प्रवृत्ति–दर्शनात्। अर्थनीय–सारूप्य–मात्रस्य च अतिप्रसंजकत्वात्।

Trans: By the foregoing rebuttal stands rebutted the view that the identity of form of the object of cognition and that of the urge to action is the regulator of the relation of cognition and the real. This is because there is urge for action even in relation to that object which is not endowed with a desirable form common to itself and the cognitive object. If the identity of form which is not desirable is also thought adequate to regulate cognitive relation then there would result irregularity.

Expl: Gñānasrī has stated in his discussion of the relation of cognition and the real that the cognition of an object as endowed with a property leads to action towards that object as endowed with that very property. This view is proved wrong in the case of the fire-cognition giving rise to action in relation to the diamond-sparkle. Fireness is not common to fire and sparkle. Fireness is desired but it is not present in the sparkle. Some form which is not desired may be common to both but then a person desiring a silver-piece and having the cognition 'this substance is silver' should turn even to iron which is a substance.

Denial of identity of form between the cognition and its objects

Text: न च बाह्यवादे ज्ञान–ज्ञेययोः विाक्षित–सारूप्य–संभवः सामग्री–वैषम्यात्। साम्ये वा जाड्य–चैत्तन्ययौः एक–शेष–प्रसङ्गात्। न च साम्ये अपि अवांतर–विशेषात् कार्य–विशेष–व्यवस्था। मिथः सामग्री–अन्–अनुविधानेन जायमानत्वात्। न च कार्य–उन्नेयं सामग्री–साम्यम्। बाह्ये धूम–आदि अनुविधीयमानस्य कारणस्य दृश्यत्वात्। धूम–ज्ञानस्य च तत्–व्यभिचार–उपलंभात्। न च तत् एव कारणे एकत्र दृश्यं अदृश्यं च अन्यत्र इति युक्तम्।

Trans: Nor can there be the intended identity of form between the

cognition and its object in the theory of the reality of the external world. This is so because the respective causal collocations of cognition and its object are quite different from each other. If the collocations were the same then there would exist in the world only one of the two viz. insentience or sentience. But couldn't it be that despite identity of their causal collocation some specific causal difference brought about some difference in their natures? No. (This cannot be the truth) as the two are brought into being by different causal collocations. And identity of causal collocation cannot be inferred from the identity of effect. For example the external object-fire is perceived as the cause of the external object smoke—but the cognition of smoke-an internal object is not seen to be caused by fire as it does not go along with fire. One cannot say against this that even the smoke-cognition like the smoke is caused by fire but an invisible one because the same cause cannot be a visible one in one case and an invisible one in another case.

Expl: Thus far the view of the identity of form of concept or cognition and object was being variously criticised. Now the very possibility of such a view in a realistic theory is sought to be ruled out. If the concept and the object or the cognition and the cognised are produced by different causal collocations how can they be identical in form or nature? These two are like brightness and darkness which are produced by entirely different causal collocations. Their difference is not like that of cognition and pleasure both of which though internal realities or mental states produced by the same causal collocation have yet some special causal diversity differentiating them as mental states. The external realities like smoke etc. are produced by other external realities like fire but the cognition of smoke which is an internal reality is not produced by fire. This shows that cognition and its object have different causes and so they are mutually different in nature.

Another objection to the foregoing view

Text: यदि च नीलिमा–आदिः विज्ञानस्य जाति–विशेषः कथं तत्–अतिपत्य ज्ञेयं स्पृशेत्? ज्ञेयस्य चेत् कथं ज्ञानं तत् विशिंष्यात् इति जाति–संकर–आपादन–प्रस्तावे चिंतित–प्रायम्। तस्मात् स्फुरिते एव ज्ञानं प्रवर्तयति इति गले पादुकया अपि अंगीकारयितव्यः गति–अंतर–अभावात्।

Trans: If at all blueness or any other property is the characteristic generic property of cognition (of the blue) how can it leave cognition and come in contact with the object of the cognition? And if it belonged to the object how can it characterise the cognition? All this has almost been thrashed out in connection with the precipitation of the fallacy of overlapping genera. So the thesis that cognition leads to action in relation

to its own object (which could be the real) has to be forced upon the Buddhist even by stamping one's footwear upon his throat. There is simply no other go.

Expl: Another objection against the thesis of identity of form being pointed out here is that if blueness for example is the form or special generic property of the blue-cognition it can have nothing to do with the blue object. Similarly if blueness characterised the blue object it cannot also characterise the blue-cognition. If the property is supposed to characterise both the object and its cognition then it would be afflicted by the fallacy of overlap. The property would overlap cognitionness as both the property and cognitionness come together in blue-cognition while excluding each other in the blue object and some other cognition like that of the yellow.

The third of the earlier alternatives that form is apprehended by cognition being now considered

Text: तर्हि स्फुरिते स्व–आकारे एव प्रवर्तयतु। तत्र प्रवृत्तः एव च अर्थी तत्–सदृशं अर्थं आसादयाति प्रभायां प्रवृत्तः मणिवत् इति चेत्? न। अभिमत–अर्थक्रिया–सामर्थ्य–विरहिणि अ–प्रवृत्तेः। न च बाह्ये विकल्प–आकार–आरोप–संभवः। तस्य तेन अ–संस्पशात्। न च आकारे बाह्यत्व–आरोपः। स्वरूपे स्फुरति आरोप–अन्–अवकाशात्। प्रभायं तु मणि–बुध्या एव मणि–अर्थी प्रवर्तते न तु तत्–अबुध्या इति दृष्टांतः अपि आभासः।

Trans: Let then the cognition lead one towards its own form which is known along with the cognition which it characterises (as it is self-conscious). A person on turning towards this form itself reaches in the end the real object as happens with a person who turning to the splendour of a stone reaches ultimately the stone itself. No. This is not a correct account of the cognitive causality of action because nobody is disposed towards that which does not lead to any desirable and significant result. (The form is such an entity.) Nor can there be imposition on the external real of the conceptual form as the real is not connected with the concept. On the form too the externality (or the objectivity) of the object cannot be imposed. When the form is luminous because of the self-luminosity of cognition there is no scope for any false imposition upon it. As to the urge (inclination) towards the splendour of the diamond cited above, the inclination takes place only on account of the false cognition of the (splendour being the same as the) diamond. Without this illusory cognition the urge would not have arisen at all. So this example cited by

the Buddhist to prove his point is also fallacious.

Expl: The earlier-mentioned Sauṭrānṭika view is that it is the cognitive form that is the object of cognition and as in the case of the person who, seeking a diamond runs after its splendour mistaking it for the diamond the erroneous identification of the form with the real object makes the cogniser go after the real. The critic controverts this explanation on the ground that the form cannot be sought after by anybody as it is not productive of any desirable significant (activity or) result. Perhaps the false imposition of objectivity on the form which is identical with the cognition (of which it is the form) may lead to the urge for it but since the form stands revealed with the self-conscious cognition it cannot be the subject of any false imposition. The external real too cannot be the subject of such imposition because the conceptual cognition cannot have the real as its object. The conceptual cognition is false because it has —as per the Buddhist —only the unreal concept as its object. In the case of the example of the urge for the splendour when the diamond is sought after, it is the identification of the splendour with the diamond engendered by their close proximity that produces the urge for the wrong object. There is however neither proximity nor similarity between the concept and the real.

Another objection to the Sauṭrānṭika view

Text: न च आकार–वादे अ–स्फुरतः अर्थस्य सत्तायां प्रमाणं अपि अस्ति। आकार–कादाचित्कत्वस्य तैमिरिक–केश–आदि–आकारेण–अन्–ऐकांतिकत्वात्

Trans: Nor in the theory of form-objectivity there is any valid proof for the reality of the external object which is not apprehended by cognition. The occasional appearances of different forms in different cognitions by means of which the reality of objects corresponding to the forms can be proved is a deviant middle term for the inferential proof as a person suffering from epilepsy sees forms which do not exist in the world.

Expl: On the view that cognition has the form of the object there is no proof for the reality of the object. The occurrence of the different forms in the cognitions may even be accidental as is the case with the forms of hair appearing to an epileptic person. If the reality of the object is proved on the basis of the cognition of the object then there is no need to accept the reality of a form over and above that of the cognition. So if the form is real there is no real object and if there is the real object there is no form apart from the cognition of the object.

Proof for the external real in the Sautrāntika theory and its criticism

Text: अर्थक्रिया–संवादस्य अपि स्फुरितस्य आकार–मात्र–शरीरत्वात्। बाह्यस्य च अ–सिद्धे। निर्–आलंबन–अर्थ–आकारवत् च क्वचित् वासना–वशांत् अर्थक्रिया–आकारः अपि निर्–आलंबनः एव भविष्यति इति विपक्षे बाधक–अभावात् प्रतिबधस्य अपि असिद्धेः। तस्मात् बाह्यसिद्धिः साकारं च ज्ञानं इति बाल–लोलुपत्वं इति।

Trans: Even the fulfilment of significant activity (which may be trotted out as proof for the reality of the external real) if known is constituted by a certain form only. And the reality of the external entity too is not provable. Moreover like the unobjective form of a nonexistent object (like the hair-form appearing to an epileptic) even the form of a certain significant activity arising from some transcendental urge could exist without any objective basis. So the concomitance of externality and production of significant activity cannot be established as the contradictory thesis cannot be disproved. Thus to maintain that the external entity is real and that cognition is endowed with form is nothing but childishness.

Expl: Above it was argued that the external objects would be disestablished if the cognitive form is supposed to be real. The Buddhist contends against this that the criterion of the production of significant activity is sufficient to prove the external object. But this is not correct. Even the production of significant activity is a kind of form which cannot help in proving the reality of the external object. Moreover if the external reality is established then only its significant activity could be established. The form of reality appearing in the cognition can well be explained by means of the causality of the transcendental urge (without admitting any real object of the cognition). Thus the concomitance of reality and production of significant activity would be disestablished for want of any evidence opposed to its contradictory thesis.

The Vaibhāṣika view that the real is the object of conceptual cognition considered

Text: अस्तु तर्हि बाह्यं एव स्वलक्षणं विकल्पस्य विषयः। यदि अपि स्वरूपेण अ–सामयिकतया तत् न अभिलाप–संसर्ग–यौग्यं तथा अपि तद्रूप–परावृत्ति–प्रत्यासत्त्या साधारण–रूपतां आपन्नं सत् तथा भवति एव। यथा हि एकः गौः अ–गौ–व्यावृत्तः तथा अपरे अपि गावः इति चेत्?

अथ कः अयं अ–गौः नाम? किं एकस्य गो–स्वलक्षणस्य अन्–आत्मा आहोस्वित् तत्–गत–धर्म–विरही?

Trans: Let then the external self-defined real itself be the object of conceptual cognition. Although this object in itself cannot be the object of any verbal convention and so not verbalisable, yet by means of the indirect relation of the exclusion of the other it can acquire a general form and thereby be definitely verbalisable. Thus just as one individual cow is exclusive of the non-cows so too are other cows. Well! if this is so then we ask, 'what is this socalled non-cow? Is it that which is other than a single cow or that which is devoid of the property characterising the cow?'

Expl: Now the Vaibhāṣika view that the self-defined real itself is the object of cognition is being taken up for critical consideration. The real being unique it cannot be the object of any verbal (meaning) convention which is general in nature and so the real cannot be denoted by words. But through the indirect relation of the exclusion of the other the individual can assume the general form, that is to say, like an individual cow all cows become excluders of non-cows. Thus exclusion is the negative general form of the individual real cows. In reply to this explanation the Buddhist is asked to elucidate what he means by 'non-cow'.

The suggested first meaning of 'non-cow' criticised

Text: प्रथमे न गो–अंतरे अपि गौ–शब्द–विकल्पौ प्रवर्तेयाताम्। अश्व–आदिवत् अन्–आत्मत्व–अ–विशेषात्। अतिप्रसंगः च। महिष–मांतग–आदि अ–गौ–व्यावृत्या अश्वे अपि गो–व्यवहार–प्रसङ्गात्। स गोः अपि व्यावर्तते इति चेत? तत् किं अभिमतः गौः गोः अपि न व्यावर्तते? व्यावर्तते किंतु स्वयं अपि असौ गौः इति चेत्? यदि अ–गौ–व्य.ावृत्तिः एव अस्य गोत्वं तत् अश्वे अपि समानम्। अन्यत् चेत् तत् उच्यताम्।

Trans: On the first meaning even a certain cow different from a given individual cow could not deserve to be known or referred to as cow as, being different from the given cow it does not exclude non-cows. Moreover even non-cows would on this interpretation come to be known as cows because a non-cow like the horse is such that it excludes the buffalo, elephant etc. which are other than a given individual cow. But doesn't the horse exclude even the cow (as it excludes the non-cow)? Yes, but then the cow which is intended by the word 'cow' also excludes another cow. Well! (this is true) but despite this it too is a cow. No! the

fact is that if the exclusion of the non-cow is itself the cowness of the cow then it is present in the horse too. If it is something else it needs to be elaborated.

Expl: Rebutting the first meaning of the word 'non-cow' the non- Buddhist says that if 'non-cow' means 'different from a certain cow' then even other cows cannot be the excluders of non-cows as these themselves would be non-cows. If however some non-cow different from a certain cow is the excludent then even the horse be such as it excludes the buffalo which is a non-cow. Perhaps the exclusion of everything excluding that which is characterised by cowness could be taken as the basis of the usage of the word 'cow'. Here the cowness may be either common to all cows or different from individual to individual. If the former then the generic universal is established. If however cowness is not a common positive property it may be the negative exclusion of non-cows. Now this exclusion may be the exclusion of some non-cow or all non-cows. If the former then even a horse can be such. If the latter it would be of the nature of the exclusion of everything that is other than every cow. Such an exclusion cannot be known by any one other than an omniscient being.

The second meaning of 'non-cow' criticised

Text: द्वितीये तु तत्–गत्–धर्म–विरहि–व्यावृत्तः तत्–वान् एव स्यात्। तत्र न विवादः।

Trans: On the second meaning of 'non-cow' exclusion of non-cow would mean the exclusion of that which is devoid of the property characterising the cow and such an entity would be the same as what is endowed with cowness.

Expl: According to the second meaning 'non-cow' would mean either 'that which is devoid of some property characterising the cow' or 'that which is devoid of all properties characterising the cow'. The first extends even over the cow while the second does not cover any object. So 'non-cow' needs to be defined as 'that which is devoid of cowness which characterises all cows'. Thus the reality of the cow—universal (and other universals) has necessarily to be accepted.

An objection of Dharmakīrti and its reply

Text: मिथः सम्भिन्न–आकाराः पिंडाः एव साधारणं रूपं अस्तु कृतं अ–तत्–रूप–परावृत्त्या इति चेत्? न। संभेद–अभावात्। सः हि न वास्तवः, पिंडानां विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यस्तत्वात्। न अभिमानिकः। शाबलेय–आदेः भेदेन एव प्रथनात्। तत् धर्माणां संभेद–अभिमानः

इति चेत्? न। धर्मि–अतिरिक्त–धर्म–अन्–अभ्युपगमात्।
अभ्युपगमे वा पर्यवसितं विवादेन।

Trans: Let the identical-looking individuals themselves be the common form of all individuals (belonging to a class) and let us not bother with the exclusion of the other (to show that it can be the common form). This (however) cannot be the case because there is no identity of form. The identity is not real as the different individuals are endowed with mutually-incompatible propęrties. The identity cannot also be notional as the grey, yellow etc. cow-individuals are perceived only as distinct from each other. Could it be that the properties of things (of the same class) are imagined to be identical with each other? No. There is no characteristic that is different from the characterised. If there is then the controversy directly comes to an end.

Expl: Arguing against the reality of generic universals the Buddhist savant Dharmakīrtī contends that though individuals may differ their form could be common and identical. But this will not do as each individual has characteristics incompatible with those of others. There is no real identity of form among the individuals. If the form is the same as the individuals there is absolutely no possibility of the form being one. If however the form is different from the individuals and characterises them it must also be common to them and one. This cannot but be the generic universal. There is also no notional identity of individuals as Dharmakīrtī says in the following verse.

पर रूपं स्वरूपेण यया संव्रियते धिया।
एक–अर्थ–प्रतिभासिन्या भावान् अश्रित्य भेदिनः।।
तया संवृत–नाना–अर्थाः संवृत्या भेदिनः स्वयम्।
अभेदिनः इव आभांति भावाः रूपेण केनचित्।।

'The difference of differing individuals is covered up by the cognition of uniformity as a result of which they appear as if they are one and not many.

'Individuals are cognised only as different from each other —as blue, grey, yellow etc.'

Consideration of Dharmakīrtī's view regarding the universal

Text: स्यात् एतत्। भिन्नानां एव स्वलक्षणानां समान–आकार–विकल्प–जनन–सामर्थ्यं अस्तु। तत्–अपेक्षया च केचित् गावः इति व्यपदिश्यंते केचित् अ–गावः इति। तत् च सामर्थ्यं स्व–कारण–नियतत्वात् अ–

पर्यनुयोज्यम्। अन्यथा सामान्येषु अपि सामान्य-अंतरं कल्प्येत अनुगत-व्यवहार-अनुरोधात्। तथा गो-पिंडेषु अपि गौत्वस्य, तेषु एव व्यवस्थिति-अनुरोधात्। उभय मुखी च एवं अन्-अवस्था स्यात् इति चेत्?

Trans: Let there be (then) this argument. Let the different self-contained reals themselves be (supposed to be) endowed with the capacity to produce the cognition of their own uniformity. The reals having this capacity are called 'cows' (for example if it is the cow-uniformity) and those devoid of this capacity are called 'non-cows'. And this capacity is transmitted to the individuals by their respective causes and so its reality cannot be called into question. Otherwise if the universal is postulated to account for the uniformity-cognition then to account for the uniformity-cognition among the universals themselves a new universal common to them will have to be postulated. Similarly another universal determining the inherence of universals in individuals will also have to be postulated. Thus two kinds of infinite regresses would result if the universal is postulated to account for the uniformity-cognition. One regress directed upwards and another downwards.

Expl: Now Dharmakīrti's view that the different individual reals themselves give rise to the conceptual cognition as they inherit this capacity from their respective causes, is being critically considered. The individuals may be said to cause the conceptual-cognition or the uniformity-usage. The hypothetical universal is not then needed to explain the conceptual-cognition. It would not be needed even for explaining the uniformity-usage for then a series of universals would be needed to explain the uniformity-usage with regard to different universals or the universal-character of the universal common to the former and so on. Similarly a universal determining the inherence of a certain capacity in certain things, another universal determining the inherence of the former in those things alone and thus a series of universals having to do with things will have to be postulated. Thus there will arise two types of regression if the universal is postulated to account for conceptual-cognition or uniformity-usage with regard to different individuals. This is what Dharmakīrti says in the following verse:

एक-प्रत्यवमर्षस्य हेतुत्वात् धीः अ-भेदिनी।
एक-धी-हेतुभावेन व्यक्तीनां अपि अ-भिन्नता॥

Although the individuals differ from one another their cognition which is one comprehends them all. The different individuals themselves give rise to this single comprehension and thus they appear to be one.

Rebuttal of the above

Text: यदि एवं निमित्-अंतरं अन्-अपेक्ष्य एक-व्यवहारः अत्यंत भिन्नैः एवं भिन्न-व्यवहारः एव अ-भिन्नेन एकेन केनचित किं न साध्यते? शक्ति-स्वभाव-अवलंबनस्य उभयत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्। अथ एवं सति एक-व्यवहारः क्वचित् अपि न स्यात् निर्-निमित्तः वा भवेत्। उभयं अपि अनिष्टम्। तत् एतत् तुल्यम्। अनेक-व्यवहारः अपि एवं सति न स्यात्। निर्-निमित्तः वा भवेत्। उभयं अपि अनिष्टम्। तस्मात् एकेन एक -व्यवहारवत् अनेकेन अपि अनेक-व्यवहारः एव इति सामार्थ्य-नियमः।

Trans: If thus the uniformity-usage can be explained by means of individuals totally different from each other without depending upon any auxiliary cause then even diversity-usage can be explained by means of some identical entity. In both views the assumption of natural capacity of the individuals is common. But if this is so then there will not arise identity (or unity)—cognition anywhere or it will be without any cause (if it arose) and both these possibilities are undesirable. This predicament is common to the other view. Even the diversity-usage would not arise if the above were true or it will be rendered causeless (if it arose). Both these possibilities are undesirable. Hence just as a single entity gives rise to identity-usage different entities also give rise only to the usage of diversity. This is how the capacity of things to produce usages is regulated.

Expl: Arguing against the above the non-Buddhist says that if differing individuals can give rise to identity-usage then like the unitary Brahman of Advaita single individuals can give rise to diversity-usage so that every individual would then come to be treated as many. So differents cannot be taken to explain identity-usage. The identical universal however can be taken to explain the uniformity-usage with regard to differing individuals.

The crux of the above rejoinder is this: If capacity of individuals differs from individual to individual then it cannot produce the usage pertaining to identity but if the capacity is one and the same and common to all individuals then there is no sense in denying the reality of the perceptually-established universal.

Removal of infinite regress

Text: का गतिः तर्हि सामान्येषु अनेकेषु एक-व्यवहारस्य? या चंद्रमसि एकस्मिन् अनेक-व्यवहारस्य। भ्रान्तः असौ इति चेत्? अयं अपि

भ्रान्ताः एव। बाधकस्य उभयत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्। सर्वत्र भ्रान्तः अस्तु इति चेत्? भेद–व्यवहारः अपि तथा किं न स्यात्? अर्थक्रिया–स्थितेः इति चेत्? व्यक्ति–भेद–अभेद–व्यवस्थापक–अर्थक्रिया–भेद–अभेदवत् सजातीय–अ–सजातीयत्व–व्यवस्थापक–अर्थक्रिया–साजात्य–वैजात्ये अपि किं न पश्यसि? ते अपि भ्रान्ते इति चेत्? अर्थक्रिया–भेदः अपि भ्रान्तः इति तुल्यम्। अस्तु एवं इति चेत्? त्यज तर्हि बाह्य–व्यसनम्। अयं एव आशयः इति चेत्? तत्र वक्ष्यामः।

Trans: (If the identity-usage is produced only by a single entity) then what is to be said of the usage of diversity with regard to (different) universals? The answer is, 'The same that is said of the usage of diversity with regard to the moon which is only one'. But isn't this usage erroneous? Yes, the other usage is also erroneous. Contradictory evidence is present alike in both cases. Let then the identity-usage be treated as erroneous in all cases (that is to say even with regard to individuals belonging to a class). Well! If so then the diversity-usage too could be treated as erroneous. But how can this be if the significant activities (produced by things) are different from each other? Yes, but then why don't you realise that like the identity and difference of significant activities entailing the idenity and difference of the individuals producing them there are also similarities and dissimilarities of significant activities proving the identity and difference of the universals characterising the individuals? Could one say against this that even the similarities and dissimilarities of significant activities are not real? Yes, then equally one can say that the differences of significant activities are false. 'Let it be so' one may urge against this. But in that case one should give up the attachment to external reality (treating it as real). 'This is precisely what we mean', one may again make the retort. About this we shall make our rejoinder later.

Expl: Against the foregoing conclusion the Buddhist argues that if differents did not cause identity-usage the different universals—as potness, treeness, etc.—would not be called as universals. In reply the non-Buddhist says that there is no identity-usage with regard to the moon although the one moon appears as two moons under certain conditions. Both the usages are false. As a matter of fact all universals are eternal and inherent in many individuals and this property characterises all universals but this property is not a universal. If however the uniformity-usage with regard to different individuals is regarded as false then the diversity-usage regarding all individuals could also be false as the Advaitins maintain. The usage cannot be grounded on the different significant activities of the different individuals. If individuals are differentiated by means of their

activities then common and dissimilar properties too can be differentiated on the basis of their respective significant activities. But if the diversity of the activities is also treated as false then there can be no universals and also no objects characterised by the universals. Thus there would be no external world.

Another proof for the universal

Text: मा भूत् वा अर्थक्रिया–साजात्य–वैजात्य–अवगमः। भ्रान्ति–अनुगमः अपि एकं निमित्तं अन्–आदृत्य कथम्? तत् अपि हि साजात्यं सामग्री–साजात्यं–अंतरेण आकस्मिकं आपद्येत। अन्यथा तत्–परंपरा–आलंबनं अपि विडंबनं एव। भिन्नैः तैः तैः अभेद–व्यवहार सिद्धौ व्यक्तिभिः एव तथाभूताभिः अभिमत–सिद्धेः तत्–अनुसरण–प्रयास–वैफल्यात्। तस्मात् आरोप–व्यवहारस्य अपि अन्–आरोपित–जाति–अन्–आदरे अ–संभवः एव इति।

Trans: Or let there not be the cognition of similarity and dissimilarity and thereby the inference of the identity and difference of objects producing them. Even the knowledge that a certain cognition is veridical and a certain other illusory cannot arise without there being causes of a certain type producing veridical and certain others producing false cognitions. The typical nature of an effect depends upon the typical nature of the cause. If it did not then the typical nature of the effect (resulting from a causal collocation) would be rendered accidental. Without admitting this generic determination by the cause of the effect if the uniformity-usage with regard to different individuals is sought to be explained with the help of a series of illusions then the explanation is no better than a mockery. (The individuals illusorily appear to be one because there arises the illusory cognition of uniformity with regard to them and this illusory cognition is produced by the illusion of oneness of the retrospective cognition pertaining to the individuals.) If as stated earlier differing individuals themselves could engender the cognition of their uniformity or identity and thus the desired synoptic comprehension of the individuals be achieved the attempt to explain this by means of a series of illusions would be rendered infructuous. So even for the usage of illusory imposition to take place there has to be a universal (like illusoriness) as the subject of imposition. Without admitting the reality of a universal this is not possible.

Expl: If all cognitions are supposed to be illusory as contended above by the Buddhist then even the common illusory nature of the cognitions would remain unproved if typical causal conditions productive of the

illusions are not admitted. If without typical causal conditions typical effects can be supposed to arise then just as different individuals are supposed to give rise to the uniformity-usage so different individual seeds may be supposed to produce different seedlings. Hence there would be no need for the Buddhist to postulate the different properties of 'immediate productivity' as inhering in the causes productive of different seedlings. Thus if a common generic property is not admitted causal relationship holding between different individual causes and their effects cannot be known. Nor can there arise any inference which is based upon the knowledge of generic concomitance of the middle and major terms.

Consideration of a possible objection to the admission of the universal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि जाति–आदौ बाधकात् अपोह–सिद्धिः इति चेत्? व्यवहारस्य अन्–अन्यथा सिद्धौ क्व बाधकम्? अन्यथा विपक्षे बलवत्–बाधकं उपनीय अन्–अन्यथासिद्धि–विश्रांतः अपि स्वभाव–हेतुः बाधक–शंकया अपि उपहन्येत। ततः बाधक–व्यसनं अपहाय अनुगम–व्यवहृतिः अन्यथा अपि उपपाद्यताम्। न च एतत् शक्यं गति–अंतर–अभावात्।

Trans: Let then 'apoha' be established because there is proof against the reality of the universal. No, if the usage (pertaining to uniformity) cannot be explained otherwise how can there be any proof against the universals etc? If this is not so then even identity or nature as middle term established as indispensable on the basis of the ascertainment of evidence opposed to the contrary thesis could as well be thrown out just by some doubtful evidence which opposed the contrary thesis. So discarding this game of searching a contrary proof the Buddhist should try to explain the uniformity-usage. And this is not possible because there is no other go.

Expl: If the proofs to be mentioned against the reality of universals are supposed to establish the reality of 'apoha' then one may ask, 'How is the uniformity-usage to be explained without the universal?' Mere doubt that there may be evidence contrary to the reality of universals will not do. Such a doubt may destroy even 'nature' as middle term in an inference. The Buddhist needs to concentrate his attention on explaining the uniformity-usage and this explanation cannot be had without the universal.

Presence of contrary thesis mooted

Text: न च बाधकं अपि अस्ति। तत् हि स्वरूपतः वा स्यात् ज्ञानतः वा

स्यात्? स्वरूपतः अपि अन् –उपलंभः वा विरूद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः वा?

Trans: Nor is there any strong evidence contrary to the reality of the universal. If there is, then it may be against the universal itself or against the cognition of the universal. The evidence against the universal may be either the non-cognition of its nature or cognition of it as endowed with incompatible properties.

Expl: If there is definite contrary evidence then it may be opposed to the universal itself or its cognition. The first may be either of the nature of the noncognition of the universal or of the nature of the cognition of it as endowed with mutually-incompatible properties.

Rejection of the first alternative mentioned above

Text: न प्रथमः, अ–सिद्धेः। स्फुरतः एव हि साधारण–आकारस्य शरीरं चिन्तयितुं आरब्धं न अ–स्फुरतः। अध्यक्षे साधारण–स्फुरणं व्यासे–धामः न तु विकल्पे। तस्य समान–संकेत–ग्रह–तिमिर–निकुरंब–करंवित–दृष्टिभिः एव उपपादनात्। न तु अस्माभिः। कल्पना–कोषस्य अनंत–प्रसरतया तत्व–अ–व्यवस्थापकत्वात् इति–चेत्? शब्द–अनुसंधान–विरहे अपि जायमानत्वात्।

Trans: The first (alternative) is not tenable because it is unprovable. It is only the cognised uniformity of things whose nature we have started investigating, not the uncognised or unknown nature. (So the universal cannot be supposed to be unknown.) Couldn't we say against this that the cognition of the universal is denied by us in perception only not in determinate cognition and that only those persons whose vision is veiled by the thick cloud of the darkness of the false cognition of the uniformity of verbal convention who maintain the reality of the universals —not we. Isn't it also a fact that the flight of imagination is without any limit and so it doesn't help establish the reality of anything? No! This is not correct. Even in the absence of the recollection (or cognition) of words the universal is cognised.

Expl: It cannot be concluded that the universal is not known at all because it is the nature of the known uniformity of individuals of a class that is being enquired into. Perhaps the Buddhist will say that the appearance of the universal in the determinate cognition is not denied by him. Only perception is supposed to be unconcerned with the universal because its object is real while the objects of determinate cognitions are all kinds of imaginary entities to which there is no end. In the Buddhist view only

those who depend upon the general verbal convention maintain the reality of universals. But such a view is not tenable as even in the absence of the knowledge of verbal convention universals are 'cognised'.

Objection against the above rejoinder

Text: तथा अपि तत् वासनातः एव इति चेत्? किं एक–संकेत–विषय–अभावे अपि समान–शब्द–संकेत–ग्रह–वासना–वशात् एक–आकार–परामर्शः तत्–सद्भावे वा? न तावत् आद्यः। नाना–सास्ना–आदिमत्–व्यक्तिवत् स्वर्ग–लोचन–बाण–अंबु–कुलिश–आदिषु अपि गौ–शब्द–संकेत–ग्रह–वासना–वशात् तथा–विध– प्रत्यय–अनुगम–प्रसङ्गात्। इष्टः एव असौ अर्थः इति चेत्? सः अयं सास्ना–आदिमतीषु व्याक्तिषु साधारणं रूपं न पश्यति पश्यति तु गो–शब्द–वाच्येषु दशसु इति किं अत्रं वक्तव्यं नुनं रुचिरं एव अस्य लोचनं इति।

Trans: Even in the absence of the knowledge of the verbal convention could the cognition of the universal be caused by the very urge for the knowledge of the convention? Well! if it could then it may be asked, 'Does the cognition of the universal take place as a result of the urge for the knowledge of general convention even in the absence of an identical object of convention or in its presence? The first cannot at all be the case. Just as the word 'cow' is used for different individual cows endowed with dewlap so by different conventions the same word 'cow' is used for heaven, eyes, arrows, water, thunder etc. and so as a result of the urge for the knowledge of the conventions of this word all these different entities denoted by the word 'cow' should be comprehended as endowed with a common character. But is this possibility acceptable? Well, the acceptance would mean that the acceptor does not see any common form or character in the individuals endowed with the dewlap but he does so in the case of the ten different types of above-mentioned entities. What can one say to this? Certainly the eyes of such a person must be very beautiful!

Expl: If the same urge mentioned above leads to the cognition of the universal even when the objects of the verbal convention are not of one type then the different meanings of the word 'cow' namely the heaven, eye, water, arrow etc. would be cognised as endowed with a common universal. Instead of admitting this it is certainly far more sensible to admit that the different individual cows meant by the word 'cow' are endowed with the universal cowness.

Objection to the above and its rejoinder

Text: शक्यं इदं इतरेण अपि वक्तुं इति चेत्? शक्यम्। न-तु व्यवहारः तत् मूलः विपर्यासयितुम्।

Trans: But couldn't a similar plea be made by the other party too, (that is to say even the Buddhist can urge that his critic does not see the common nature of the above-mentioned entities but does so in the case of the entities (endowed with the dewcaps)? Yes, it could but the usage based on the knowledge of the general verbal convention cannot be subverted.

Expl: The Buddhist argues against the above that his opponent is also guilty as he does not see the common nature of the above-mentioned different entities meant by the single word 'cow'. In reply the non-Buddhist says that this would not help the Buddhist to explain the common usage of the word 'cow' in relation to all cows. If there is a common cognition of the things meant by the word 'cow' it will be under the common form of being denoted by the word 'cow'. In the case of the cows the common form is just cowness as even a person who is not aware of the verbal convention knows cows as cows.

Objection to the rejoinder and its reply

Text: ननु एतावता अपि विकल्पः सिद्ध्यतु अनुभवः तु कथम्? स-वस्तुक-विकल्प-सिद्धेः। एव। कथं तस्य स-वस्तुकता इति चेत्? शब्द-वासना-आदि-कारण-अंतर-विध्वंसात् इति तुष्णीभंव।

Trans: But notwithstanding this only the determinate cognition would be proved to have the universal as its object; how can the indeterminate cognition be proved to apprehend the universal? The answer is,'Because the determinate cognition has the real for its object and the object of the indeterminate cognition is identical with that of the determinate'. But how can the determinate cognition have the universal as its object? Because words, transcendental urges and other possible conditions are ruled out as the determinants of the objectivity of the real in relation to the determinate cognition. This is the final answer and now please hold your tongue!

Expl: That even indeterminate cognition has the universal as its object as does the determinate is proved by the fact that the objects of both the cognitions are the same and not different, that the object of the determinate cognition is the real and that the nature of this object is not determined by words, urges etc. It is from the objects that their cognition arises.

A question and its answer

Text: अंतराले किं इति न उपलभ्यते इति चेत्? उपलब्धि–कारण–अभावात्।

Trans: If there is the universal why doesn't it appear existing between two individuals (to which the universal belongs)? (The answer is that) it does not so appear because the cause of its appearance namely the individual is not present between the two individuals.

Expl: If the universal is present everywhere why does it not manifest itself between two individuals it inheres in? If it does not exist there then it would not inhere in the individual which may come in existence in the intermediate space. The answer to this is that the individual which manifests the universal is not available between two individuals and so the universal is not manifested there (although it exists there). Similarly the universal being eternal it does not go out of existence with the destruction of one individual and before the genesis of the second individual. Only its manifestation by the nonexistent individual comes to end.

Another question and its answer

Text: पिडे एव कुंडे बदरवत् कुतः न उपलभ्यते इति चेत्? न। अन्–अन्य–देशत्वात्। भेदैन तु उपलभ्यते एव। पिंड–अंतर–संसर्गिणि पिंडे अनुभूयमाने तत्–संसर्गितया अनुभवात्।

Trans: Like the berry-fruit in the pot in which it is placed why doesn't the universal appear as different from the individuals in which it inheres? (The answer is) that if different appearance is appearing at a different place then the universal cannot do so as its place is the same as the individual. If different appearance is appearing differently then the universal does so appear. If the individual and the universal are one then an individual appearing as unconjoined with another individual would not appear as endowed with the universal (as the two individuals are unconjoined).

Expl: Another question about universal is that if the universal is as different from its inheree as the berry placed in a pot is from the pot it should appear as such. But it does not. The answer is that if 'appearing differently' is appearing at a place different from that of the inheree this is not possible for the universal because its place is the same as the inheree. So it cannot appear anywhere else than in the inheree. Another meaning of 'appearing differently' is 'appearing as different from its inheree'. This the universal does always. It cannot be urged against this that the universal is the same as its inheree for then the universal would

not appear as inhering in an individual which is unconnected with another individual. One and the same universal cannot be both connected and unconnected with its individual inherees.

Consideration of the second of the foregoing alternatives

Text: न अपि द्वितीय बाधकम्। अवयवि–समान–योग–क्षेमत्वात्। जायमान–पिंड–संबंध–अन्–अपपत्तिः अ–प्रतिसंक्रमात्, तत्र असत्वात् अन्–उत्पादात् च इति चेत्? कथं पुनः तत्र अ–सत्वं त्वया व्यज्ञायि? तत्र सत्वे तत्रत्य–आकाश–आदेः अपि गोत्व–प्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्? न च एतत् पश्चात् अपि तचत्य–आकाश–आदिना संबध्यते। येन च पिंडेन संबध्यते न तत्र कदाअपि तत् नास्ति। तत् कुतः विरोधः?

Trans: Nor again the second above-mentioned alternative is opposed to the universal. All objections connected with this are disposable in the same manner as those directed against the reality of the composite product. But how can the universal enter into relationship with an individual yet to be born; it cannot move on from the individual it inheres in to the later individual nor is it born with the birth of the later? Well! how did you know that the universal does not exist where the new individual is born? But if the universal exists there, wouldn't even the space (or sky) at the place be endowed with the universal like cowness? No, this certainly cannot happen because even after the individual came into being the universal does not get connected by the inherence-relation with the space etc. And the individual with which it gets related is such that it is never unrelated with it. So where is any inconsistency (in the view that the universal does not exist in space before the individual occupying the space is born and that it inheres in the individual as soon as it is born).

Expl: The second objection to the universal is that it appears endowed with incompatible properties but this is not true. This objection is to be disposed of in the same manner as similar objections urged against the independent reality of the composite entity are disposed of. However if it is asked how the universal inhering in an existing individual would come to inhere in an individual which is going to be born without leaving its first locus and moving on to the new (individual) locus or simply by being born with the new individual, the answer is that by its very nature the universal is connected with the new individual without leaving the old individual. Although the universal exists even at the place of the individual which is going to be born it is not manifested there because its manifestor at the place, namely the new individual is non-existent. If again it is asked how if the universal exists everywhere it does not inhere in the space or sky too

(and this becomes a cow) the proper answer is that not any relation of the universal with a thing determines the thing's being endowed with the universal. It is only the inherence-relation of the universal with a thing that endows it with the universal. But why is it that only certain individuals are the inherees of a certain universal and not others? The answer is that it is the very nature of different universals to have different types of inherees. It has not to move to the inherees to be connected with them. The inheree is born as connected with its characteristic universal.

The consideration continued

Text: अथ पिंडं अंतः–गडुं उपादाय उपलक्षणतया तत्र इति व्यवहारः तदा तत्–उपसर्पण–अपसर्पण–उत्पत्ति–विनाशैः एव तत् उपपत्तौ न याति इत्यादिः अपराद्ध–इषोः इव धानुष्कस्य कंठ–उंबरः।

Trans: It may be contended that the individual is only the indicator of the universal, the universal does not inhere in the individual and so the usage relating to the inherence of the universal in the individual is only symbolical; therefore if the universal existed in space (before the individual occupying the space came into being) then the space would be endowed with the universal. Yes, if it is so then the forward and backward movements, genesis, destruction etc. of the individual itself (which is the indicator) should suffice to account for the usages of these with regard to the universal. Hence there will be no scope for Dharmakīrtī's objection against the universal (that without moving to and from any individual it is wrongly supposed to inhere in past, present and future individuals). Thus like the archer who has missed his aim makes up for his failure by shouting, Dharmakīrtī too makes meaningless noise in raising the objection.

Expl: The Buddhist contends that if the individual is just an indicator and not the inheree of the universal then if the universal is supposed to exist everywhere it should exist or inhere even in the sky and so the sky could be called a cow (for example) not otherwise. To this the non-Buddhist replies that if individuals are just indicators of the universal then the movements of the individuals themselves could be attributable to the universal. There would then be no occasion for the objections set forth by Dharmakīrtī in the following verse:

न याति न च तत्र आसीत् न च उत्पन्नं न च अंशवत्।
जहाति पूर्वं न आधारं अहो व्यसन–संततिः ॥

That is to say the universal does not move on to a new individual nor was it already there. It does not come into being nor does it have parts. What a series of misunderstandings is this! The usages that 'cowness is or

is not here etc.' can be explained as referring to the individual's existence or non-existence.

Consideration and criticism

Text: तथा हि पिंडं अधिकृत्य उपसर्पण–अपसर्पण–अभावः तत्–उपलक्षितं देशं अधिकृत्य च सत्व–अ–सत्वे सामान्यस्य इति किं केन संगतम्? अथ अपि अन्–उत्पन्ने पिंडे तस्य अ–सत्वं सुलभं एव तत् अ–सत्वात् इति हृदयम्? तत् न। स्वरूप–सत्व–अ–सत्वयोः द्वितीय–अन्–अपेक्षात्वात्। संबद्धत्व–अ–संबद्धत्वे तु द्वितीय–अपेक्षे। ततः तत्र असति नास्ति इति कः अर्थः?

Trans: To explain (Dharmakīrtī's irrelevant objections). First it is urged that the universal does not approach or recede from individuals and then the contingency is precipitated that the universal should or should not inhere in the space to be occupied by the individual (to be born). What connection is there between these propositions? But if the argument is that although the universal is at all places and times yet it cannot be connected with a nonexistent individual then its answer is that the intrinsic existence or non-existence of a thing does not depend upon any other thing. Only the relatedness and unrelatedness of a thing depend upon another thing.

Expl: The inconsistency in Dharmakīrtī's criticism is evident from the fact that arguing that the universal cannot move to and from individuals Dharmakīrtī contends that the universal should or should not characterise the space where the future object is to be born. The absence of movement in the universal does not prevent it from inhering in the individual. The movement of the individual or its coming into being or going out of being are themselves sufficient to make the universal characterise or not characterise the individual. As to the above preventing the universal from inhering in the space of the individual it has already been stated that the space is never characterised by the universal by the inherence-relation. Would then the universal be non-inherent in the nonexistent future individual and if so would it itself be nonexistent? This question has been answered in the text.

It may here be noted that the relation of inherence being eternal the inherence of the universal which also is an eternal entity will be present even in a nonexistent entity simply because it cannot ever be absent. Yet inherence as qualified by a certain individual need not be eternally present.

Criticism continued

Text: तेन अ–सता न संबध्यते इति चेत्? तत् च एवं एतत्। पश्चात् कथं संबध्यतां इति चेत्? तस्य सत्वात्। अ–संबद्धत्वस्य तत्–अ–सत्व–प्रयुक्तत्वात्। ततः प्राक् असन् पिंड़ः पश्चात् कथं उत्पद्यतां इति चोद्य–निष्ठा। सा च सत्कार्य–वादं अनुपतति इति अ–भुक्त–वांतिः।

Trans: So when the future individual is not there what can be meant by saying that the universal does not exist there? (Only this) that the universal is not in relation with the nonexistent. Yes, that is precisely the meaning. But how can the universal be related with the individual later when the individual is born? (The answer is), 'Because the individual is present and the absence of relation is due to the non-existence of the individual'. So the crux of the objection is, How the individual which did not exist earlier comes into existence later' and this obviously falls in line with the theory of the pre-existent effect. To trot out such an objection is like throwing out what has not been eaten.

Expl: So the nonexistence of the universal when the individual inheree is nonexistent means—as explained above—the nonrelationship of the eternally-existent universal with the nonexistent individual. The universal is ever and everywhere present but the coming into and going out of being of the individuals (characterised by the universal) gives rise to usages like 'The cow exists, the cow does not exist and so on'. Just as in the presence of Chaitra it can be said that, 'This is Chaitra holding a stick' or 'This is Chaitra not holding a stick' depending upon the fact that Chaitra does or does not hold a stick.

Objection based on the view that the qualifier-qualified relation is of the nature of difference-cum-non-difference

Text: तथा अपि सामान्य–तद्वतोः आत्यंतिक–भेदे कथं सामानाधिकरण्यं इति चेत्? कि ... अधिकरगेन संबंधः सामानाधिकरण्यम्। तस ... रोधः इति न अधिगच्छामः। गौ–अश्वयोः अपि त ... इति चेत्? ननु व्यतिरेक–दृष्टांत–स्थानं तत् न ... नम्। तत् च मैत्र–तनयः अपि कश्चित् अ–श्यामः ... ानानां अपि तथा–भाव–प्रसङ्गः इति क्व नाम दुर्लभ

Trans: Notwithstanding t ... planation if the universal and the

individuals characterised by it are radically different from each other how can there be coexistence between them? In reply to this objection one may say this: Etymologically coexistence means relationship with the same locus. How this is opposed to the difference of the entities we do not know. But if such is the case won't even a cow and a horse be coexistent? No, this is an instance of negative example and not of contradiction. For example if one says regarding a certain offspring of Maitra that 'Maitra's son is dark–complexioned' it does not mean that all the known off-spring of 'Maitra are dark-complexioned'. Such negative instances are not at all rare.

Expl: The view of partial identity of the universal and the individual is now taken up for refutation. There is nothing wrong in treating these two as coexisting despite their radical difference in nature. This does not mean that all differing entities necessarily coexist. The coexistence of differing entities is only not ruled out by the above statement, that is to say it is indicated that there is no conflict between difference and coexistence. There is no invariable concomitance between these two either from the side of difference or the side of coexistence.

Another objection and its rejoinder

Text: तथा अपि विशेषः वाच्यः इति चेत्। अस्ति स्वभाविकः विशेषः यत् किंचित् एव केनचित् संबंद्ध न सर्वं सर्वेण इति। तथा अनुगम–नियमः अपि स्वभावात् एवं किं न स्यात् इति चेत्? एकस्य अनेक–संबंधे अनेकस्य च एक–संबंधे अ–विरोधात्। एक–अनेकयोः अनेक–एक–व्यवहार–विरोधात् इति।

Trans: Even then there has to be some distinction between instances of differents of which some are and some are not coexistent and this needs to be specified. Yes, there is distinction and this is due to the nature of things so that only certain things are related with certain other things and not everything with everything else. If so then couldn't even uniform appearance of individuals be taken to be regulated by the natures of things? No. There is no inconsistency in the assumption that a single entity is related to many or many entities are related to a single entity. But the assumption of a single entity giving rise to the usage of plurality or many entities giving rise to the usage of unity is inconsistent.

Expl: It is only by nature that certain things are related with certain others although they are different from each other. The same cannot be said of the uniformity-cognition or usage; there has to be a common property among different individuals to explain the uniformity-cognition with regard to them. There is nothing opposed to the thesis that a single entity

can inhere in many or the corresponding thesis that many entities can be characterised by a single entity. In fact we see one cognition related cognitively to many objects or several objects cognitively related to one cognition.

Rebuttal of the second of the earlier two alternatives

Text: न अपि ज्ञानतः बादकम्। तत्–स्वरूप–प्रतिक्षेपस्य अनुभव–बाधितत्वात्। कारण–प्रतिक्षेपस्य च जन्मना एव अपास्तत्वात्। एकत्व–प्रतिक्षेपस्य च विरूद्ध–धर्म–अध्यास–विरह–प्रतिहतत्वात्। पारोक्ष्य–अ–पारोक्ष्य–आदेः अ–सिद्धेः। विषयं अ–प्रतिक्षिप्य तत्–प्रामाण्यस्य प्रतिक्षेप्तुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। तत्–अ–प्रतिक्षेपस्य च दर्शितत्वात्। इंद्रियजत्व–प्रतिक्षेपस्य च इंद्रिय–अन्वय–व्यतिरेक–अनुविधान–बाधितत्वात्। साक्षात्कारित्व–विश्रांते च तत्–अनुविधानस्य अ–व्यभिचारात्।

Trans: Nor is there any epistemic contradiction of the universal. The denial of the nature of the cognition of the universal is ruled out or opposed by experience itself. The denial that this cognition has no cause is contradicted by its genesis itself. The denial that it is a singular entity is ruled out by the fact that there is no appearance of coexistence of incompatible properties in the object of the cognition. The denial that this cognition does not have the character of immediacy is disproved by the fact that the object of cognition is neither immediate nor mediate. (A cognition is immediate if it is produced by the senses, otherwise it is mediate). The denial that the cognition is veridical is ruled out because without falsifying the object its cognition cannot be falsified. The denial that the cognition is not sensory is contradicted by the discovery that the cognition is determined by the positive and negative association of the senses. The denial that it is not perceptual is disproved by the concomitance of sense-generatedness and perceptuality.

Expl: Earlier the very existence of the universal was called into question. Now the cognition of the universal is subjected to criticism. The contrary evidence may be opposed to the very being of the cognition of the universal or to its unity. The first evidence is the nonapprehension of this cognition or non-availability of any cause for it. Both these are rebutted in the text. The second evidence is the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties of mediacy and immediacy in the object of the cognition viz. the universal. Being perceptible and also inferrible the universal is both immediate and mediate and as such its cognition appears to be endowed with the incompatible properties of immediacy and mediacy. This is

rebutted by maintaining that the sensory cognition of the universal is nothing but immediate. The third contrary evidence is opposed to the veridicity of the universal cognition. Only cognitions due to objects are veridical. Those due to transcendental urges only are like the cognitions of the hare's horn and the determinate cognitions are not due to objects or caused by the senses. This is rebutted by maintaining the sensory character of the universal-cognition. Since this cognition is perceptual it is necessarily caused by senses.

Proof that the perceptual cognition must be sensory

Text: अन्यथा निर्विकल्पकस्य अपि अन्–इंद्रियजत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। काम–आतुर–कामिनी–ज्ञानस्य तत्–अतरेण अपि उपपत्तेः। बाधक–अभावात् च दर्शन–व्यापार–औपाधिकत्व–कल्पना–अन्–अवकाशात्। अवकाशे वा विपर्य.य–कल्पनायाः अपि प्रसङ्गात्। इंद्रियं–अन्–अपेक्ष्य साक्षात्कारि–समनंतर–प्रत्यय–महिम–मात्रेण साक्षात्कारि–विकल्प–उपपतौ तत्–विपरीत–अन्–उत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्। प्रथमं अन्–उत्पत्तेः पुर्व–स्मरण–आदि–सहकारि–वैधुर्य–निबंधनत्वात् इति एषा दिक्।

Trans: If despite being perceptual the universal-cognition were not sensory then even the indeterminate cognition would not be sensory. The lovelorn person's phantasy of his mistress would not be perceptual in nature if perceptuality of a cognition is supposed to depend upon its following the indeterminate cognition of its object. Moreover there being no contrary evidence the perceptuality of the cognition need not be thought to be due to its being the effect or instrument of the preceding perceptual indeterminate cognition. If such a notion could be entertained then the opposite notion regarding the indeterminate congnition too could be entertained. If without being caused by the sense-organs the determinate cognition could be perceptual simply by being caused by the indeterminate cognition then no other kind of cognition can arise after the indeterminate cognition. 'But if senses produce the perceptual cognition why don't they produce it as soon as they come in contact with the object?' (It may be asked). The answer is that the causal auxiliaries like recollection of previously-perceived contents being not available to sense-object-contact there does not arise from it the determinate perception. (Despite being generated by senses this perception is verbalisable).

Expl: If despite being immediate the universal-cognition is not regarded as sense-generated because even without sense-object-contact the determinate cognition of fictitious entities like hare's horn etc. does arise then even indeterminate cognition could be so regarded. The phantasy

which is of the nature of the indeterminate cognition of his beloved and is experienced by the love-lorn person is not produced by sense-object-contact. It is not the indeterminateness of the cognition that determines its sense-generatedness. The imaginative projection by the love-lorn person of his beloved on the pillar facing him for example is an indeterminate cognition although not sense-generated. If the immediacy of the determinate cognition was due mainly to its being immediately preceded by the indeterminate cognition and not to its causation by the senses then no non-perceptual cognition would ever be produced by an indeterminate cognition.

Even those determinate cognitions like the inferential, verbal etc.—which are not caused by their objects as the indeterminate cognition is supposed to be—are shown to be veridical as they are true to their objects. If they were not veridical there would be no point in maintaining that these comprehend names, universals etc.

Rebuttal of the justification for accepting the apoha-doctrine and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हिं प्रयोजन–अनुरोधात् अपोह–स्वीकारः। सर्व–धर्म–अ–वाच्यत्व–सिद्धिः हि परमं प्रयोजनम्। कल्पना–जाल–विधूननेन गंभीर–उदार–समाधि–समधिगमात् इति चेत्? निः प्रमाणकं इदं कः क्षद्दध्यात्? प्रमाणं च अत्र न प्रत्यक्ष–अनुमाने। आगमः च न किंचित् वदति इति त्वया एव ग्राहितः शिष्यः।

Trans: Let us then accept the doctrine of the apoha to fulfil a certain purpose. This supreme purpose is of course the establishment of the thesis of the ineffability of all things. By the dissipation of the cobwebs of all conceptual constructions the mind attains the profound and transparent condition of perfect quietude. (Alright). But who will put faith in all this baseless lore? Certainly perception and inference do not authenticate this. As for scriptural testimony, you have yourself exhorted to your disciples that the scriptures are not concerned with anything real.

Expl: If there are no rational arguments to support the doctrine of apoha it can be upheld at least for the noble purpose that it subserves. The supreme purpose is the realisation that words cannot denote the reals nor can inference apprehend them as they are absolutely particular in nature and these modes of cognition apprehend the objects only conceptually. All dealing with the world therefore is conducted only through 'apoha'. On the realisation that words and inferences cannot apprehend the real the mind will desist from all external manipulation (of things) and fall back upon itself so that thereby all falsehood along with the cravings there for would be dissipated and the immediate intuitive realisation of the truth of universal soullessness would be attained. The non-Buddhist's

retort to all this exhortation is that it is simply baseless. Even Buddhist's own scriptures describing all this cannot be depended upon to tell us the truth as the Buddhist has himself disowned the truth of verbal cognition. Nothing can be gained by studying the scriptures.

Rebuttal continued

Text: न च एवं चेतनः ग्राहयितुं अपि शक्यते स्व–वाक्–विरोधस्य उद्भूटत्वात्। तथा हि–
शब्दस्य कस्यचित् अपि वस्तुनि मान–सिद्धा।
बाधा–विधि–व्यवहृतिः क्वचित् अस्ति नो वा।।
अस्ति एव चेत् कथं इयंति न दूषणानि?
नास्ति एव चेत् स्व–वचन प्रतिरोध–सिद्धिः।।
इति तत्र एव विषय–संचार–मात्रेण श्लोक।

Trans: Certainly no sentient person can be exhorted like this—that the scriptures do not teach anything. Even this statement denying the validity of verbal statements is itself a statement. Thus the self-contradiction of this utterance of the Buddhist is quite evident. To explain: If words are used to make positive and negative statements about things then the self-defined reals not being the object of general convention or verbal cognition as they are not verbalisable the very possibility of verbal usage about them would be ruled out. If on the other hand words are not (for this very reason) usable to make positive or negative statements then your (Buddhist's) statement of denial itself entangles you in self-contradiction. You have implicitly referred to things as unverbalisable by your denial.
(The verse translated above contains the word 'Vastuni' in place of the word 'Avastuni') used by the Buddhist who summarises the objections he has preferred against his opponent's denial that the unreal is beyond the pale of any statement. Now the opponent says that by the above substitution this very verse can be used to expose the self-contradiction of the Buddhist position. The object referred to by the Buddhist is the unreal while the object of his opponent's reference is the real.

Expl: The Buddhist is here confronted with a dilemma and the verse in which the Buddhist presents a dilemma against his opponent's position is used by the opponent to present the dilemma against the Buddhist position itself. The crux of the dilemma is this: 'Is the Buddhist view real or not? If not how can there be any valid proof for it?' But if it is real it cannot be communicated by words as the real is not the object of any convention. If the convention can be learnt by using common properties of things the view of the discrete nature of things will have to be discarded.

Objection to the rebuttal and its reply

Text: न च अस्मांक इव तव अपि अत्र मूकता एव शरणम्? सर्वत्र वचन–विरोधे हि उदासीनस्य सा शौभते। न च अत्र विधौ विरोधः कश्चित्। न च त्वं उदासीनः प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तत्वात्। तस्मात् अलं अंगुली–दीपिकया ध्वांत–ध्वंस विधिं अनुष्ठाय इति।

Trans: Nor like us you too can take refuge in silence (when the above verse expressing the dilemma is read out to you by a slight change of wording). If we contradicted your statements referring to the unreal (as minor, major or middle terms in inferences) we would be involved in self-contradiction but because we are not interested in this game we may afford to remain silent in the debate. But such is not the case with you as you are to prove a positive thesis which does not involve any contradiction. You are a partisan and you want to achieve a purpose (which is not possible to achieve by means of perception or inference. So you have got to use words to refer to unverbalisable things). Enough then of this game of eliminating profound darkness by means of a pencil torch.

Expl: Your purpose is to establish the thesis that the real is unverbalisable which cannot be fulfilled without using words. But if therefore you use words you involve yourself in self-contradiction. You cannot just remain silent to avoid this contradiction. We the non-Buddhists however are not interested in establishing any thesis so we can afford to remain silent in the debate.

Purpose of debate in the non-Buddhist view

Text: आगमस्य तत्व–अर्थ–परिस्पर्शित्व–विरोधे न स्वर्ग–अपवर्ग–अर्थिनां प्रवृत्तिः सिद्धयति इति प्रयोजनं अस्मत् –विचारस्य एव परं सुन्दरम्।

Trans: If the scriptures were opposed to truth then the behaviour of people seeking heavenly bliss and redemption would have no basis (or justification). Hence our doctrines alone lead to the ultimate goal.

Expl: Scriptures have got to tell us about the right things because all purposeful activity of sensible people is based upon scriptual injunctions.

Criticism of Gñānasrī's view and conclusion

Text: तस्मात् शब्दैः किं वाच्यं इति अनुयौगे किं प्रतिभासात् अथ अध्यवसायात् यत् वा तत्वतः इति विकल्पे विकल्पस्यः अन्य–अपोढ–आकारः, अन्य–अपोढ–स्वलक्षणं, न किंचित् इति यत् क्रमेण प्रत्युक्तं तत्र प्रथमे समय–विपर्यासः विकल्प–आकारस्य समय–अ–

विषयत्वात्। द्वितीये तु प्रवृत्ति–विपर्यासः अदृष्टे नियामक–अभावात्। तृतीये स्व–वाङ्–निरोधः। अस्य एव अर्थस्य अनेन तत्वता–वचनात्। अ–वचने वा तत्वतः अन्–उत्तरत्वात् इति उपसंहारः। तत् सिद्धं एतत् न क्षणिकत्वं आत्मनि बाधकं इति।

Trans: As a result of the foregoing criticism (the following conclusions can be reached with regard to Gñānasrī's answers to certain questions posed by him). If it is asked 'what do words mean?' the question is interpreted in three alternative forms (by Gñānasrī) namely, 'what is revealed by words', 'what cognition do words lead to' and 'what is really referred to by words'. To the first (form of the question) the answer is: 'The form of the exclusion of the other'; To the second the answer is: 'The self-defined real which excludes the other'; and to the third the answer is 'Nothing'. These successive answers to the question tendered by Gñānasrī are not tenable. The first misrepresents the convention of words as the form of the exclusion of the other (of things) is never the object of verbal cognition. The second answer misrepresents the nature of the urge to action. (From the exclusion one cannot turn to the self-defined real). The third answer is self-contradictory as it refers to its meaning itself as real. If it did not so refer it would not be the answer to the question. This is the end of the debate on momentariness and apoha). Thus it is now established that the doctrine of momentariness cannot overthrow the reality of self.

Expl: The foregoing criticism meets Gñānasrī's answers to three questions relating to the meaning of words. The first question is about that which is cognised by means of words and its answer is that it is the determinate exclusive form. This is misrepresentation because word-meaning which is concerned with objects is transferred to this form. The second question is about that for which the words produce the urge and the answer given to it is that it is the self-defined real exclusive of others. This is also misrepresentation as exclusion and the real have nothing to do with each other and as stated earlier no via media between the two can be found. The third question is about the real object of meaning to which the answer given is 'nothing'. This too is gross misrepresentation because the statement of this answer itself contradicts the answer. Thus the doctrine of apoha stands refuted and as this doctrine is an off-shoot of the doctrine of momentariness this too is thereby refuted.

Now we move on to the next Buddhist doctrine opposed to the reality of self as a reality outside consciousness advocated by the N.V. school.

SECTION II

Discussion of the Doctrine of the Denial of External Reality

Introducing the subject of the debate

Text: विज्ञान वादिनि जागरुके बाह्यं एव नास्ति कुतः आत्मा इति चेत् सः तावत् इदं पृष्टः व्याचष्टां किं ते ग्राह्य–ग्राहक–भागयोः परमार्थ सतोः एव अ–भेदः विवक्षितः उत अहो अभिन्न–जात्तीयत्वं अथ ग्राह्य–अंशस्य अलीकत्वं इति?

Trans: When the idealist is prepared to maintain his idealististic doctrine nothing outside consciousness can (be said to) exist, what to say then of the self? Well! if it is so the idealist may be asked to explain whether he means by his doctrine that the two parts (of the cognitive situation) namely the cognised and the cognising consciousness, though ultimately real are identical with each other or that they are of the same generic type or that the cognised part is fictitious.

Expl: The second of the previously-mentioned objections to the reality of self as an object external to consciousness is being discussed now. The Advaitins and Yogācaāra idealists deny the reality of the world of objects and advocate the sole reality of consciousness or Brahman. N.V. is opposed to all these views as according to it the self is a reality outside consciousness like other such realities. The Yogācāra idealist is the main contestant in this debate. He is asked to elaborate his view and explain whether his denial of external reality is intended to deny only the difference between it and the consciousness cognising it or the dissimilarity between the two or the very reality of anything outside consciousness. Any one of these three views could be meant by the broad denial of the external. The debatable propositions here are as follows:

1. Is the property of knowability pervaded by the property of cognitionness or not? (which means: Whether everything is of the nature of cognition)?
2. Correspondingly is cognitionness pervasive of knowability or not?
3. Are all the objects like yellow etc. which are the objects of their respective cognitions identical with them or not?

Pointing out the fallacies of the idealistic inference

Text : तथ प्रथमे साध्ये यः काश्चित् हेतुः उपादीयते सह–उपलंभ–नियमः वा ग्राह्यत्वं वा प्रकाशमानत्वं वा सः व्यक्तं आभासः।

Trans: As to the first major term (in the first of the three inferences

mentioned), whichever term like, 'the necessity of coaapearance', 'cognitivity' or 'luminosity' (or apparentness) is adduced as the middle to prove it is obviously fallacious.

Expl: The word 'co' occurring in the body of the first middle term suggests difference (of the cognised and the cognition) and as such the middle term is opposed to the identity (of the cognised and the cognition). Yet if the middle term is interpreted in terms of 'non-objectivity in relation to the cognition which is non-apprehensive of cognition' then both the object and its cognition being cognisable by the same cognition in the Buddhist view, the refined middle term can go along with the major. However if in the above inference 'objects' is the minor term and non-difference from cognition' is the major term then the above middle term would not suit the N.V. position as cognition is not self-cognitive for N.V. So in N.V. view objects would be cognised by cognitions not cognising themselves. If however 'Cognition' is taken as the minor term and non-difference from objects' as the major term then too the middle term would not accord with the N.V. position as a cognition not cognising the object like one produced by the word 'cognition' has cognition alone as its object. This difficulty can be overcome only by assuming self-luminosity of cognitions. Also the word 'cognition' has always to be taken to mean 'that which has some object cognitively related to it'.

The second of the above middle terms means 'being the object of cognition' while the third means 'being the object of a particular type of cognition like perception'. Now there seem to be many drawbacks in the above inference. When objects are sought to be inferred as non-different from their cognitions difference and its counterpositive not being identical, cognition would differ from its difference and this difference is one of the objects. Moreover if the cognised and its cognition are one there cannot be any inference as an inference is based on the difference of its terms and their difference from itself. Further, in the inference if 'objects' is the minor term in which 'nondifference from cognition' is sought to be established then 'cognitivity' is the middle term. On the otherhand if 'cognition' is the minor term in which nondifference from objects' is sought to be established then 'self-luminosity' is the middle term.

Elucidation of the Fallacy

Text: तथा हि नील–धवल–आदि–परस्पर–विरुद्ध–आकार–निकर–अवगाहि–विज्ञानं अनुभूयते तत् इदं तस्यं स्व–वधाय कृत्या–उत्थापनम्।

Trans: To explain the fallacy (mentioned): The fact that certain

cognitions having the mutually -incompatible forms of blue, white etc. are known to occur (as per the above inference) implies that such cognitions raise the Frankenstein to destroy themselves.

Expl: Objecting to the foregoing inference common to the idealistic and the Advaitic views the non-Buddhist says that a cognition simultaneously cognising mutually-incompatible objects can be supposed to be identical with them only at the cost of destroying its own identity, because nothing can be both blue, white etc. at the same time.

Elucidation continued

Text: यदि हि मिथः प्रत्यनीक–धर्मान् उल्लिखेत् कथं एके सत् तत्– आत्मकं भवेत? न चेत् उल्लिखेत् कथं तत्–आकारं नाम? स्व–संवेदनस्य अन्–उल्लिखित–रुप–अभावात्।

Trans: If the said cognition apprehends mutually-incompatible entities, how being one could it be identical with the latter? If it does not apprehend them how can it have the form of these entities? Cognition which is self-conscious cannot be unconscious of its own form (accruing to it from its objects).

Expl:- If cognition apprehends mutually-incompatible entities it cannot be one with them. If it does not apprehend them it cannot be endowed with their forms. The forms and the formed being one, cognition which is by nature self-conscious cannot be unaware of its forms which accrue to it only because it apprehends the objects. The unity and multiple-objectivity of cognition is testified by reflective cognition. It cannot be denied.

Ratnakīrti's reply to the above and its rebuttal

Text: बाह्यस्य एवंविध–विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासात् भयम् तथात्वे अपि अ–भेदे अर्थक्रिया–चेतन–प्रवृत्तीनां संकर–प्रसङ्गात्–विवेचन–अन्–उपपत्ति–प्रसङ्गात् च। न तु विज्ञानस्य। न हि तस्य अर्थक्रिया–अधीनं सत्वं अपि तु प्रतिभास–मात्र–अधीनम्। न अपि तत्र अर्थक्रिया–अर्थिनः काचित् प्रवृत्तिः। स्वरस–वाहि–विज्ञान–प्रवाह–अति–रिक्तायाः अर्थक्रियायाः तत्–अर्थिनः च अभावात्। विवेचन–अभावः च परमः निर्वाहः स्व–संविदित–रुपत्वात् इति चेत्?

Trans: Couldn't it be urged against the foregoing that only for the external reality there is danger from the appearance of coexistence of incompatible properties in it because if despite this appearance in the external entities they are treated as identical the significant activities

caused by them and the dispositions towards them would get confused with each other. Besides on this view the external objects could not be distinguished from each other. But there is no such danger for consciousness. Certainly the being of consciousness does not depend upon its production of any significant activity. It depends only upon its luminosity. Nor does anybody desiring any object go in search of consciousness. There is no activity of consciousness other than the natural flow of selfluminous conscious moments. The seekers of these activities are also not different from (or outside) this flow. Nondiscrimination is its absolute and ultimate character. This is so because all consciousness is selfconscious.

Expl: Replying to the above objections Ratnakīrtī says that the criterion of significant-activity-production is applicable only to the external entities as they are usually distinguished from each other and the desires and actions in relation to them differ from each other. Such is not the case with consciousness as its being is selfdetermined as self-luminous. No external criterion is applicable to it to determine its being. There is no significant activity either, pertaining to consciousness. Consciousnesses are not also mutually-distinguished. Each consciousnesses cognises itself only and not its difference from other consciousness. As Gñanāsrī says in the following verse:

भावं कंचित् पुरस्कृत्य भेद–अभेदौ उदीरयेत्।
देश–काल–आदि–भेदेन चित्–मात्रे तत्र कः क्रमः?।

All difference and identity are reckoned on the basis of the spatio-temporal differences relating to different things, but in the case of pure consciousness where is such a basis?

Dharmakīrtī voices the same idea when he says that:

स्वरुप–बुद्धिः अपरैः न याति न भिनत्ति च।
स्व–पर–प्रविभागः हि धियः याचित–मंडनम्।

Consciousness is not differentiated or destroyed by anything other than itself. The distinction of self and notself is an imposition upon consciousness. It is adornment by borrowed jewellery because the distinctions of objects happen to be projected upon their consciousness.

Ironical retort to the above reply

Text: तत् किं अङ्ग! परिणत–शांतेः आश्रम–पदं इव विज्ञानं आसाद्य व्याल–नकुल–आदेः इव नील–धवल–आदेः शाश्वातिक–विरोध–त्यागः निभृत–वैराणां तत्–फल–त्यागः वा?

Trans: Dear Brother! Does it mean then that just like the serpent and the mongoose etc., the creatures which are inveterate enemies of each other, forsake their instinctive hostility to each other on nearing the vicinity of the hermitage of a saint of quiescent nature, the mutually-opposed entities like the blue, the white etc. discard their natural hostility (or incompatibility) on being apprehended by a cognition or even while retaining the hostility they do not retain the result of the hostility, namely mutual difference?

Expl: If there is no diversity in cognition due to the diversity of its objects it may mean that the objects of cognition lose their mutual opposition once they are apprehended by a cognition or that they lose their difference despite being mutually-opposed.

Rebuttal of the above two alternatives

Text: न तावत प्रथमः। परस्पर–निषेध–विधि–नांतरीयक–विधि–निषेधयोः अ विरोधे जगति विरोध–उच्छेद–प्रसङ्गात् । न च एवं अस्तु इति उत्तरे अपि निर्वृतिः । कथं अपि उक्तरुपतायाः अ–निवृत्तेः। तावत्–मात्र–शरीरत्वात् च विरोधस्य। तत्–सिद्धिः एव च भेद–सिद्धिः। अतः न द्वितीयः अपि।

Trans: As to the first (alternative) it is not tenable. If things whose presence and absence are pervaded by their absence and presence respectively are not supposed to be opposed to each other then all opposition would disappear from the world. 'Doesn't matter, let it be so' etc. cannot be the right answers to this. The contrary or opposed nature of things cannot by any means be thus eliminated because the very nature of opposition consists in this (fact of mutual exclusion). The establishment of this exclusion itself is the establishment of difference and so even the second alternative cannot be upheld.

Expl: The opposition of things consists in the fact that the presence of one of them is pervaded by the absence of the other while the absence of one is pervaded by the presence of the other. If despite such mutual relationship things are not supposed to be mutually opposed there cannot be any opposition anywhere. Here absence of opposition of things related as above is the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional and total absence of all opposition is the consequent of the conditional. Alternatively while the antecedent may be said to be as above the consequent is the fact of 'not being cognisable as opposed'. If one argues against the above that even the opposition as an object is identical with cognition, so why bother to maintain its separate existence, then the reply to it is that in this manner the real nature of the opposition cannot be got

rid of. If there is no opposition whatsoever there cannot be any opposition of views and consequently nothing to discuss. Even the statements that there is and that there is not opposition would cease to be opposed to each other. If things are not opposed then their cognitions would not differ from each other with the result that there would remain only one cognition cognising everything or nothing.

Objection to the rebuttal and its reply

Text: यः तु बाह्ये विरोध–परिपालनाय विशेषः दर्शितः स–तेषां एव अस्तु। यदि हि विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासस्य भेद–साधकत्वं प्रति समाश्वासः किं अर्थ–क्रिया–प्रति–नियम–उपन्यासेन? न चेत् तथा अपि किं तेन? सः अपि हि अर्थक्रिययोः विरुद्धः धर्म–अध्यासेन भेदे सति स्यात्।

Trans: It may be contended that the diversity of significant activities of external things that was trotted out as the basis of their opposition may be taken to be applicable to these only and not to cognition or consciousness (so a cognition would not differ despite the difference of its objects). But such a contention is not sensible. If the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties is to be depended upon as the reason for establishing difference or diversity of things then what is to be gained by mentioning the individual restriction of significant activities? If nothing is to be gained even then what is to be gained by mentioning it? Even the individual restriction of significant activity would take place only if the latter are differentiated because of the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties in the significant activity.

Expl: It is now contended that the individual restriction of significant activities differentiates only external objects, not cognitions because the restriction is not to be applied to them. The opponent replies that it is not mainly the diversity of significant activities that differentiates the external objects. The significant activities themselves are differentiated on the basis of their appearing to be endowed with incompatible properties. This appearance is the basis of all diversity. No significant activity can be differentiated from another on the basis of its own significant activity. Such an assumption would lead to infinite regress. So if the appearance of incompatible properties is the primary basis of all diversity then even cognitions cannot escape its application and the resulting diversity.

Another rebuttal to the objection

Text: अन्यत् च यथा बाह्ये अर्थक्रिया–प्रति–नियमः न स्यात् इति दंडः तथा ज्ञाने अपि प्रतिभास–नियमः न स्यात् इति दंडः एव।

Trans: Here is another rebuttal to the above objection. Just as in the case

of external objects their diversity has to be accepted on pain of their significant activities being rendered arbitrary so in the case of cognitions too it can be urged that their diversity needs to be admitted on pain of denying the restriction of each cognition to its own object.

Expl: Just as for external objects there is the diversity of their significant activities so for cognition too there is the unavoidable restriction of each cognition to its own object, which would be jeopardised if the diversity of cognition is not admitted.

Objection to the rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: क्व प्रतिभास–अ–सांकर्य–नियमः? सह एव प्रतिभासः अपि स्यात् इति चेत्? न सह–अन्–उपलंभं अ–सांकर्य ब्रूमः। किंतु नीलस्य एव पीतत्वेन पीतस्य एव नीलत्वेन अन्–उपलंभम्। सः एव मूलं सर्व विरोधानाम्।

Trans: But where is the rule that different objects cannot appear in a single cognition? There can certainly appear different objects in the same cognition. No! This is not what we mean by the nonoverlap of the appearances (of different objects). We mean (by the phrase) the nonappearance (for example) of the blue itself as yellow or the yellow itself as blue. This alone is the basis of all opposition.

Expl: Objecting to the above the Buddhist says that in cognition there is no restriction to the appearance of different objects. One and the same cognition can apprehend simultaneously different objects like blue, yellow etc. Things however do not have simultaneously different significant activities. The opponent answers the objection by clarifying the meaning of 'objective restriction' in the case of the cognition. In the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow the blue does not appear as yellow or yellow as blue. If objective restriction is not admitted such erroneous cognitions would become common.

Justification of the rebuttal

Text: अन्यथा उपलंभ–अन्–उपलंभयोः अपि अ–सिद्धिः एव। यत् अपि न उपलभ्यते इति उच्यते तत् अपि उपलभ्यते एव। यत् इदं अश्व–आदिकं उपलभ्यते तत् न उपलभ्यते इति उक्त्या एव निर्वृतेः। तेन आत्मना न उपलभ्यते इति चेत्? तत् किं सह–उपलंभे अपि नील–आत्मना पीतं उपलभ्यते यतः न विरोधः स्यात्? तस्मात् उभौ अपि विरोधौ समौ, क्षमौ च अ–भेद–निवर्तने। केवलं एकस्य प्रौढिः

सुभगा–भिक्षुक–न्यायेन यदि स्यात्।

Trans: If this were not so even cognition and non-cognition would certainly fail to be mutually-opposed, (For example) whatever is said to be 'not cognised' is cognised because we can very well elucidate the non-cognition by saying that 'this horse etc. which is cognised is not cognised'. But isn't it the case that cognition does not appear as non-cognition nor non-cognition as cognition? Yes, but then is it the case that in the simultaneous cognition of different objects like blue and yellow the blue is cognised as yellow so that there will not be any opposition between the objects of the cognition? Hence both the objective and cognitive oppositions are to be treated as alike and equally competent in disposing of the identity of their respective objects. To hold one of them as superior to the other is mere partiality which is suggested by the well known adage of the beggar and the housewife.

Expl: If this were not so then even cognition and non-cognition would cease to be mutually-opposed. We can say for example that what is not cognised is cognised. Thus we can say that this horse for example which is not cognised is cognised. If cognition and non-cognition are to be distinguished we have to say that the cognition does not appear as noncognition or non-cognition as cognition. Similarly in the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow the blue does not appear as yellow or yellow as blue. The blue and the yellow forms present in the cognition do not appear as yellow-form and blue-form respectively. The same cognition cannot have two different forms.

Rebuttal of an earlier contention

Text: एतेन विवेचनः अभावः अपि निरस्तः। आकारयोः असंभेदेन वेदनस्य एव विवेचनत्वात्।

Trans: By the above rebuttal the earlier contention of the Buddhist that there is no differentiation in cognition also stands rebutted. The cognition of the forms as different from each other is itself its differentiation.

Expl: If cognition and the form appearing in it are identical then the diversity of the forms diversifies the cognition. The differentiation in cognition is nothing other than the differentiation of its forms.

Another rebuttal of the objection

Text: अपि च क्षणिकतायां एक–पुरूष–अपेक्षया बाह्यस्य अपि कुतः विवेचनम्? नाना–पुरुष–अपेक्षया अपि संदिग्धम्। परेण परस्य अवेदनात् क्व संदेहः इति चेत? अभेदेन एव तत्व–अ–विवेचनं

साध्यम्। तथा च किं तेन उपन्यस्तेन अपि?

Trans: Moreover if all external reality is momentary then any two external reals like the blue and the yellow go out of existence at the moment when their mutual difference is sought to be cognised by the person who cognised them together. So how can even the same person cognise things and their difference one after another? As to the possibility of the cognition of this difference by another person there is no certainty about it. (If there is doubt about this difference then there is also doubt about the cognition of difference). But how can there be doubt if it is a fact that an object or its cognition is not cognised by anything different from it? Well! The non-difference of the cognised and the cognition is sought to be established by the Buddhist on the ground of the nondiscriminability itself (of cognition). If this nondiscriminability itself is sought to be proved by means of the said non-difference there results circularity in argument. So there is no point in adducing nondifference as the reason.

Expl: The Buddhist may argue that in cognition there is no possibility of differentiation; for example in the separate cognitions of blue, yellow etc., the forms of the cognitions are cognised only through the cognitions themselves; it is not the case that the blue-form for example is cognised through the cognition of the yellow. The variegated form of blue mixed with yellow however, which is cognised through the cognition of the variegated is quite different from the separate blue and yellow forms; so the variegated form does not cause any differentiation in the cognition (of the variegated colour). As a retort to this argument it is urged by the N.V. that such non-differentiation can be proved of the external entity also. If the external entity is subject to differentiation it could be so individually or generically. If individually, then the differentiator may be one person or different persons. Since the blue, yellow etc. are momentary they cannot be both cognised and differentiated from each other by the same person. For this to happen the entities will have to exist at least for two moments. It cannot also be the case that the entities cognised by one person are differentiated at the same moment by another person. Firstly, it is doubtful if such a thing is sure to happen and secondly even in the case of cognitions such differentiation is not impossible to have. If it is contended that the cognitive relationship excludes difference of the relata (namely the cogniser and the cognised) and so a cognition cannot be the object of another differentiating cognition then there results circularity (in argument) as the non-difference of the cognition and the cognised is itself sought to be established by means of the non-differentiability of cognitions. Moreover if the cognitive relation excludes difference how can the blue, yellow etc. cognised together be mutually differentiated? If the different (individual) cognitions of blue, yellow etc. are supposed to differentiate them then these cognitions cannot be

different from these objects. This means that these two cognitions (to take only blue and yellow), their two objects and the cognitions of the blue and yellow together will all be one and the same. Further it may be asked whether the cognition of the absence of differentiation cognises difference or not. If it does then it follows that even that which is different from cognition is cognised by it. If it does not then the cognition having a bare absence as its object (the counterpositive of the absence, namely, the differentiation, not being cognised) the nondifference of cognition from its objects cannot be validly inferred. Could one say against this that the actual absence of differentiation is concomitant with nondifference and so it can lead to its inference? No! This cannot be. But it can again be asked whether the knowledge of this very fact has the fact for its object or not. If it does then the fact differs from the knowledge. If it does not then the concomitance remains unknown.

Rebuttal of the contention that the external is generically differentiable.

Text: तत्–जातीयस्य तु बाह्यवत् विज्ञानस्य अपिः विवेचनं एव इति। स्व–संवेदन–बाधितः अयं विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः न भेद–साधकः इति उष्ट्र–लगुडकम्। संवेदनेन एव अस्य साधितत्वात्।

Trans: If the external entities are supposed to be differentiable generically then their cognitions too can thus be certainly differentiable. To say against this that since the identity of a cognition cognising two or more objects is testified by the self-consciousness of cognition and as such the alleged appearance of cooccurrence of incompatible properties in the cognition (its identity with two different reals) is contradicted by the self-consciousness of cognition is to act as suggested in the adage of the camel wielding the stick. (Some people set out to kill the ugly animal camel but this campaign ended in the camel itself setting out to kill the killers). (The self-consciousness which is taken to establish the identity of cognition is itself the proof for the diversity of external objects. How can it establish the identity of the simultaneous cognition of different objects?).

Expl: If generic differences of external entities are supposed cognisable, then such differences in cognitions too may be supposed to be cognisable. The ground for the admission of difference or diversity in cognition is of course the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties in the cognition. One who denies this may deny either the incompatibility of blueness, yellowness etc. which appear together in cognition or the presence of this incompatibility in cognition or its appearance in any cognition. The first denial is untenable as the opposition of blueness, yellowness etc. is already established. If the second denial is upheld it

would go to prove that what is other than cognition is cognised by it. (Since cognition is not characterised by blueness, yellowness etc. it is other than blue, yellow and such other entities). As to the third denial it is ruled out by the fact that self-consciousness which is taken to establish the identity of cognition is found to establish the diversity of external objects. If self-consciousness is the proof for the identity of cognition, the same self-consciousness is also the proof for the diversity of objects. How the two can then be identical with each other?

Objection that pure cognition is not differentiable rebutted

Text: हिनस्तु तर्हि प्रकाशमानता अनेकत्वं, विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः अपि एकताम्। तथा अपि एकत्व–अनेकत्व–विकल–नील–आदि–आकार–प्रकाश–स्वरूपे किं आयातं इति चेत्? तस् इदं भौतैः क्षेत्र–निनायनम् । नियत–आकारत्वं एव हि एकत्वं, अ–नियत–आकारत्वं च अनेकता। तत् निवृत्तौ च न नील–आकारं न अपि नील–पीत–आदि–आकारं इति अन्–आकारं एव अवशिष्यते।

Trans: Let then the lumuinousity (as one) of cognition dissipate its (multiplicity or) diversity and the apparent coocurrence of incompatible properties in it do away with its oneness. But how do these (eliminations of diversity and unity) affect the pure luminous nature of the cognition of blue, yellow etc. which is divested both of unity and diversity? No! this rejoinder is like the weeding of the field by the barbarians. (Asked to clear the field of weeds the barbarians cleared away the grass too.) To be one is to be endowed with a definite form and to be many is to have an (irregular or) indefinite form. If both unity and diversity are absent in a cognition then it cannot have the form of the blue or both the blue and the yellow (for example) and as such it would be left without any form (appearing in it).

Expl: It is argued now that even if unity or diversity do not characterise any cognition, its self-luminous intrinsic nature would not be affected. The N.V. replies that unity is definiteness of form and diversity is its indefiniteness and so if both these are absent in a cognition it would be rendered formless.

Objection that the appearance of incompatible properties in congnition is illusory and its rebuttal

Text: स्यात् एतत्। पारमार्थिकः विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः भेद–हेतुः अयं काल्पनिकः इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि सुतरां अ–यत्न सिद्धं स्फटिकवत्

बोधस्य निर्–आकार–शुद्धत्वम्। आकार–निकरः तु अन्–आत्मा एव स्फुरति इति उभयथा एव काल–अत्यय–अपदिष्टाः सह–उपलंभ–आदयः।

Trans: Let then be this (argument for non-differentiability of cognition): Only the real appearance of coexistence of incompatibles is the cause (or determinant) of diversity (of that in which the appearance takes place) but the appearance (under consideration) is only illusory. Yes! But if this is so then it is established of itself that cognition is like the crystal. It is pure and without forms and the different forms that appear in it are not its own. Thus on both the views (namely that the forms are real or that they are unreal) the inference of the non-difference of cognition with its objects on the basis of the co-appearance of cognition and the object is afflicted by the fallacy of the absent major term.

Expl: If it is contended that the external entity being unreal the appearance of coocurrence of incompatibles mentioned cannot but be illusory and as such it cannot differentiate cognition the reply is that then cognition will be absolutely formless and so whether the blue-form, the yellow-form etc. are real or unreal in either case the cognition cannot be non-different with these forms. Thus the above inference will be afflicted by the fallacy of the absent major term.

Another rebuttal of the Buddhist view

Text: अपि च आस्तां तावत् विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यास–चिंता। यः अयं ग्राह्य्–ग्राहक –भाग–भेदः ग्राह्य–नील–आदि–भेदः वा चकास्ति सः किं सत्यः असत्यः वा? सत्यत्वे सः एव दोषः । अ–सत्यत्वे न अयं आत्मा विज्ञानस्य इति अन्–आत्मनि अपि सह्–उपलंभ–नियमात् अयोग्यता इति अन्–एंकाताः। भेदः न प्रथते एव इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि अस्तु तावत् सार्व–जनीन–प्रतीति–विरोधः स्व–वाक्–विरोधः वा। असिद्धाः तर्हि हेतवः। न हि भेद–अ–प्रथने सह्–अर्थ तत्–व्याप्यतां वा पश्यामः। तत्–अ–स्फुरणे अपि पक्ष–आदि प्रविभागः अपि कथं, कं च बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तः असि किं–अर्थ च। अन्वय–व्यतिरेक–अ–प्रतीतौ किं च हेतोः बलं, कुतः च विप्रतिपत्तिः, कीदृशे च इति? नूनं उन्मत्तः अपि अनेन जितः !

Trans: Moreover let us leave aside speculation about the apparent coocurrence of incompatibles. Instead we ask this question, 'Is the

difference between the cognised and the cognising part or the difference among the cognised objects the blue, yellow etc. which stands out conspicuously (in the cognitive situation), real or unreal'. If it is real then the same (above-mentioned) fallacy of absent major term results. If on the other hand it is unreal it cannot be identical with cognition (which is real) and so the middle term (in the inference, namely) 'coappearance' would be deviant as the cognition would not be nondifferent with an unreal object. (Can one say against this that) difference (of cognition from its object) does not appear at all? No! If this view is accepted then either the testimony of common experience would have to be denied or the self-contradiction of one's own utterances would have to be admitted. Also the middle term in the inference would on this view be disestablished. Certainly if difference is not cognised we do not find any meaning in 'togetherness' or the possibility of concomitance. If difference did not appear in any cognition how can there be the distinction of minor, major and other terms in the inferee and with whom may the debater be supposed to communicate in the debate? If further, the positive and negative association of the middle with the major (based on the knowledge of difference) remains unknown how can the middle term be effective? How again can there be any discussion and about what? It is indeed strange that the Buddhist engages in discussion but is not prepared to admit even apparent difference! Certainly the Buddhist has far surpassed even an insane person by his irrational utterances.

Expl: Continuing the above rebuttal the N.V. argues further both against the Buddhist and the Advaitin that if the two components of the cognitive situation are real and mutually-different then cognition cannot be non-different with the cognised (If the difference of the cognised entities is the same as its cognition then the two cannot be identical.) If the difference of the components is unreal then the real cognition cannot be identical with the unreal cognised. If the cognition of difference is denied there cannot be any coexistence of any two or more entities. So the coappearance of cognition and its object cannot be a middle term in the inference of nondifference. Of course coappearance can be defined as 'being cognised by that which has the coappearing thing as its object' and this definition does not require the coappearing things to be mutually different. But invariable concomitance cannot be defined without importing difference into it. For a thing to be invariably concomitant with another it is to be uncognisable by any cognition not cognising the other and this involves difference. The Buddhist denies both real difference and also the cognition of difference. So he is dubbed by his opponent as the most irrational person.

Objection to the rebuttal that the difference is unreal and its reply

Text: विकल्प–आरुढः एव भेदः व्यवहार–अङ्गं न अनुभव–आरूढः इति चेत्? सः सत्यः अ–सत्यः वा भासते न वा इति विकल्पान् न अतिवर्तते।

Trans: Can't we say (against the above) that only the unreal difference which appears in determinate and not in indeterminate cognition is needed for usages pertaining to difference? No! Even such a difference cannot be supposed to be invulnerable to objections regarding its reality or unreality and appearance or non-appearance in cognition.

Expl: The Buddhist contends that only the real difference appearing in indeterminate cognition is opposed to the unity of cognition and its object. The difference appearing in determinate cognitions need not be so, and it may be the basis of the usage regarding all differences. But even such a difference appearing in cognition can be either different or non-different from the cognition in which it appears. If it is different then cognition must be different from the cognised. If it is not then it must be real if cognition is identical with it. It cannot then be the object of determinate cognition.

Defence of the objection and its rebuttal

Text: असन् एव अ–स्फुरन् एव अध्यवसीयते इति चेत्? अध्यवसीयते इति विवरण–अर्हं एतत्। तत्–विषय–व्यवहार–जननं अध्यवसाय–अर्थः इति चेत्? व्यवहारः अपि यदि अ–ज्ञान–रूपः कथं असन्–तेन जन्यताम्? ज्ञान–रुपः चेत्? कथं नियामकं बिना तत्–विषयः? स्व–कारण–सामग्रो–सामर्थ्यात् इति चेत्? सः अयं व्यवहृति–रुप–ज्ञान–अलीक–भेदयोः नियामक–अंतर–अभावे अपि कारण–सामर्थ्यं आश्रित्य विषय–विषयिभावं इच्छति न तु अनुभव–अनुभाव्ययोः इति क्षीरं विहाय रुचिर–रोचक–ग्रस्तस्य सौवीरे।

Trans: Couldn't it be urged (against the above) that the nonexistent (or unreal) and noncognised difference alone is apprehended? Yes, but the meaning of 'apprehension' in the statement needs elucidation. Can the meaning be, 'Being the cause of the usage regarding that which is apprehended?' No, if the usage is something different from cognition how can it (being unreal because different from cognition) be produced by difference? If however the usage is cognition itself how without any determinant it can be cognitively related to a particular object and not to

any other? (Can one say in reply to this) that the relationship of different usages to different differences is determined by the capacity of the causes of the former? No, this is rather strange that the Buddhist should maintain that the relationship of usage which is a kind of cognition and the unreal difference which is its object should be determined by the capacity of the cause of usage even if there is no other determinant for the former yet he should not be prepared to admit any cognitive relationship between the indeterminate cognition and its real object. This tendency of the Buddhist is just like the craving of a person afflicted by a certain disease (of the digestive system) for boiled-rice-water in place of pure milk.

Expl: The Buddhist now argues against the above that it is only in the determinate cognition that the unreal difference which is not cognised by the indeterminate cognition is apprehended. The meaning of apprehension is 'to produce usage in relation to difference'. Here usage cannot be different from cognition for then it would be unreal. But if it is some kind of cognition itself then its relationship to a particular object and not to any other can be (supposed to be) determined only by its own causes. If such a relationship of diversity can be admitted to hold between a determinate cognition and the non-existent difference similar relationship can be admitted to obtain even between the real difference and its indeterminate cognition.

The real determinants of the cognitive relationship of cognition and its object are sense-object-contact, the cognition of the concomitance of the middle and the major term and so on, and not the causes of the cognitions as contended by the Buddhist.

Objection to the rebuttal

Text: भेदः अपि विकल्प–आकारः एव न तु बाह्यः इति चेत्? यदि असन् एव असौ कथं विकल्प–आकारः? तत्–आकारः चेत् कथं असन् इति परिभावय। अस्तु तर्हि सन् एव इति चेत्? ननु अद्वय–दर्शि चेत् विज्ञानं कथं भेद–प्रथा? आकार–द्वय–दर्शि चेत् कथं एकं सत् द्वय–आत्मकम् ? चित्र–आकारं इति चेत्? चित्रं एकं अनेकं वा इति विकल्प–गिलितं एव तव पश्यतः। अनेकत्वे क्व एक–विज्ञान–तादात्म्यम्? विज्ञानस्य अपि यावत्–आकारं अनेकत्वे क्व चित्र–आकार–सं–वेदनम्? स्व–स्व–मात्र–मग्नत्वात्। एकरत्वे क्व भेद–प्रतीतिः?

Trans: Couldn't it be that even the difference of the external entities is (like these entities themselves) the same as the form of the cognition (by

which it is apprehended) and not other than it? Well, if the difference is definitely unreal how can it be the form of the cognition (the form and the formed cognition being one the unreal difference cannot be one with the real cognition)? If on the other hand the difference is identical with this form how can it be unreal? This dilemma needs to be noted by you (the Buddhist). Alright! let it then be real (for sure), but if the cognition does not apprehend the locus and the counterpositive of the difference how can then the difference be cognised? And if cognition cognised these along with it how can it (being unitary) be indentical with all of them? Could it be said then that the cognition has a variegated form? No, this possibility will be instantly eliminated if the implications of the alternatives—whether the variegated form is unitary or multiple, are taken into account. If the form is multiple in nature how can it be identical with the unitary cognition? If the cognition (apprehending the difference) became diversified according to the diversity of the forms appearing in it there cannot be any cognition of the variegated form, each cognition being concerned with its own form. If however the cognition remained unitary how can it apprehend the difference (which brings in its wake its locus, counterpositive etc)?

Expl: Now the Buddhist argues against the above that if the difference of the objects cognised had a viable existence apart from the cognition cognising it then only it could be maintained that the cognitive relationship is based on the difference of the cognition and the cognised. But the difference is regarded as the very form of the cognition cognising it and so indentical with it. This is possible only if difference is real and also if the cognition cognises both the relata of difference viz. the counterpositive and the locus because it is by these that the nature of a difference is fixed. Now if all these together constitute the form of the difference-cognition it cannot be one with all of them and also remain one itself. Three different cognitions occurring simultaneously or successively and cognising the three constituents of the difference-form cannot also account for the unitary cognition of difference. This difficulty can be overcome by treating the form as variegated. But if this consists of many constituents the cognition cannot remain one (being nondifferent with each of the many). It is possible to treat the variegated form as unique and different from its constituents. In that case the cognition cognising the form cannot cognise the difference as the difference of the blue and the yellow (for example). The blue and the yellow do not figure as such in the cognition of the variegated. The view thus criticised is set forth by Ratnakīritī.

Defence of the foregoing objection and its rebuttal

Text: अनील–आदि अनेक–व्यावृत्ति–कृतः अनेकत्व–अध्यवसायः एव इति चेत्? अ–तादात्म्ये कथं व्यावृत्तीनां उल्लेखः? तादात्म्ये कथं अनेकत्वम् ? एकत्वे अपि क्व तत्–कृतः अपि भेद–अध्यवसायः? उल्लेखः अयं अस्य विज्ञानस्य यत् अनेकत्वं नाम न पुनः तत्व–अंतरं इति चेत्? स्वरुपं अ–स्वरुपं वा इति वाच्यम्। आद्ये अनेक–स्वरुपं एकं इति कः अन्यः वदेत् अ–सुस्थात्? द्वितीयः तु इष्यते एव अस्माभिः। किंतु त्वया इष्यताम्। भ्रांतिः असौ इति चेत्? तस्यां अपि स्वरुपं अ–स्वरुपं वा प्रकाशेत प्रकार–अंतर–अभावात् इति।

Trans: Couldn't it be urged against the above that although the variegated cognition has only the unitary variegated-form as its object yet because of its exclusion of many other forms it falsely appears as diversified? Yes, but if the exclusions are different from the cognition they cannot be cognised by it and if they are identical with it they cannot be many. If they are one how can they engender even the false cognition of difference? Perhaps there is no real difference or multiplicity there, there is only (a false) cognition of it. Well! if so then it has to be specified whether the difference is or is not the form of its cognition. If it is, then none but a deranged person will say that one and many are identical. As to the second alternative, we certainly admit it but you too should admit it. Couldn't the cognition be illusory? Well, if it could then only its own or some other form would appear in it, there is no other alternative (and both the alternatives are shown to be untenable).

Expl: The reply tendered by Gñanāsrī to the above rebuttal is now being considered. Posing the objection contained in the rebuttal Gñanāsrī remarks:

यदि स्वरुपं आकारः चित्रता एक–धियः कथम्?
भेदः प्रति–अर्थता बुद्धेः तदा अन्योन्यस्य वेदनम।।
मिथः तथा आपि व्यावृत्तौ बाह्य–वस्तु–क्षण–स्थिति :।
भेदे अपि एवं धियः तेषां प्रकाश–घटना कथम्?
अलीकं अन्यरत्वे अपि इदं व्यावृत्ति–अंतरं ईरितम्।

'If the forms are identical with the cognition how can the cognition be variegated? The cognition differs with the difference of its objects. How

then can it reveal its different objects simultaneously? The answer to these questions is that it is the diversity of exclusions appearing in cognition that engenders the illusion of multiplicity'. This answer suffers from the same difficulty as pointed out above. The exclusions cannot be cognised by the cognition unless they are identical with it but cognition being one cannot be identical with different exclusions. If the exclusions too are supposed to be mutually-identical they cannot engender the cognition of multiplicity (of objects). Could one urge against this that even the multiplicity appearing in cognition is not real? No! because the unreal multiplicity cannot be identical with the cognition cognising it. If therefore multiplicity or difference is regarded as different from its cognition this implies that cognition cognises what is different from it. Perhaps the cognition of the variegated apprehending the unreal multiplicity could be treated as illusory so that this illusory cognition cannot prove the diversity of cognition. But even in illusory cognition either its own form or something other than it would appear. If it is the former then cognition is sure to be diversified. If the latter then it follows that cognition does apprehend things other than itself.

Ratnakīrtī's view regarding the variegated cognition considered and rejected

Text: स्यात् एतत्। यथा अ–तत् तत्तया परिस्फुरत् अपि न बस्तुगत्या तत् एव तथा तत् अपि अ–तत्तया परिस्फुरत अपि न अ–तत् एव। ततः स्वरुपस्य अ–तत्तया प्रथने अपि न काचित् ग्राह्य–लक्षण–क्षतिः इति चेत्? यदि अत्तत्ता अपि परिस्फुरंती स्वरुपं एव अस्य स्यात् स्यात् अपि अस्य उपन्यासस्य प्रस्तुत–उपयोगः। अ–स्वरूपस्य कथं प्रकाशः इति चेत् यद्यपि तथा वक्ष्यामः। तथा अपि अ–तत्ता कथं तस्य स्वरूपं इति इतः अपि दीयतां दृष्टिः।

Trans: Let there be then this argument. Just as something other than a given thing may falsely appear as that thing without really being one with it so a given thing appearing as other than itself does not cease to be itself. So cognition which is unitary in nature may appear as many (assuming the different forms of its objects) and thus the cognitive character of the objects of cognition can be maintained: This view can be entertained as relevant to the discussion only if the otherness (from itself) could be the very form of the cognition (but this is not the case). 'But how is it that, that which is other than cognition appears in cognition?' This question will be replied to later. However how otherness can be the form of cognition is a vital point in the discussion to which the Buddhist has to pay

particular attention.

Expl: It is now contended that diversity or multiplicity can appear as the epistemic qualifier though not as the qualificand of cognition. This means that the unitary cognition may appear (falsely) as many without ceasing to be unitary just as the shell appears (illusorily) as silver without forfeiting its shell-character. Thus the diversity is not the epistemic qualificand in its cognition. It is the qualifier and as such it need not appear in the cognition of multiple objects. The non-Buddhist's reply to this contention is simple. Diversity cannot be the epistemic qualifier of cognition unless it appears in the cognition as characterising the qualificand of the cognition. In a determinate cognition the qualifier and the qualified appear as related with each other. So the diversity must be identical with the cognition if it is to appear in it. If the diversity cannot be the qualificand it cannot also be the qualifier.

Defence of the view that the cognised is different from cognition

Text: कः च अ–स्वरुप–स्फुरणे दोषः? न अयं भिन्नयोः वेद्य–वेदक–भावः व्यापार–निबंधनः नियतस्य तस्य अभावात्। न अपि तत्–जाति–निबंधनः। कश्चित् कंचित् प्रति ज्ञेयः इति व्यवस्था–अन्–उपपत्ति–प्रसङ्गात्। नहि निसर्ग–सिद्धानां गोत्व–आदीनां ईदशी रीतिः इति चेत्? ननु अयं अभेदे अपि दोषः तत्–अवस्थः एव। तथा हि स्वस्य वेदनं इति न अयं व्यापार–निबंधनः व्यवहारः, स्व–आत्मनि तत्–अभावात्। न अपि जाति–निबंधनः साधारण्य–प्रसङ्गात। न हि जात्या एव गौः स्व–आत्मानं प्रति न तु परं प्रति इति नियमः दृष्टः। न च ज्ञानं स्वस्य इव परस्य अपि वेदनं सर्व–सर्वज्ञत्व–आपत्तेः।

Trans: And what after all is the fallacy of the view that that which is different from cognition is cognised by it? None, but (in this view) the cognised-cognitive relation of different entities (namely the object and the cognition) cannot be determined by some process (initiated by either) because there is no such regular process. It cannot also be generically determined for then there will be no restriction of the cognitive relation to specific objects (and their specific cognition). Any entity would be the object of any cognition. Certainly the cow which is known as endowed with cowness does not become noncow in relation to some other entity! Well, if this is so the fallacy mentioned afflicts for sure even the view of non-difference (of cognition and its object)! To explain: When we say that cognition cognises itself this usage cannot be due to any process because there cannot be any process of one's own upon oneself. The usage cannot

also be due to generic affinity because then the cognition will have everything as its object. Certainly no such rule has been observed to hold that the cow is generically a cow in relation to itself and not to others. Nor is cognition other - cognitive too as it is self-cognitive for then every cognition will have every other cognition as its object.

Expl: Gñanāsrī upholds the cognitions-object-identity—view by showing that the cognitive relation cannot be due to any process initiated by the cognition or its object. The cognition of smoke has fire as its object because fire is the object of the inference generated by the smoke-cognition. But present and future objects cannot thus be invested with a process like knownness initiated by cognition. Nor is the relation due to causality for then cognition and sense-organs which produce it would have the cognitive relation with each other. Even in the objects that are present cognition does not seem to produce any perceptible activity or process on the basis of which the cognitive relation of the two could be maintained. Nor does the object produce any activity or process in its cognition. Moreover this hypothetical process is not invariably present so that it could determine the cognitive relationship. If the generic character of the object is supposed to determine the relationship then for example a pot will be the object of all cognitions simply because it is endowed with potness. Specific properties characterising individuals and determining their objectivity relative to particular individual—cognitions are also not known to exist. If however the genus cognitionness is supposed to determine the cognitive relation then every cognition would have everything as its object simply by virtue of being a cognition. To this criticism and contention of Gñanāsrī the N.V. rejoinder is that the view of the non-difference of cognition and its objects fares no better in the above respects. Cognition cognising itself does not produce any activity in itself or is related to itself as cognition. If it were, then every cognition would have every cognition as its object. If on the other hand a single cognition as cognition is supposed to be the object of cognition then this single cognition would be cognised by every cognition.

Objection to the rebuttal and its reply

Text: न तत् कस्यचित् किं तु वेदन–मात्रं इति चेत्? तथा अपि स्व–आत्मनि अ–जडवत् परत्र–अपि अ–जंड स्यात्। परस्मिन् अंधवत् स्वास्मिन् अपि अंधं प्रसज्येत जात्या एव तत्–रूपत्वात्। जात्या अपि स्व–कारणात् क्वचित् नियत–रूपं एव तत् उत्पन्नं इति चेत्? न एवं उच्चैः ब्रूयाः परैः अपि कदाचित् एवं श्रूयेत।

Trans: (Against the above rebuttal it may be urged that) cognition does

not cognise itself or any other but is simple consciousness by nature. But then if cognition is sentient in itself (with respect to itself) it could be sentient in respect of others also and if it is blind (or insentient) in respect of others it could be so even in relation to itself because by its very nature it is so. However it may be contended that even generically cognition arises from its causes as being of a definite nature in relation to itself. But the Buddhist should not make such a remark loudly because his opponent may pick up the suggestion contained in the remark and turn the tables against him.

Expl: Gñanāsrī arguing against the above rebuttal says as follows:

विज्ञानं जड–रूपेभ्यः व्यावृत्तं उपजायते।
इयं एव आत्म–संवित्तिः तस्य या अ–जड–रुपता।

'Cognition comes into being excluding insentient forms. This non-insentience of cognition is itself its selfcognition or self-awareness'. The point of the remark is that cognition is mere consciousness, there is no question of its being self-conscious or other-conscious. The rejoinder to this argument is that if cognition is self-conscious it cannot fail to be other-conscious and if it is not other-conscious it cannot be self-conscious too. If despite being neither self-conscious nor other-conscious cognition is regarded just as cognition then the external object too can be regarded as what it is. If there is any evidence against the reality of the external then this evidence may speak against its own object or any thing whatsoever. If it is the latter then even cognition would be disproved by the evidence. If it is the former then cognition of the other is established because the evidence itself is such a cognition.

Objection to the reply and its rejoinder

Text: अभेदः अस्तु मा वा भेदं तु प्रकाशमानखेन व्यासेधामः इति चेत्? न।
वस्तुनि भेद–निवृत्तेः एव अ–भेद–रूपात्वात्।

Trans: But cannot we simply repudiate difference of cognition and its object on the ground of the revealed nature of the object, without maintaining the identity of the two? No! The repudiation of difference is itself of the nature of (the affirmation of) nondifference.

Expl: The Buddhist contends that mere denial of difference of cognition and its object would suffice for his purpose. This is rebutted by the opponent by equating the denial of difference with the affirmation of non-difference.

Objection that cognition as variegated is neither different nor nondifferent and its rejoinder

Text: अस्तु तर्हि भेद–अभेद विधुरं एव चित्रम्। चेतः–भेदे प्रकाशमानत्व–अ–योगात्, अभेदे चित्रत्व–अन्–उपपत्तेः इति चेत् ? न। मिथः विरुद्ध द्वय–विधिवत् तत्–उभय–निषेधस्य अपि एकत्र विरुद्धत्वात्। न च सः अपि अस्तु इति वाच्यम्। स्यात्–वाद–अवतारे तव अपि दिगंबरत्व प्रसङ्गात।

Trans: Let then the variegated cognition be devoid both of difference and nondifference. If its form is different from it it cannot be revealed by it, If it is nondifferent, then the cognition being unitary the form too must be unitary so that there cannot be variegatedness in the cognition cognising blue, yellow etc. simultaneously. This position is however untenable. Just as the affirmation of opposites in the same locus is inconsistent so even the denial of the latter in the same locus is inconsistent. 'Let this denial too be conceded' one may say, but in that case every undesirable contingency being conceded by the Buddhist he will have to follow in the footsteps of the Jaina teacher—(or be as shameless as the follower of the Digamber sect of the Jains).

Expl: It is now urged by the Buddhist that the variegated cognition is neither different nor non-different as both these alternatives have been shown to be untenable. It is better to characterise it as 'variegated'. This contention is rebutted on the ground that if difference and nondifference cannot be affirmed of cognition they cannot also be both denied of it. If this denial too is admitted as an object of cognition then there would be nothing to distinguish the Buddhist doctrine from the Jaina doctrine of probabilisim.

Objection that variegatedness is beyond all determinations and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि चतुः शिखरी–शून्यं एव चित्रं, आश्चर्य–रुपत्वात्। एक–अनेकत्व–विरहे अपि सत्वं इति आश्चर्य–अर्थः हि चित्र–शब्दः इति चेत्? अथ चतुः–शिखर–शेखरं एव किं न स्यात्? आश्चर्य–रुपता–युक्तेः तुल्यत्वात्। एक–एक–पक्ष–अन्–उपपत्तिः च यथा तत्–निषेध–पर्यवसायिनी तथा तत्–इतर–पर्यवसायिनी अपि स्यात् इति।

Trans: Let then the variegated (cognition) be devoid of all the four opposed properties namely difference, non-difference, absence of

difference and absence of non-difference. The 'variegated' is indeed a miraculous entity. In spite of being neither one nor many the cognition is yet real. This miraculous fact may be taken to be meant by the word 'variegated'. (Well)! If this is so why not take the cognition to be endowed with all the four properties? The reason for characterising cognition as miraculous is the same for both the views. Moreover the untenability of each of the four ascriptions entails even the corresponding ascription of its opposite as it entails the denial of the ascriptions shown to be untenable.

Expl: 'Difference, nondifference and the absence of each of these are the four ascriptions all of which may be denied of the variegated because the word 'variegated' stands for 'an entity of a miraculous nature'. This is the fresh contention of the Buddhist. The reply to this is that if simply on the basis of the meaning of the word 'variegated' and its use to describe cognition the latter is to be regarded as endowed with incompatible properties then it is simpler to ascribe all these properties to cognition. It is true that none of the properties is ascribable to cognition as already shown. But it is also true that the denial of each entails the affirmation of its opposite with the result that all the four denials taken together lead to the affirmation of all the four opposite properties.

Another rebuttal to the objection

Text: अपि च अत्र वस्तुनः चतुः कोटि–विरहे चेतसः भाषा–अंतरेण इदं उक्तं यत् अन्–आत्मानः एव एताः चतस्त्रः कोटयः भासंते न वा प्रतिभांति इति। तत्र अ–प्रतिमासनं अन्–उत्तरम्। प्रतिभासने तु ग्राह्य–लक्षण–अयोगे अपि ग्राह्य–भावः इति चित्रं एतत्। तथा च चित्र–अद्वैतात् वरं चित्र–द्वैतं अस्तु प्रतिभासन–अनुरोधात् इति।

Trans: Moreover if really cognition is devoid of the four properties then to say so is to say in different words that these properties although different from cognition are cognised or not cognised. But to say that they are not cognised is not a correct statement (or answer) because they are cognised by these very words. And if they are supposed to be cognised then they are so without having the defining property (viz. nondifference with cognition) of a cognised entity. (Thus one and the same cognition has to be regarded as diverse and this entails the admission of) a queer sort of nonduality. (But as there are already two queer admissions namely that even a thing devoid of the characteristic of cognisedness is cognised and that the cognition of this thing is devoid of oneness as well as manyness) it is more sensible to admit a duality of queer entities. (On this admission) the cognition of many different entities as well as the oneness of this

cognition are also upheld.

Expl: Continuing the rebuttal the non-Buddhist asks: 'Is the variegated cognition cognised as being devoid of the four properties or not?' If it is not then it is not cognisable as variegated and it goes against the Buddhist's own assertion. If it is so cognised then the four properties as the counterpositivies of their respective absences, are required to be cognised. The cognition of mere absence cannot lead to the cognition of variegatedness. But no one cognition can be identical with four different properties. Thus the same unitary cognition has to be reckoned as diverse and this is a queer (or variegated type of) duality which needs to be upheld to justify the cognition by one of many.

Critical consideration of the view that objects are nondifferent from cognition because they are revealed

Text: स्यात एतत्। बहि: अंत: उभयथा अपि ग्राह्य–लक्षण–क्षति: अस्तु। प्रकाश मानत्वं तु नील–आदीनां अ–शक्य–अपन्हवं, तावत्–मात्रं च अस्माकं अभिमतं इति चेत? तत् एतत् विक्रीत–गवी–रक्षणम्। किं इदं प्रकाशमानत्वं यत् सर्वथा ग्राह्य–लक्षण–क्षतौ अपि न क्षीणम्? न प्रकाश–संबंध:, नियम–अन्–उप–पत्ते: इति उक्तम्। न प्रकाश–तादात्म्यम्। चित्रत्व अन्–उपपत्ते: इति उक्तम्। तस्मात् नील–आदीनां प्रकाशमानत्वं परिपालयता ग्राह्य–लक्षणे यत्न: कर्तव्य: परिहर्तव्यं वा प्रकाशमानत्वम्। अन्यथा तपनीयं अपनीय वाससि ग्रंथि कर्तारं उपहससि स्वयं च कनकं उपादाय गगन–अंचले ग्रंथिं करोषि इति। सा इयं सर्व–प्रकारं अ–सिद्धि: सर्व–प्रकारं च अन्–एकांतिकत्वं इति।

Trans: Let there be this argument (for nondifference of cognition and its object). We admit that in respect of both the subjective entity-cognition and its external object the definition of cognisedness remains unfulfilled. But the revealedness however of blue, yellow etc. cannot be suppressed and this is all that is maintained by us. No! (This cannot be). To advocate such a view is like trying to preserve a cow which has been sold out. What after all is this 'revealedness' which does not suffer any dilution despite the absence of the definition of cognisedness in objects (of cognition)? It is not ,'Relationship with revelation' because it has already been explained by the Buddhist himself that without there being any process initiated by cognition or revelation mere relation of the latter cannot determine as to which cognition cognises which object. It is also not the same as 'identity

with revelation' as the variegated cognition would get diversified (by being identified with different objects) so (the disputant) interested in maintaining the revealed character of objects must strive to explain their cognisedness or deny their revealed character. Otherwise the attempt of the Buddhist (specially Gñanāsrī) to defend the revealed nature of both internal and external objects when they do not at all fulfil the definition of cognisedness) is like tying a knot in space while holding a piece of gold in his hand for preserving which the knot is to be tied. (The Buddhist makes fun of the N.V. thinker for his denial of the cognitive form while advocating the reality of the external object by comparing this denial with tying a knot in one's cloth for preserving a gold- piece but throwing away the gold piece'. The inference of the Buddhist is riddled with all kinds of fallacies concerned with the establishment of minor, middle terms etc. and those connected with the deviation of the middle term).

Expl: Against the above there is another defence of Gñanāsrī to the effect that difference or non-difference of objects with their cognition may be dropped but the very revealed nature of the objects may be taken as proof for their identity with cognition. The following is the statement of this defence:

प्रकाशमानं नील–आदि जडं वा अ–जडं एव वा।
इति प्रकरणे अस्माभिः बुद्धित्वे हेतु : उच्यते ।।

'The blue, yellow etc. whether sentient or insentient are in either case revealed and this revealedness is the ground of their being identical with cognition'. Since the revealedness of the external object had earlier been denied by the Buddhist himself Gñanāsrī's above defence is compared here to the attempt to preserve a cow which has already been sold. What the Buddhist should attempt is to show how the external object can fulfil the definition of the 'cognised'. Instead he makes fun of N.V. for affirming the reality of the external while denying the reality of the cognitive form. The external is needed only to support the diversity of cognitive forms. If the forms are denied there is no need of the external entity. So this attempt is like tying a knot in one's cloth after throwing away the gold. Countering this ironical remark of Gñanāsrī the opponent makes a still more scathing ironical remark to the effect that Gñanāsrī's attempt to prove the identity of cognition and its object when the latter does not meet the definition of the 'cognised' object at all is like tying a knot in empty space while holding the gold-piece in one's own hand. Just as no knot can be tied in empty space so the identity of cognition and object cannot be proved by the nonexistent cognisedness of the latter. Thus the inference 'Blue etc. are nondifferent with their cognitions because they are revealed or they are cognised along with their cognitions' is riddled with all kinds of fallacies relating to the establishment of

inferential terms and the concomitance of the middle and major terms. For example, if the external object is unreal, the minor term is unproved. The external not being a cognised entity, the middle remains unproved; 'being endowed with all the properties that characterise cognitions' is a condition that delimits the concomitance of the middle with the major and so the concomitance remains unproved. (If cognition is not conceded to be self-conscious the condition mentioned pervades the major but not the middle term). Even the unreal being revealed, the middle proves to be too wide. If the external is not cognisable (either differently or nondifferently) the middle is excluded both from the cominor and the contraminor. If everything is taken as the minor term then the fallacy of universal minor is entailed.

The second view mentioned at the beginning repudiated

Text: एतेन द्वितीयः पक्षः प्रत्युक्तः। न हि सजतीयत्वेन ग्राह्य–लक्षण–वैधुर्यं उत्सार्यते। अतिप्रसंगस्य तादवस्थ्यात्। जडत्वे प्रकाश–अ–संभावना एव इति चेत्? न। तुल्यत्वात्। यथा हि अ–स्व–संवेदन–वादिनः परं प्रति प्रकांश अपि ज्ञानं आत्मनि जडं एवं तथा स्व–संवेदन–वादिनः अपि स्व–आत्म नि प्रकाशं अपि ज्ञानं परं प्रति जडं एव। कथंचित् बुद्धि–अंतरे अपि अ–जडं चेत् ? बाह्ये अपि तथा किं न स्यात् इति संदिग्ध विपक्ष–वृत्तित्वम्।

Trans: By the above (denial of cognisedness of external entities) the second of the first-mentioned alternatives also stands repudiated. Certainly the (affirmation of) generic similarity of objects with cognition does not remove their non-fulfilment of the definition of cognisedness because the undesirable contingency of anything being the object of any cognition remains uneliminated on the assumption of generic similarity of cognition and objects. (The cognition of a pot is generically similar even to a tree for example). But if the object were inert how can it be revealed or sentient and (if revealed it must be admitted to be generically similar to cognition)? Well, this fact is common both to the inert and the sentient. (Just as the inert if different from cognition cannot be revealed by it so the sentient too if different cannot be revealed by cognition). To explain: Just as on the view of the advocate of nonself-conscious cognition, cognition though revelatory of the other is not self-revelatory so on the view of the advocate of self-conscious cognition also cognition, though self-revelatory is certainly insentient in respect to others. So cognition cannot cognise the other according to this view. If somehow a cognition is conscious of some other cognition too then it could be so in relation to the external object

too and thus the middle term in the inference may be found to extend even to contraminors.

Expl: The second view stated in the beginning stands repudiated by the foregoing criticism that the external object fails to satisfy the definition of cognisedness. If generic similarity to cognition is supposed to determine the cognisedness of the object all cognitions being alike any cognition will be cognisant of any object. It may here be argued that cognition cannot be the revealer unless there is something that is revealed by it. But it has to be noted that even a cognition cognises only a certain object and not everything and so there must be a determinant of this specific relationship. Identity cannot be this determinant for then a cognition cannot cognise a cognition other than itself. If the cause of the cognition like sense-object- contact is the determinant then even the external object should be cognisable.

In the view of self-consciousness of cognition there being no sense-cognition-contact self-consciousness is not possible and other-cognition too is not possible as the other and cognition are different from each other.

Defence of the generic similarity of the object to cognition

Text: ननु बाह्ये सर्वथा एव ग्राह्य–लक्षण–क्षतिः। इह तु समान–उपादनता–नियमेन चित्र–आकाराणां परमार्थ–भिन्नानां एव व्यतिवेदन–सिद्धिः? न। मिथः प्रथा–नियमे हि उपादान–मुखेन सामान्यतः वा सामग्री–सामर्थ्यं एव वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा तथाविध–कार्य–अन्–उत्पत्तेः। तथा च बाह्य–ग्राह्य–नियत–स्वभाव–ज्ञान–उत्पतौ अपि सुलभं एतत् इति पूर्वकः एव दोषः।

Trans: But isn't it the case that if the external entity is (regarded as) dissimilar to its cognition it cannot fulfil the definition of cognisedness at all; only if it is regarded as generically similar to the cognition the two will have as a rule the same material cause and then the cognitions of the blue, yellow etc. having these respective forms can be proved to be cognisant of each other and of themselves despite their mutual difference? No. (this cannot be the case). For the mutual cognition of different forms, only the common material cause as a special determinant or the capacity of the causal collocation as a general determinant has to be laid down (otherwise the cognition of pot for example would not necessarily be confined to the pot, it may have even the tree as its object). If this is so then the same determinants can very well be taken to account for the restriction of cognitions to their own dissimilar and different objects. So the same fallacy mentioned above afflicts the middle term in the inference.

Expl: It is now being argued that although difference cannot determine the relationship of cognition and its object their generic similarity based upon the similarity of their causes can do so. This will also help explain the occurrence of variegated cognition. If the cognitions of blue, yellow etc. arise simultaneously as generated by similar causes they may then be taken to be cognisant of themselves as also of each other and their objects and thus the emergence of variegated cognition can easily be accounted for. In reply the opponent counterargues that the similar material cause as the special determinant or the causal collocation as the general determinant of the cognitive relationship is acceptable to him (opponent) too. (Of course the material cause by itself cannot be the determinant as other causes are needed for the production of the cognition). So if the causal collocaltion is taken to determine the cognitive relationship the earlier fallacy of doubtful concomitance of the middle term will continue to afflict the inference.

Consideration of the third of the first-mentioned alternatives

Text: अस्तु तर्हि तृतीयः। सर्वथा ग्राह्य–लक्षण–अन्–उपपत्तेः। तत् अभावे सामग्री–सामर्थ्यस्य अपि आश्रयितुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। विचार–सिद्धे हि वस्तुनि कारण–चिंतन–अवसरः न तु अ–विवेचिते इति चेत्? किं ग्राह्य–लक्षण –अ–निर्वक्तव्यतया प्रकाशमानत्वं अमीषां निवर्तते सत्वं वा?

Trans: Let then the third alternative (that the cognised entity is unreal) be accepted as correct as the definition of the cognised (as different or as identical with its cognition) is untenable and if there is no definition of the cognised it is not possible to depend even upon the capacity of the causal collocation for the determination of the cognitive relationship. Only in the case of a rationally- established entity the inquiry regarding its cause has any relevance, not in the case of an irrational entity. Well! if so we ask 'Is it the cognisedness or the reality of external entities that stands eliminated because the definition of cognisedness cannot be formulated?'

Expl: Gñanāsrī upholding the third view mentioned at the beginning says as follows :

वेद्य–वेदकरूपं हि नियतं यदि लक्षितम।
तत् उपादान–पर्येषे सामग्री शक्तिः उत्तरम्।
वेद्य–वेदकयोः रुपं न च अद्य अपि निवर्तते।
ततः स्वरुपे वक्तव्ये सामग्री–परिकीर्तनम्।।

'If the nature of the cognition and the cognised is exactly defined then only the question regarding their cause can be answered by referring to causal capacity (as the cause). But since the nature of these too is not yet determined, there is no point in mentioning the capacity of causal collocation (as the cause). But since the cognised can in no way be defined it must be regarded as fictitious. Only if there is valid definition the reality of the defined entity can be ensured.' In reply to this it is asked whether absence of definition entails simply the non-cognition of the defined or its non-existence itself?

Rebuttal of the first of the above alternatives

Text: न प्रथमः। न हि लक्षण–अ–परिज्ञान–मात्रेण स्पष्ट–दृष्टं अपि लक्ष्यं अपन्होतुं शक्यते । अपरिज्ञानस्य दुरूहत्वेन अपि उपपत्तेः। तेषां अ–प्रतिभासे तत्–निषेधस्य अन्–उत्पत्तेः।

Trans: The first of the above alternatives is untenable. Certainly merely because of the nonascertainment of its definition even a vividly-observed entity cannot be denied to exist. The nonascertainment of the definitions may be due even to the complexity (and abstruseness of the definition). If the (cognisable) external entities were not cognised the denial of their cognition will not be rational.

Expl: If the external entity is denied because of the undefinability of its cognisedness then even this denial will be rendered invalid as the cognition of the cognised entity as the subject of the denial will be impossible. The impossibility of the definition cannot be a logical one as the concept of the cognised is quite rational.

Rebuttal of the second alternative

Text: न द्वितीयः। तदा हि तत्– लक्षण–अन्–उपपत्तिः सत्वं निवर्तयेत् यदि अ–सत्वे लक्षणं उपपद्येत। उभयथा अपि अन्–उपपत्तौ कः अनुरागः अ–सत्वे? तत् एव लक्षणं इति चेत्? सत्वं एव किं न स्यात्? अतिप्रसंगात् इति चेत्? तुल्यम्।

Trans: The second alternative (too) is untenable. The untenability of the definition of the cognised would entail unreality of the latter only if the definition were entailed by the unreality of the cognised. But if the definition were untenable on both counts (that is whether the cognised is real or unreal) why cling to unreality? If you say that unreality itself is the definition of the cognised we ask 'Why not have reality (as the definition)? If the latter is fallacious the former too is so.

Expl: If for lack of definition the reality of the cognised is denied it means that it is not the reality that entails the definition. Then it must be the unreality. But it has been shown that neither reality nor unreality entails the definability of the cognised. If so why fix upon the unreality of the cognised? If the admission of the reality and difference from cognition of the cognised makes any cognition to have any entity whatsoever as its object then the opposite view also leads to the same predicament.

Formulation and rebuttal of another definition of the cognised

Text: वेदन–अधीन–व्यवहार–गोचरत्वं इति चेत्? अस्तु तावत् इदम्। तस्य एव इति तु नियमः कुतः? सामग्रीतः तथा वेदन–उत्पत्तिः इति चेत्? तत् एतत् संभाव्यते सति न तु अ–सति इति विशेषः। यथा हि सति ज्ञानेन अभिलाषः, तेन यत्नः तेन प्रवृत्तिः, तया तत्–प्राप्तिः क्रियते न तथा अलीके। तस्य प्राप्तुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। शक्यत्वे वा अन–अलीकत्वात्। व्यवहारः अपि अयं अलीके इति चेत्? तर्हि सुतरां लक्षण–अभावः तत्–द्वारस्य अपि अभावात्।

Trans: Let then 'cognisedness' be defined as 'being the object of usage generated by the cognition'. Alright, let it be as you say, but how is it to be determined that a particular usage is generated by a particular cognition and not by any other? If a particular causal collocation is supposed to give rise to a particular cognition and not to any other, this supposition is possible in regard to the real only and not the unreal. This is the speciality of usage. Just as it is for the real for which we cherish desire if we know it, the desire leads to effort and the latter to action by means of which the real is obtained, we do not do so in the case of the unreal as it cannot be obtained. If it were obtainable it cannot be unreal. If the usage too is false then the definition of the cognised is simply ruled out as the basis of definition viz. usage is itself unreal.

Expl: If the cognised is defined as the object of the usage engendered by its cognition then the specific relation of a particular cognition with the usage relating to a particular object will have to be accounted for on the basis of the specific causal collocation relating to the cognition. The indifferent cognition does not generate any usage. But the usage must be real and different from cognition to be generated by it. If the usage is real its object too must be real. If it is not real then the definition becomes inapplicable as the unreal cannot be a product of anything.

An extreme suggestion and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि सर्वथा विचार–असहत्वं एव विश्वस्य इसि चेत्? तत् कि

इदानीं तत्व–उपप्लवः एव, काष्ठा–शून्यता वा? न प्रथमः। इयतीं भूमिं आरूढस्य अपि विचारस्य निश्चलतायां प्रमाण अभावात्। भावे वा कथं तत्व–उपप्लवः? अस्य एव विचारस्य अन्–उपप्लवात्। तत्–समान–न्यायस्य अन्यस्य अपि तथाभाव–प्राप्तेः निष्फलत्वात् च।

Trans: Let then the world be absolutely unthinkable (because it is not cognisable either as different or nondifferent from cognition). Well! does this then amount to the very denial of any knowledge of truth (about the world) or the culmination of this in nothingness? The first cannot be the case because the denial of the knowledge of all truth is itself a truth which being one of the subjects of denial cannot be supposed to be undeniable. (If it can, how can there be the above absolute denial of all knowledge or thought? And if this truth is undeniable other truths like those concerning the reality of self, or Brahman which are just like the latter will also be undeniable. Moreover, if all knowledge or thought is deniable there is no point in engaging in any thinking or noetic enterprise.

Expl: 'If the world is regarded as simply unthinkable then can there be any thought or knowledge of any truth? Even the truth that nothing can be known cannot be known. If this can be known for certain how can there be universal confusion (as claimed) or ignorance? And if the above thought is immune to criticism other thoughts like those pertaining to the reality of self could also be above criticism. Further if all thought were subject to criticism there will be no point in engaging in any thinking activity.

Defence of the above suggestion and its rebuttal

Text: न हि अस्य अतिप्रवृत्तिः फलं गगन–आस्वादनेन अ–तृप्तेः। ज्वाला कलाप–अलिंगनेन ताप–अन्–अपनोदनात्। न अपि अति–निवृत्तिः। जड़ीभाव–मात्रे अपि उपनिपाति–दुःख –अ–निवृत्तेः। न च दुःखं अपि विचार–असहं इति अ–हेयं एव। तथाविधस्य विचारे अपि अन–अधिकारात्। न अपि यथा–लोकं व्यवस्थितिः। विचारात् प्राक् अपि तस्याः पामर–आदिवत् अयत्न–सिद्धेः। न अपि पर–लोक–मात्रात् निवृत्तिः, तस्य ऐहिक–तुल्यत्वात्। दृश्यते हि तावत् अयं इति चेत्? यदि ज्ञान–वचनः दृशि–शब्दः तदा अपरः अपि तथा। साक्षात्कार–वचनः चेत् इह एव अनुमान–आदेः अ–प्रवृत्ति–प्रसंगः।

तत् अपि प्रत्यक्षं इतिचेत्? आमुष्मिकं अपि प्रत्यक्षं एव तुल्य–लक्षणत्वात्। अ–रुचेः एव तत्र न प्रवृत्तिः इति चेत्? तथा अपि किं विचारेण? तं अंतरेण अपि तस्याः सुलभत्वात्। तां एव अयं पुष्णाति इति चेत्? अ विशेषात् इह अपि पुष्णीयात् इति।

Trans: Certainly this thinking activity (carried on by the Buddhist) cannot be said to have any irregular urge to action as its result as no gratification can result from tasting the emptiness of the sky (as this activity is supposed to lead to sheer nothingness as its result). (Nor does this thinking bring about any relief from pain). The embracing of nonexistent flames of fire does not produce any heat- sensation. Absolute elimination of the urge to action is not also the result of thinking activity. Even if one is totally inactivated the sorrows befalling one cannot be got rid of simply by remaining inactive. It cannot be urged against this that since sorrow and suffering too do not stand rational scrutiny (and so are unreal) they are not worth discarding (by means of any effort). If one does not have any undesirable condition to get rid of he has no right to engange even in a thinking activity. Can one say then that all thinking leads only to the conclusion that there is nothing real outside common experience? No! Even without thinking this conclusion is available without any effort to everybody as it is ingrained even among illiterate persons. Nor can thinking be expected to turn people away only from activities like sacrifice and killing etc. which are supposed to lead to heaven and hell respectively (which are mere imaginative fictions). If thinking can turn one away from heaven and hell it can also turn one away from the desirable goals of this life (by engendering the realisation that everything is false or irrational). The other-wordly and this-worldly objectives are quite like each other. It cannot be argued against this that the objectives of this world are observable but those of the other world are not so because if observation means cognition then both are equally cognisable. If however observation is sense-perception then even in this world we cannot have anybody prompted to action by means of inferential and other kinds of cognition of the object of the action. But isn't it the case that even nonperceptually-cognised objects, of this world are certainly the objects of perception (earlier or later)? Yes, but then so are also the objects pertaining to the other world. Both the other-worldly and mundane pleasures and pains are alike in nature and so they are alike perceptual. It could be said against the supramundane pleasures that there is a natural dislike or indifference towards these in people's minds. But this does not provide any reason for thinking for, even without the benefit of thinking people may have a natural disinclination for other-worldly things. Thinking cannot be supposed to boost up this disinclination for, even with regard to actions in

this world thinking can quite well engender disinclination to engage in them.

Expl: Above, the very usefulness of thinking activity was called into question. Defending the necessity of this activity the Buddhist says that either absolute cessation from all activity or irregular activity is the result of thinking and so it is not useless. In reply the non-Buddhist argues that if thinking resulted in the denial of all truth it can lead neither to the gratification of any desire (as everything is rejected as false by the thinking) nor to the removal of any suffering. It won't do to say that suffering too being irrational need not be treated as rejectable. If someone is not required to discard the undesirable there is no sense in his engaging in any thinking activity. It cannot be urged against this that thinking is required to dissuade credulous people from engaging in ritualistic activities as even mundane activities would be thwarted by the thinking whose upshot is nothingness.

Conclusion of the discussion

Text: सः अयं पवन–तनय वार्तां उपश्रुत्य तत्–स्पर्धया बाल–वानरः कियत् अपि दूरं उत्प्लुत्य महा–अर्णवे पतितः प्राह, अपारः एव अयं अकूपारः मिथ्या रामायणं इति। तत् किं अनेन? एवं ज़ातुं निर्वक्तुं वा न शक्यते कीदृशं जगत् इति एतावत्–मात्रं अपि पामर–दशावत् निष्फलं एव। न च निष्फलत्वेऽपि श्रद्धेयं इदम्। तावत्–परामर्श–पाटव–अभावेन अपि उपपत्तेः। न हि जाति–अंधः नीलं ज्ञातुं निर्वक्तुं वा न शक्तः इति अज्ञेय–अ–निर्वाच्यं एव तत् लोके इति।

Trans: The debating tactic adopted by the Buddhist is similar to the proverbial speculation of a young monkey who on hearing about the exploits of the lord Hanuman, the son of the wind-god was infused with the competentive spirit and so took a long jump over the ocean but fell down into it after hopping over some distance and then exclaimed, 'Certainly this ocean must be limitless, nobody can cross it, the story narrated in Rāmāyaṇa must be false'. So there is no sense in the Buddhist's foregoing contention. That the world cannot be known or defined and so it is unthinkable is a conclusion which is known even to the layman without any thinking and therefore the thought yielding this conclusion is simply wasted. But is not the thinking worth pursuing despite its fruitlessness? No! Even the Buddhist's lack of expertise may be responsible for the thinking leading to the above conclusion. Certainly if a man born blind cannot see or define a blue object the latter is not regarded as unknowable or undefinable by common people.

Expl: Gñanāsrī says:

बुद्धया विविच्यमानानां स्वभावः न अवधार्यते।
अतः निर्–अभिलप्याः ते निः स्वभावं इदं जगत्।

'Since the real nature of things is not known even by intellectual analysis the world of things is therefore devoid of nature and so indescribable'. Keeping this remark and the foregoing arguments in view the non-Buddhist says ironically that being endowed with shallow intellect the Buddhist childishly jumped to the sweeping conclusion that the world is undefinable after making a few unsuccessful attempts to define external reality. In this he is just like the young monkey who unable to cross the ocean decided that the story of Hanumān crossing the ocean must have been fabricated. The Buddhist does not realise that it is his shallow intellect that makes him incapable of engaging in a bold intellectual enterprise.

Consideration and rebuttal of the second of the two alternatives mentioned above

Text: अस्तु तर्हि शून्यता एव परमं निर्वाणं इति चेत्? न सा हि यदि असिद्धा कथं तत् अवशेषं अपि विश्वं अभिधीयते, वाक्–मात्रस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्। परतः चेत् सिद्धा, परः अपि अभ्युपगन्तव्यः ग्राह्य लक्षणं च अवर्जनीयं इति। सः च परः यदिः संवृति एव विश्व–शून्यतयोः न कश्चित विशेषः। कथं तत् अपि अवशिष्येच? अ–संवृति–रूपः चेत् परः परचः एव तस्य सिद्धौ अनवस्था। स्वयं असिद्ध चेतः कथं शून्यत्वं अपि साधयेत्। स्वतः सिद्धः चेत् आयातः असि मार्गेण।

Trans: Let then nothingness itself be the ultimate condition of quiescence (and beatitude) No! (this cannot be). If nothingness is not proved how can it be stated that the world is reduced to nothingness? Mere (irresponsible) utterance (of this kind) is easy to make on any occasion. If however nothingness is established by some proof other than it then this proof too has to be admitted as real and its fulfilment of the definition of cognisedness has also to be treated as inescapable. But if this proof which is the other is nothing other than intellect then there cannot be any difference between the world and the nothingness as both are the objects of (intellect or cognition). How can then there be the nothingness (when the world is there uneliminated)? The other (which is the proof) cannot also be different from intellect because if this other needs a proof other than itself, there will result a regress. And an unproved other cannot prove even nothingness. If however you say that nothingness of the world is self-

established or self-revealed you have adopted the course which takes you to the Vedāntic fold.

Expl: If nothingness is the ultimate conclusion there must be some proof for it. But if the proof is there how can there be nothingness? If intellect itself is the proof then both the world and nothingness would be objects of this proof and then how can there be nothingness? If this proof is different from intellect then some other proof will be needed to establish this proof and thus there is bound to be regress. If nothingness of the world is self-revealed then there is no difference between this view and that of the Vedāntin.

The Vedāntic view explained

Text: तथा हि स्वतः सिद्धतया तत् अनुभव-रूपं, शून्यत्वात् एव च न तस्य काल अवच्छेदः इति नित्यं, अतः एव च न देश-अवच्छेदः इति व्यापकं, अतः एव तत् निर्-धर्मकं इति विचार-अस्पृष्टम्। तस्य धर्म-धर्मि-भावं उपादाय प्रवृत्तेः। अतः एव विशष-अभावः इति अद्वैतं, प्रपंचस्य अपारमार्थिकत्वात् च। निः प्रतियोगिकं इति विधि-रूपं, अविचारित-प्रपंच-अपेक्षया तु शून्यं इति व्यवहारः। तथा अपि प्रपंच शून्यस्य अनुभव-मात्रस्य प्रपचेन सह कः संबेधः? न च न अयं, प्रकाशते इति चेत्? वस्तु-गत्या न कश्चित्। संवृत्या तु गगन-गंधर्व-नगरयोः आधार-आधेय भावः इव विषयः-भावः। सः च यथा नैयायिकैः समर्थयिष्यते तथा एव। वेद्य-निष्ठः तु असौ अस्मिन् दर्शने इति विशेषः। अविद्या एव हि तथा तथा विव र्तते यथा यथा अनुभाव्यतया व्यवह्रियते। तत्-तत्-माया-उपनीत-उपाधि-भेदात् च अनुभूतिः अपि भिन्ना इव व्यवहार-पथं अवतरत गगनं इव स्वप्न-दृष्ट-घट-कटाह-कोटर-कुटी-कोटिभिः। तत् आस्तां तावत्। किं आर्द्रक-वणिजः वहित्र-चिंतया?

Trans: (Now the Vedāntin comes forward with his view to which the Buddhist view seems to approximate). To explain the Vedāntic view: The ultimate real being self-evident it is of the nature of experience itself. The world being unreal and nothing, the real is not determined by any temporal limitations and so is eternal. For this very reason it is not spatially determined and so is ubiquitous. Again for this reason it is devoid of any character and so inapprehensible by any thought. All thought proceeds by

means of the character-characterised- relation (but the real is beyond this relationship). For this reason also there are no differences in the real and so it is beyond all differences or duality. Moreover there cannot be duality because the world is absolutely unreal. There being nothing other than it, it is without any counterpositive and so is positive in nature. Still it is (some times) referred to as nothingness in relation to the irrational reality of the world. What is then the relation of pure experience which is exclusive of the world with the world (if subject-object-relationship holding between the cognition and the cognised is not admitted)? Certainly it is not the case that the world is not cognisable? (The answer to the question is this). In reality there is no relationship but illusorily there obtains between the two the subject-object-relationship similar to locus-located-relationship. This relationship holding between the sky and the land of the angels is just like the one maintained by the Nyāya logicians. The only difference of the relationship in this school is that it characterises only the cognised. Ignorance itself is illusorily transformed into the forms of (the socalled) entities which are objects of different usages pertaining to different cognised entities. Experience too is treated as diversified due to its qualification by different conditions projected by ignorance. This diversified appearance is just like the diversification of the one ubiquitous sky into innumerable portions due to the projection of the pan, the hole in a tree, the hut and innumerable such other entities experienced in a dream. However let us stop this jargon! 'A ginger-vender need not bother about a boat'.

Expl: Taking a cue from the doctrine of nothingness the Vedāntin holds forth on his view that Brahman as pure experience is the only reality that is there. The world is only an illusory appearance of Brahman conjured up by ignorance which projects all kinds of differences on the ineffable identity of pure experience which is identical with Brahman. Thus there is no nothingness because at the basis of all apparent diversity there is the reality of absolute experience which is only illusorily related with the illusory world. Even the non-dualists deny nothingness on the ground that there is no experience, even including the dream or illusion which can testify to the reality of nothingness which is absolute negation of everything everywhere. There cannot be such a negation at all.

Statement of the conclusion of the argument

Text: तस्मान अनुभव–व्यवस्थितौ अन्–आत्मा अपि स्फुरति इति अ वर्जनीयं एतत्। तत्–सिद्धौ तत्–लक्षणं अपि किंचित् अस्ति एव। तत् च बाह्य–अ–विरोधे ज्ञान–अ–नित्यतायां तन्–निष्ठं उभय–निष्ठं वा। बाह्य–विरोधे ज्ञान–निष्ठं एव। तत्–नित्यतायां तु ग्राह्य–निष्ठं

एव इति। तथा हि लक्ष्यः तावत् अत्र विषय-विषयि-भावः। सः च प्रकाशस्य सतः तदीयता-मात्र-रुपः स्व भाव-विशेषः। स्वभावत्वात् एव च न उपकार-अंतरं अपेक्षते। तत्-मात्रीयत्वात् एव च न अन्यदीयः।

Trans: For the reasons mentioned earlier (ignoring the Vedāntic diversion of the Śūnyatā-view) the reality of experience (both determinate and indeterminate) has got to be admitted and consequently the admission of the object of the experience as different from it is inescapable. And if the object is established there has to be for sure some definition or determinant of the objectivity of the object. As to this definition or determinant, (it is to be noted that) if the external entity is not denied and its cognition regarded as noneternal then the determinant is to be taken as characterising the cognition or both cognition and the external entity (which is the object of the cognition) but if the external reality is denied the determinant has to be treated as characterising the cognition alone. But if the cognition is supposed to be real (as in the Vedāntic view) the determinant has to be taken to characterise the cognised object only. Now to explain this: The definiendum here is the cognitive relation. This relation is the same as a certain intrinsic property of real cognition which is nothing other than the characteristic of 'belonging to'. And only on account of being an intrinsic property of cognition it does not stand in need of any causal condition (other than that of the cognition). Also because of its being of the nature of belonging only to the particular object of the cognition (it characterises) it does not relate to any other object.

Expl: Setting aside the Vedāntic view briefly stated in the foregoing passage the non-Buddhist now turns to state the conclusion of the discussion carried out so far. If experience is real and not mere nothing it must have an object different from itself and what determines the relationship of experience with its object is the property which characterises the experience or both the experience and its object if the external object is treated as real. This is so because if there is no experience or cognition the cognitive relationship does not come into being despite the object being there. In the Buddhist view cognition has the form of the object inhereing in it and cognised by it. So the determinant of the cognitive relation may be supposed to characterise both the cognition and its form, (which is non-different from the cognition) in this view. In the Vedāntic view however cognition is eternal but objects are not so, so the determinant of the (illusory) cognitive relation is to be taken as characterising the object only. But in the Nyāya view which is upheld here, the cognitive relation is regarded as the special

nature of cognition which is the same as the property of pertaining to a particular object and not to any other. Being the very nature of cognition-because a cognition is always a cognition of a particular object—it does not require any special cause to bring it into being. Thus cognition is by nature a revelation of a particular object. Its relation to its object is quite unlike its relation to its absence or to its inherence or samavāya (which are described as types of 'svarūpa' relation). It may here be asked, 'If the cognitive relation is as described then in the compound cognition of the form, 'x knows something and this something of course is a claypot', since both the cognition and the claypot are known the cognitive relation of the claypot with x's cognition should not remain unknown which however is not the case. Here the cognition is known as the cognition of something and the claypot is known as itself. This discrepancy in the (description or) definition of the cognitive relation can be removed if the definition is modified to state that the two natures must be known to be mutually synthesised. In the above the claypot as claypot is not synthesised with the cognition of something as something. If a general formulation of this definition is to be given we may say that the cognisedness of objects consists in their being definable on their cognition being defined.

Another question that may be asked here is, 'What is this 'nature' of cognition?' Is it some property of cognition or the very being of cognition? If it is the first then the object will constitute the nature of its cognition and this would be tantamount to the Buddhist view that cognitions have form. On the second alternative the object will be identical with its cognition and such a view is indistinguishable from idealism. And any object cannot constitute the nature of any cognition. Further the cognitive relation cannot be supposed to be located either in the cognition or in the object. If the former is true then the object cannot be the locus of this relation. If the latter is true then a thing even if uncognised will be endowed with this relation. Moreover in the simultaneous cognition of two or more objects the cognitivity of each of the objects must be taken to be its own. If a pot and a tree are cognised together the cognitivity of the pot must be distinguished from the cognitivity of the tree. Otherwise the pot would be cognisable as tree and the tree as pot. But if cognitivity or cognitive relation is cognition itself then the cognition would be diversified according to the diversity of its objects.

In reply to the above it is maintained that the cognitive relation which is identical with cognition differs from cognition to cognition. The generic property of pot-cognitionness for example is common to all the different pot-cognitions. The difficulty arising in the case of the simultanceous cognition mentioned above can be got over by regarding the different objects as the different locative determinants of the cognitive relation (as is done by the logicians in the case of the one inherence-relation relating different relata with each other). The cognition is said to pertain to its

object in the sense that it engenders a determinate apprehension of the object of the form 'this object is known'. This is not the case with the cognition mentioned earlier namely, 'x knows something and here is a pot', as x's cognition does not engender the determinate apprehension that the pot is cognised'.

In this account of the cognitive relation the generic properties of cognitive objects like potness etc. form part and parcel of the cognitive relation, for it is the pot as endowed with potness that constitutes the relation. So the cognition of pot will not be describable (as per this account) as the cognition of pot as endowed with potness or the cognition of the blue pot be describable as the cognition of the blue pot as endowed with blueness as the properties form an integral part of relations. Moreover if cognition, being by nature related to its object is supposed to engender some usage in regard to it, and the capacity to engender appropriate usage is equated with its relation to its object then it could have the cognitive relation with its negation too. It is best therefore to regard cognitivity as a relation different both from cognition and its object. There is a further reason for regarding this relation as a different entity altogether namely, that cognitions of a certain object—as cognitions—are productive of desires relating to that object. There is nothing common to these cognitions and desires except their relation to their common object.

Another important question that arises in this connection is whether desires and efforts are related by themselves to their object, or their relationship to the latter is mediated through the cognitive relation to the objects of the corresponding cognition generating them. This cannot be supposed to be true of God's desire which is eternal. Moreover if a certain cognition is supposed to be productive of a desire only because it alone has direct relation to its object then God's desire cannot have everything as its object. Further if it is stipulated that the cognition of an object which necessarily precedes a certain desire is what determines the nature of the object of the desire then the desire for cooking may have even 'the causality of the desired' as its object for it is the cognition of the latter that generally produces any desire. Also no effort can have cooking as its object as prior to the effort there does not occur the cognition of cooking. And since the cognition preceding desire is gone at the time the effort takes place the desire producing the latter would be deprived of any object at its second moment of occurrence. One could say in reply to this that the desire is both preceded and followed by different cognitions but a far better strategy than this is to treat both desire and effort independently concerned with their own objects instead of imposing upon them a borrowed objectivity.

It may however be argued against the above that a cognition is related to its object directly through identity while in the case of the desire

generated by it, it acts as the relation to the same object indirectly.

Defence of the cognitive relationship as advocated by the N.V School

Text: किं अस्य फलं इति प्रश्न–प्रसंगे अपि बहिः तत्–गोचर–व्यवहार–प्रवृत्तिः आंतरं अपि तेन ज्ञान–निरूपणम्। कुतः अयं ईदृक इति अनुयोगे अपि सामग्री–शक्तिः एव उत्तरं कार्य–कारणवत्। अन्यथा तत्र अपि उपकार–अंतर–अपेक्षायां अन्–अवस्था। तत्–अन्–अपेक्षायां वा साधारण्यं केन वार्यम्? तेन तत् एव क्रियते अनेन अपि एतत् एव विषयी–क्रियते इति विवेचनीयम्। विषयीक्रियते इति कः अर्थः? क्रियते इति अपि कः अर्थः इति विचारणीयम्। कार्य–उत्पादनं एवं करणं, तदीयतया उत्पत्तिः एव विषयीकरणं इति विवेचनीयम्। उपकारः तु यथा अत्र विज्ञान–स्वरूप–अतिरिक्तः नास्ति तथा अत्र अपि कार्य–स्वरूप–अतिरिक्तः नास्ति इति प्रतिसंधेयं इति।

Trans: If it is asked, 'What is the result of this cognitive relationship', the answer is: 'In the world of objects the result is the promotion of usage relating to the object of the cognition and internally it is the revelation of the cognition.' If it is then asked, 'Why is cognition such (that is promotes the usage) the answer is, 'because the causal collocation producing the cognition has the capacity to endow the cognition with the casuality'. This answer is similar to (another to a question) regarding the causality of the cause in relation to its effect. If the answer were not correct then if the cause is supposed to produce some benefit in the effect then this benefit itelf being an effect some benefit will have to be produced in this benefit too and thus there will be an unending series of benefits. But if the benefit generated by the cause is not needed for the effect what is to prevent any cause to produce any effect? Can it be said that a particular cause produces only a particular effect? Yes, then this too must be noted that cognition cognises only a certain object. But what is the meaning of cognising (or having an entity as object)? Well! then it too must be explained as to what 'produces' means. But is not production the same as bringing the effect into being? Yes, then it too must be noted that the origination of cognition as cognition of a certain object is itself its cognising of the latter. As to the benefit (produced), just as in the case of the cognition, there is no benefit other than the genesis of the effect.

Expl: The Buddhist questions the reality of the cognitive relation on the ground that it is unproductive of any result and that the specificity of this

relation cannot be explained. Both these questions are sought to be answered by the opponent by comparing the cognitive relation with the causal relation in every respect. The cause produces the effect as being endowed by the capacity to do so. It is not the cause because it produces some benefit in the effect. Similarly the cognition too apprehends its object because it is endowed with the capacity to do so. There is no benefit generated in the case of cognition except the cognising of the object.

Objection to the defence and its rebuttal

Text: अतः एव कार्य-कारण-भावः अपि उपेक्षितव्यः इति तु महत् साहसम्। तथा सति हि स्यात् एव न स्यात् एव इति-आदि आपद्येत। तथा च प्रकाश-तमसोः अन्यतरस्य कौटस्थ्य-प्रसङ्गः। सावृतः अस्तु इति चेत्? विषय-विषयि-भावः अपि एवं अस्तु। यदि विषय-कार्ययोः बलवतीं वाधा इति सांवृतः, नो चेत् एवं इति द्वयी गतिः।

Trans: If due to the foregoing objections themselves even causal relationship is put in cold storage it will be extreme rashness. In that case either things will be eternal or simply nonexistent. If the cognitive relation too is set aside then either there will be perennial cognition or no cognition whatsoever. One of the two will be the absolute reality. But could not the causal relation be conceptual? Well! then the cognitive relation too could be such. If there is some strong evidence against the reality of the cognised object and the effect then the two relations would be conceptual otherwise they will both have to be real. These are the only two alternatives.

Expl: If the Buddhist is prepared to discard even causality when confronted with the foregoing objections he is involved in the predicament of either affirming the eternity of things or totally denying their reality. The unfavourable contingencies may be precipitated thus: 'If a certain object originating at this moment did not depend upon any earlier object for its origination, it would originate even earlier'. Similarly, 'if this object existing only at some time did not depend upon anything for its production it would not be occasional in nature'.

In the case of the cognitive relation the unfavourable contingencies are. 'If cognition has no cause it would be eternal and so there would not be ignorance at all anywhere. But if cognition did not exist at all there will be absolute ignorance'. Some commentator has interpreted the text as explained above.

The rebuttal of Sāṃkhyaṇ and other views regarding the bearer of the cognitive relation

Text: तत् अत्र तत्वम्। न तावत् उभय–निष्ठं लक्षणं सतः अ–सतः वा स्थिरस्य अपि स्फुरणात्। न च ज्ञान–नित्यतायां पारमार्थिक–बाह्य–निष्ठं, सत् कार्य–वाद–व्यावृत्तेः सांख्य–प्रक्रिया–विध्वंसात्। न खलु पूर्व–अपर–तिरो–भाव–आविर्भाव–अंतरेण विचारस्य अपि अवसरः। न अपि अलीक–ग्राह्यतया क्षणिक–ज्ञान–निष्ठं इति। तुच्छस्य विशेष–अभावात्, ज्ञानस्य च निर्–आकारत्वात्, अन्यत्र अपि अ–सिद्धेः आरोपयितुं अ–शक्यत्वात्।

Trans: So this is the truth about the matter (in hand). In the Buddhist view the cognitive relationship cannot characterise both cognition and its object. Since even a durable real or unreal entity does appear in cognition, the cognition would have to be durable if the relation characterised both. It is better therefore to treat cognition alone as the bearer of the relation. If however cognition (the evolute of the intellect) is supposed to be eternal while the objects are taken to be changeable in nature then the latter cannot be the bearer of the relation as the Sāṃkhyaṇ maintains because the Sāṃkhyaṇ scheme has been polemically eliminated. Certainly even the discussion about this matter cannot take place if the disappearance of the earlier and the appearance of the latter is not admitted (and this goes against the Sāṃkhyaṇ view). Nor again can the momentary cognition be the locus of the relation if the cognised entities are unreal (to which nothing can bear any relation) and cognition does not have a form of its own which it can be supposed to apprehend. The blue, yellow etc. cannot also be supposed to be illusorily imposed upon cognition as, these being unreal are not available even for imposition.

Expl: Summarising the discussion the opponent says that in the Buddhist view cognition being momentary it alone can be regarded as the bearer of the cognitive relation. Of course if the object too were momentary and the cognition originated along with the object both cognition and its object would have this relation but since even the durable (real or unreal) can be cognised, only the momentary cognition can be supposed to be the bearer of the cognitive relation. In the Sāṃkhyaṇ view however it is the changing object not the unchangeable cognition which is the bearer of the relation because the cognisedness of the object depends upon the appearance and disappearance of the object. But on Sāṃkhyaṇ view even discussion of any view will be rendered senseless. The momentary cognition too cannot

be the bearer of the relation because the other relatum of the relation is nonexistent. The unreal object cannot qualify any object like cognition. There is also no form in the cognition (real or unreal) which may be the object of the cognition.

Objection to the rebuttal and its reply

Text: असंतः एव विशेषकाः चकासति इति चेत्? न। अ–संतः इति अ–तत्कालाः, अ–तत्–देशाः इति वा, अ–किंचित्–रूपाः इति वा, नियत व्यावृत्ति–मात्र–रूपाः इति बा? प्रथमे काल–देश–अंतरयोः सत्व–प्रसंगः। द्वितीये तु अ–विशेषता। तृतीये नीलस्य अलीकस्य अ–नील–व्यावृत्ति–रुपतायां अ–नीलानां पारमार्थिकत्व–प्रसंगः। तेषां अलीकत्वे तत्–व्यावृत्ति–आत्मनः नीलस्य अन्–अलीकत्व–आपत्तिः। तथा अपि अलीकत्वे अ–विशेषत्वम्।

Trans: Could it be said against the above that the unreals (blue, yellow etc., the external entities which are fictitious) themselves appear as characterising cognitions? No. Here it may be asked, does the word 'unreal' mean 'nonexistent at the time and place of the cognition' or 'devoid of any characteristic property' or 'that which is of the nature of specific exclusions only'? On the first alternative time and space would have to be regarded as real (even if things are unreal). On the second, the unreals being devoid of any character they cannot characterise cognition. On the third alternative, if the unreal blue (for example) were of the nature of the exclusion of the nonblue then the nonblue would have to be real. If on the other hand the nonblue were unreal then the blue which excludes it would have to be real. If both the blue and the nonblue were unreal none of them can characterise the cognition.

Expl: Replying to the foregoing objection against his view the Buddhist argues on the basis of his theory of the appearance of the unreal in cognition (specially illusory) that only the nonexistent external entity is apprehended by cognition. This nonexistent may be understood in three different ways. One is to take it as, 'existing at other times and places but not in the present.' Such a non-existent presupposes the existence of space and time. Another way of understanding the nonexistent is to take it as characterless. Such an entity cannot characterise anything. The third type of nonexistence is exclusion which if unreal entails the reality or existence of the excluded. If the excluded is unreal the excluder must be real.

Objection to the reply and its rejoinder

Text: तेन रुपेण अ–विशेषत्वं एव इति चेत्? अथ विशेषः केन? नील–पीत–आदिना इति चेत्? तत् किं ततः अधिकम्? अन्–अलीकं तर्हि स्यात्। अन्–अधिकं चेत् कुतः तेन अपि इति?

Trans: But is it not the case that as unreal the blue etc. do certainly not characterise the cognition? Well! if this is so then in what other capacity do they characterise the cognition? Could it be as blue, yellow etc.? If so then these forms are other than the unreal forms (of blue, yellow etc.) and if they are so they must be real. If they are not so then they too cannot characterise.

Expl: It is now contended that just as blue, yellow etc., despite being real (in the N.V. view) have each of them their own distinctive characters, so even if each of these is regarded as unreal it must have its own distinctive character. But this character must be different or nondifferent from the unreal character inhering in these entities. In either case there is difficulty as mentioned above.

Objection to the rejoinder and its reply

Text: वासना–वशात् विशेषाः स्फुंरति इति चेत्? स्फुरंतु, कः कारणे विप्रतिपद्यते? ते तु नील–आदयः यदि–अ–किंचित्–रुपाः कथं विशेषाः? तत्–इतर–रुपेण अ–किंचित्–रुपत्वे तेन रूपेण किंचित्–रुपाः एव इति ब्रूमः। विचार–अ–सहता–मात्रं अलीकत्वं इति चेत्। तथा अपि भाषा–परिवर्तन–मात्रम्। विचार अ–सहतायाः किंचित्–रुपत्व–विरोधित्वात्। अ–विरोधे वा त्वत्–विचार–अ–सहनाः अपि किंचित्–रूपाः नील–आदयः इति विचारस्य दुर्–विचारत्व–प्रसंगः। तेन नील–आदीनां छाया–मात्रस्य अपि अन्–आक्रान्तेः। प्रविश वा अनिर्वचनीय–ख्याति–कुक्षिं तिष्ठ वा मति–कर्दमं अपहाय न्याय–नय–अनुसारेण नील–आदीनां पारमार्थिकत्वे।

Trans: (Against the above it could be contended that) even the unreals appear in cognition because of the impulsion of certain (transcendental) urges (and thus they come to characterise the cognition). This may be right. There is no doubt about the causation of the appearance of the unreal. The doubt is how the unreals having no form or character can

themselves be the characteristics (of others)? What is however being emphasised is the fact that the blue, yellow etc. may be characterless so far as their nonapparent aspect is concerned but as blue, yellow etc. they must have some character. But mayn't it be urged that these are called unreal only because they do not stand rational scrutiny? No, this is only using a different expression for saying that the blue, yellow etc. are unreal, as irrationality and having some character do not go together. If these two were not opposed to each other then it follows that the blue, yellow etc. have some form or character despite their being unamenable to your scrutiny. This means that your scrutiny or thinking is fallacious as it does not affect even the shadow of the blue, yellow etc. So only one of two courses is open to you. You may either take refuge in the theory of the appearance of the inexplicable proprounded by the Vedāntin or come out of the intellectual quagmire (of the theory of the appearance of the unreal) and join hands with the N.V. philosophers to uphold the reality of the external.

Expl: Now it is contended that the unreal appearance of the blue, yellow etc. is engendered by certain urges. So the appearance of the unreal cannot be avoided. The rejoinder to this is that the causation of the appearance is not under dispute. What is disputed is the appearance of what is totally formless. If formlessness is only inexplicability as real or as unreal then this inexplicability must be opposed to everything so that even the thinking about the inexplicable would be opposed by it. So the thinking cannot be supposed to affect the nature of the external entities. Otherwise one will have to side with the Vedāntins who espouse the theory of the appearance of the inexplicable.

Summary statement of the conclusion

Text: तस्मात्

न ग्राहय–भेदं अवधूय धियः आस्ति वृत्तिः।
तत्–बोधने जयिनि वेद–नये जयश्रीः।
नो चेत् अ–निंद्यं इदं ईदृशं एव विश्वं
तथ्यं तथागत–मतस्य तु कः अवकाश?

Trans: For this reason the cognitive relationship cannot obtain if the mutual difference of the cognised entities and their difference from the cognitions were not admitted. If these differences are denied then the strong view of the Vedāntins will have to be upheld. Otherwise this world has to be admitted as real and not rejectable. In either case there is no scope for the Buddhist to maintain his view.

Expl: Summarising the discussion the non-Buddhist says that without

admitting the diversity and reality of external objects and their difference from cognition the cognitive relationship cannot be upheld. If all diversity is denied there is no go but to fall in line with the Advaitins for whom only the principle of consciousness is real. Otherwise what the logicians say, namely, that the world of commonsense has to be regarded as real has to be accepted even if the Vedic statements seem to say something quite opposed to this. Sometimes Vedic statements need reinterpretation to reconcile them with common experience. But the Buddhist view discussed above can in no way be defended.

Explanation of the paradoxical nature of the Buddhist contention

Text: तत्र अलीकं विचार–अ–सहं अनिर्वचनीयं वा यं आश्रित्य जगत् उद्गीयते सः एव विचारः चिंत्यतां कः असौ कीदशः च इति। सतर्क प्रमाणं एव वाक्य–आरुढं इति चेत्? तत् चेत् विचार–अ–सहं किं तेन भौत–विचार–कल्पेन? तथा हि केनचित् भौतेनं राज–द्वारि द्विरदं आलोक्य विकल्पितं, कि अयं अंधकारः मूलकं अत्ति अहोस्वित् जंलचाहः बलाकान् वर्षति गर्जति च, यत् वा बांधवः अयम्? 'राज–द्वारे स्मशाने च यः तिष्ठति सः बांधवः इति परम–आचार्य–वचनात्। अथवा यः अयं भूमौ दृश्यते तस्य छाया इति? दूषितं च। तत्र न आद्यः। शूर्प–युगल–स्फोट–अन्–उपपत्तेः। न द्वितीयः। तस्य स्तंभ–चलुष्टय–अभावात्। न तृतीयः, तस्य लगुड–भ्रामण–अभावात्। न चतुर्थः। तस्य नर–शिरः शत–उद्गिरण–अभावात्। ततः न किंचित् इदं इति। किं तावता द्विरद–स्वरुपं निर्वततां, यद्वा वरं एतस्मात् यः अयं सः अयं इति वादी द्वितीयो भौतः? तत् विचार–सहं इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि स्वयं एव विलीनं अलीक–आदि–वादैः। न उत्तर–प्रतीक्षणं अपि।

Trans: Apropos of the thought that is regarded as the basis of the view that the world is unreal or rationally-inexplicable or validly- unascertainable it may be asked, 'what after all is this thought and what moreover is its nature?' It may be replied that only a proof supported by a counterfactual conditional is the object of syllogistic thought but if this proof is not rationally sustainable what is the use of such a proof which is just like boorish speculation? To illustrate boorish speculation. A certain ignoramus saw an elephant at the gate of the king's palace and started speculating thus: 'Is it darkness gulping radishes, or rainbearing clouds

thundering and pouring down lightnings or a kin because the great teachers have said, 'whoever accompanies one at the palace-gate or the crematorium is a kin', 'or perhaps is it the shadow of what is seen standing on the ground?'.

Having speculated thus the stupid person also cancelled his various imaginative phantasies thus: 'It cannot be darkness because then there cannot occur the whacking by a pair of winnowing baskets,' it cannot be the cloud as the cloud does not have four pillars, it cannot be a kin because a kin does not brandish a big stick'; 'it cannot be the shadow of the one standing on the ground as a shadow does not spew out hundreds of human heads; so it is nothing.'

Should such speculations coupled with their cancellations be allowed to eliminate the reality of the elephant or another stupid person, saying, 'it is what it is' be regarded as a better authority on the matter? If the nature of the world is rationally- ascertainable then the theories like those of the unreality of the world stand automatically refuted. There is no need to wait for their rejoinder.

Expl: To scotch the various contentions that the world is unreal, irrational or rationally-inexplicable it is asked whether the thought by which these theses are sought to be proved is itself irrational or not. An example of irrational thinking and its equally irrational cancellation by a boorish person is presented above to show how the above Buddhist contentions are irrational and stand cancelled of themselves. A boorish person on seeing an elephant for the first time imagines it to be various things. The elephant is mistaken by the person as an embodiment of darkness, as a rainbearing cloud, as some relative of his and lastly as the shadow of the real creature. The elephant's snout, legs, tusks, urination, droppings etc. are also variously mistaken by the person. Subsequently the same person discards all these constructions of his on the basis of other false constructions of his own. But neither his earlier nor later constructions disprove the reality of the elephant. Similarly if the proofs adduced for the irrationality of the world are themselves irrational then automatically the irrationality etc. of the world are ruled out. On the other hand if this proof is not irrational then it follows that everything is not irrational which again disproves the original proposition of universal irrationality.

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Defence of the Buddhist thought and its rebuttal

Text: लोक–सिद्धं इति चेत्? तर्हि तस्य परिकर–शुद्धिः अपि तथा एव ग्राह्या। अन्यथा लोकस्य अपि व्यतिक्रमे विचारस्य यादृच्छिक–वाङ्–मात्रत्व–आपत्तेः। लोके च आकांक्षा–योग्यता–आसत्तिमत्तया प्रतिसंहितं अ–श्लिष्ट–अर्थं प्रमाण–अंतर–अ–प्रतिहतं स्व–वचन–स्व–क्रिया–स्व–ज्ञान–व्याघात–आदि–दोष–रहितं वाक्यं अर्थ–प्रतिपत्तेः अंगम्। यथा अयं पर्वतः वन्हिमान् इति। अन्–अंगं इतरत्। यथा अयं पर्वतः देवदत्तः गौरः इति, जलह्रदः वन्हिमान् इति, गिरिः देवदत्तेन भुक्तं अग्निमान्–इति श्वेतः डित्यः धावति इति, शशः विषाणी इति, मम माता वंध्या इति, अहं मूकः इति इमं न जानामि इति, मम कर्णे प्रविश्य गजः गर्जति भेषजं उच्यतां इति।

Trans: (The Buddhist now seeks to defend his foregoing contention). Could not the syllogistic proof (for the irrationality-thesis) be commonsensical (so that the irrationality sought to be established by it would not be vitiated as mentioned above)? Yes, but then the purity of the collocation of the causal auxiliaries of the proof should also conform to commonsensical norms. Otherwise, if these norms too are violated the resulting thought would be reduced to being mere arbitrary speech-act. Commonly only such senteneces are the means of verbal (communication or) knowledge as are structured by (component) words which are syntactically, competently and proximately connected with each other, which do not have double meanings, whose content is not contradicted by other valid means of cognition, which are devoid of the fallacies of contradictory self-utterance, self-activity, and self-cognition and which do not entail any thesis which contradicts its own meaning. Such a sentence for example is, 'This mountain is afire.' Sentences of a different type are not the means of (true) verbal cognition. For instance the following are the sentences which do not fulfil the above qualifications: 'This mountain,

Devadutta is fair-complexioned'; 'The lake full of waters is afire'; 'The mountain Devadutta has eaten is afire'; 'The white wooden elephant is running, "The hare has horns; 'The mother is barren', 'I am dumb', 'I do not know this', and 'The elephant entering my ears is trumpeting to say, tell me a cure (for this)'.

Expl: Couldn't the proof for rationality be just commonsensical (so that absolute reality of it may not be expected)? To this Buddhist suggestion the opponent replies that both such a proof and its auxiliaries have to conform to commonsensical norms. If these are transgressed all thinking will be reduced to mere irrelevant gabble. According to these norms syntax, competence, proximity etc. are the essential conditions for sentences to be significant. Syntax is defined by some as the anterior nonexistence of the cognition of the relationship of the meaning of one word-component of a sentence with another word-component. This by itself is regarded as the syntactic relationship of words with one another in a sentence because if the knowledge of this is considered essential then there would arise the fallacy of circularity. The anterior nonexistence cannot be known without the knowledge of the cognition of the relationship of the meaning and the latter cannot be known without the knowledge of the syntax. But syntax cannot be defined as the anterior nonexistence as mentioned above. Such a definition would render the other two conditions superfluous as the incompetent and mutually non-proximate words would be excluded by the definition of syntax itself. Further anterior nonexistence being the common cause of all products, syntax defined in terms of anterior nonexistence cannot be treated as the special cause of verbal cognition. So syntax has to be redefined as that property of words (composing a sentence) without which they cannot lead to connected meaning. As to competence it is not definable as the absence of any obstructive factor (established elsewhere) in the case of the relationship of the meanings of the competent words, as the relationship is not known before the competence is known. Nor is competence definable as the cognition of the coocurrence of generically-similar meaning contents as any two such contents can have generic similarity in relation to some genus common to them. Generic similarity cannot also be defined as 'being endowed by a property conducive to connection of meaning.' Even the word meanings in the sentence, 'He irrigates trees with milk' have such generic similarity, milk too being a liquid object fit for irrigation. Nor can competence be defined as 'being endowed with a property which is concomitant with the connection of the meanings of words composing the sentence.' If this was the nature of competenc verbal cognition resulting from it would be of the nature of inference. The right definition of competence therefore is 'the absence of the true cognition of the connection of the meaning of one word being unrelated with the meaning of another word both of which compose a significant sentence'.

Proximity, another condition of verbal cognition is the uninterrupted cognition of the words composing a sentence. All these are not by themselves needed for verbal cognition as even in the absence of one or more of these conditions the erroneous cognition of their presence in the case of certain sentences verbal cognition does arise. And in the case of certain sentences where the context engenders doubt regarding the availability of any of these conditions the sentences do not give rise to any definite verbal cognition.

Words are qualified as unambiguous in meaning in the text not because seuences with ambiguous words are not meaningful but because if the ambiguity of the ambiguous words is not known to their speaker the hearer may misunderstand him.

Another qualification of sentential meaning given is 'noncontradiction by any other valid means of cognition' which may appear to be identical with competence. But this is really different from it in that contradiction of the sentential meaning may take place after the latter has been apprehended while competence needs to be ascertained before the sentential meaning is known.

The sentence 'This mountain Devadutta is fair' is an example of a nonsyntactic combination of words as the words 'mountain', 'Devadutta' and 'fair' are not syntactically related with each other. 'The water reservoir is afire' illustrates the absence of competence in words. 'The mountain, Devadutta has eaten afire' is a sentence whose words lack mutual proximity. 'The white 'dittha' runs' is an example of a sentence with an ambiguous word as the word 'dittha' has more than one meaning. 'The hare has horns' conveys meaning which is contradicted by common experience. 'My mother is barren' is a sentence which is selfcontradictory as 'motherhood' and barrennss do not go together. (I am dumb' is contradicted by its very utterance as a dumb person cannot make any utterance. 'I do not know this' is contradicted by the very cognition implied by the referential use of 'this'. 'The elephant entering my ear trumpets, 'prescribe me some medicine' is a sentence which implies what contradicts the very meaning it conveys. If the elephant has entered the ears of a person he cannot hear anything, how then can he be asked to prescribe in words some medicine or if the elephant cannot enter the ear at all then what the medicine is for?

Purpose of syllogistic statements

Text: तत–अर्थः च साधनं दूषणं च। तत्र साधनं व्याप्ति–पक्षधर्मता–औपयिक–रूप–पंचक–उपेतं लिंगं, यथा विशिष्ट–धूमवत्वात् इति। लिंग–आभासं इतरत् यथा जलाशयत्वात् इति। तत्–परिकरः च तर्कः। सः अपि व्याप्ति बलं आलंब्य अनिष्ठ–प्रसङ्गरूपः अनिष्टं च

द्विविधं प्रामामिक परित्यागः अ–प्रमाणिक–परिग्रहः च। यथा यदि उदकं पिपासा–दुखं न न अशमयिष्यत् न पीयेत, यदि च तत् एव परं अंतः दहेत् तदा अ–विशिष्टं मां अपि दहेत्। इतरः तु तर्क–आभासः। यथा यदि जलं पिपासा–दुखं न अशमयिष्यत् रूपवत् अपि न अभविष्यत् यथा आकाशम्। यदि च तत् एव परं अन्तः अधक्ष्यत् मां अपि सुरभिं अकरिष्यात् इति। स्वप्रतिक्षेपक–युक्तेः अन्–आक्षेपकं सिद्धं च्। दूषणं अपि विद्धंच। यथा अग्निमत्वे साध्ये प्रमेयत्वं अन्–ऐकांतिकत्वात् अ–हेतुः इति। अन्यथा तु तत् आभासः यथा अयं धूमः न अग्नि–साधकः सर्वथा अन्–उपलभ्यमान–उपाधि–शंका–ग्रस्तत्वात्, प्रमेयत्वात् विरूद्धत्वात् च इति। इतरत् अपि प्रमाणं अनुमान–छायया एव विचार–अंगं, तर्कं अन्–अन्यथासिद्धिं च पुरस्कृत्य प्रवृत्तेः। ततः तत्र अपि एषा एव रीतिः अनुगंतव्या इति।

Trans: The purposes of syllogistic statements or one of these statements is proof and disproof. As to proof (or that by means of which proof is effected) it consists of the middle term which is endowed with the five characteristics conducive to the concomitance of the middle with the major and its presence in the minor. Such a middle term is (for example) 'there is issuing a continuous column of smoke from here' (in the case of the thesis that 'there is fire here'). A middle term which is not such is a pseudo-middle term as 'being a reservoir of water' is for the above thesis. The auxiliary to this proof by valid middle terms is the counterfactual conditional. It consists of the precipitation of an undesirable conclusion based upon the concomitance (of the absences of the major and the middle terms). The undesirable conclusions are of two kindes viz. the rejection of the validly-established and the espousal of the invalidated. For example, 'If water did not quench the pain of thirst it would not be drunk, if it caused burning-sensation inside other bodies it would cause such a sensation within my body too,' is a valid counterfactual conditional. A conditional unlike this is a fallacious one. For example 'If water did not quench the pain of thirst it would not be endowed with whiteness as is the sky and if water caused burning-sensation within others' bodies it would induce fragrance even within me'; are instances of fallacious conditionals. As to the fallacy leading to disproof it is that which does not entail a conclusion opposed to its own assertion and which is invariably concomitant with being the disproof of the opposite middle term. Also it must be already established. For example in the inference of fire on the

mountain the property of 'being' is not a valid middle term as it is deviant with fire. So deviantness is the proper fallacy afflicting the middle term 'being' in this inference. If a fallacy does not fulfil the above conditions it cannot be supposed to lead to disproof as for example in the inference, 'This smoke does not lead to the inference of fire as it is beset with the doubt of being afflicted by absolutely unknowable conditions, (determining its concomitance with fire) or it is endowed with the property of being and is also opposed to the presence of fire in its locus' (these do not lead to the disproof of the major term). All other proofs based on perception, verbal statements etc. are conducive to thinking only as instrumental to (or subserving the interest of) inference as they proceed only by taking the help of the counterfactual conditional and the relation of necessity. So even in their case the above explanation itself has to be adopted.

Expl: Elucidating the purpose of syllogistic argument the non-Buddhist says that proving and disproving are the two functions which are executed by syllogisms. For the first is specially needed a middle term which is endowed with the five properties like, presence in the minor, presence in the comnior, exclusion from the contraminor, absence of any contrary middle term and presence of its major term in the minor term. All these five properties must characterise the middle if it is to be a valid term. Only a middle with positive and negative concomitance with the major is a valid ground for inference. The counterfactual conditional precipitating the absence of the middle on the assumption of the absence of the major is an auxiliary of the valid middle term. Examples of proper and improper conditionals are given above. 'If water did not quench thirst nobody would drink it; 'If water caused burning sensation to some it would cause such a sensation to all; 'These are instances of proper or valid conditionals. 'If water did not quench thirst it would be colourless' is an example of the invalid conditional. Disproving or falsifying is attempted by means of fallacies which are established, which do not entail contradictory reasons and are concomitant with the proof of the fallaciousness of the falsified middle term. Any fallacy which is not such is not a proper one and so not to be used in disproof or rebuttal. 'Being' for example is a fallacious middle in the inference of fire. The fallacy afflicting this middle is deviation and it is a proper one. But in the inference, 'This smoke does not prove the presence of fire on the mountain; beacuse it is beset with the doubt of being afflicted by absolutely unknown conditions (determining its conconitance with fire) or it is endowed with the property of being and is also opposed to the presence of fire in its locus, the fallacious middle terms cited do not meet the requirements of a proper disproof. The first namely, 'Being beset by the doubt of affliction by absolutely unknown conditions' is a kind of disproof which entails its own contradiction. If no condition is known there cannot arise any doubt

about it. The second, 'being endowed by being' is not concomitant with the disproof of fire, for not every object is such as cannot be the ground for the presence of fire. Smoke is a thing which is such a ground. Nonexistence or opposition, the third middle term is unestablished.

Even in perceptual and verbal proofs counterfactual conditionals and relations of concomitance of middle and major have to be taken help of.

Statement of the conclusion from the above

Text: एवं व्यवस्थिते लोक–व्यवहारे साधन–उपक्रमेण यदि विचारयसि, प्रतिज्ञा एव तावत् न अंगं धारयति। तथा हि न किंचित् अस्ति, न किंचित् सत्यं, न किंचित् कारकं, न किंचित् विचार–सहं, न किंचित् स–आलंबनं न किंचित् दर्शनं, न कश्चित् सिद्धान्तः इत्यादौ स्वार्थ–प्रतक्षेपः तावत् दुर्–उद्धरः। प्रतिज्ञा अपि हि न स्यात् न सत्या, न कारिका, न विचार–सहा, तत्–विज्ञानं अपि न स–आलंबनं, तत्–फलं अपि न दर्शनं तत्–अर्थः अपि न सिद्धान्तः इति आपद्येत।

Trans: The established common convention or practice (in regard to proof and disproof) being such, if you (the Buddhist) proceed by the right method of proof then your thesis itself fails to materialise. To explain: In your negative thesis like 'there is nothing' 'Nothing is real', 'Nothing is an agent', 'Nothing is rational', Nothing has any object', There is no philosophical view', 'There is no doctrine etc.', the incidence of selfcontradiction is difficult to avoid, (If the theses are maintained then) the theses cannot occur, if they occurred they cannot be real, they cannot produce any result or be rational, their cognition too will be objectless, their result will not be some view and their content will not be any doctrine. Such an undesirable contingency will result from the affirmation of the above theses.

Expl: If the nature of the common convention with regard to proof and disproof by means of syllogisms as elaborated above is admitted then the negative theses of the Buddhist entail the negations of those very theses as the theses (as certain entities) are included in the counterpositives of the negations. So there cannot be any thesis or its cognition or any philosophical view or any doctrine for the Buddhist to maintain.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: इष्यते एव इदं इति चेत्? न। इच्छा–मात्रेण व्याघात–अ–निवृत्तेः। यदि हि न ज्ञातं किंचित् अस्ति इति–आदि प्रतिज्ञा–अर्थः प्रतिज्ञां

स्पृशेत् कथं अयं अर्थः प्रत्येतव्यः? न चेत् कथं सा न अन्–उपपन्ना? तत्–अन्–उपपन्नत्वे च कथं पुनः प्रतिज्ञां–अर्थः उपपद्यते? तत् इदं आयांतं स्व–विष–मूर्छिता भुजंगी आत्मानं एव दशति इति।

Trans: But we (the Buddhists) certainly admit these conclusions (precipitated as undesirable contingencies). No! merely by such admission the self-contradiction entailed cannot be got rid of. If there is nothing how can the meaning of the thesis be known if the thesis itself is one of the things denied in the thesis? If however the thesis is not included in the things denied in the thesis how can the latter be rational? And if the thesis is irrational how can its meaning be rational? Thus it is like the female snake paralysed by its own venom biting itself (into unconsciousness).

Expl: The self-contradictory nature of the Buddhist's thesis is being exposed here. If the thesis itself as one of the negated things in the thesis is unreal then the contradictory of the thesis is real. If the thesis is not unreal, then it follows that at least one thing in the world is real.

Defence of the objection and its rebuttal

Text: तत्वतः इति विशेषणात् अयं अ–दोषः इति चेत्? तत् विचारः वा स्यात् लोक–मर्यादा–अतिक्रमः वा? प्रथमः पूर्वं एव निरस्तः। तस्य प्रतिज्ञा–रुपतया कुलीरस्य इव स्व–प्रसूत–युक्ति अपत्येन एव प्रतिहतत्वात्। द्वितीये तु स्वच्छाया–अतिक्रमवत् सः एव व्याघातः। यदि हि लोकमर्यादा–अतिक्रमः न विचार–स्वरुप–स्थितिः तत्–स्वरुप–स्थितिः चेत् न तत्–अतिक्रमः इति अर्थः।

Trans: Couldn't the above fallacy be got rid of by qualifying the (theses or the) negation in the thesis by the adjective 'in reality? Yes, but what is this reality? Is it reflection or transgression of common convention? The first of these alternatives has already been rebutted. Reflection being of the nature of a thesis if it is real the thesis that 'nothing is real' will stand refuted by the reality of reflection. Thus like the mongoose being killed by its own progeny, reflection will be eliminated by the very consequence which it entailed. In the second alternative too the same selfcontradiction results. It is just like a thing overtaking its own shadow. If common convention is transgressed then there cannot be any definite reflection or thinking and if definite reflection is there then the common convention cannot be transgressed.

Expl: The Buddhist seeks to justify his negative theses by qualifying them by the adjective 'in reality' so that they would imply that empirical reality is

not affected. This is countered by the non- Buddhist on two counts. If the qualification means that only on reflection everything is found to be nonexistent, unreal etc. then a thesis being only a kind of reflection its reality entails the unreality of the thesis itself. If the reflection is unreal it cannot entail the unreality of every thing which is maintained by the thesis. If however the qualification means that beyond common conventions nothing is real etc. then because all thought or reflection depends on common convention there cannot be any truth or reality surpassing the latter.

The above rebuttal continued

Text: प्रतिषेध्य–सिद्धि–अ–सिद्धि–व्याघातः च। यदि हि प्रतिषेध्यं सिद्धं न अत्यंताय निषेधः। न चेत् न तराम्। लोक–व्यवहार–सिद्धं इति चेत्? सिद्धं एव तर्हि। न हि अन्यतः अपि किंचित् सिद्धयति। न अयं अ–बाध्यः व्यवहारः इति चेत्? न। यदि न एकत्र अन्यत्र अपि तथा भाव–प्रसंगात्। सर्वत्र बाध्यते इति चेत्? तत्–अपेक्ष–सिद्धिना व्यवहारेण, अन–अपेक्षेण वा, अ–व्यवहारेण एव वा इति? यः तावत् तत अपेक्ष–सिद्धिः स : कथं तं एव बाधेत? न हि अन्–उष्णत्व–अनुमानेन उष्णत्व–ग्राहि–प्रत्यक्ष–बाधः लोके। द्वितीयः तु अ–संभवी। न हि निषेधकं प्रमाणं निषेध्य–सिद्धि–निरपेक्षं भवितुं क्षमते। तृतीये तु तत्–विपरीत–आपत्तिः। विचार–बाध्यत्वं उपक्रम्य अ–विचारेण बृहणात्।

Trans: Moreover the theses entail contradiction both if the counterpositive of the negation in the theses is real or is unreal. If real it cannot be negated absolutely and if unreal there cannot be negation its counterpositive being nonexistent. But doesn't mere commonsensical cognition of the negated suffice for its negation (its reality not being required)? Yes, but then the existence of the negated is as good as established. Certainly nothing is established otherwise. But isn't it a fact that this common cognition or usage is not (uncontradictable or) unfalsifiable? No: If the cognition or usage is falsified in one case it is not so in other cases. (The silver-cognition in the shell is falsified but in the silver itself it is held as veridical). But can't we say that the common cognition is falsifiable everywhere (nothing being real)? Well! if so we ask, 'Is the cognition falsified by another (valid) cognition which depends upon it for its validation or a cognition which does not so depend or finally by a cognition which is itself false?' It cannot be the first. Certainly

the inferential cognition of something being not warm is not commonly taken to contradict the perceptual cognition of warmth of the same thing. (Unless warmth is known its opposite or absence cannot be known). The second alternative is simply impossible. Certainly a contradictory and valid cognition of negation can take place without the occurrence of the cognition of its counterpositive. On the third alternative, in lieu of the contradictory falsifying a thesis, the thesis itself could falsify its contradictory (as the contradictory cognition is avowedly invalid), The Buddhist started the discussion by maintaining the falsity of everything by means of valid cognition but he wound up the discussion by maintaining universal falsification by means of invalid cognition.

Expl: Urging another objection to the Buddhist view the non-Buddhist says that universal negation cannot be asserted. If the counterpositive of the negation is real universal negation is ruled out. If it is unreal how can there be a negation without any counterpositive? If for negation only a cognition of the counterpositive is supposed to be needed then this cognition itself suffices to establish the reality of its object. Of course such cognitions are in some cases falsified but not in all cases. It cannot be said that these cognitions are universally falsifiable (espousing the doctrine of the appearance of the unreal). If every cognition is falsifiable it must be so by a valid cognition depending upon the cognition to be falsified or by one not depending upon it or by a cognition which is itself false. All these alternatives are rejectable. Moreover in the inference of universal negation the middle term may be concomitant with pure negation or the negation of the real. If it is the first then nothing is negated in the inference. If it is the second then the cognition of the middle term cannot lead to the negation of the real as it is dependent upon the cognition of the latter. Similarly the contradicting cognition cannot have pure negation as its object as then nothing would be negated by it. But if it has the negation of the real as its object it cannot negate the real absolutely, being itself dependent upon the cognition of the real.

Concluding the rebuttal

Text: न च एतत् अपि निर्व्यूढम्। सः हि अ–यत्न–सिद्धं अध्यक्षं वा स्यात् अन्–इष्टि–मात्रं वा? आद्ये विरोधः अ–सिद्धिः च। द्वितीये लोक–अतिक्रमः। पर–अन्–इष्ट्या त्वत्–अन्–इष्टि बाध–प्रसंगः च इति।

Trans: Even this—the abovementioned falsifiability by means of invalid cognition—has not been properly defended. For what is this 'false cognition?' Is it a spontaneous perceptual cognition or just some undesirable contingency? If it is the first the Buddhist will have to regard perceptual cognition as veridical. Also there being no perception negating

the world the thesis would remain unproved. On the second alternative common practice would stand violated as a mere adverse contingency is not supposed to falsify anything. Moreover the opponent can contradict the adverse contingency of the Buddhist by not entertaining it.

Expl: Even a non-veridical cognition cannot be supposed to falsify the world. If spontaneous perception is the nature of this cognition then this perception itself has to be treated as veridical. Moreover there is no world-denying perception. Mere undefined adverse contingency also cannot be the nature of this falsifying cognition for what is a contingency for the Buddhist is not such for the non-Buddhist.

Rebuttal of the middle terms in the negative inferences

Text: एतेन हेतवः निरस्ताः। ते हि ज्ञेयत्वात, ज्ञानत्वात, अ–सत्वात् विकल्प–अ–उपपत्तेः, प्रत्ययत्वात् कर्म–अन्–उपपत्ते, मिथः व्याघातात् इत्यादयः। एते हि सर्वे एव स्व–अर्थ–प्रतिक्षेपिकां युक्तिं आक्षिपंति, निषेध्य–सिद्धिं च अपेक्षते। अन्–ऐकांतिकौ च प्रथम–द्वितीयौ स्व–फले एव व्यभिचारात्। अ–सिद्धौ तृतीय–चतुर्थौ। अन्–एकांतिकः पंचमः पूर्ववत्। असिद्धः व्याहतः अन्–एकांतिकः च षष्ठः। अ–सिद्धः अन्–ऐकांतिकः च सप्तमः। सर्वे एव काल–अत्यय–अपदिष्टाः इति।

Trans: By the above rebuttal the different middle terms in the several negative inferences also stand rebutted. The middle terms with the respective inferences are 'There is nothing because it is cognised, like the illusory snake in the rope', 'Nothing is true because it is cognition as is the cognition of the illusory snake', 'Nothing is (active or) an agent because it is unreal as is the hare's horn', 'Nothing is rational because it cannot be determined as is the case with the face reflected in the mirror', 'Nothing has a real as its object because it is a phantasy like the dream,' 'There is no viewing because there cannot be the activity involved in viewing just as there cannot be any cutting if there is nothing which is cut,''There cannot be any theory because every socalled theory is opposed by another just as heat which dries up and water which wets are opposed to each other.' All the middle terms in the above inferences entail theses opposed to what they themselves entail and also presuppose the truth of the theses opposed by their assertion. The first and second of the above middle terms are deviant as both cognisedness and cognitionness characterise the inference produced by them which is not nothing. (If inference were nothing the middle terms would be infructuous). The third and fourth middle terms are themselves unestablished (as the reality of objects and their

determinate character have already been established). The fifth middle term also is deviant like the first and second (as the inference resulting from it has itself an object namely the inferred entity). The sixth is unestablished, self-contradictory and also deviant as the active nature of viewing has already been established. The cognitivity itself is the activity of cognition or viewing and the view that there is no view is itself a view so the middle term is riddled with self-contradiction. The seventh is unestablished as well as deviant as there is no contradiction in upholding a certain theory (the opposite theory could be treated as invalid) and the denial of all theories being itself a theory the middle term is deviant. Moreover things being real all middle terms are afflicted by the fallacy of the absence of the major term in their minor.

Expl: Now the non-Buddhist adduces fallacies in the middle terms of the negative inferences of the Buddhist. Every one of these entails propositions which go against its own major premise. For example the unreal cannot be the middle term in any inference, so it must itself be a real which is universally denied in the major premise. Similarly the middle term in the second inference must be true so the premise that nothing is true is false. In the third inference cognition of the middle term is necessary for inference, so this itself is the active agent denied in the inference. The irrational cannot be a middle term, so the middle must be a rational term opposed to the premise that everything is irrational. Similar is the case with other middle terms. These also presuppose the reality of what they negate because if the counterpositive is unreal there cannot be a negation of it but if it is real there cannot be absolute negation of it.

An accusative (of cognition) is either an object or an entity bearing the fruit produced by an action or an entity which bears the fruit which determines the meaning of a verb. The first cannot be denied as every cognition has a real object. The second too cannot be denied as the cognised entity is the bearer of the fruit produced by an action. If the third is denied then cognition will be turned into its opposite so that an unknown entity would have to play the role of the middle term.

Mutual contradiction is either mutual contradictedness or mutual contradictoriness. The first cannot be maintained as a valid thesis is uncontradictable. The second leads to the fallacy of deviation. The Buddhist treats his thesis which contradicts mine (the non-Buddhist's) as the true thesis.

Rebuttal of all examples in the inferences

Text: एतेन दृष्टांताः अपि विसर्जनीयाः। ते हि रज्जु–सर्पवत्; तत्–ज्ञानवत्, शश–विषाणवत्, दर्पण–मुखवत्, स्वप्न–प्रत्ययवत्, छेद्य–अन्–

उपपत्तौ छिदावत्, मिथः शोषक–निर्वापक–अनल–सलिलवत् इत्यादयः। येन च तत्र सर्प्रस्य अ–सत्त्वं, तत्–ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वं, शश–विषाणस्य अ–कारकत्वं दर्पण–मुखस्य विचार–अ–सहत्वं, स्वप्न–ज्ञानस्य निर्–आलंवनत्वं, छेद्य–अन्–उपपत्तौ छिदा–अन्–उपपत्तिः च अवधारितानि तेन एव तत्र रज्जोः सत्त्वं, अ–सर्प–ज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वं, शशस्य अन्यत्र, गवादेः विषाणे एव कारकत्वं, दर्पणस्य विचार–सहत्वं अ–स्वप्न–ज्ञानस्य स–आलंबनत्वं छेद्य–निष्ठ छिदा–सिद्धिः ज्ञानं कर्म च उपपादितानि। तत्–अन्–उपपत्तौ वा साध्य–विकलतया सर्वे एवं दृष्टांत–आभासाः। अंतिमः तु साधन–विकलः। सिद्धान्तानां व्याघातः परस्पर–विरह–रूपत्व–लक्षणः। जल–अनलयोः तु वध्य–घातक–स्वभाव–लक्षणः। न च शब्द–साम्येन अनुमानं इति एषा दिक्।

Trans: Because of the above criticism even the examples in the inference get eliminated. The examples are: The rope in the snake, the dream cognition, the hare's horn, the face (reflected) in the mirror, cutting if there is nothing to be cut, fire and water which are dry and wet respectively and so on. What leads to the realisation of the unreality of the snake in the rope, the falsehood of the cognition of the snake in the rope, the inactivity of the hare's horn, the irrationality of the face in the mirror, the nonobjectivity of dream- cognition and the impossibility of cutting in the absence of anything being cut does itself produce the realisation of the reality of the rope, the truth of the cognition of the rope as different from the snake, the agency or causality of cows in respect of their horns and of hares in respect of their ears only, the rational nature of the mirror, the objective character of cognitions other than those of dreams, the reality of the cut object if there is cutting and the reality of the object of cognition. If this were not the case all the examples will be bereft of the major terms-unreality etc. (because if there is no reality anywhere there cannot be unreality too). The last of the foregoing examples however is devoid of the middle term itself because the mutual contradiction of theories is of the nature of mutual negation whereas the opposition of fire and water is of the nature of the destroyed and the destroyer. Simple verbal similarity of contradiction and destruction cannot lead to the inference as given above.

Expl: Just like the middle terms the examples too are riddled by the above-mentioned fallacies and so they need to be discarded.

If the snake in the rope etc. were real, true etc. then the examples

would be devoid of the major term unreality, untruth etc. Moreover if nothing were real, true etc. there cannot be unreality untruth etc.

In the text dream-cognition is described as unobjective which is not strictly correct. It being an erroneous cognition it cannot be devoid of object. Such a statement refers to a certain view of the illusory cognition.

Buddhist arguments to disprove the reality of the composite entity

Text: अस्तु तर्हि दूषण–उपक्रमेण विचारः इति चेत्? तं अपि पश्यामः कीदृशः असौ इति। न इदं स्थूलं, विरुद्ध–धर्म–संसर्ग–प्रसंगात्। न अ–स्थूलं तथा प्रतिभास–प्रसंगात्। न पर–अन्–अपेक्षं सदातनत्व–प्रसंगात्। न पर–अपेक्षं सत्–असत्–व्यतिरेक–प्रसंगात्। न एकं तथा प्रतिभास–प्रसंगात्। न अनेकं भेद–व्यवस्थिति–प्रसंगात्। न च व्यापकं निःक्रियत्व–प्रसंगात्। न अ–व्यापकं अ–विधेयत्व प्रसंगात्–इत्यादिः इति चेत्? न। मिथः विरोध–मूल–शैथिल्य–इष्ट–अपादान–अनुकूलत्व–विपर्यय–अ–पर्यवसानैः तर्क आभासत्वात्।

Trans: Let then there be debate (between the Buddhist and his opponent) by pointing out fallacies (in each other's position). Alright, let us see how the debate too proceeds. (The Buddhist may adduce the following arguments to falsify the opponents' position): (For example) 'The socalled real cannot be gross in size for then it would not be endowed with mutually-incompatible properties. It cannot be subtle in size for then it would appear such. It cannot be nondependent upon others for then it would be eternal. It cannot be dependent uypon others for them it would be neither real nor unreal (if it were real and dependent then its cause cannot be productive of it as it is already there. If however it were unreal no cause can bring it into being). It cannot be unitary for then it would not appear as multiple (as the combination of a substance and its several qualities). It cannot be multiple for then it would appear diversified in nature. It cannot be ubiquitous for then it would be immovable. It cannot be non-ubiquitous for then it would not be known as real (because the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time). All these arguments are afflicted by the fallacies of mutual contradiction, absence of concomitance as the basis of the counter-factual conditional, entailing an acceptable contingency, being supportive of the opposite argument and absence of negative concomitance (needed for inference in the arguments). All these fallacies are explained below.

Expl: The Buddhist now seeks to disprove the reality of the composite entity which is taken to be perceptibly real. If a perceptible entity is proved

unreal then all perceptions become suspect so that only objectless cognition is then left as real. The arguments for the unreality of the composite seek to disprove all commonly-recognised properties of it successively. For example the socalled composite cannot be either gross or subtle because it would not then be endowed with incompatible properties (to be explained shortly) or appear as other than subtle. It cannot be independent of others for then it would be eternal like space. It cannot also be other-dependent for then it cannot be produced. If real no production of it is possible and if unreal then anything can produce it. Thus the other-dependent would be other than both real and unreal. It cannot be unitary for then it would not appear as endowed with different attributes. Nor can it be multiple in nature for then multiplicity or diversity as consituting the nature of a thing would have to be accepted. Again the composite cannot be ubiquitous as it moves from place to place. It cannot also be spatially limited. If being existent at one place the composite did not exist elsewhere it cannot be known as real as nothing is both real and unreal at the same time. The various fallacies besetting these arguments are listed and explained below.

Elucidation of the fallacies

Text: यथां हि न अयं पर्वतः निर्–अग्निः निर्–धूमत्व–प्रसंगात्, न अपि अग्निमान् तथा उपलब्धि–प्रसंगात् इति अनयोः एकः आभासः, परस्पर–अर्थ–प्रतिक्षेपकयोः उभयोः अन्–आभासत्व–अन् उपपत्तेः; तथा अत्र अपि। न हि अ–स्थूलता–आदि–निषेधात अन्यः स्थूलता–आदि–विधिः तत्–निषेधात् वा अन्यः अस्थूलता–आदि विधिः इति शिथिल–मूलाः च एव ते, प्रतिबंध–अ–सिद्धेः। सिद्धौ वा व्याप्य–व्यापक–तत्–अधिकरणानां सिद्धौ विवाद–निवृत्तेः। ईष्ट आपादनं च प्रथमे। अनुभूत–अवसिते स्थूले विरुद्ध–धर्म–अ–संसर्गस्य इष्टत्वात। तथा च वक्ष्यामः। अनुकुलः च द्वितीयः। अ–स्थूलता–प्रतिक्षेपस्य स्थूलता उपलंभ–अनुग्राहकत्वात्। तत्–रूपता–व्यवहारस्य तथा प्रतिभास–व्याप्तत्वात् च। एवं तृतीयः अपि। अन् अपेक्षत्व–प्रतिक्षेपस्य स–अपेक्षत्व–उपलंभ–अनुग्राहकत्वात्। अन्–अपेक्षत्व–विधेः सदातनत्व–व्याप्तत्वात् च। चतुर्थः तु अ–प्रसिद्ध–व्यापकः। सत्–अ–सत्वस्य विरोधेन एकत्र विधिवत् निषेधस्य अपि अन्–उपपत्तेः। पंचमः तुं अनुकुलः एव। अनेकत्व–अभिमते वस्तुनि एकता–

प्रतिक्षेपस्य अनेकता–उपलंभ–उपष्टंभकत्वात्। ताद्रूप्य–व्यवहारस्य तथा प्रतिभास–व्याप्तत्वात् च इति। षष्ठः तु इष्ट एव अस्माकम्।

Trans: Just as of the two arguments namely, 'This hill is not devoid of smoke as then it would be without fire' and 'This hill is not also with fire as then it would appear to be such' one is fallacious because both of two mutually-opposed arguments cannot be valid, so it is in the present case too. Certainly the affirmation of grossness is not different from the negation of subtlety or the affirmation of subtlety is anything different from the negation of grossness. Moreover the concomitance between the absences of the consequent and the antecedent (in the counterfactual conditional which is the basis of the inference) is not established. If it is established then the concomitants and their loci being established the ultimate conclusion that there is nothing cannot be true and so the controversy will be over. Further in the first inference denying grossness the contingency precipitated is quite desirable because the absence of incompatible properties in the composite entity which is determinately and indeterminately known is acceptable to the non-Buddhist. This will be explained latter. Also the second thesis is favourable to us namely that the negation of subtlety is conducive to the cognition of grossness and further the appearance of a thing as of a certain form is concomitant with the usage that it is of that form. The third thesis is also like this. The negation or rebuttal of nondependence in a thing is conducive to the cognittion of its dependence and moreover the affirmation of nondependence is concomitant with the affirmation of eternity. As to the fourth, the pervading term or (contingency or consequence) entailed in it is unestablished as reality and unreality being mutually contradictory their joint negation is as impossible as their joint affirmation. The fifth of course is certainly acceptable to the non-Buddhist. In the thing which is admittedly multiple the negation of unity is conducive to the apprehension of multiplicity. And the usage as of multiple form with regard to a thing is concomitant with its appearance as of multiple form. As to the sixth it is certainly acceptable to us (the non-Buddhists).

Expl: Explaining the fallacies afflicting the various inferences the non-Buddhist says first that of the two theses affirming and negating the grossness of the composite, one has got to be true. Both cannot be false. Also none of the middle terms in the inferences can have concomitance with their major terms. If they have then the major, middle and minor terms being real there is left no ground for controversy. Further, except the Buddhist nobody admits that the composite is endowed with mutually-incompatible properties whatever these properties may be. As to the second inference the contingency supporting it is quite acceptable. If a thing is recognised as subtle it must also appear as subtle. Similar is the

case with the third inference. The concomitance of a certain usage and corresponding appearance is here elucidated by the non-Buddhist. The composite is not recognised as multiple in nature. If it were so recognised then only its unitary character can be called into question. So the non-Buddhist does not grant the thesis that the composite is not unitary.

Objection to the reality of difference

Text: ननु भेदः स्वरुपं व स्यात् इतर–इतर–अभावः वा धर्म अंतरं वा? न पूर्वः। घटः भिन्नः इति सह–प्रयोग–अन्–उपपत्तेः। न अपरः। प्रतीतौ आत्म–आश्रय–प्रसंगात्। भिन्न–प्रतियोगि–निरुपणात् हि तत्–अभावः निरुप्यः, तत्–निरूपणं एव च भेद–निरूपणम्। न उत्तरः, अनवस्था–प्रसंगात्। तत् कथं असौ व्यवतिष्ठतां इति चेत्?

Trans: (Against the foregoing argument that if the composite were multiple, difference as the nature of things would be established, the Buddhist now contends that the reality of difference cannot be maintained at all). What could be this difference? Is it the very nature of things or the mutual negation of things or some property different from things? It cannot be the first because then (the thing and its nature being the same) the usage 'the pot is different' would not be rational (the statement would become tautological). It cannot (also) be the second); the cognition of difference would then be self-dependent. Without its counterpositive being defined or known it cannot be known but to know the counter positive as different (from the difference) is also to know the difference. The last too it cannot be as that would lead to regress. (If difference is a property different from the thing (which is different) it cannot differentiate. If it is the same as the different another property would have to be postulated for differentiatation. This would entail regress). So how can difference be established?

Expl: Now the Vedāntin comes forward with his contention that difference cannot be defined and so it does not exist. It may be identical with its locus or be a characteristic property of the locus. If it is the first then we cannot say for example that the pot is different. If then it s the second then we can say that in the cognition of the pot, potness appears while in the cognition of difference 'potness' as characterised by potnesseness appears and thus the cognitions can be differentiated from one another. But then the expression 'The locus of potness is different' would turn out to be tautological on the above view as the subject and the predicate in it would be identical. The objections to the remaining two views of difference are explained in the text.

Objection to the above criticism of difference

Text: तत् किं भेद–ज्ञानं एव नास्ति, सत् अपि वा नित्यं, अ–नित्यं अपि वा निर्–हेतुकं, स–हेतुकं अपि वा निर्–विषयकं, स–विषयकं अपि बा बाध्यमान–विषयकं इति? तत्र प्रथमः सर्वतः विरोधात् अनुत्तरः। द्वितीयः सुषुप्ति–अवस्था–अनुरोधात् उपेक्षणीयः। तृतीयः अपि विरोधात् हेयः। चतुर्थः तु भेद–उल्लेखात् एव त्याज्यः। पंचमः तु चिंत्यते किं एतेषु अन्यतम–आत्मा तस्य विषयः तत–अन्यः वा इति। तत्र यदि अन्यः एव किं एताभिः व्यधिकरण–अन्–उपपत्तिभिः तस्य बाध्येत? एवं हि चौर–अपराधेन व्यक्तं अयं मांडव्य–निग्रहः स्यात्।

Trans: Does it mean then that there is no knowledge of difference at all or even if there is the knowledge it is eternal or if it is ephemeral it is uncaused or if it is caused it has no object or if it has object the object is contradictable? The first alternative is contradictory in every respect and so does not deserve any reply. The second is incompatible with there being the (non-cognitive) state of sleep and so it deserves to be ignored. The third too is inconsistent with experience and so rejectable. The fourth is worth discarding simply because it refers to difference itself (the expression 'knowledge of difference' refers to difference whether there is difference or not). As to the fifth, let us consider whether one of the three mentioned above, (namely the nature of the locus of difference, mutual negation or some property residing in the locus) is the object of the knowledge or the object is something other than these. If it is the latter how can the above inconsistencies affect adversely the fifth alternative? To think so would be to act in conformity with the adage that 'the sage is arrested for the guilt of the thief.

Expl: Opposing the Vedāntic criticism of difference the N.V sets forth certain alternative views concerning the knowledge of difference and refutes them. If the very knowledge of difference is denied then this denial itself will be rendered false; if difference is unknown it cannot be denied and without there being difference of debaters not even the discussion about difference can proceed.

Criticism continued. Defence of the first view of difference

Text: अथ अन्यतम–आत्मा तत्र अपि यदि धर्म–अंतरं एव इति तत्वं तदा अनवस्था–भिया तत्–अधिकः एव प्रवाहः त्यज्यतां तस्य कुतः त्यागः? न हि अनवस्था प्रतिभासमानं अर्थं निवर्तयति किंतु प्रवाहं

परिहापयति गंधे गंध–अंतरवत्।

Trans: If the object of the knowledge of difference is one of the three and if it is the truth that a property other than the locus (of difference) is itself the nature of difference then we may discard the admission of the property of this property and so on to avoid regress. There is no need to discard the original property itself. Certainly a regress does not lead to the rejection of a property, it only brings about the rejection of an infinite series just like the admission of one smell in another smell.

Expl: If the property residing in the locus of difference is different then this property need not be supposed to require another property to differentiate it. It may be taken to be self-differentiated. The object endowed with the property cannot thus be self-differentiated. Besides the property is an object of knowledge. It cannot be denied. Regress can be avoided by denying properties of properties. Of course if there is evidence for admitting such properties regress cannot be an objection to the admission.

Defence of the second view of difference

Text: अथ इतर–इतर–अभावं एव भेद–ज्ञानं अवलंबते इति तत्वं तथा अपि हि आत्म–आश्रयः। त्तेन हि भेद–ज्ञानं एव न स्यात्। अस्ति च तत्। ततः हेतु–अंतरं आक्षिपेत्। न तु स्व–आत्मनि स्वयं अ–हेतुत्वे स्वयं एव निवर्तते। अविद्या वशात् इति चेत्? किंच अतः? नहि अविद्या इति–एव आत्म–आश्रय–निवृत्तिः तथा सति घट–आदयः अपि कुलाल–आदि–निरपेक्षाः स्वयं एव भवेयुः। अथ आत्म–आश्रय–दोष–उपहततया तत न स्वस्य एव कारणम्? ततः यतः कुतश्चित् तस्य जन्म तत् च दुर्–निरूप्यं इति अविद्या इति उच्यते इति विचार–अर्थः, नाम्नि तर्हि विवादः। न च तत् अपि दुर्–निरूपम्। प्रतियोगि–रूपत्वेन अ–प्रतीतौ अधिकरण–प्रतीतिः अधिकरण–स्वभावत्वेन अ–स्मृतौ प्रतियोगि–स्मृतिः च इतर–इतर–अभाव–ग्रहण–कारणं इति निरूपणात्।

Trans: If however the truth is that the difference-knowledge has mutual negation as its object then this too entails the fallacy of self-dependence. But this fallacy would oppose the occurrence of difference-knowledge although there does take place this knowledge. So it presupposes the operation of some cause other than itself. It is not however the case that if

the difference-knowledge is not its own cause it does not take place at all. But couldn't this knowledge be the product of ignorance (and so it does not need any cause for its production)? Well! what of it? Certainly by treating the knowledge as the product of ignorance the fallacy of self-dependence is not removed. If it is removed then even the ordinary objects like pot, cloth etc. being the products of ignorance would be self-produced and not need the potter etc. for their production. But can't it be argued that since the admission of self-causation of difference-knowledge entails the fallacy of self- dependence something else must be regarded as the cause of the latter but such a cause being difficult to define it has to be reckoned as ignorance and this is what is implied by the contention (that this knowledge is caused by ignorance)? Yes, but then the dispute between us is only nominal (whatever is regarded by me as the cause of the knowledge is called by you as ignorance). And even this cause is not difficult to define. If the locus of negation is not cognised as its counterpositive and if the counterpositive is not remembered as of the nature of the locus of the negation then the mutual difference of the counterpositive and the locus is known and this is how the cause of the said knowledge can be defined.

Expl: It is now argued that even mutual negation can be regarded as the object of difference-knowledge. The fallacy of self-dependence urged against this alternative may be supposed to entail either of two things, namely, that due to ignorance this knowledge arises of itself or it arises out of ignorance itself. The first is untenable as then even things like pot would be self-produced due to the influence of ignorance. According to the second alternative if something other than itself whose nature is supposed to be unknown is the cause of the knowledge then there need not be any dispute on the matter. The above fallacy can be avoided by treating the locus and the counterpositive in their capacity as locus and counterpositive and not as things different from these as the cause of difference-knowledge. If the locus is known as characterised by a property not determining counterpositivity and the counterpositive similarly is known as characterised by a property not determining locusness then the mutual diference of the entities which are respectively the counterpositive and the locus of the difference are known. The word 'recollection' used in this connection in the text refers to knowledge in general. It may be noted here that the mere knowledge of the counterpositive does not cause the difference-knowledge as this is needed for the knowledge of all kinds of negation. This does not mean that this knowledge is not at all required for difference-knowledge. But the knowledge of any counterpositive and any locus is of no use for the knowledge of a specific difference. If the counterpositive and the locus are specified as those pertaining to the difference whose knowledge they are supposed to cause then there arises again the fallacy of self-dependence. So the knowledge of the locus as

characterised by a property not known to characterise the counterpositive and the similar knowledge of the counterpositive as characterised by a property not known to characterise the locus are to be reckoned as the causes of the difference- knowledge.

Defence of the third view of difference

Text: अथ स्वरुपं एव भेद–प्रतिभासस्य विषयः इति तत्वं तथा अपि सह–प्रयोगः एव अनुपपन्नः त्यज्यतां भेदेन तु किं अपराद्धम्? सः अपि दृश्यते इति चेत्? नैमित्तिकः तु स्यात् न स्वरुपतः। न हि घटं आनय, पटं अवलोकय इत्यादौ भेद–पदं अपि प्रेक्षावान् उपादत्ते। व्याख्यायां तु मूढ–प्रबोधनाय घटः कुंभः इतिवत् सह–प्रयोगे अपि न दोषः।

Trans: If the fact is that the very nature of a thing is supposed to be the object of difference-knowledge then the coordinate use of the word 'difference' with the word denoting the thing being non-syntactical it may be discarded. But there is nothing wrong with the reality of the difference (why should it too be discarded?). But isn't the coordinate use of the word 'difference' (too) with the thing-word sometimes condoned? Yes, but the use is only occasional. It is not natural. Certainly no sensible person uses the word 'difference' (to denote an object) while asking another person to bring a pot or look at a piece of cloth. But just as one uses the two words 'the pot' and 'the jar' in coordination in a sentence to explain the synonymy of these words to one who is unaware of it so one may use the words 'the pot' and 'is different' in a sentence for explaining the distinctive nature of the pot to one unaware of the fact without incurring any fallacy.

Expl: If the coordinate use of the word 'difference' with an object-word is rendered ungramnatical on the identity-view of difference, then the use may be discarded but not the difference. Sometimes such coordinate use is made with a specific object in view. Ordinarily nobody uses the word' 'difference' along with the word 'pot' in sentences like 'bring the pot', 'see the cloth' etc. or in explaining the identity of an object and difference. However the coordinate use of the two words can certainly be made.

The statement of the final view on the matter

Text: तथा अपि कः परमार्थः? यथा–यथं त्रयं अपि। घटस्य हि घट–आत्मना अ–प्रतीतिः, अ–घट–आत्मना च प्रतीतिः, ततः वैशिष्ट्य–प्रतीतिः च इति अनुभव–सिद्धम्। तत्र अभावस्य प्रथम–मात्रं,

अभाव–अंतर–धर्म–अंतरयोः अभावात्। सामान्य–आदिषु त्रिषु द्वयं धर्म–अंतर–अभावात्। द्रव्य–आदिषु त्रिषुं त्रयं त्रयस्य अपि संभवात्। भवति 'पटः अयं न घटः तंतुमयः च' इति, 'गंधः अयं न रूपं सुरभिः च' इति 'गतिः इयं न उत्क्षेपणं तिर्यक् च' इति। लक्षणं च स्वरूप–भेदस्य ताद्रूप्येण अ–प्रतीतौ प्रतीतिः। इतरः–इतर–अभावस्य तु अबाधितः समान–अधिकरणः निषेध–प्रत्ययः। वैधर्म्यस्य तु विरोधः। सः च एक–धर्मि–अ–समावेशः इति एषा दिक्।

Trans: Still (although three different conceptions of difference have been defended above) what is the ultimate truth about difference? 'All the three (mentioned), depending upon the nature of the entity (that is said to be different).' (For example) a piece of cloth (as different from a pot) does not appear as identical with a pot, appears as other than a pot and also as endowed with a generic property absent from the pot. Out of these three (forms of difference) only the first appears in negation as there is no other negation or a generic (or any other) property which may be supposed to reside in negation. Among the three categories of reality, namely the universal, the specificity and the relation of inherence only the first two forms of difference are present, there being no property that resides in them. Among the three categories beginning with substance all the three forms of difference are present as each of them is applicable to them. For example we say, 'This is a piece of cloth not a pot and is a thing woven of thread. This is an odour not colour and it is fragrant. This is motion not upward throw and is oblique?' As to the definition of intrinsic difference, it is, 'the appearance of a thing as itself and not as other than itself.' Of mutual negation the definition is: '(being the object of) the uncontradicted cognition of negation generated by a word which is coordinate with the word denoting the locus of the negation' and the definition of difference or opposition in nature is 'incompatibility in nature.' This consists in 'the noncoexistence of two incompatible properties.' In this manner all differences have to be understood.

Expl: All the three conceptions of difference are acceptable to the non-Buddhist and which of these is or are applicable to a certain object depends upon the nature of that object. In the case of negation the admission of one negation residing in another negation leads to infinite regress and so the second of the above conceptions is not applicable. The third too is inapplicable to negation if the property not residing in the counterpositive is supposed to be a generic universal. It is however possible to account for the cognition of difference in negation by admitting the residence in it of a different negation without admitting a

third negation resident in the second negation.

As to the difference of universals etc. it is stated above that there are not any properties constituting their mutual difference but couldn't the very definitions of these be treated as their properties? (Even difference of universals etc. has to be determined on the basis of their being endowed with incompatible properties). If however things themselves are to be equated with their character of 'being endowed with incompatible properties' then mutual exclusion of different entities can never be known as each of the excluder would be involved in the exclusion of the other which would lead to circularity. However the textual statement may be justified on the ground that there are no properties directly resident in universals etc. which differentiate them from one another.

Now it may be asked, 'How can difference be the nature of a thing?' If it can, then there can never be doubt or illussion regarding the nondifference of one thing from another. Perhaps one may meet this objection by saying that though the difference is known the difference-nature of the latter may remain unknown. This nature may be defined as 'the property of being the object of a cognition which does not apprehend the counterpositive of the difference'. But then this property could be no other than the above third kind of difference. Moreover difference which is not without a counterpositive cannot be identified with things like pot which have nothing to do with counterpositives. Mutual negation, too cannot be the nature of difference as stated above. The knowledge of this negation depends upon the knowledge of its counterpositive and the locus. But these latter are to be known as counterpositive and locus respectively of a particular negation in order to yield the knowledge of the difference. Otherwise the knowledge of the (counterpositive and locus) entities by themselves would always bring in its wake the knowledge of their difference so that there can never arise illusion or the mistaking of one thing as another. An incompatible property also cannot be the nature of difference. If by itself it constituted difference then there can never be illusion. Moreover such difference cannot have any counterpositive. Further if different incompatible properties are themselves not endowed by such properties they themselves cannot be incompatible. And whatever be the nature of difference if it resides in a locus which, if already different, then the difference of the different may be due to the differentiating difference or some other difference. If the former there arises the fallacy of self-dependence. If the latter there is infinite regress (for the above question can be asked about this differentiating difference too).

The reply to all these problems is as follows. To differ means to be the object of the cognition opposed to the identity-cognition. An object like pot is by itself the object of a cognition opposed to the cognition of its non-difference from the tree. Difference is related to the counterpositive

but not identical with it. The nature of a pot for example does not include anything within itself. Yet when this nature of the pot is elucidated (vis-a-vis other things) it assumes the form of difference. If this difference remains somehow unknown then there arise doubt and illusion about the identity of things. Mutual-negation-view of difference can also be similarly defended against the foregoing objections. To cognise mutual negation or the difference of one thing from another what is needed is cognition of only the nature of these two things. As to the objections against the third type of difference, they can be avoided by regarding the incompatible properties as self-differentiated. There is no need to postulate further differentiating properties for the properties of the first order so that there would be entailed infinite regress.

The last of the above objections can be sidetracked if the different locus of difference is treated as not already differentiated but as deemed to be differentiable. If therefore one asks, 'where is the difference?' the proper answer is, 'Where it is veridically cognised'.

In the text it is stated that the cognition of pot as pot (for example) is the definition of the first kind of difference. This is not literally correct as cognition does not characterise a thing. However this may be taken as the basis of the urge towards the differentiated nature of things.

The definition of mutual negation given in the text covers even the anterior and posterior negations of things as they coexist with their counter-positives in the parts of the thing. If the coexistence is qualified as 'eternal' the two negations could be eliminated (as they exist only sometimes in the parts of things) but then even the absolute negation of a thing would be covered by the definition as a non-pervasive absolute negation coexists with its counterpositive. A monkey and its absence for example may both be said to exist in a tree when the monkey is sitting only on a certain branch of the tree. This difficulty can be overcome by stipulating that the negation coexisting at the same time and place with its counterpositive is its mutual negation. Alternatively a negation which never resides in its counterpositive may be said to be its mutual negation. The mutual negation of time however exists in time which is its counterpositive but this existence in time is quite different in nature from ordinary existence. It is strictly 'occurrence'.

Perhaps the mutual negation can be distinguished from absolute negation by the fact that while the identity relation determines the counterpositivity pertaining to the former negation. other relations determine the counterpositivity pertaining to the later negation. Identity characterises only a single object. So mutual negation may also be regarded as one whose counterpositivity is determined by a property characteristic of a single object. Perhaps the mutual negation expressed by the sentence, 'This pot is different from the one located in the house' could be cited as one whose counter-positive is not determined by an

individualised property. Here location appers to be such a determinant. But strictly speaking here too only an individualised property namely, the potness as coexistent with location in the house is the determinant.

It may here be asked whether the absolute negation of the property characterising a thing can do duty for the mutual negation of the thing. It would seem to do so because when a red pot is denied to be black it is not denied to be pot. It cannot be urged against this that the mutual negation of things can likewise be supposed to replace the absolute negation of the property (characteristic of one thing, upon another). If it were so then there can never occur the nonpervasive negation of a property in a thing as a thing can never differ from itself. The right answer to the above question is that the difference between the two types of negation is intrinsic and so it cannot be discarded.

According to Raghunātha, a celebrated commentator of A.V., difference is a special type of relation of the located and the locus which may be identical with its relata or different from them. A thing can be located in itself by some relation—like identity—and in its locus by some other relation. So a thing can have its absolute absence as well as a thing other than itself as its counterpositive. As to mutual negation, it resides in positive entities, in other negations as also in itself. Different negations differ due to their differentiating properties like those of being absolute negations, mutual negations, relational negations etc. However the different-negations of pot, cloth etc. cannot themselves be regarded as of the nature of difference because these being located in each other (there is absence of pot in the absence of cloth) they would differ even from themselves (the absence of pot is located in the absence of cloth which in its turn is located in the absence of pot). If these absences are not located in each other, then there cannot occur the cognition that the absences are other than pot and cloth. Against this it may be urged that the absences are different even from the pot and the cloth respectively so that the above veridical cognition would not be prevented from arising. But this assumption would result in the locus of cloth where there is absence of pot to have also the absence of cloth, as the absence of pot is not identical with cloth. Thus it is more sensible to accept an infinity of differences differing from one another. Innumerable mutual negations and the negations of these negations also can be admitted.

There are some thinkers who opine that the first and last views of difference mentioned above may be dispensed with and the second only retained. The first and third may be supposed only to sustain the usage pertaining to difference.

As to the nature of mutual negation some thinkers are of the view referred to above that the absolute negation of the property determining the counterpositivity of a socalled mutual negation is itself that negation. This view may lead to the undesirable consequence that the socalled

mutual negation of an entity characterised by a nonpervasive entity like the contact of an object would turn out to be nonpervasive. For example if the contact of monkey with a tree is nonpervasive its absence is nonpervasive, so the natural negation of the tree as qualified by the monkey's contact should also be nonpervasive. This contingency can be avoided by regarding the absolute absence or negation of some pervasive property concomitant with the non-pervasive property under consideration as the nature of the above mutual negation. But then there arises another difficulty in the view. Referring to the floor with the pot we say 'this is not pot'. On the above view we should be able to say that 'there is not pot on the floor' as this should mean that there is the absolute absence or negation of potness on the floor. Similarly if we say referring to potness that 'there is not potness in potness' we should also be able to say that 'potness is not potness' as the latter should mean according to the view that 'potness is not potnessness'. This difficulty can be overcome by stipulating that (for example) the negation of pot is mutual negation in relation to itself. If this is not admitted then a pot being the locus of its own absolute negation it would be different from itself. A further stipulation to be mde is that (for example) if the absolute absence of pot differs from the similar absence of cloth the difference has the latter as its counterpositive. Otherwise if there is no pot on the floor the absence of cloth also will not be there (the two absences of the absences of pot and cloth respectively being non-different.

In the definition of mutual negation the Sanskrit word 'समान अधिकरण' has been used and its meaning as given by one commentator is given above. According to Raghunātha, another commentator, the word means 'coordinate' or being of the same case. So the definition as a whole means that mutual negation is the denotend of the negative particle suffixed to the word which denotes the counterpositive of the negation and is coordinate with the word which denotes the locus of the negation. (That is to say both the locus-denoting and the counterpositive-denoting-words must be coordinate and in the nominative case). This formulation of the definition involves two difficulties namely, that every instance of mutual negation cannot be taken to be actually denoted by a negative particle and that when such a negation is not being verbally communicated it would cease to be such an entity. So the definition would have to be modified to read as 'that which is capable of being denoted' but here capability cannot be explained without the help of some generic or common property inherent in all denotends. So it is better to go back to the meaning of the Sanskrit term as given by other commentators. If that meaning is adopted it is found to be too extensive as, nonpervasive negations, anterior and posterior negations and negation of a thing by one relation in a locus where it exists by another relation are all covered by the above formulation of the definition. Certain genuine cases like that of the

mutual negation of space which is supposed to be unsupported are also not covered by the formulation. There is no locus for the counterpositive of this negation in which it could exist. Could we then redefine the negation as one which never exists in its counterpositive (as it can never be different from itself)? Well! if so then the mutual negation of time would be excluded by the definition as this, like every other thing does exist in time which is its counterpositive. This difficulty may however be got over by stipulating that although time is the universal repository yet the relation determining the location of everything in time is of a special type whereas the location mentioned in the definition is to be taken as determined by the 'svarūpa' relation (an identity relation peculiar to the location of negations). Now there arises another difficulty. The Nyaya logicians are of the view that the generic property known as 'sattā' or 'existence' which is common to the first three categories of reality is itself real. So 'sattā' too is endowed with 'Sattā' (in a certain sense) so that its absolute negation too does not exist in it and thus the definition of mutual negation becomes overextensive. Against this it may be argued that in absolute negation there is the presumption that the counterpositive may exist in its locus by a certain relation and this presumption is cancelled by the negation. In mutual negation the presumption is quite different. It is the presumption of the counterpositive, identity which is denied by the negation. In the case of the absolute negation of 'Sattā', its absolute negation does not deny its identity as the occurrence of 'Sattā' in itself (to account for the reality of sattā) is determined by a relation different from identity. But this argument is vitiated by the fact that negation is not always preceded by some presumption. At the most what one can say is that mutual negation has its counterpositivity determined by the relation of identity while other relations determine the counterpositivity of other negations. It should here be kept in mind that' identity' is not to be regarded as the individual nature of the identical individual. So far as mutual negation is concerned identity is to be treated as a relation. The qualification 'never' occurring in the definition above will have to be defined as the property of 'not being subject to anterior and posterior negation'. These negations too will have to be defined in their turn. For example the anterior negation is the negation which coexists with all the things that do not exist in the time in which the counterpositive of the negation exists. The posterior negation may be defined by the contradictory of this definition.

In case any other difficulty is still found besetting the above definition of mutual negation we can maintain its reality on the basis of a special intuition testifying to its special irreducible nature. We may treat this nature as unanalysale and irreducible.

Defence of the seventh thesis

Text: सप्तमः अपि अनुकूलः एव। घट–आदौ व्यापकता–प्रतिषेधस्य अ–व्यापकता–उपलंभ–उपष्टंभकत्वात्। व्यापकत्वस्य निः–क्रियत्व व्याप्तत्वात् च।

Trans: The seventh of the above theses too is quite acceptable. The denial of ubiquitousness in the composite entity is supportive of the cognition of limitedness in the latter; besides ubiquitousness is concomitant with immobility.

Expl: The proof that the composite entity cannot be ubiquitous because it is mobile has nothing objectionable in it as a ubiquitous entity cannot move at all.

Partial acceptance of the eighth thesis

Text: अष्टमः तु क्वचित् इष्टः एव। यतः एव हि क्वचित् अ–विधेयः अतः एव क्वचित् विधेयः अ–व्यापकः इति व्यवह्रियते। सर्वत्र इति चेत्? न। व्याप्ति–अ–सिद्धेः विरोधात् च। न हि यत् अ–व्यापकं तत् सर्वत्र अ–विधेयं इति प्रतिबंधः। क्वचित् अस्ति इति अ–व्यापक–अर्थः सर्वत्र नास्ति इति च अ–विधेय–अर्थः तव अभिमतः। तत् अनयोः विरोधः अपि स्यात्।

Trans: As to the eighth it is acceptable if qualified by the adjective 'in some cases'. For the very reason that a certain thing is impredicable of some subjects it is reckoned as predicable of others and so as non-pervasive. But can't it be said that the thing is universally impredicable? No! There is no basis of concomitance to say this and moreover there is contradiction too (between limited existence and universal impredicability). Certainly there is no such concomitance that whatever is nonpervasive in nature is universally impredicable. 'Non- pervasive' means existent at some place and 'impredicable' means universally nonexistent according to the Buddhist. These two are in fact contradictory of each other.

Expl: Impredicability sought to be precipitated in the eighth of the above theses is acceptable if qualified by 'in some cases'. Total impredicability cannot be precipitated because there is no concomitance between non-pervasiveness and universal impredicability which means universally non-existent. Except the Buddhist nobody admits this. In a certain sense the sky or space may be said to be nonexistent everywhere.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: यत् विधेय–स्वभावं तत् कथं प्रतिषेध्यं इति चेत्? न प्रतिषेध–स्व–भावता हि विधेयस्य विरुद्धा न तु प्रतिषेध–प्रतियोगिता अपि। अथ यः अस्ति कथं तस्य प्रतिषेधः अपि अस्ति इति चेत्? कः दोषः? अनयोः अ–विरोध–प्रसंग–इति चेत्? प्रकार–भेदेन प्रसक्तः अपि न दोषं आवहति। तत्–अ–भेदेन तु विधि–निषेधौ केन स्वीकृतौ यं प्रति अ–विरोधः प्रसज्येत इति? एतेन काल–भेद–आदिना–अपि अ–विरोधः द्रष्टव्यः।

Trans: But how come that which is by nature predicable becomes negatable? The answer is that it is the negative character that is incompatible with the predicable, not its being the object (or counterpositive) of negation. But how can there be even negation of that which exists? Well, there is nothing wrong in maintaining this. But doesn't the possibility of existence and nonexistence becoming mutually non-contradictory go against this? No! This possibility does not lead to any fallacy if existence and nonexistence are viewed under different aspects. Under the same aspect nobody maintains both existence and non-existence (of the same thing) so that the possibility of contradiction could be precipitated against him. This shows how the apparent contradiction of existence and non-existence in certain cases can be removed by viewing the terms under different temporal aspects.

Expl: If existence and nonexistence are mutually opposed then predicability and negatability (which are respectively subordinate to these two terms) must also be mutually-opposed according to the Buddhist. But the reply to this is that pure existence and pure nonexistence are not mutually opposed. It is existence at one place and nonexistence at the same place that are opposed to each other. If the places are different the same thing can be both existent and nonexistent. Similarly in relation to different times the same thing can be both existent and nonexistent.

Another objection to the reality of the composite entity and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि स्थूल–घाती विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासः ग्रहण–अग्रहण–आदिः पंचविधः। न। अ–सिद्धेः। तथा हि यः येन यत्र एव यदा एव उपलभ्यते सः तेन तत्र एव तदा एव न उपलभ्यते इति न अनुभवः न अपि अभ्युपगमः। एक–अवयव–सहितस्य उपलंभे अन्य–अवयव–सहितस्य–अनुपलंभः इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि अवयविनि उपलभ्यमाने

कश्चित् अव्यवः उपलभ्यते कश्चित् न इति वाक्य–अर्थः; सविशेषणे हि विधि–निषेधौ विशेषणं उपसंक्रामतः इति न्यायात्। तथा च अवयवानां उपलंभ–अनूपलंभौ अवयविनि संचार्य प्रसंगः तत् अलं अनेन।

Trans: Let then there be the objection based upon the apparent coexistence of incomipatibles, like cognition and noncognition etc. which refutes the reality of the composite entity. No! The incompatibility cannot be established. To Explain: There is no such experience that whatever is cognised at a certain place and time by a certain person is not cognised by the same person at the very place and time. Nor is such a view unheld by anybody. But isn't it the case that whatever is cognised in one part is not cognised in other parts? Yes, what this means is that when the whole composite entity is cognised some part of it is cognised and some is not. This is according to the convention that affirmation and negation made with reference to the qualificand in a statement are transferred to the qualifier. Thus the cognition and non-cognition which really pertain to the parts are transferred to the whole composite entity and the above mufavourable contingency is precipitated by the Buddhist.

Expl: Now the Buddhist adduces another argument based on the apparent coexistence of incompatibles to refute the reality of the composite. The non-Buddhist's first reaction to the argument is that the incompatibility is not real. The composite is for example cognised in one part and not so in another. This is in fact the cognition and noncognition of the parts and not of the whole.

Second objection to the reality of the composite and its rebuttal

Text: एतेन आवृत्त्व–अन् आवृतत्वं व्याख्यातम्। अन्–आवरण–दशावत् कतिपय–अवयव–आवरणे अपि तथाविध–स्थौल्य–उपलंभः किं न स्यात् इति तु अवशिष्यते। तत् अपि असत्। तस्य परिमाण–गत–सामान्य–विशेषस्य ततः अन्यस्य नियत–सामग्री–वेद्यस्य तत्–अभावे तत्–उपलंभे अपि अनुपलंभात्।

Trans: By the foregoing is also explained the alleged coexistence of being and not being covered (by some object). But (despite the explanation) the question remains why despite the covering up of some parts of it the whole composite entity with its gross dimension is not cognised as it is cognised when no part of it is covered up. The answer is that such a possibility cannot be envisaged. The special (limited) dimension being different from that of the composite entity and the causal collocation of its cognition being of a specific nature, when this latter is absent the limited

dimension is not cognisable despite there being the cognition of the composite entity.

Expl: If some portion of the composite entity is covered then it should not be cognisable even in respect of its uncovered portion because as a whole composite entity it is covered up. But if despite this covering up of a part the whole remains uncovered then it should be cognisable even in respect of its covered portion. This difficulty is resolved by regarding the whole as unaffected by the covering up of the parts; so there is no coocurrence of the incompatible properties of being and not being covered up. As to the question why the special dimension of the whole is not cognisable when some part of the whole is covered up the answer is that such a cognition requires the cognition of the distribution of the dimension over the major portion of the whole. This does not mean that the dimension should be seen as spread over every part of the whole. This is not possible. This only means that there should be contact of the senses with a large protion of the whole.

Third objection to the reality of the composite and its rebuttal

Text: एतेन कंप–अ–कंप–संसर्गः निरस्तः। सामग्री–भेदेन अवयव नियत–कंप–उत्पादे तस्यां दशायां अवयविनः निः–चलत्वात्। एवं तर्हि कंप–अ–कंपयोः अवयवयोः विभागात् संयोग–नाशे द्रव्य–नाशः स्यात् इति चेत्? ततः किम्? अपसिद्धान्तः इति चेत्? न। एवं अपि क्वचित् अभ्युपगमात्। सर्वत्र एवं प्रसंगः इति चेत्? तथा अपि अवयविनः किं अति–अहितम्? न च एवं अपि। कर्मणः द्रव्य–आरंभक–संयोग–प्रतिद्वंद्वि–विभाग–जनन–नियम–अनभ्युपगमात्। कारण–विशेषात् कस्यचित् एव कर्मणः तथाभूत–विशेष–उपलब्धेः।

Trans: Because the coexistence of incompatibles in the composite has been disproved the cooccurrence of movement and immobility in the composite has also been disproved. When due to the diversity of collocations of causal conditions movements only of specific parts of the whole take place then the whole remains immobile. But if this were so wouldn't the mobile and immobile parts of the whole get separated from each other and wouldn't this lead to the destruction of their conjunction resulting in the destruction of the whole? Well! What then? But isn't it contrary to your basic position? No! Even this is admitted in certain cases. 'But then you will have to admit this possibility in all cases'. 'Alright, but how does it affect the status of the composite entity? It is not admitted that movement (of the parts) necessarily produces the disjunction which is opposed to the conjunction of the parts conducive to the production of

the whole. Only due to the operation of certain of its special causes a certain type of movement is found to produce the disjunction leading to the destruction of the whole composite entity.

Expl: Since the alleged coexistence of being and not being covered in the composite could not be proved, cooccurrence of movement and immobility also cannot be proved of the latter. The parts may be moving without the whole moving. Movement is not nonpervasive like conjunction so that it can coexist with its absence in the same entity. When a part moves it moves wholly. If the same movement were pervasive in the parts but nonpervasive in the whole the property of motion would not be simultaneously inherent in both types of entities. This cannot be permitted. Of course the moving and nonmoving parts of the same composite entity would be disjoined by the movement but this movement need not cause the destruction of the composite entity. Not all such disjunctions of parts produce the destruction of the whole. Moreover all this argument does not disprove the reality of the composite entity.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: एतेन पाणौ चलति तत्–मूलभूतः परमाणुः अपि चलेत्, ततः अ–चलत् तत्–भुज–परमाणोः विभागः, ततः यः येन संयुज्यते विभज्यते वा सः तत्–कार्य–द्रव्येण अपि इति न्यायेन भुज–पाण्योः अपि विभागः, ततः संयोगनाशः, ततः शरीर–नाशः इति निरस्तम्।न हि पाणि–परमाणु–क्रिया भुज–परमाणु–विभागं आरभते नियमेन। तत्–अन्–आरंभकत्वे कर्म–लक्षण–क्षतिः इति चेत्? न। आकाश–आदि–देश–विभाग–जननात् अपि तत्–उपपत्तेः। नुद्य–कर्मवत्। कुतः अयं विशेषः इति चेत्? कारण–विशेषात् इति उक्तम्। एवं तर्हि यदि अवयव–कंपे अपि अ–कपः एव अवयवी हंत अवयव–संयोगि–विभागिभ्यां आकाश–आदि–देशाभ्यां न संयुज्येत न विभज्येत इति चेत्? न। अवयव–संयोग–विभागाभ्यां एव तत्–सिद्धेः। एतत् च सम्यक्–अवबोद्धुं वैशेषिकं अनुसंधेयम्। तर्हि चलत्–अवयव–समाश्रितः अपि अ–चलन् एव अवयवी उपलभ्येत इति चेत? न। इदं अनिष्टम्। पाणौ कंपमाने शरीरं न कंपते इति प्रत्ययात्।

Trans: By the above rebuttal also stand rebutted the following argument viz. that if the palm moves the atoms on which the palm is ultimately based also move with the result that these and the unmoving arm and its atoms

are disjoined from each other; consequently as per the rule that 'that which conjoins with or disjoined from a certain entity gets conjoined with or disjoined from any entity produced by it' the arm and the palm also get disjoined. This would cause the destruction of their conjunction leading to the destruction of the body itself. Certainly the movement of the atoms of the palm does not invariably produce the disjunction of the arm and the said atoms. But won't this non-production of disjunction adversely affect the nature of movement (as movement is supposed to be productive of disjunction)? No! The movement-nature can be justified even on the basis of the causation of the disjunction from the sky of the moving limb. It is just like what happens in the case of the movement due to impact. But why is there this difference (in the movements)? Because as already stated the cause of the product-destructive movement is a special one. But if the composite entity can remain unmoving despite the movement of its parts then the entity would be either not conjoined with or disjoined from the space conjoined with or disjoined from the parts. No! This cannot be because the conjunction and disjunction of the composite which is a product are brought into being by those of the parts themselves. To understand better the nature of this process the Vaisesika doctrine has to be studied. But shouldn't on this view the composite seem to be unmoving even when the parts by which it is sustained are moving? Yes, this is not unacceptable to us. When the hands (alone) are trembling the body (as a whole) does not seem to be trembling.

Expl: The foregoing rebuttal applies even to the argument that the movement of the hand should by a chain-reaction lead to the disintegration of the whole body. Not all disjunctions of parts produce the destruction of the whole. However the conjunctions and disjunctions of the parts do bring about the conjunctions and disjunction of the whole with the surrounding space although the latter remains unmoving despite the movement of the parts. This spatial conjunction and disjunction of the whole is produced by those of the parts themselves. These cannot be due to the movement either of the whole or of the space. Both these are unmoving.

The movement of the parts cannot be supposed to cause the movement of the whole for if there is movement in the parts of parts it cannot be supposed to cause the movement of the whole.

Minor objections to the above and their rebuttal

Text: अथवा यः यत्–आश्रिततया उपलभ्यते सः तस्मिन् चलति अचलः अपि चलः एव विभाव्यते दर्पण–मुखवत् जल–चंद्रवत् च इत्यापि द्रष्टव्यम्। कृतं प्रतीति–कलहेन। एवं अपि सर्वत्र चलः एव उपलभ्येत

इति चेत्? चलति अवयवे सर्वत्र तथा एव इति न किंचित् अनुपपन्नम्। अचले तु कथं तथा उपलभ्यताम्? तथा अपि चल–अचल–आश्रयस्य चल–अचलतया प्रतीतौ चल–अचल–जल–चंद्रवत् द्वैत–प्रत्ययः अपि स्यात् इतिचेत्? स्यात् अपि यदि आश्रय–व्छिेदः स्यात्। न हि एकस्मिन् एव जले अ–विच्छिन्न–अवयव–भेदेन द्वि–चंद्र–भ्रमः नाम। किंतु सः एव एकः चले जले चलः उपलभ्यते अचले तु अचलः इति। वीचिषु सः अपि सहस्त्र–निभः इति चेत्? एवं एतत्। तासां विच्छेदेन आकालनात्।

Trans: Or it is a fact that that which is seen to be based or located in a thing is felt to be moving although unmoving if the latter is moving as is the case with the face reflected in the mirror or the moon reflected in water. (When the mirror and water move the unmoving face appears to be moving). So enough of this shadow-boxing. (But if the movement of the locus makes the located appear moving then) why does not the whole always appear as moving? Well! if the parts are moving all over, the whole does appear so and so there is nothing wrong in the assumption. When the parts do not move how can the whole appear as moving? But if this is so then since some parts are moving and some unmoving the body based upon them should also be both moving and unmoving and so like the moving and unmoving moon reflected in water the body too should appear both moving and unmoving at the same time. Yes! This is possible if there takes place disruption of the parts. Certainly in the same static pool of water there does not arise the illusion of double moon. Instead the same one moon appears moving in flowing water and unmoving in calm water. But doesn't the moon appear thousandfold in water? Yes exactly! The waves appear to disrupt water.

Expl: Modifying slightly the foregoing view the non-Buddhist says now that the movement of the parts is sometimes imposed upon the whole so that when the parts are moving all over the whole appears to move. But this does not imply that even when there is no movement in the parts the whole would appear moving or because the parts are both moving and unmoving the whole would appear both moving and unmoving. If there is disruption in the locus of the whole as happens in water in which the moon is reflected then depending upon the movement of one part and the nonmovement of another the whole could quite well appear both moving and unmoving. In the body if one limb appears moving while th other appears unmoving the two do not appear as disrupted from each other. So the body does not appear as both moving and unmoving.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि चल–अचलयोः युत्–सिद्धि–प्रसंगः इति चेत्? न स्वयं प्रतिबंध–असिद्धेः। न च प्रसंगे व्याप्तौ अपि पर–अभ्युपगमः शरणम्। न च एवं पर–अभ्युपगमः अपि। वस्त्र–उदक–आदौ दृश्यते तावत् अयं इति चेत। न। तंतु–वस्त्र–आदौ विपर्ययस्य अपि दर्शनात्। इदं मिथ्या इति चेत्? इह कथं सत्यम्? अ–बाधनात्–इति चेत्? इह तर्हि बाधक–अंतरं वाच्यम्। चल–अचलत्वं एव इति चेत्? न। युत–सिद्धौ अपि किं इति न इदं बाधकं इति विपर्ययस्य अपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् इति।

Trans: Let then the hand etc. and the body, although connected with each other be capable of existing as unconnected with each other (as the body remains unmoving even when the hand etc. move)? No! The Buddhist himself does not admit the concomitance of unconnected existence and having no movement when the other (connected) entity has movement. (How then can he precipitate the above contingency?). Certainly when an unfavourable contingency is precipitated the concomitance on which the latter is based should be one which is acceptable to others only. But even the non-Buddhist does not admit the concomitance. But don't we see the said concomitance in the case of the cloth and water ? (In the wet cloth water dripping from the cloth has movement while the cloth does not move and both water and cloth exist unconnected with each other). Yes, but the opposite of this also is seen in the case of the yarn and the cloth. (Although the yarn and the cloth have differing movements yet the cloth cannot exist unconnected with the yarn). Couldn't this existence be just an illusion and so false? (Both the yarn and the cloth may exist mutually-unconnected for all we know).Well! if so how can the existence in the other case (cloth and water) be true? If it is so because the cognition of unconnected existence of two things in this case is uncontradicted (as water dripping from cloth is still connected with it) then in the second case of the yarn and the cloth too there need be no contradiction in admitting the connected existence of the two. So some other contradictory of this admission has to be mentioned (if the above concomitance is to be upheld). Could it be said that movement of the part and nonmovement of the whole goes against the connected existence of the cloth and the yarn? Well! even the opposite of this could well be maintained namely that unconnected existence of part and whole is contradicted by the movement of the parts coupled with nonmovement of the whole.

Expl: Now it is argued by the Buddhist that since the body can be unmoving even while the limbs are moving the body and its limbs should

be able to exist unconnected with each other. The non-Buddhist replies that there is no concomitance between these and the Buddhist cannot hold any such concomitance, as according to his theory of momentariness the parts and the whole cannot exist unconnected with each other at the same moment. So to exist they will have to last at least two moments. Moreover it is also not establishable in the Buddhist theory denying external reality that things which exist unconnected with each other have their separate movements. Even the non-Buddhist does not admit this and even if he admitted it it would not be proper for the Buddhist to argue on the basis of a concomitance which he does not admit. If the concomitance is supposed to be instantiated in the example of water dripping from a wet cloth the opposite is instantiated in the example of the cloth woven with the thread. So it cannot be definitely stated that movement of parts and non-movement of the whole do not go along with connected existence.

Objection to the rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: रक्त–अ–रक्त–विरोधः इति चेत्? न। भ्रांतत्वात्। तत्–मूल–रागि–द्रव्य–संयोग–अ–संयोग–विरोधः अस्तु इति चेत्? न परमाणु–वादिनं प्रति प्राक् एव परिहृतत्वात्। इतरं प्रति का वार्ता इति चेत्? सा एव तावत्। तथा एव अ–विरोधात्। प्रकार–भेदेन अपि विरोध–अभ्युपगमे व्याप्तेः असिद्धेः संयोग तत्–अभावयोः एव असिद्धेः। सिद्धौ वा प्रकार–भेद–अ–विरुद्ध–स्व–अभाव–सादेश्य–अ–परित्यागात्। न च एवं पदार्थ–अंतर–वैधर्म्येण संयोगः एव निराकर्तव्यः तत्–वैधर्म्येण तेषां एव निराकरण–प्रसंगात्।

Trans: But isn't the apparent existence of red colour and its absence in different parts of the composite incompatible with the unitary character of the latter? No! In such a case the cognition that such an entity is red is illusory. (The entity with such parts is not red at all). Couldn't then the contact of the substance productive of red colour and the absence of the contact occurring in the different parts be incompatible with the nature of the whole? No. If the whole is regarded as a conglomeration of atoms then the possibility of this incompatibility has already been countered earlier, but what about other—idealistic views in which the atoms have no existence apart from consciousness? (The answer is that) the same rebuttal based upon difference of aspects determining redness and nonredness holds in the idealistic view also. By this means itself the incompatibility can be removed. If even under different aspects red and not-red are supposed to militate against each other then the concomitance of diversity and the co-existence of the two (incompatibles)

cannot be established as the contact and its absence cannot coexist. If however the concomitance is established then the coexistence of contact with its absence which is not opposed to the diversity of aspects will have to be admitted. But can't we discard the (reality of) contact itself because it is unlike other entities in coexisting with its opposite? No, we could discard then all the other entities because they are unlike contact in its coexistence with its opposite.

Expl: Another objection to the reality of the composite is that if part of it is red and part is not then it cannot be a unitary entity. If the cognition of redness in the composite in such a case is illusory then the cooccurrence of the contact of the reddening material and its absence in the composite cannot be denied and this would entail diversity in the latter. But the incompatibility of the cooccurrence has already been shown to be untenable. Even a cognition having both red and not-red as its objects cannot be afflicted by incompatibility. If despite this the two are supposed to be incompatible then the rule that a thing is not coexistent with its absence cannot be maintained. The word 'Vyāpti' occurring here in the text has been rendered as concomitance by another commentator. The concomitance is between diversity and the coocurrence of contact and its absence. The cooccurrence of these two is possible only if these are taken under two different aspects. But if even under different aspects these remain incompatible then the concomitance cannot be established at all.

Objection to the last and its rebuttal

Text: न च एवं एव न्याय्यम्? नियमवता हि सत्य-वैधर्म्येण इतरत् निराक्रियते। असत्य-वैधर्म्येण सत्यत्वस्य एव निवहितात्। निषेध्य-प्रतीति-नांतरीयकत्वात् च निषेध-सिद्धेः। शश-विषाण-आदौ कल्पितेन निषेध्येन निषेध-सिद्धिः इति चेत्? न। निराकृतत्वात्। संयोगस्य वाङ्-मात्रेण काल्पनिकत्व-सिद्धौ अतिप्रसंगात् च। शश-शृंग-न्यायस्य च योग्य-अनुपलंभ अ-अभावेन असिद्धेः। इत एव बाधकात् तत्-सिद्धौ इतर-इतर-आश्रयत्वम्।

Trans: Let then this (the elimination of everything) itself be treated as reasonable (so that nothingness itself would thereby be established). Well! anything is eliminated or discarded if it is shown to be endowed with a property which invariably excludes all real entities. If anything is endowed with properties excluding the unreal then this establishes only its reality. Moreover the elimination or negation of a thing cannot be made unless the negated thing is cognised. But isn't the negation of the hare's horn made possible by means of the imaginative cognition of the hare's horn?

No! This view has already been refuted' If contact is treated as unreal and imaginary for no reason at all anything could be so treated. The reason for regarding the hare's horn as unreal is not applicable to contact because it is cognisable and is cognised. If, simply because contact is unlike other entities it is supposed to be nonexistent then its noncognition being dependent upon its nonexistence and the nonexistence upon its noncognition there will result circularity in argument.

Expl: The Buddhist being prepared to accept the consequence of his denial of the reality of contact, that the reality of everything would then have to be denied, the opponent maintains that not everything can be denied to be real. If anything is found to be unlike the real because of nonpossession of the properties of the real it is discarded as unreal. Similarly if a thing is found to be unlike the unreal on account of its possession of properties not characterising the unreal like knownness, meantness etc. it is regarded as real. Contact is such a real. Besides even for significant denial the cognition of the reality of the denied is necessary. The denial in the case of a non- existent like hare's horn is not of a non-existent but of an existent (horn) in another existent (the hare) as explained earlier. Moreover there is no non-cognition of the cognisable in the case of contact. It is both cognisable and cognised.

Objection to the above rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: शब्द–प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् संयोग–प्रतीतेः अन्यथा–उपपत्ति–मात्रेण बाधक–प्रवृत्तिः इति चेत्? न। अनुभवस्य ततः अनुरूपं उपधि मुख–पिंडे अ–दत्वा भ्रान्त त्वेन अन्यथा–उपपत्तौ तत्–विपरीत–अनुमान–प्रर्वतने अग्नौ अन्–उष्णत्व–अनुमाने प्रवृत्ति–प्रसंगात। न च प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य सामान्यवत्, संयोग–प्रत्ययस्य तत्–अनुरुपं उपाधि–अंतरं अस्ति्। एवं भूत–मर्यादा–अतिक्रमे तु त्वत्–अभिप्रेत–प्रतिबंधक–प्रत्ययस्य अपि भ्रांतत्वेन अन्ययासिद्धि–प्रसंगः कथं वार्यः? तत्–अ–वारणे शिथिल–मूलः तर्कः कथं प्रवर्तेत? यथा–लोक–व्यवस्थानं च अध्यक्ष–अंतरवत् संयोगस्य अपि शब्द–पाक–ज–आदि–अर्थ क्रिया–स्थितेः तत्–अध्यक्षस्य अपि प्रमाण्य–सिद्धेः न भ्रांतत्व–शंका–अवकाशः–इति।

Trans: May it be that as in the case of the recognitive cognition of alphabets it is the generic property of the phonetic sounds which is taken to be the real object of the cognition so the cognition of which contact appears to be the object may be explained without admitting the reality of

contact (and its being the object of the cognition) and then noncognition can be used to prove the unreality of contact? No! without assigning an appropriate object to objective cognition, or feeding (or providing) the right object of the nature of a property to an objective experience, or cognition, if it is simply dubbed as illusory then one can have inferences opposed to such cognitions. Thus despite experiencing directly the heat of fire one may seek to infer coldness in fire. Certainly there is no appropriate object to the cognition of contact as there is (like the universal) for the recognitive cognition mentioned. If such a convention (for deciding the real object of a cognition) is not followed then even the cognition of concomitance (of diversity and apparent coexistence of incompatible properties) admitted by the Buddhist may be proved to be erroneous and so explained without admitting the reality of its object. If this predicament is not avoided how can the conditional argument devoid of concomitance proceed? So, as in the case of other object-cognitions even in the case of the contact-cognition the reality of its object based on the production of sound and the process of frying etc. by contact has got to be admitted. There is no basis for treating the cognition as illusory.

Expl: Now the Buddhist argues that the contact-cognition could be explained without admitting the reality of contact as the identity-cognition of alphabetical letters is explained by taking the generic property of the letters as the real object of the cognition. But the Buddhist does not give any reason for the ordinary cognition of contact to be regarded as illusory or assign any appropriate object for the cognition other than contact. If absence of interval between two things is supposed to replace contact in all contact-cognitions and thus contact is done away with then the cognition of warm water for example cannot arise as warmth or heat enters into water thus forming a kind of wedge between different quantities of water.

The concomitance referred to above is that holding between diversity and cooccurrence of incompatible properties.

Another objection to the reality of the composite and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि तत्–देशत्व–अ–तत–देशत्व–रूपः व्रिरोधः। न। विरोध–लक्षण अभावात्। नहि तत्–देश–संसर्ग–विधौ नियमेन देश–अंतर–संसर्ग–निषेधः तत्–देशत्व–तत्–अ–देशत्वयोः तु स्यात्। तत्–संसर्गः तु केन इष्यते? अध्यक्षं एव एक संसर्ग–परिच्छेदकं तत्–अभाव–व्यवच्छेद–मुखेन तत्–अन्य–व्यवच्छेद–फलं इमं विरोधं उद्गिरति इति चेत्? स्यात् अपि एवं यदि नियमेन एक–संसृष्टस्य अन्य–संसर्गं प्रतिक्षिपत् अध्यक्षं उदियात् न तु एतत्

अस्ति। युगपत् एकस्य अनेक–संसर्ग–प्रवृत्तं अध्यक्षं अ–विशेषात् सर्व–संसर्गं वा प्रतिक्षिपेत न वा कं अपि स्व–आत्मानं एव वा। सर्वथा न विरोधं दीपयेत्। अंततः परमाणोः अपि एकस्य अनेकैः परमाणुभि, संसर्ग–स्वीकारात्–इति।

Trans: Let then the incompatibility consist in being located and not located at a certain place. No! This does not fulfil the definition of incompatibility. Certainly if the conjunction of a thing with a certain place is affirmed its conjunction with another place is univariably denied ('not being located' is taken here to mean 'located at a different place'). Of course being located at a place and not being 'located at that place are certainly incompatible with each other. But who admits that they agree with each other? However can't it be urged that the very perception which apprehends the conjunction of an object with a certain place gives rise to the incompatibility resulting from the exclusion of conjunction with another place via the exclusion of the conjunction with the first place well! It culd be so if the perception of an object in conjunction with a locus occurred only as invariably excluding the conjunction of the object with any other locus. But this is not at all the case. Any perception apprehending an object conjoined with several entities may indifferently exclude the conjunction of the object with everything or may not exclude conjunction with any or exclude itself. On none of these alternatives the perception reveals any incompatibility. Eventually it is also a fact that the Buddhists (too) admits the conjunction of a single atom with many atoms at the same time.

Expl: The composite is now denied because it exists and does not exists at the same place. This is answered by clarifying the meaning of 'not' and showing that existence at a place is negated only by nonexistence at that place, not by existence at some other place. It is also clarified that the cognition of a thing at one place does not exclude the existence of the thing at some other place although existence at another place is a special case of non-existence at its place which is excluded by existence at the place. This may be so if the cognition of a thing as connected with a place invariably excluded the cognition of it as connected with any other place. But this is not at all the case. If a cognition of a thing simultaneously connected with many loci were exclusive in character it may exclude the cognition of the thing as connected with every possible locus, or it may exclude itself. But the absence of connection with everything is not incompatible with connection with some loci, and if it itself is excluded by the cognition there will be nothing for it to be incompatible with. Further even the Buddhist admits the contact of a single atom with many atoms at the same time.

Rebuttal of another of the above objections

Text: एतेन वृत्ति–विकल्पः निरस्तः। परमाणु–वृत्या अवयवि–वृत्तेः तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वात्।

Trans: By the foregoing rebuttal stands rebutted the objection pertaining to the existence of the composite in its parts. This existence is in every respect similar to the existence (or contact) of one atom in (or with) other atoms.

Expl: It is objected that the composite cannot exist either wholly or partly in its parts. If the first is true then some parts will be left by themselves as bereft of the whole. If the second is true, then the whole being different from its parts it can nowhere exist in parts. Such objections are met by the reply that the existence of the whole is (in every respect) like that of the atoms in one another.

Next objection stated

Text: अस्तु तर्हि चित्रे नील–अ–नील–आदि–विरोधः। न हि तत् एकं रूपं चित्र त्व–विरोधात्। न अपि अनेकम्। एक–अवयवि–समवाय–विरोधात्। न च अनेकं व्यापकं तथा अन्–उपलंभ–विरोधात्। न च अ–व्यापकं स्व–अभाव–विदेश–जातीयत्व–विरोधात्। अन्यथा विरोध अ–विरोध–व्यवस्था–विरोधात्। न च अ–रुपः एव अवयवी चाक्षुषत्व–विरोधात् इति चेत्? न।

Trans: Let then an object of variegated colour be infected by the incompatibility of the coexistence of different colours. Such an object can certainly not have a single colour because the colour cannot then be variegated. The colour cannot also be multiple in nature as then it cannot inhere in a single composite entity. (If the locus is one the located colour must also be one). Moreover the many colours (if they are many) cannot pervade the composite entity as it is not seen to be endowed with many colours in every part of itself. The many colours cannot also be non-pervasive because then they would not be of the same nature as the entities which do not coexist with their absences (only nonpervasive entities coexist with their absence). If despite being of such a nature the many colours coexisted with their absences then the distinction between incompatibility and compatibility would be annulled. It can't also be urged that the composite entity is simply colourless because then its perceptibility would be jeopardised.

Expl: Another objection to the reality of the composite is now being

urged. If the composite is variegated in colour it cannot be said to have or not have any particular colour. No colour is the variegated colour. If a plurality of colours are such they cannot be supposed either to permeate or not permeate the composite entity. Colour is not like contact, a non-permeating or non-pervasive entity. On this account it cannot be opined that the composite itself is without colour although it is visible because it is produced by parts which are visible. If the parts also are variegated in colour then they too will have to be treated as colourless. If the visibility of the parts too is explained on the basis of the visibility of the parts of parts then, if these latter also are variegated the same difficulty would reappear.

Rebuttal of the objection

Text: चित्रत्वं हि नानात्वं वा मिथः–विरुद्ध–नाना–जाति–समवायं वा अभिप्रेत्य यदि एकत्व–अभ्युपगमे विरोधः उद्भाव्यते तदा एवं एतत्। न तु तथा अभ्युपगमः। न खलु अनेकत्वं चित्रत्वम्। शुक्लेषु अपि अनेकेषु चित्र–प्रत्यय–प्रसंगात्। न अपि एकस्मिन् विरुद्ध–अनेक–जाति–समवायः। विरोधेन एव निराकृत्वात्। अपि तु नीलत्व–आदिवत् चित्रत्वं अपि जाति–विशेषः एव। सः च अवयववृत्ति–विजातीय–रूप–समाहार–अभिव्यंग्यत्वात् न एक रूप–अवयव–सहितस्य अवयविनः उपलंभे अपि उपलभ्यते। अतः एव त्र्यणुके चित्रे अपि न चित्र–प्रत्ययः कदा अपि। तथा अपि अ–चित्रे पार्श्वे चित्र–प्रत्ययः मा भूत् धवल–प्रत्ययः तु कुतः इति चेत्? अवयव–रूप–संचारेण अवयविनः अपि तथा–प्रत्ययात्। अतः एव यत्र अवयव–रूपं न प्रत्यक्षं तत्र त्रसरेणौ एतत् अपि नास्ति। दृश्यं एव बाह्य–आलोक–रूपं आरोप्य पिंजरः त्रसरेणुः आलोक्यते।

Trans: If the aforesaid incompatibility is based on the assumption that variegatedness is constituted by a plurality of colours or by a single colour which is characterised by different mutually- incompatible properties and so the variegated colour cannot be a single colour then there need be no objection to it. But we do not make such an assumption. Certainly variegatedness is not plurality. If it were so then a plurality of whites would appear as variegated. Nor is it the inherence of mutually-incompatible properties in a single entity. It is ruled out by the very incompatibility of the properties. In fact like blueness etc. variegatedness too is a special type of generic property. And this being manifestable only by the congcomeration of colours of different types inhering in the different

parts of a composite entity it is not manifested in a composite whose parts are of only a single colour. This is why even if a triad is of variegated colour it is never cognised as such (as its parts are not perceptible). Well! this explains why a certain surface of a composite endowed with a single colour does not seem to be variegated in colour but how can it explain the white appearance of the composite in respect of the white surface (when it is itself variegated in colour)? The answer is that in this case it is the colour of the surface or part, which, being imposed upon the composite, the composite appears as of the colour of the former. For this very reason where the colour of the part is not visible as in the case of the triad it is the colour of the light external to the atoms that is imposed upon the triad and so it is perceived as being of tawny colour.

Expl: Answering the above objection the opponent explains that variegatedness is a special type of generic property and it is manifested in the composite if its parts possess different colours. Sometimes it is the colour of a certain part of the composite which stands out and overshadows the variegated colour of the composite. In the case of the triad there is no possibility of the part of the triad being visible, so it is the colour of light that is imposed upon the latter when it looks variegated.

A technical point may be raised here. If a cloth is woven out of threads each of which is of variegated colour how can it be supposed to be of variegated colour when the parts are of the same single colour namely the variegated colour? If the variegatedness of the composite is accounted on the basis of the different colours of the parts of parts etc. then even the visibility of the composite may be accounted on the basis of its being the remote product of coloured parts of parts. Thus the composite may even be regarded as colourless. One answer to this difficulty is that in this case the different colours of the parts of parts may be supposed to be the cause of the colour of the composite. Another answer is that just as a variegated composite produced by blue and white parts is different from one produced by yellow and red parts so a variegated composite produced by parts which too are variegated is a special type of variegated entity, but for all variegated colours of a composite only the colours of its parts are needed as cause.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: स्यात एतत्। यदि चित्रत्वं नाम जाति–विशेषः कथं तर्हि विरुद्ध–जातीय रूप–समाहार–मात्रे चित्रत्व–प्रत्ययः इति चेत्? न वै नील–धवल–अरुणेषु पटेषु क्वचित् अपि कार्बुर–अर्थः चित्र–प्रत्ययंः कस्य अपि। वैधर्म्य–निमित्तः तु कैन वार्यते? चित्र–पदस्य अक्ष–आदि–पदवत् अनेक–अर्थत्वात्। नील–पीत–आदिषु मिथः संसृष्टेषु अन्–

आरब्ध–द्रव्येषु अपि कर्बुर–प्रत्ययः भवति इति चेत्? सत्यम्। द्रव्य–अंतर–उत्पाद–अभिमानात् स्थौल्य–अतिशय–प्रत्ययवत् उपपत्तेः इति।

Trans: If variegatedness is a special type of property how come it appears in a cluster of objects of different colours (where there is no one object produced by parts of different colours)? The answer to this question is that if the word 'variegated' is used in the sense of 'an object produced by parts of different colours' then yards of differently-coloured cloths cannot be called variegated. But in the other sense of 'objects of different types' the use of the word 'variegated' would not be denied by anybody in the cited instance. The word variegated like the word 'aksa' has many different meanings. But isn't it the case that we do have the cognition of variegatedness (in the first sense) with regard to objects of different colours lying in close proximity with each other but without producing any object out of themselves? Yes, it is so but it is due to the wrong impression that some new object of variegated colour has come into being in the situation. It is just like the impression of a new large quantity engendered by piles of paddy stacked near each other.

Expl: It is now questioned that if variegatedness is and is manifested as explained above how is it that differently-coloured pieces of cloth placed near each other look variegated when their respective parts do not have different colours. The answer to the question is that in the strict sense this is no case of variegatedness. The word happens to be used here to denote variety which consists in the colours displayed being of different kinds. If even real variegatedness appears in certain instances like this it is due to the impression (engendered by the objects of diverse colours placed alongside each other) that a new object of variegated colours has been produced by those objects.

A new objection to the reality of the composite based on the denial of atoms and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि परमाणु–निवृत्तेः सर्व–विलोपः। तथा हि बहुभिः परमाणुभिः संसृज्यमानः परमाणुः प्रत्येकं किं एकदेशेन संयुज्यते कात्स्न्येन वा? प्रकार–अंतर–अभावात्। न प्रथमः। तस्य एकदेश–अभावात्। भावें वा परमाणुत्व–व्याघातात्। न द्वितीयः। परमाणु–अंतरेण अ–संसर्ग–प्रसंगात्। न हि अस्ति संभवः एकत्र एव परिसमाप्त–वृत्तिः अन्यत्र अपि वर्तते इति।

Trans: Let then the composite be discarded because there are no atoms at

all (from out of which the former may be produced). To explain: It may be asked, 'Does an atom coming in contact with many other atoms (in order to produce the composite entity) does so in parts or as a whole? There is no third alternative. The first alternative is untenable because an atom is partless. If It had parts it would forfeit its atomic nature. The second alternative is also not tenable because after conjoining with one atom an atom cannot conjoin with any other atom. Certainly it is not possible that a thing which is wholly located at one place only can be located at another place too.

Expl: Now another objection based on the denial of the possibility of atomic conjunction is adduced by the Buddhist to show that the composite cannot be produced at all.

Rebuttal of the objection

Text: न। बुद्धया समान–योग–क्षेमत्वात्। तथा हि बुद्धिः अपि संतं अ–संतं वा अनेकं विषयं॰आंलबमाना आकारं वा विभ्रती कात्स्न्येन वा एकदेशेन वा? न प्रथमः। पीत–आदि विषय–आकार–विलोप–प्रसङ्गात्। न हि अस्ति–संभवः नीले एव विषये आकारे वा परिसमाप्त–आत्मा पीत–आदि संयुक्त–आत्मा च इति। न द्वितीयः। तत्–अभावात्। एवं अनाकारत्वं अ–विषयत्वं च बुद्धेः इष्यते एव इति चेत्? तत्–किं यत् प्रतिभासते तत् असत् आहोस्वित् न प्रतिभासते एवं किंचित्? न आद्यः। असति अपि नील–पीत–आदौ ज्ञान–वृत्ति–विकल्पस्य तत्–अवस्थत्वात्। न हि कृत्स्नं एव विज्ञानं नील–उल्लेखि, पीत–आदि–अनुल्लेख–प्रसंगात्। न अपि तत्–एकदेशः। तत् अभावात् इति उक्तत्वात्। न द्वितीयः बाह्ये अपि वृत्ति–विकल्पस्य अनुपपत्तेः इति।

Trans: No! This objection is untenable. The atomic conjunction is in every respect like cognitive objectivity. To explain: It may be asked, 'Does cognition apprehending real or unreal objects or bearing their form does so wholly or by parts? The first is untenable because then the same cognition cannot have the forms of both blue and yellow objects. Certainly it is not possible that cognition which is wholly engrossed in the blue object or its form is engrossed in the yellow object or its form also. The second alternative also in not tenable. There are no parts in a cognition. But why should we deny such formlessness and objectlessness of cognition? We accept it. Alright, but does this mean that that which is

cognised is false or nothing is cognised at all? The first cannot be the case. Even if the blue, yellow etc. were non-existent the question regarding the mode of their cognition remains unanswered. Certainly the whole of a cognition cannot apprehend the blue for then the yellow etc. will remain unapprehended. Nor can a part of the cognition cognise, for it has already been said that cognition does not have parts. The second too cannot be the case. If nothing appears then there is nothing; how then can there be the question whether anything exists wholly or partly.

Expl: The conjunction of an atom with other atoms can be conceived on the analogy of the relationship of a cognition with its objects. For example if it is asked whether a cognition is wholly or partly related to its different objects or their different forms what will be the answer? If the cognition is supposed to be related wholly with one of its objects it cannot be related to any other object. But cognition cannot be related with any object in parts because cognition does not have parts. Even if the reality of all objects is denied the above question cannot be brushed aside. Even the unreal appears in cognition and so the question remains whether this appearance is total or partial. If however nothing (even the unreal) appears then there is nothing at all. How then the question about the existence or contact of an atom in other atoms wholly or partly be raised at all?

Defence of the objection and its rebuttal

Text: स्यात् एतत्। निःशेष–समुदायी कृत्स्न–शब्दस्य अर्थः। समुदाये कश्चित् एव समुदायि–एकदेश–पदार्थः। न च बुद्धिः समुदाय–स्वभावा। तस्याः एक–रुपत्वात्। तत् कुतः कृत्स्न–एकदेश–विकल्प–उत्थानम्? कथं तर्हि तत्–विषयिणी तत्–आकारवती वा? प्रकार–अंतर–अभावात् इति यदि तदा स्वरूपेण इति ब्रूमः इति चेत्? स्फुटं निरटंकि तार्किक–वेदिका–विटंकेन केवलं अस्मभ्यं अभ्यसूयता दूरं गत्वा इति।

Trans: Let then be this (reply to the above objection). The word 'whole' (English for 'Kritsna' in Sanskrit) means 'everything without remainder' and the word 'part' (English for 'Ekadesa' in Sanskrit) means 'a fraction of a whole or collection.' Now cognition is not collective in nature as it is an unitary object. So how can the question regarding the partial or complete apprehension by cognition be raised and how can the nonapprehension by cognition of the object or bearing its form by it be sustained? If you say that there is no other way in which the apprehension can be conceived then our reply is that cognition apprehends its object by itself. 'Well'! this cunning fellow in the logical fraternity has only now

come out with the right statement. Only because of his jealousy for us he had so far withheld the right statement (which applies to the atom too).'

Expl: The Buddhist now seeks to defend his query about atoms by saying that since cognition is not a whole of parts the above question is irrelevant to it. Cognition cognises its objects as itself. The opponent replies that the atoms too can be supposed to exist in other atoms as atoms, or by their own nature, and so the above query is not relevant to them.

Rebuttal of an earlier objection to the reality of the composite

Text: एतेन तत्–अ–तत्–देशत्वं निरस्तम्। तथा हि बुद्धेः नील–आकारतां परिच्छिंदत् अध्यक्षं तत्–अभाव–व्यवच्छेद–मुखेन तत्–अविनाभूतां: पीत–आदि–आकारतां अपि व्यवाच्छिद्यात्। तथा च कथं एका बुद्धिः नील–पीत–आदि आकारा स्यात् इति तुल्यः अनुयोगः? भवेत् एवं यदि नील–आदि आकारतायाः पीत–आदि–आकारत्व–अविनाभावः स्यात्। सः एव तु कुतः? नील–पीत–आदि–आकारायाः बुद्धेः ऐकात्म्येन एव निश्चयात्। प्रति–आकार–नियतत्वे चित्र–प्रतिपत्तेः अपि अनुपपत्ति : इति चेत्? तत्–एतत् तुल्यं परमाणु–अवयव–आदिषु अपि। न हि तत्र अपि अनेक–परमाणु–संसृष्टस्य परमाणोः अनेक–अवयव–संसृष्टस्य अवयविनः वा न एक–आत्मता अनुभूयते। तथात्वे वा एकस्य अनेक–संसर्ग–प्रतिपत्तिः कदा अपि न स्यात् इति तुल्या एव अर्थ–गतिः। वाचि वैचित्र्यं तु क्व उपयुज्यते इति?

Trans: By the above stands rebutted the alleged incompatibility of being and not being located in the same place. To explain: A perceptual cognition known to have the form of the blue may be realised to exclude the form of the yellow etc. because this form is concomitant with the absence of the blue-form which the cognition is supposed to exclude. So the question may arise as to how a single cognition can have simultaneously the forms of blue, yellow etc.? This question is similar to the one about simultaneous existence and nonexistence at a place raised with regard to the composite entity. The Buddhist may answer this question thus: The above possibility may be envisaged if the possession of the blue-form is concomitant with nonpossession of the yellow-form. But this is not the case at all. The cognition having the forms of the blue and the yellow is known to be nothing but unitary. If a cognition were invariably tied down to a single form there will not arise collective

cognition at all. And this contingency is applicable to atoms and the composite too. Certainly in these cases it is not true that an atom conjoined with several atoms or a composite inhering in several parts is not felt to be a single entity. If it were so then there can never arise the cognition of one thing being connected with many. So the consequences are alike in both cases. Thus the difference of the case of cognition from those of the atom and the composite is of no consequence at all.

Expl: The alleged incompatibility of being and not being located at a place is just like the incompatibility of the same cognition being simultaneously of diverse forms. Being of one form does not make the cognition the excluder of all other forms. If this were so there cannot arise a simultaneous cognition of different objects. Likewise an atom can be conjoined with many other atoms and a composite inhere in many parts. If a single cognition did not cognise many different objects even concomitance involving the major and middle terms etc. cannot be known.

Rebuttal of objections against the atom

Text: संयोग–व्यवस्थापनेन एव षट्केन युगपद्–योगात् दिक्–देश–भेदात् छाया–आवृतिभ्यां इत्यादयः निरस्ताः।

Trans: Only by thus establishing the possibility of the conjuntion (of one atom with many other atoms) objections based upon the impossibility of the conjunction of one atom with six different atoms, the different places of the atom, the incidence of the shadow of the atom etc. stand refuted.

Expl: The Buddhists have urged certain objections against the reality of atoms which are summarised in the following verse:

'षट् केन युगपत् योगात् परमाणोः षडंशता। दिक्–देश भेदत्तच्छाया वृत्तिभ्यां च अपि स–अंशता।'

It says that if an atom conjoins with other atoms then, there being six atoms on the six sides of the single atom it should be conjoined with each of them. In order to have this conjunction the conjoining atom must have six different phases or parts, so it cannot be an atom at all. Also an atom must cast its shadow as well as create a cover for another atom by its presence. This is possible only for a composite entity. All these puzzles are resolved by the above explanation of how one thing can be conjoined with many different things. It is the difference of directions which determines the diversity of the conjunction of an atom. An atom casts shadow not because it has parts but because it has a definite shape. The difference of directions in relation to the atom is

also due to the different directions themselves.

Rebuttal continued

Text: परमाणु–सिद्धि–अ–सिद्धिभ्यां एव भूतत्व–आदयः निर–अवकाशिताः।

Trans: Other reasons for disproving atomicity of the atom stand refuted either by the proof or the disproof of the reality of the atom.

Expl: Other objections to the reality of the atom are inferencs like, 'The atom has parts as it has shape, it is itself a part of the diad, is coloured and has feel'. If the atom is unreal all these inferences are ruled out. If however the atom is proved to be real then it is also proved to be partless because if there can be parts to an atom these parts also will have parts and thus there will result infinite regress. There are other fallacies too in the inferences but the fallacies that are mentioned are conspicuous.

Another minor objection and its rebuttal

Text: आकाश–व्यतिभेद–आदयः तु अ–संभाविताः एव।

Trans: The penetration of space within the interior of an atom is simply impossible.

Expl: If space is ubiquitous it must be present inside the atom. This would make the atom a composite entity. The reply to this is that since there is no middle in the atom nothing can penetrate it.

A general rebuttal of all the above objections

Text: सर्वत्र च अत्र हेतु–दशायां प्रतिज्ञा–पदयोः व्याघातः। काल–अत्यय–अपदेशः च। प्रसंग–दशायां आश्रय–असिद्धिः व्याप्ति–असिद्धिः च। दृष्टांत–असिद्धेः। अनवस्था–लक्षण–विपरीत–तर्कस्य तत् उपष्टंभकतया त्रुटेः अमेयत्व–प्रसंगस्य च विद्यमानत्वात्।

Trans: Moreover in all these inferences the two terms occurring in the minor premise contradict each other ('The atom has parts' is the minor premise; here the word 'atom' means 'partless') and the major being absent in the minor the fallacy of absent major term also afflicts the inferences. The conditional arguments, 'If the atom were partless it would not have definite shape, be conjoined with six different atoms and so on' would be afflicted by the fallacies of nonexistent minor and unestablished concomitance as the example to illustrate the concomitance would not be available (if there are no atoms there would be nothing to illustrate the concomitance). Further there arises infinite regress which is of the nature

of a conditional argument opposed to the divisibility of the atom and there is also the unfavourable contingency—that the triad would become immeasurably large if the atom is not partless—which supports the conditional argument.

Expl: Pointing out further fallacies in the inferences disproving the atom the opponent says that in the minor premise of the inferences the minor and the major term are mutually contradictory and the minor is bereft of the major. For the conditional argument no example to illustrate the concomitance is available. The composite entity is not admitted by the Buddhist. So there is nothing which has parts and definite shape. Moreover if there is nothing having parts then the concomitance of the middle and major cannot also be established.

The immeasurability of the triad mentioned arises from the fact that if the atom is divisible there cannot be an end to the process of divisibility anywhere so that the triad would turn out to be infinitely divisible.

An objection to the rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: न च प्रलयः परमाणोः, असत्व–साधकस्य प्रमाणस्य अभावात्। सावयवत्व–आपादकानां च हेतूनां अनवस्था–उत्थापकत्वात् इति। तत् अन्यः एव अयं परमाणुः रक्त–बीजः यस्य भागाः युक्ति–चामुंडा–उदरं अपि भित्वा निष्पतंति इति।

Trans: Let the atom too be destructible. No. There is no proof that can establish its destructibility. All the middle terms however that entail the compositeness of the atom lead to infinite regress. So this atom is a queer entity or demon called 'bloodseed' which tears asunder the belly of the 'ogress' reason and bursts forth from out of it in the form of the atom itself. That is to say the reasons adduced to disprove the atom only succeed in proving the atom.

Expl: There is no middle term like the destruction of the material or non-material cause to prove the destructibility of the atom. If the middle terms like 'definite shape' which entail compositeness are taken to prove the destructibility of the atom the answer is that these lead to infinite regress and however further we go in proving that an atom has parts, parts of parts etc., the parts with which we stop will themselves be proved to be the partless atoms.

Defence of the earlier objection and its rebuttal

Text: न च कल्पित–आश्रयाः काल्पित–प्रतिबंधाः च प्रसंगाः भविष्यंति इति युक्तम्? स्व–इच्छा–कल्पितेन व्यवहारेण सर्व–विधि–निषेध–

व्यवहार–विलोप–प्रसंगात्। लोक–व्यवस्था–अपेक्षणे तु तत्–विरोधेन उत्तरस्य निषेधस्य आत्म–लाभ–अभावात् इति अ–सकृत् आवेदितत्वात्।

Trans: Couldn't we have conditional arguments with imaginary minor terms and imaginary concomitances? No. If affirmation and negation etc. are based on imaginary concepts then all real affirmation and negation would disappear. But if common conventions are followed in this matter then the earlier contentions that 'the composite cannot inhere in its parts and so on' which violate common conventions cannot be permitted at all. This has been explained more than once.

Expl: If atoms are unreal we can have inferences with unreal entities in the Buddhist view. But such a procedure cannot be condoned. Common conventions have got to be followed and then the earlier arguments of the Buddhist which violate these conventions will need to be discarded.

Rebuttal continued

Text: अन्यथा सर्व एतत् बुद्धौ अपि समानम्। सा अपि हि षट्केन युगपद् योग–अदिभिः सावयवा प्रसज्येत। तस्यां अ–सिद्धाः ते इति चेत्? न। अनुमान–सिद्धत्वात्। तथा हि बुद्धिः षट्केन युगपद–योगिनी मूर्तिमती च, सत्वात्, व्यवहर्तव्यत्वात् वा, बोध्यवत् वा इति शक्येते। विपर्ययस्य अपि धर्मि–ग्राहक–मान–साधितत्वात् अन्–अवकाशं इदं इति चेत्? एवं अन्यत्र अपि प्रतिसंदधीथाः इति एषा दिक्।

Trans: Otherwise (if even nonconventional and fallacious arguments are permitted) all the above arguments against the atom are applicable to cognition too. On the basis of the possibility of its simultaneous relation with six entities cognition also could be proved to be composite. But how can the contact etc. be proved of cognition? By inference itself. For example here is the inference; 'cognition is in contact with six entities simultaneously and is of definite shape, because it is real and the object of some usage like the cognised objects'. But isn't the opposite of this also established by the proof which proves the reality of cognition and so the above inference is simply baseless? Well! if this is so then in the other case (that of the atom) too this very consideration should be allowed to prevail. This is how other related issues need to be tackled.

Expl: If even nonconventional and fallacious arguments are allowed then even cognition can be shown to be a composite entity by means of the same arguments. If arguments for the opposite thesis being there these

arguments are disallowed then the same can be said of the arguments against the atoms and the composite.

The consideration of the Mādhyamika view

Text: अन्यः तु चक्षुषी निमील्य निर्भयीभवितुं इच्छन् आह, 'अस्तु तर्हि बुद्धेः अपि विलोपः इति।' अत्र तु किं वक्तव्यं यत्र हेतु–आदि–व्यवहारः नास्ति? अस्तु परं सांवृतः चेत्? भवेत् एवं यदि संवृतिः अपि परमार्थ–सती स्यात्। अन्यथा तु यथा न वास्तवः तथा न सांवृतः अपि। संवृतिः अपि संवृति–सती इति चेत्? अस्या अपि अ–सत्वे न किंचित् अधिकं उक्तम्। पर–संवृतेः तु परमार्थ–सत्व–स्वीकारे सा एव बुद्धिः अपरिहेया इति। सती च बाधकवती च संवृति–सत्ती च इति चेत्? सती एव यदि तत् कथं बाधकम्? तथा चेत् कथं तत्–आलीढस्य सत्वं इति?

Trans: Another disputant (the Mādhyamika) closing his eyes in order to get rid of fear says, 'Let then consciousness too disappear.' What is one to say about this when even reference to middle, minor etc. is done away with? But can't there be an illusory reference to these? Yes, there can be if at least illusion or illusory cognition were absolutely real. Otherwise just as there is neither a real object nor an illusory one can't illusion itself be illusorily real? Yes, but if the second illusion too is unreal then nothing more is said by the above statement. If the second illusion is regarded as absolutely real then it is itself the consciousness whose reality is undeniable. But couldn't this illusory cognition be real, also contradictable and therefore illusorily real? No! if it is real for sure how can anything contradict it and if there is contradiction how can anything apprehended by it be real?

Expl: The Mādhyamika Buddhist's view that even consciousness is non-existent is now being considered. If there is no consciousness at all then all usages will have to be explained on the basis of some illusion. But then the reality of this illusory cognition would have to be allowed. Moreover to be illusory may mean to be endowed with reality which is illusion itself or to be endowed with the property of reality which is the object of illusion or to be the object of the usage engendered by illusion. On any of these meanings the reality of illusion is undeniable and so universal emptiness cannot be maintained.

Rebuttal of the Mādhyamika view

Text: दृश्यते तावत् एवं इति चेत्? सत्व–एक–अर्थ–समवायिनः बाधकत्वं एव तर्हि हेयम्। बाधक–एक–अर्थ–समवायिनः सत्वं एव किं न हीयते इति चेत्? न। बाधकस्य अपि त्याग–प्रसंगात्। उभयं अपि अ–वर्जनीयं एव तर्हि। एवं एतत्। मिथः विरोधः तु हेयः। न हि विरुद्धयोः एक–अर्थ–स्मवायः तभाभूतयोः वा विरोधः शक्यः उपपादयितुं ऋते स्व–समयात्। न च विचार–अवसरे स्व–समय–अवसरः इति। यथा यथा च बुद्धि–निवारणाय यत्नः तथा तथा उज्वलः प्रकाशः। तत् निवारणं अपि बोद्धव्यं एव इति। तत् एतत् आयातं प्रदीप–अतरेण प्रदीपं निर्वाप्य तिमिर–आपादनं इति।

Trans: But we do find that what is not obviously contradicted is taken to be real. If so then it is to be denied that there can be contradiction of that which is coexistent with the property of reality or that which is real. But why shouldn't we deny the reality of that which is coexistent with contradiction or that which is contradicted? Well! if we can then the contradiction can be denied. Allright, let then both the reality and the contradiction be unavoidable. Yes! This is in fact so, what is to be denied however is their cooccurrence (leading to contradiction). Certainly the cooccurrence of opposites or the opposition of coexistents cannot be justified except in one's personal view and in the course of discussion one's personal views are not supposed to be aired. Thus the more the Buddhist tries to get rid of consciousness the brighter shines the light of this consciousness. Even the denial of consciousness needs to be cognised. Thus the Buddhist is trying to create darkness by extinguishing one light by another light.

Expl: It is now urged that both reality and unreality or opposition to reality being seen in the object of illusion only its empirical reality and not absolute reality or unreality should be maintained. But then in the absence of clinching evidence neither reality nor its opposite can be denied. If reality is denied even its opposite cannot be there because unless it is real it cannot cause opposition. Only the cooccurrence of these two needs to be denied. Thus the Mādhyamika's denial of the reality of consciousness does itself need to be cognised. So there cannot be absolute negation of consciousness.

Rebuttal of another objection

Text: एतेन हेतु–फल–भाव–अनुपपत्तेः सर्व–विलोपः इति निरस्तम्। तत्–

निराकरण–प्रयासस्य साफल्य –वैफल्याभ्यां तत्–निराकरण–अनुपपत्तेः। सत्कार्य–दूषणस्य इष्टत्वात्। असत्कार्य–दूषणस्य च प्रत्यक्ष–बाधितत्वात्। तत्–प्रतिपादनस्य असतः एव उत्पतौ अनैकांतिकत्वात् सत्वे वा प्रयास–वैफल्यात् इति।

Trans: By the above rebuttal stands rebutted the contention that nothing is real because the cause-effect-relationship cannot be justified. Whether this attempt of the Buddhist to disprove cause-effect-relationship is successful or unsuccessful the said relationship cannot be refuted. (If the attempt is successful there is the relationship and if it is not then too the relationship stands as uncontradicted). If he intends to disprove the theory of preexistent effect by his denial of the relationship it is quite acceptable. But if the disproof of the theory of emergent effect is sought to be denied then, this being opposed to perceptual evidence it cannot be admitted as correct. Moreover if the statement of the fallacy in the theory of emergent effect is already there there is no need to make it. But if it is not already there then it itself is something which, not being already there is brought into being by his utterance by the Buddhist. So the middle term in the inference that 'the unreal is not produced' is found to be deviant.

Expl: Even by the denial of the causal relationship universal emptiness cannot be maintained. At least the intellectual attempt to deny this relationship must be treated as a real cause. The preexistence of the effect can very well be denied but the production of the non-pre-existent effect cannot be denied as it is testified by perception. To prove that a thing is not produced because it is nonexistent before its production is to invite the fallacy of deviation of the middle term. One's own statement, nonexistent before utterance is brought into being by one's utterance of it.

Objection to the rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: स्थात् एतत्। मा भूवन् एतानि दूषणानि अवयविनि, अनुपलंभः तु स्यात्। न हि परमाणु–समुच्चयात् अपरं किंचित् उपलभ्यते इति चेत्? वैलक्ष्य–विष्टंभिका इयम्। स्थूल–एक–अनुभवस्य सर्वजन–सिद्धत्वात्।

Trans: Let then be this objection. Although all the above criticisms of the composite are proved to be otiose, noncognition could be a (potent) criticism of it. Certainly we don't see anything other than a congeries of atoms at the place of the composite. Well! this statement is just an outburst of a defeated person. The experience of the reality of the gross

composite entity is universal.

Expl: It cannot also be maintained that the gross composite entity is not perceived but only a congeries of atoms is perceived in the place of the latter. A single gross composite entity is a common object of perception.

Objection to the rebuttal that the cognition of grossness is false rebatted

Text: विकल्प मात्रं तत् इति चेत्? न। स्पष्ट प्रलिभासत्वात्। औपाधिकं अस्य स्पष्टत्वं इति चेत्? तथाभूत–अनुभवं–अंतरेण उपाधेः अपि अभावात्। अन्यथा नीलादि–विकल्पानां अपि तथा एव स्पष्टत्व–उपपत्तौ सर्व–प्रत्यय–उच्छेद–प्रसंगात्। गृहीत–निश्चिते एव अर्थे प्रत्यक्ष–प्रामाण्यात्। निश्चय–उपप्लवे तस्य अपि उपप्लवात् इति।

Trans : But mayn't it be urged (against the rebutal) that the cognition that the composite is a single entity is only determinate and so false? No! It cannot be so because the cognition vividly appehends the object; can one say then that the vividyess of the cognition is only conditional? No, If the indeterminate conginition having an object similar to the determnate congnition is the condition and it is the vividness characteristic of the former that is imposed upon the latter then the truth of the latter is established. Otherwise (if an idetermiante conginition having an object dissimilar to the determinate cognition is such a condition) then even the inderterminate congnition of blue, yellow etc would have such conditional vividness so that no cognition could be vivid absolutely. Only that which is indeterminately and also determinately cognised can be taken to be the object of viridical perception. If the determinate cognition did not have the real as its object then even the inderminate cognition would not have the real as its object.

Expl: It is now urged that the perception of the composite gross entity is determinate and so illisory. The non-Buddhist replies that the vividness experienced in the cognition cannot be due to its association with the inderterminate cognition. If this latter has the same object as the former than the gross cannot be unreal. If however the indertermiante cognition has a different object then no inderterminate cognition would have a real object Even a derterminate congnition must apprehend the object which is apprehended by the indeterminate (even if indirectly)

Objection to the above rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: नच परमाणवः एव स्थूला, तत्व–व्याघातात्। न च तत्–समुदायः तथा। तस्य समुदित–स्थानस्य त्वया अन्–अभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे

वा अवयविना किं अपराद्धम्? न च समुदिताः एव तथा प्रतिभासितुं अर्हति। तेषां प्रत्येकं अ–स्थूलत्वात्। न च नाना–दिग्–देश–व्यापिता एव स्थौल्यम्? परमाणुषु प्रत्येकं असंभवात्। न च नानात्व–समवायिनि एव सा स्थौल्यं इति सांप्रतम्? स्थूलः एकः इति प्रत्यय–नियमात्।

Trans: But can't the atoms themselves be gross? No! If they were so they would cease to be atoms. Couldn't the conglomeration of atoms be gross? No. A unitary conglomeration based upon the conglomerated entities is not admitted by the Buddhist. But if such a thing is admitted what is wrong with the composite? Couldn't however the atoms themselves in their aggregation appear as the gross entity? No, because each of these entities is not gross. But isn't grossness the same as pervading different places? No. Each single atom cannot pervade any place. Couldn't however many atoms in a compact form appearing as one and pervading different places be regarded as gross? No again, with regard to the gross there is invariably the experience that it is one.

Expl: Atoms in their aggregation cannot account for the experience of grossness. The aggregation may be the same or different from the aggregate. If different it is the same as the gross. If nondifferent then each of the atoms not being gross the aggregate cannot be gross. The aggregate cannot also pervade different places as each member of the aggregate does not do so. A compact aggregate of atoms also cannot be treated as gross because the gross entity is identified as unitary.

Another defence of the cognition of unity in atoms and its rebuttal

Text: न च भागेषु आरोपितेन एकत्वेन इदं उपपत्तिमत् तत् अ–संभवात्। न हि कर–चरण–चिबुक–नासिका–आदि–परमाणूनां ऐक्यं कश्चित् क्वचित् आरोपयति। न च तेषु भेदेन प्रथमानेषु न स्थूल–प्रत्ययः। न च तत्वे स्फुरति एव तत्–विपरीत–अ–तत्व–समारोप–संभवः।

Trans: Couldn't the cognition of the unity of the gross entity be justified on the basis of the imposition of unity on the atoms constituting the parts of the gross entity? (If the parts appear severally as one the whole also would appear such). No. (this cannot be). Certainly nobody ever imposes unity on the many different atoms that go to make up the various limbs like hands, feet, chin, nose etc. of the body. And when these appear as different from one another it is not the case that there is no cognition of

unity amongst them. Also when the parts do appear as different it is possible to impose unity upon them.

Expl: To account for the experience of unity with regard to the gross entity it is now urged by the Buddhist that first unity is imposed upon the cluster of atoms constituting the different parts of the whole and then this unity is apprehended as coexistent with the grossness of the whole. Such an account ignores the diversity of the parts and the atoms constituting them. The gross entity appears as one despite the diverse appearance of the parts like the different limbs of the body. What is to be noted here is that the cognition of the unity of the whole goes along with the cognition of the diversity of the parts.

The Rebuttal continued

Text: अपि च एवं एक परमाणु–आत्मना परमाणु–कोटिः अपि आरोपिता परमाणु–मात्रतया एव परिस्फुरेत् न स्थूलतया। न च नाना–दिग्–देश–व्यापित्वस्य एष महिमा इति सांप्रतम्? विरोधात्। यदि हि नाना–दिक्काः परमाणवः देशतया अवभासेरन्, न एकतथा देशितया च आरोप्येरन्। तथा च कस्य नाना–दिग्–देश–व्यापिता? देशिनः अपरिस्फूर्तेः। अथ तथात्वेन आरोप्येरन्? न नानात्वेन देशत्वेन वा अवभासेरन्। तथा च कस्य नाना–दिग्–देश–व्यापिता देशिनः अ–परिस्फूर्तेः। तस्मात् एकत्व–आरोपे परमाणु–मात्र–अवभासः एवं स्यात् इति।

Trans: Moreover (if there is really no one composite entity then) the millions of atoms constituting the whole (or its parts) would have to be supposed to appear as one only because of the imposition of the oneness or unity of a single atom upon them. The objects of such imposition would appear only as atoms and not as gross entities. Could it be said that the appearance of grossness is due to the inference of the pervasion of different places by the atoms? No. This explanation is selfinconsistent. If the atoms scattered in different places appeared (or were cognised) as these different places then they would not be the objects of the imposition as one and as occurring in the different places. So if the things occurring at the different places are not cognised what can be taken to pervade the different places? If however the atoms are the objects of imposition as one and as the occupants of different places (that is to say the atoms themselves are imposed as such) there is nothing which can be supposed to occupy different places. The atoms would not now appear as many or as the different places. No occupier of the places is now cognisable. So if the

unity is an object of imposition then the atoms only would be cognisable (without the grossness of the atoms).

Expl: It is now contended that because of its scattering in many places the many atoms appear as a gross entity and not as atoms. Now this scattering in many places may itself be grossness or it may be a special type of dimension. The first view is not correct. The different places are for the Buddhist nothing but atoms, so if these atoms are cognised as many and as places then neither oneness nor the property of being the occupants of the places can be imposed upon them because no other occupant of the places is cognised. If however the atoms themselves are imposed as one and as occupants then they cannot be cognised as many and as places and no other place is cognised. So the atoms cannot be cognised as occupying many different places. Perhaps it may be urged that the atoms of the pot for example are the occupants and the atoms of the floor on which the pot is placed are the places occupied. But even the cognition of unity and grossness in the floor also needs to be accounted for. If every such cognition is sought to be explained by the assumption of innumerable clusters of atoms related amongst themselves actually as places and as occupants of places then in darkness when a pot is tactually apprehended its grossness and unity will remain unapprehended as no places other than the pot are cognisable in darkness.

If on the other hand the said scattering is a special dimension it cannot inhere in single atoms and so the composite entity would have to be admitted on this view. If this dimension is supposed to inhere collectively in more than one or two atoms then the cognition that 'these atoms are gross' would turn out to be veridical.

A minor query and its reply

Text: एवं तर्हि अन्–आरब्ध–द्रव्य–राशिषु का वार्ता इति चेत्? तावत्–देश–व्याप्ति–साम्येन तावत्–परिमाण–द्रव्यत्व–आरोपः। न च इह अपि तथा स्यात्? अन्यत्र अपि अ–सिद्धेः। न च असन् एव एकः स्थूलः परिस्फुरति? बाधकानां अपास्त त्वात्।

Trans: If it is so then how to account for the cognition of grossness and unity which usually takes place in relation to a cluster (of certain things) which has not given rise to any composite product? The answer is that here there occurs the imposition on the cluster of the nature of a substance of the dimension of the cluster because such a substance happens to be similar to the cluster in occupying the same extent of space as the latter. In your view however this cannot be the case because grossness which is to be imposed is not veridically cognised even elsewhere. Could it be urged that the nonexistent unity and grossness

themselves are cognised in the present case? No. All arguments opposed to unity and grossness have already been refuted.

Expl: If there is only a cluster of certain things and not a single composite thing the experience of oneness and grossness in the cluster is due to the imposition of the oneness of an entity of the same dimension as the cluster. The Buddhist cannot say this as grossness is nonexistent for him. The nonexistent too can be cognised in the Buddhist view but there is no need to hold the view that the nonexistent grossness is cognised because the view has already been refuted.

Indirect rebuttal of a possible opposite view

Text: एतेन प्रतिभास–धर्मः अपि निरस्तः। सः अपि असन् बौद्धः वास्तवः वा इति चर्यों गतिं न अतिवर्तते इति।

Trans: By the foregoing rebuttal of arguments against the composite also stands rebutted the view that the grossness appearing in the objects is the object of a determinate cognition (which is not veridical). Even such grossness cannot be other than either a totally unreal entity or a cognitive construction or something real. (These are the only three possibilities).

Expl: It may be contended that grossness as cognised by some determinate cognition is imposed on the atoms. But if this grossness is totally unreal it cannot be cognised; if its appearance in the determinate cognition is due to its appearance in another cognition (it being a cognitive construction) the appearance in this latter cognition would require its appearance in a still different cognition. Thus there would arise infinite regress. If however grossness is real then the object of the cognition in which grossness appears must be real and so there will have to be real gross objects.

Rebuttal that invisible atoms cannot be perceived

Text: अतींद्रियाः च प्रत्येकं अणवः; कथं मिलिताः अपि दृश्येरन्? अतीद्रिय–समूहस्य अपि अतींद्रियत्वात्। विशिष्ट–उत्पादात् ऐद्रियकत्वं इति चेत्? किं अद्य अपि स्वप्ने हस्तं प्रसारयसि?

Trans: Since each atom is invisible how can even an aggregate of the atoms be visible? Even a collection of invisible entities does not become visible. Could it be said that the objects which come into being every moment out of invisible atoms (to go out of existence the next moment) are of a special type and so they are cognisable by means of senses? No, you seem to be extending your hand for begging in a dream because the doctrine of momentariness has already been refuted.

Expl: If one atom is invisible a host of them cannot be visible. The atoms are not of a special nature, being of momentary duration. The doctrine of momentariness has already been rejected.

Rebuttal continued

Text: अस्तु वा एवम्। तथा अपि क्षण-भेदात् जाति-भेदः निराकृतः। जाति-संकर-प्रसंगात्। तत्-अभेदेन तु उत्पादे अपि तद् बा तादृक् वा इति तत्व-दृशा न कश्चित् विशेषः।

Trans: Or let us accept momentary causation but we have already rejected the reality of a property like immediate productivity characterising the momentary entities as the assumption of the property entails the fallacy of overlapping genera. If therefore there are no such properties in the atoms then there cannot be any guarantee that any particular atom of the general atomic nature is invisible or visible. (Any one may or may not be so). So on a discriminating view no distinction can be discovered among the atoms.

Expl: Even if momentary production is admitted the socalled special property of immediate productivity characterising the momentary entities cannot be admitted. So all atoms would be of the same type. Hence any atom may be visible or invisible. It may be of a general invisible nature or of a special visible nature. There cannot be any guarantee that the conglomeration of such atoms would be visible.

Rebuttal that grossness determines perceptibility

Text: भवतु वा जाति-विशेषः अपि तथा अपि स्थूलत्वं एव ऐंद्रियकत्वं प्रति प्रयोजकं मंतव्यम्। अन्यथा स्थूलतां अन्-आप्नुवन् एकः अपि परमाणुः कदा अपि तथा उत्पन्नः प्रत्यक्षतां इयात्। नियमेन तु तत्-विपरीतस्य प्रत्यक्षता तथाविधस्य अ-प्रत्यक्षतायां एव विश्राम्यति। अन्वय-व्यतिरेक गम्यत्वात् हेतु-फल-भावस्य।

Trans: Let us even accept the special property. Still we will have to admit grossness alone as the determinant of sensibility. Otherwise a certain atom which is not gross but is endowed with the special property of immediate productivity would become visible. The necessary (perceptibility or) visibility of what is other than the not-gross entails only the perceptibility of the gross entity. The causal relationship in this case is known through the positive and negative association of grossness and visibility. Even the aggregation of atoms is not endowed with grossness.

Expl: It is explained here by the opponent that whether the special

property is admitted or not grossness must be taken to determine sensibility because whether a thing is endowed with the special property or not it has to be gross in order to be visible.

Objection to the rebuttal

Text: न च संचितः अपि स्थूलाः तथा उत्पन्नाः, न च बहुत्वं एव स्थौल्यं, तत्–विपर्ययः एव सूक्ष्मता? वितत–देशानां अपि प्रत्यक्षत्व–प्रसंगात्। नैरंतर्यं अपि विवक्षितं इति चेत्? न। तस्य प्रकृते अपि अ–संभवात्। रूप–परिमाणूनां रस–आदि परमाणुभिः अंतरितत्वात। न च आरोप्यते नैरतर्यं इतर–इतर–आश्रय–प्रसंगात्। नैरंतर्य–आरोपे तेषां स्थूलानां ग्रहणं तत्–ग्रहणे च सति नैरंतर्य–आरोपः इति। तस्मात् ऐद्रियकत्वे स्थूलताथाः प्रयोजकत्वात्। अ–प्रयोजकत्वे वितत–देशानां अपि प्रत्यक्षत्व–प्रसंगात्। तेषां च प्रत्येकं अ–स्थूलत्वात् अतींद्रियाः एव परमाणवः। तथा च सर्व–अ–ग्रहणः अवयवि–अ–सिद्धेः इति।

Trans: May it be that plurality itself is grossness and its absence is subtlety? No, in that case many atoms scattered over a large area would be visible. If plurality without any gap between any two atoms is also required for grossness then in the present case too it would not be available. The atoms of colour would be interspersed with the atoms of taste etc. (in the structure of a thing in the Buddhist view). Absence of gap cannot even be taken to be imposed because such a supposition would involve circularity. If the absence of gap is imposed there is the cognition of the gross and only if grossness is cognised the said imposition is made. Hence it follows that for sensory apprehension or sensibility of an object its being gross is essential. If it were not so then the atoms spread over a vast space would also be visible. So the atoms are to be treated as invisible. If the composite is not admitted no attribute or property of it will be known.

Expl: Grossness cannot be equated with plurality as many atoms lying at intervals from one another would not be gross. If they are required to be uninterruptedly close to each other then in the Buddhist view of the nature of the structure of a thing there cannot be such closeness. The atoms of different qualities jostle with each other in the structure of every substance.

Another objection to the reality of the composite and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि क्षण–मात्र–स्थायी स्थूलः अर्थः इति चेत्? न। भाग–भागिनोः युगपत्–उपलंभ–बाधितत्वात्। घट–पट–आदि भंगे तंतु–

कपाल–आदीनां उत्पादे समान–उपादानतया सप्रतिघत्व–व्याघातात् च इति।

Trans: Let there be then the gross object existing for a moment only. No, this cannot be the case. The parts and the whole cannot be perceptible simultaneously on the momentaristy view. Parts being the material causes of the whole they must pre-exist it by one moment, so when the whole comes into being the parts would be nonexistent. Moreover the products pot, cloth etc. which are destroyed in the very next moment of their coming into being are produced by their causes, namely the potsherds, threads etc. which are also found to be the causes (in different ways of threads and potsherds, yarns etc. in the series of threads and potsherds that come into being every moment and go out of existence the very next moment). As a result the material causes of pot, cloth etc., viz. the potsherds threads etc. will give rise simultaneously to two different material entities. This is against the rule that the occurrence of one material product is preventive of another such product in the same material cause.

Expl: Now the gross entity which earlier was shown to be imperceptible if regarded as a cluster of atoms is shown to be perceptible though different from the composite entity. The opponents regard the composite as a durable entity but the view now set forth is that the gross is a momentary entity. The first difficulty in this view is that according to momentarism the cause and the effect cannot coexist, the first being required to preexist the second, but the parts and their gross product are definitely cognised as coexisting. It may here be opined that the parts go out of existence as soon as their effect comes into existence and so the two cannot be perceived together at all. But when the product is destroyed the regeneration of the parts has got to be admitted as otherwise these parts would not produce, as per the theory of momentariness, a series of similar parts every moment. Now this series of parts and the whole are both the products of the same material parts which is not possible in the case of material entities. It may be contended against this that the cause of the whole is different from the causal term in a series of terms coming into being successively and constituting the apparent unity of the perceptual object. But there is really no ground for making such a distinction. Besides the parts as the cause of the whole do not go out of existence when the whole comes into being in every case of production. If the seed is found disintegrating when it gives rise to a shoot the clay remains intact when the pot is fashioned out of it.

Conclusion of the argument

Text: सः अयं अधिकरण–सिद्धान्त–न्यायेन स्थूलत्व–सिद्धौ क्षण भंग–भंगः।

Trans: Thus this proof of the grossness of the composite entity entails the disproof of momentariness in the same manner in which the proof of a proposition entails the proof of the proposition presupposed by it. (Grossness entails nonmomentariness) of the gross entity.

Expl: Grossness is established as involving the nonmomentariness of the gross entity. A separate proof for non-momentariness is not called for because nonmomentariness is implicated in grossness. It may be objected that in the perception of the gross entity its nonmomentariness is not involved. It is true but there can also be an inference in which both these are involved. The inference is like this: 'The parts productive of the pot are contemporaneous with their products because they are the material causes of the latter'. The example of a proof of the above type given in Vātsyayāna's Bhāṣya of Nyāya aphorism is like this: 'The knower is different from the senses because it is the same object that is apprehended both by seeing and touching'. Here the knower is established (by the middle term) as a substantive entity differing from its attributes.

A minor objection and its repudiation

Text: एतेन यत् सत् तत् निरवयवं यथा विज्ञानम्। सन् च विवाद–आस्पदी–भूतः घट–आदिः इति निरस्तम्। विपर्यये बाधक–अभावेन व्याप्ति–असिद्धेः। यत् सत् तत् सावयवं यथा घटः सत् च विज्ञानं इति चार्वाक–परिवर्तस्य अपि अवकाशात् च। समः वा समाधिः।

Trans: By the above stands repudiated the inferential proof of the non-compositeness of the composite like this: 'Whatever is real is noncomposite like consciousness and real are entities like pot which are of debatable nature'. The negation of the above (major) premise not being contradictable the concomitance of the major and the middle needed for the inference remains unproved. One can even argue against this like the C'ārvāka thus: 'Whatever is real has parts like the pot and real of course is consciousness'. If this inference is defective, the contrary inference is also defective. In both cases the answer is the same.

Expl: Because grossness has been established in the composite entity the latter cannot be proved to be noncomposite by any inference.

The repudiation continued

Text: ननु निरवयवं एव विज्ञानं स्व–संविदित–रुपम्। घटस्य च सावयवतायां अद्य अपि विवादः एव, तत कथं परिवर्तः कथं वा समः समाधिः इति चेत्? शुष्क–विवादस्य विज्ञाने अपि दुर्वारत्वात्। न हि कश्चित् कंठ ओष्ठ–पार्श्व–जठर–आदि–परिहीनं पिठरं अनुभवति। अस्तु वा सत्वात् स प्रतिघत्व–सिद्धिः बुद्धौ अ–प्रतिघत्वं वा घट–आदौ इति।

Trans: But isn't it a fact that consciousness is partless and self-conscious by nature while the compositeness of pot etc. is still under dispute, so how can there be a valid argument to prove compositeness and how can both the arguments be repudiated by the same reply? No! Baseless argumentation can be carried on even in relation to consciousness (one may argue against its partlessness). Certainly nobody ever cognises a pot as devoid of the neck, the lips, the sides and the belly etc. Or we may have inferences to prove that consciousness does not coinhere with some other entity or the pot does coinhere with some other entity in its parts on the ground of their being real. (just as these inferences are ineffective in proving anything so the other inferences too are ineffective in proving the partlessness of consciousness).

Expl: It cannot be contended against the above that consciousness is experienced to be partless so it cannot be equated with a thing like pot because pots, cloths etc. are commonly experienced to be composite in nature. If experiential testimony is ignored then anything can be sought to be proved of anything by means of any middle term. Even the Buddhist maintains that the storehouse-consciousness and active consciousness arising in the next moment out of a certain storehouse-consciousness are together inherent in it.

Elaboration of the repudiation

Text: अपि च स्वतंत्र साधनं इदं प्रसंगः वा? न प्रथमः। घटादि–शब्देन स्थूल–इतराणां रूपादीनां परमाणूनां वा पक्षीकरणे सिद्ध–साधनात्। स्थूलं एकं अभ्युपगम्य पक्ष–विधौ काल–अत्यय–अपेदशात्। अनभ्युपगमे तु आश्रय–असिद्धेः इति। ननु प्रामाणिके अभ्युपगमें बाधः स्यात्, सर्वथा अनयुपगमे च आश्रयासिद्धिः स्यात् न च एवं अत्र इति चेत्? तत् एतत् नभ–स्थल–कमल–परिमल–साधनस्य अपि

साश्रयतां आपादयत् आश्रयासिद्धि–दोष–मोषाय इति अलं अनेन।

Trans: Moreover is this foregoing proof of the partlessness of the gross entity a positive inference or a (counterfactual) conditional thesis? It cannot be the first. If the words 'pot etc.' in the inference are used to denote qualities like colour or things like atoms and these are included as minor terms in the inference there arises the fallacy of proving the already proved. If however a unitary gross entity is admitted and it is inserted as the minor term in the inference then the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of absent major term. If such an entity is not admitted then there arises the fallacy of unproved minor term. One may however contend against this that if the acceptance of the unitary gross entity is valid then only the fallacy of absent major term will arise and only if the gross entity is not admitted the other fallacy of absent minor term will arise, but such is not the case in the above inference. But such a justification of the inference would entail the validity of the minor term even of the inference of fragrance in the flower in the sky and thus lead to the elimination of the fallacy of absent minor term (in this inference). So enough of such argumentation.

Expl: If the above is an inference and not a counterfacutal conditional then either nongross entities like colour etc. (which too are the denotations of words like 'pot') or gross entities like pot are the minor terms in the inference and thus various fallacies would afflict the inference. An unreal minor term however is available for all inferences but then even the inference of fragrance in the sky-lotus would be justified.

Objection to the repudiation and its reply

Text: पर्वतादिवत् लोक–प्रतीतिसिद्धान् घटादीन् उपादाय निरवयवत्व अनुमानं स्यात्। अन्यथा ब्रम्ह–विवर्त–आदि–विप्रतिपत्ति–विहतं तया दहन–अनुमानं अपि पर्वतादौ न स्यात् इति चेत्? न एवम्। अविरोधात्। न हि ब्रम्ह–विवर्त–आदि–सिद्धौ अपि आश्रय–आदयः अन्य–प्रकाराः संभवति। तथा हि सर्वत्र स्वप्न–पर्वते स्वप्न–घूमेन स्वप्न–वन्हिः एव साध्यते। केवलं सांवृते अपि व्यवहारे सत्य–अनृत–व्यवस्था अस्ति इति तस्यां निर्भरः कर्तव्यः। इह तु पर–आदि–व्यपदेशेन स्थूलः एव यदि पक्षीकृतः कथं निरवयवत्वेन साध्येन न विरोधः?

Trans: But can't we have the inference of partlessness, having the commonly—experienced pots etc. as minor terms as we do, having the

mountain as the minor term (without ascertaining first whether it has fire or not)? If it weren't so we cannot infer even the presence of fire in the mountain as we do not know whether the mountain is the transformation or the illusory appearance of Brahman? No. This is not so. No inconsistency arises in the inference (on either view). Even if the world is proved to be the transformation of Brahman, minor terms (like mountains) cannot change their nature. To explain: If one has an inference in a dream then it is the dream-fire which is inferred in a dream-mountain by dream-smoke. Even among those activities which are (supposed to be) due to ignorance there does obtain the distinction of true and false and we have to depend upon this distinction. In the above inference however, it is the gross entity which is posited as minor term by the words 'pot etc.' used for it. So there is bound to result incompatibility between this minor term and partlessness which is sought to be proved of it.

Expl: It is now contended that in the inference of fire in the mountain if the fieryness of the mountain is known the inference would be afflicted by the fallacy of proving the already proved. If the mountain is known to be devoid of fire then the fallacy of absent major would afflict the inference. So it has to be maintained that the mountain as mountain is the minor term in the inference. Similarly we can say that the congeries of atoms not known as such but cognised as pot are the minor term in the inference. There is the further difficulty in treating the mountain as minor term that nobody knows whether the mountain is a transformation or illusory manifestation of Brahman if the Vedāntic doctrine is taken into consideration. In reply the opponent says that the Vedāntic view does not turn the mountain into something other than itself. If it is an unreal mountain it remains an unreal mountain. It is not changed into an unreal smoke. Even in dreams we have regular inference based upon the distinction of relative truth and untruth. So if it is the gross entity that is the denotend of the word 'pot' then it alone is the minor term. Potness is not something common to both atomic and gross entities. Even exclusion of the other taken as the meaning of the word is not common to both atomic and gross entities.

Objection to the repudiation and its rebuttal

Text: अथ परमाणुः एव कथं न सिद्धसाधनम्? विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति न तथा इति चेत्? न वै कश्चित् परमाणूनां निरवयवत्वे विप्रतिपद्यते। लोक-व्यामोह-निबर्हणाय साधनं इति चेत्? तथा अपि यं लोकः स्थूलं एकं उपलब्धवान् तस्य पक्षत्वे विरोधः एव। तत् अन्यस्य पक्षत्वे सिद्धसाधनं एव। एकः स्थूलः अयं इति मिथ्या इति चेत्? एतत् एव

तर्हि साध्यताम्। किं अनेन अजा-गलस्तन कल्पेन सत्वेन? न च तत्र एव इदं शक्यं उपसंहर्तुम? व्यधिकरणत्वात्। तस्मात् येन रूपेण यस्य पक्षत्वं विवक्षितं तेन सिषाधयिषित-धर्म-अविरोध-विवादाभ्यां तत्र अनुमान-प्रवृत्तिः न अन्यथा इति।

Trans: If however it is the atoms themselves which (as pot) are posited as minor term in the above inference how can there be no fallacy of proving the already proved? But isn't it a fact that it is not such (proving the proved) to one who has doubt about the partlessness of the atoms? No! Nobody is ever in doubt regarding the partlessness of the atoms. But can't this inferenc be of use for dispelling the misconception of the common people that things like pot are composite in nature? Yes, still if what is taken by common people as gross is posited as the minor term there is bound to be incompatibility of minor and major terms. If anything other than this is so posited the fallacy of proving the already proved is sure to result. Can't one say then that it is false to say that the gross entity is one? Well! if so then this itself needs to be proved. What purpose is served by the middle term 'reality' (in the inference of partlessness) which is like the udders in the neck of the goat which do not yield milk? Nor can this reality be used as middle term in the (inference of) grossness as the apprehension of grossness being false this middle term will be incompatible with the minor term. Thus it follows that that which is intended as the minor term under a certain form, that is to say as the term which is not incompatible with a major desired to be inferred but whose presence in the former is not already known or disputed becomes the subject of inference under that form alone and not otherwise.

Expl: It may be urged against the above that the foregoing inference is intended for those who have doubts regarding the composite nature of the denotend of the word 'pot'. If knowledgeable persons have no doubt on this matter common people do have them but then these people apprehend only the gross entity and so the fallacies are bound to be there in the inferences. If the cognition of grossness is false then this itself needs to be proved not the partlessness of the gross entity. If however the falseness of the object of this cognition is sought to be proved then the middle term 'reality' will be inconsistent with the major term. If the falsehood of the cognition of grossness is sought to be proved by means of the middle term 'reality' then there would result the fallacy of deviation.

So the conclusion is that inference takes place only in such a minor whose minorness-determinant is not incompatible with the major term.

The rebuttal of the second of the foregoing alternatives (that the proposition is a counterfactual conditional

Text: नः अपि द्वितीयः। विपर्यय–अ–पर्यवसानात्। न च विवाद–विषयः निरवयवः तस्मात् न सन् इति विपर्ययः? न च एवं सावयवत्वं पक्षस्य अन्–इच्छता प्रवर्तयितुं शंक्यते, न च तत् त्वया इष्यते। न च तस्य इष्टौ तेन असत्वं शक्य–साधनम्। आश्रय–असिद्धेः, विरोधात् अ–साधारण्यात् वा। न च विपर्ययः अपि पर–इष्ट्या प्रवंतते इति।

Trans.: Nor can the proposition be a counterfactual conditional or conditional inference as it does not culminate in a conclusion opposed to its antecedent (because in the conditional inference, 'if the pot is real it must be partless, but it is not partless, so it is not real' the composite nature of the pot is not acceptable to the Buddhist). So the Buddhist cannot prove the unreality of the pot on the basis of its being composite as there would result the fallacy of unproved minor. Also the fallacy of incompatibility would be entailed (if the cognition of compositeness is sought to be proved as false by the same middle term. The cognition is a real entity) and the fallacy of too narrow middle term would also afflict the middle term as according to the Buddhist neither the unreal hare's horn nor consciousness, atoms etc. are composite. It won't do to say against this that the Buddhist can argue on the basis of his opponent's admission of composite entities because the negative conclusion of the conditional inference cannot be laid down without his own admission of the reality of the middle term by the Buddhist.

Expl. If the aforementioned thesis is a counterfactual conditional of the form, 'If the pot is real it would be partless' then the negative conclusion to be arrived at from this conditional would be, 'The pot is not partless' which means that it is a composite entity and so it is not real'. Here compositeness, the major term, is riddled with three different fallacies as mentioned above. In fact it is an absolutely non-instantiable term and so may even be denied to be real. It is not so for the opponent but the opponent's admission of the instantiability of the term cannot be exploited for his own purpose by the Buddhist. Only the counterfactual conditional can be set forth by a disputant taking the opponent's admission of the reality of the antecedent of the conditional as his ground for the assertion.

Demand of inferential proof for the composite and its rebuttal

Text: कः पुनः अवयविनि न्यायः? तत् किं प्रत्यक्षात् न्यायः गरीयान्? यदि एवं बुद्धौ अपि कः असौ? तस्मात् असारं एतत्। तथा अपि यत्

निरस्त–समस्त–विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासं तत् एकं एव व्यवहर्तव्यं यथा विज्ञानम्। तथा च विवाद–अध्यासितः एकः–स्थूल –अनुभव–गोचरः इति स्वभाव–हेतुः। तावत्–मात्र–अनुबंधित्वात एकता–व्यवहारस्य। न हि अयं एक–व्यवहारः निः निमित्तः अ–नियम–प्रसंगात्। न अपि अन्य निमित्तः द्रव–कठिन–उष्ण–शीतादौ अपि तथा व्यवहार–प्रसंगात्।

Trans: But what is the inferential evidence for the composite entity? Well! in asking this question do you mean to suggest that inference is superior to perception? If it is so then what is the inferential evidence for the self-consciousness of consciousness admitted by you? So this demand is baseless. Even then there is this inference with nature-type middle term namely, 'whatever is not subject to the appearance of the co-existence of any incompatible property has got to be treated as a single entity only as is for example consciousness, and such obviously is the object which is cognised as a unitary gross entity.' The usage pertaining to oneness depends only upon the absence of the appearance of incompatibles' coexistence. Certainly this usage cannot be uncaused or caused by anything else. If it were so then even water, earth, air and fire could be treated as one.

Expl: If inference is needed to establish the reality of the composite it is easy to have it. The absence of the appearance of coexistent incompatibles is a good ground for inferring the unitary gross entity. No other ground can there be for this.

Another general objection to the reality of external objects and its rebuttal

अद्र३ह्ल अस्तु तर्हि बाह्येषु अर्थेषु नित्य–संदेह :, तथ्य–अ–तथ्य–विभागस्य अशक्यत्वात् इति चेत्? न तावत् सर्वस्य यथार्थत्वात् एवं विभागः अनुपपन्नः उत्तर–विरोधात्। तथा हि विपरीतं अवगतं मया इति लौकिकी प्रलिपत्तिः, अन्यथाख्यातिः इति च वैनयिकी यथार्था न वा? उभयथा अपि उत्तरेण न सर्व–यथार्थ्य–सिद्धिः।

Trans: Let then there be perennial doubt regarding the reality of external objects as it is impossible to distinguish between truth and untruth. No! it cannot be the case that the said impossibility is due to the fact that everything is true because the reply to the question just going to be asked contradics it. To explain: It may be asked, 'Is the common awareness that one has misperceived a thing which is technically known as erroneous

perception veridical or not'? On either answer to this question universal truth remains unproveable.

Expl: Even though no contrary evidence to disprove the composite can be adduced yet it could be urged that there is no positive evidence to prove the reality of any external entity, not to say of the gross entity. This may be due to the fact that truth and untruth cannot be distinguished one from another. If this is so because every cognition is true then this conflicts with the fact that one's awareness of one's misperception of something cannot be treated as either true or false. If it is the first then there is the fact of misperception. If the second is true the awareness itself is then admitted to be false. Thus neither every cognition is false nor every cognition is true.

Objection to the rebuttal

Text: शब्द–संलाप–मात्रं एतत् न प्रतीतिः इति चेत्? न। विवाद–अनुपपत्तेः। न हि व्यवहार–मात्रे परीक्षकाणां विवादः न च न अयं अस्ति इति। शब्द–अर्थे विवादः इति चेत्? एवं सति अ–प्रतीतस्य निषेद्धुं अ–शक्यत्वात्। पर–अभिप्राय–निषेध–अर्थत्वात् च विवादस्य अभ्युपंगतृ–प्रतिषेद्धोः प्रतिषेध्य–प्रतीतिः कथं नास्ति इति?

Trans: But may it be that to say that the statement 'I misperceived this' is a case of erroneous cognition is (to utter) a meaningless set of words? No! without any awareness at the back of it there cannot be any difference of opinion regarding the nature of erroneous cognition. Certainly knowledgeable people do not carry on discussion about mere words nor is it the case that there is no discussion or difference of opinion amongst the learned. Could then the dispute concern the meaning of words like 'erroneous cognition' etc.? Well! if it could then since what is unknown cannot be denied and since the object of a dispute is to negate other's views it cannot be maintained that the disputants are not aware of what they are negating.

Expl: It is being argued that the statement that one misunderstood a certain thing is mere words without being accompanied by any awareness of what is stated. In reply it is said that if the statement didn't mean anything then learned people would not have debated the nature of erroneous cognition. If the Naiyāyika argues against the Mīmāṇsā view of this cognition or the Mīmāṇsaka argues against the Nyāya view they cannot do so without being aware of what they are arguing against.

Justification of the possibility of determinate illusory cognition

Text: न च अन्य–ज्ञानात् अन्यत्र प्रवृत्ति–संभवः अतिप्रसंगात्। न च तत्–ज्ञान–सांनिध्यं नियामकं अतिप्रसंगात् एव। न च तत्–सहितः भेद–अग्रहः। अ–ग्रह–प्राधान्ये भेद–अ–विवक्षायां निवृत्तेः अपि प्रसंगात्। तत् हेतोः अभेद–अ–ग्रहस्य अपि विद्यमानत्वात् न असौ निवर्तकः अपि तु भेद–ग्रहः इति चेत्? न। रजते एव न इदं रजतं इति कृत्वा न निवर्तेत भेद–ग्रहस्य तत्–कारणस्य अभावात्। भावे वा विपरीत–ख्यातिः, अ–भिन्ने भेद–प्रत्ययात्। तस्मात् प्रवर्तकवत् निवर्सकः अपि अ–ग्रहः एव तेषां स्वीकर्तुं उचितः। तथा च सः दोषः तदवस्यः एव।

Trans: Nor can the cognition of one thing incline one towards another thing (that is to say unless one thing is misperceived as another the urge towards the former cannot arise) as this would result in the deviation of inclination from cognition. Nor can it be urged against this that the proximate occurrence of the cognition of one thing with that of another induces inclination towards the first as the same deviation of any cognition producing any inclination would be the result of this assumption. Nor again can it be contended that the proximity of the two cognitions coupled with the noncognition of their difference causes the inclination. If in this 'noncognition of difference' noncognition is the qualificand (and main constituent) and difference (being a subordinate constituent) is not intended to be taken seriously then like inclination disinclination also would result from the said cognition. The noncognition of the difference from the undesired entity is also present on the occasion. (Just as noncognition of difference from the desired produces inclination, noncognition of difference from the undesired would produce disinclination too). But may it not be urged against this that it is not non-cognition but the cognition of difference from the desired which induces disinclination? No! If this were so then one would not turn away from a piece of silver because of cognising it to be other than silver as there cannot be such a determinate cognition of difference from silver. If however such a cognition of difference is admitted to be present on the occasion then the reality of mistaken cognition is admitted as the nondifferent is here cognised as different. So those who deny the possibility of mistaken cognition have to regard only noncognition of difference as the cause of disinclination as well as of inclination. Thus the above undesirable contingency (of the generation of both inclination and disinclination) would stay put.

Expl: Arguing against the foregoing objection (that denial of mistaken

cognition is not possible without admitting the reality of mistaken cognition) the advocate of the Mīmāṇsā view urges now that what is denied in the mistaken cognition is its determinateness, that is to say the qualification of its object by some property not inhering in it. No cognition is determinate. The socalled illusory cognition is only the cognition of the real entity accompanied with the cognition of the unreal entity. The illusory cognition is supposed to produce inclination towards the undesired unreal because the non-cognition of the difference between the real and the unreal is also there to engender the inclination. Now this noncognition of difference may be the noncognition of a difference existing somewhere as characterising the object of inclination or it may be the noncognised difference itself. If it is the first then it may be either noncognition itself or the absence of the cognition of difference. On the first alternative the noncognition of difference from both the desired as well as the undesired being present on the occasion of the cognition of shell as silver there should result both inclination as well as disinclination towards the shell. On the second alternative the cognition of difference which is opposed to its absence turns out to be the cause of disinclination but this leads to the acceptance of determinate erroneous (and other) cognitions.

The alternative account of noncognition of difference and its rejection

Text: अथ भेदः प्रधानं अंगं अग्रहः, तदा सत्य–रजत–ज्ञानात् रजते न प्रवर्तेत इदं–अंश–रजत–अंथयोः भेद–अभावात् इत्यादि स्वयं उहनीयम्।

Trans: If it is contended that in the said noncognition difference is primary while noncognition is secondary then the cognition of the real silver would not incline one towards silver, as the given and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not different from each other. One should think out these consequences,of the view oneself.

Expl: On the second of the above-mentioned views, only if two things differ the noncognition of this difference is productive of inclination towards the qualificand of difference. Such a view conflicts with the inclination one has towards the real silver on perceiving a piece of real silver. There is no real difference there between the given and silver. The point of the argument is that there is no real difference here between the given and the desired. Another difficulty in the above view pointed out by Raghunātha Śiromaṇī is this: If the shell and silver are simultaneously misperceived as silver and shell then both these will together turn out to be objects of inclination and disinclination. Silver is different from shell

and shell is different from silver and there are also noncognitions of the differences of silver from shell and shell from silver. This difficulty may be removed by stipulating that the object sought after must not be different from the desired object under whose form it appears and similarly the object sought to be avoided should not be different from the undesired object under whose form it appears. The above difficulty however remains and so erroneous cognition has got to be admitted.

Objection to the rejection and its rebuttal

Text: प्रवृत्तिवत् प्रतिपत्तौ अपि उभय–अ–ग्रहः तुल्यः इति चेत्? न। अ–ग्रहस्य अ–विवक्षितत्वात्। सामग्री–विशेषात् एव तत्–सिद्धेः। तत्वे अ–परिस्फुरति इति तु नियमः। न च क्वचित् अपि भेद अ–भेदौ उभौ अपि तत्वं यतः तथा स्यात् इति एषा दिक्।

Trans: It may be asked: 'As in the case of inclination, noncognitions of difference both from the desired and the undesired are present so even before illusion both these being present why do not the cognitions of both difference and nondifference arise? The answer is that mere noncognition is not sufficient for the production of these cognitions. Special causal collocations are needed for both of them (like certain defects for the imposition of nondifference and the absence of defects for the cognition of difference). However if difference is cognised nondifference cannot be imposed. The rule is that defects accompanied by the noncognition of difference cause the illusion or imposition of difference and similarly for the illusion or imposition of nondifference. But nowhere both difference and nondifference constitute the truth so that they could be cognised simultaneously. This is the way to tackle problems relating to this issue.

Expl: Mere noncognition of difference does not cause the cognition of nondifference either illusory or true. Certain defects in the sense-organs or other means of cognition are also needed for this. The cognition of difference however prevents the noncognition. So its absence is also needed for the production of the cognition. But both difference and nondifference do not constitute the truth in any case so that both these could be simultaneously cognised.

The rebuttal of the second alternative that every cognition is false

Text: न अपि सर्वस्य अ–यथार्थत्वात्। तत्–ग्राहकस्य यथार्थत्व–अ–यथार्थत्वाभ्यां उत्तर–विरोधात्। तत् किंचित प्रमाणं किंचित् अ–प्रमाणं इति विभागः एव वस्तु–गतिः। न च असौ प्रतीति–गतिं अवधूय प्रमाण–गोचरः।

Trans: Nor is the distinction of true and false untenable because all cognitions are false. If the cognition that 'a certain cognition is mistaken' is true then every cognition cannot be false. If it is not true then the object of it namely, the mistaken cognition would not be real so that there would be a true cognition. Thus on either alternative the reply will be inconsistent. So the truth of the matter is that some cognitions are valid and some are invalid. Thus this distinction of valid and invalid cognitions cannot be an object of usage without being experienced.

Expl: Nor can every cognition be regarded as false. The very cognition that a certain cognition is false proves that some cognition is true. So it has to be admitted that there are both true and false cognitions. The very usage relating to this distinction proves its reality.

Elucidation of the modes of cognitive validity and defence of self-validity

Text: कथंता तु निरुप्यते स्वतः परतः वा इति। आद्ये अपि स्वयं स्व-ग्राहकेण इति वा? तत्र न प्रथमः। स्व-संवेदनस्य अ-सिद्धेः। प्रकाशत्वस्य अ-साधारणत्वात्। शब्द-साम्येन अनुमान-अ-प्रवृत्ते। न च अध्यक्षं एव अत्र प्रमाणम्। संदिग्ध-भेदत्वात्। अ-प्रत्यक्ष-उपलंभस्य न अर्थ-दृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति। परेण पर-वेदने अनवस्था स्यात्। न च क्रिया स्व-सजातीय-क्रिया-कर्मभावं अश्नुते छिदावत् इति तर्क-पुरस्कारात् न एषः दोषः इति चेत्? न।

Trans: How the validity of cognition is cognised, whether through itself or something other than itself is now being explained. On the first alternative the validity of a cognition is cognised by that very cognition or by the cognition which cognises it. The first of these last two alternatives is untenable as cognition does not (even) cognise itself (how can it cognise its validity?). The likely middle term 'being of the nature of light' is not a property common to both light and cognition. Mere similarity of the usages of a word like 'light' cannot lead to any inference. Could perception itself be a proof for this? No! whether the cognising cognition is the same as or different from the cognised cognition is a matter of doubt and so perceptual testimony is of no avail in this matter. But couldn't it be urged that if cognition is not self-cognitive it cannot cognise its object too and that the admission of the cognition of one cognition by another leads to infinite regress? Further as an action like cutting cannot be the object of another action of its own type so cognition too cannot be cognised by another cognition and so the above doubt does not arise.

Expl: Now the question whether the validity of cognition is self-cognised

or other-cognised is being considered. To be self-cognised does not mean to be cognised by every cognition which cognises the cognitive nature of a cognition because the cognition which apprehends the invalidity of a cognition does not apprehend its validity. To be cognised by the cognition which does not cognise its invalidity but cognises itself would however be the nature of this self-cognisedness. Or it may be defined as 'being the object of a cognition which is not produced by the cognition having the valid cognition as its object'. Thus all the three wellknown views that a cognition is self-cognitive, or it is cognised by another cognition or is inferred on the basis of the knownness of its object are covered by this definition. Now if cognition cognises itself it is sure to cognise its own property namely the validity. This is so even if the cognition of cognition is supposed to cognise the latter's validity.

The debatable proposition about this issue can be (variously) framed as (for example): 'Do all the causal collocations producing the cognition of cognition produce the cognition of validity too?' 'Do all cognitions cognise validity too ?' 'Is cognition the object of a cognition which does not cognise validity?' and so on. If the indeterminate cognition or the cognition produced by the utterance of the word 'cognition' or the invalidity-cognition does not produce the cognition of validity then the debatable proposition would have to be something like this: 'Is or is not validity the object of all non-recollective cognitions which do not apprehend invalidity and which have determinate objects?' Or to be specific, 'Is or is not the validity of this pot-cognition the object of this cognition' and so on.

Objecting to the self-validity-view the opponent urges that if cognition does not cognise itself it cannot cognise its validity. Cognition is not light so that it could be self-luminous. The reflective cognition of one's own cognition cannot prove that cognition is self-luminous because it is not certain whether the latter is identical or different from the former. Besides cognition need not be self-cognitive in order to produce any inclination or urge towards its object. Similarity of cognition to light is in two respects, namely that both do not require the help of any other object for their identification and both are self-referring. The first was mentioned earlier and the second is mentioned now.

It may be contended here that like the cognitions of the Yogin or that of God all cognitions could be self-cognitive, but since sense-object-contact is needed for every perceptual cognition of human beings the latter cannot be admitted as self-cognitive.

Objection to self-validity view (first alternative)

Text: उपलंभ–अपर–पर्यायायाः दृष्टे सिद्धिः निष्पत्तिः वा स्यात् प्रतीतिः वा?
आद्ये अन्–आगत–उपलंभ–वेदन–प्रसंगः अन्–उपलब्धस्य अ–

निष्पत्तेः। न च अ–विद्यमानेन अ–विद्यमानस्य उपलंभः इति स्व–संवित्तौ अ–संवित्तिः एव इति।

Trans: (In the obiter dictum of Dharmakīrtī quoted in the text) does the word for 'occurrence' mean genesis or cognition of 'vision' for which the other word is 'cognition'? If the meaning is 'genesis', then (the dictum means that) the object-cognition comes into being only when its cognition comes into being. So every cognition must cognise what comes into being only after it has come into being, that is to say what does not exist. The uncognised does not come into being (as per the above explanation). But this cognition of objective cognition too cannot come into being itself. (It must itself be cognised by another cognition). Thus the view of self-cognitivity of cognition entails only noncognition.

Expl: If the Sanskrit word for occurrence or manifestation means genesis then Dharmakirtī's quoted remark appears to say that the objective cognition is produced by self-cognition which means that the cognition is not produced if it is uncognised. But what of self-cognition? It too must be cognised in order to come into being and thus no cognition can ever come into being.

Objection to self-validity view (second alternative)

Text: द्वितीये तु सिद्धसाधनम्। न हि अन्–उपलब्धः उपलब्धः भवति। न च एवं सति अर्थः अपि न उपलभ्येत। न हि उपलंभ–प्रतीतिः अर्थ वेदनं अपि तु उपलंभ–निष्पत्तिः। उपलंभ–अ–दृष्टौ उपलंभ–निष्पत्तिः इत्येव व्यवहारः कुतः इति चेत्? मा भूत्। न हि अ–व्यवहारात् एव निष्पन्नस्य वस्तुनः निवृत्तिः। तथा च तत्–निबंधनः अर्थ–व्यवहारः दुर्वारः एव। न च अनवस्था। अवश्य–वेद्यत्व–अनभ्युपगभात्। निश्चयवत्। अन्यथा तु अ–निश्चित–निश्चयस्य अर्थ–निश्चयः अपि न सिद्धयेत्। न च असौ स्व–आत्मनि अपि निश्चयः इति। तत् इदं वधू–माष–मापन–वृत्तांतं अनुहरति।

Trans: The second of the above meanings of the Sanskrit word namely 'cognition' if adopted, entails the fallacy of proving the already proved. Certainly what is uncognised is not cognised. But won't then even the object of the cognition remain uncognised (if the cognition is uncognised)? No! Certainly it is not the cognition of cognition which is the cognition of the object. It is of the cognition of the object itself. But one may ask, 'How can there be the usage that cognition has taken place if

the cognition is not cognised? Well! why should there be such a usage? Certainly simply because of the absence of usage with regard to the existence of a thing the thing is not eliminated from existence. So the usage with regard to a thing based upon its cognition cannot be discarded. But doesn't this (dependence of usage upon cognition) entail infinite regress? No,! we do not admit that a cognition is necessarily cognised. It is just like definite cognition which itself need not be definitely cognised (in order to be a definite cognition). If it were not so then a definite cognition which is not definitely cognised would not cognise even its object definitely. But the definite cognition is not its own definite cognition. So this defence of self-cognitiveness of cognition conforms to the adage that a housewife with her mouth full of the beanpulse could not suppress the bad odour of her mouth from her husband whom she wanted to win over.

Expl: On the second (alternative) the fallacy of proving the already proved results as it is only the cognised which is the object of cognition. But this does not imply that the object is not cognised if there is no cognition of this cognition. Neither this cognition of cognition nor any usage about it is needed for the cognition of or any usage about the object. Ultimately there is divine cognition to take cognisance of everything. There is no infinite regress because no cognition is necessarily cognised. The mind being indirectly related to every cognition it may be supposed to know it but if any other mental state intervenes the mental cognition of cognition may be hindered. Moreover the definite cognition of an object arising as a result of dicriminative perception is not itself the object of another definite cognition when it definitely cognises its objects.

Rebuttal continued

Text: छिदावत् इति तु दृष्टांत–मात्रेण न अस्मत्–अवधानम्। ज्ञानं न ज्ञान–अंतर–कर्म तत्–जातीय–क्रियात्वात्, या यत्–जातीया क्रिया न असौ तत्–क्रिया कर्म यथा छिदा छिदा–अंतरस्य इति तु न्याय–विप्लवः। छिदावत् सर्वथा सजातीय–अ–कर्मत्वे साध्ये बाधित–विषयत्वात्। पुरुष–अंतर–ज्ञानस्य च पुरुष–अंतर–ज्ञान–वेद्यत्वात् स्वयं अपि स्मृति–आदि–गोचरत्वात् च। स्व कर्मत्वे साध्ये दृष्टांतस्य साध्य–विकलतया हेतोः विरुद्धत्वात् इति।

Trans: As to the example of cutting which has been adduced, this by itself is not going to satisfy us. Syllogistic proofs like, 'A cognition is not the object of another cognition because it is an activity of the same generic type as another cognition; any action of the same type as another action

cannot be the object of that action as one cutting action is not the object of another cutting action', are of course fallacious. If like cutting cognition is sought to be proved as absolutely different from the object of another cognition of its own type the fallacy of absent major term will afflict the proof. One man's cognition is cognised by another's cognition. And a man's cognition is cognised by his own recollection of it. If however self- objectivity is sought to be proved of cognition then the example namely, cutting, not being its own object is bereft of the major term and (thus) the middle term 'activity' becomes incompatible with the major term.

Expl: The foregoing inference adduced to prove self-cognition of cognition is now shown to be fallacious. Even the thesis that a cognition is not the object of another cognition sought to be established by the inference establishes the external cognition of cognition. The cognition which is the minor term becomes the object of the cognition 'of not being such an object' by the very formulation of the thesis. The cognition of one person's cognition by another person's cognition or by the same person's reflective and recollective cognitions entails the fallacy of absent major in the inference. The example viz. cutting action is never the object of any cutting action. So if self-objectivity is sought to be inferred the example cannot be the locus of the major term.

It may be contended here that following common unreflective usage we may regard cognition as self-cognitive in relation to external objects of perceptual and non-perceptual nature. In relation to the self and itself (that is cognition) however it can be perceptual only. A cognition is perceptual if its objectivity is not mediated by any cognition. The self-cognitivity of cognition may be supposed to be determined by its causal collocation itself but the other-cognitivity of cognition cannot be so determined. But if perception is treated as a special type of cognition differing from non-perceptual cognitions it cannot be regarded perceptual in relation both to itself and its object. While its object is cognised perceptually with the help of sense-contact it's own self is not so cognised.

Rebuttal of the view that validity is reflectively cognised

Text: न अपि स्व–ग्राहकेण, विवेचन–अनुपपत्तेः। न हि प्रमाण–ग्रहणं यथार्थत्व–एक–नियतम्। अ–प्रमाणे अपि प्रमाण–अभिमानात्। अन्यथा विपर्यय–ज्ञानात् अ–प्रवृत्ति–प्रसंगात् च।

Trans: Nor is validity cognised by the reflective cognition (or by the inference based on the knownness of the cognitive object) because in this way validity cannot be distinguished from invalidity. Certainly it is not the

case that only veridical cognitions are cognised as valid. Even false cognitions are so cognised. Besides if they were not, false cognitions would not lead to activity.

Expl: The first view is that a cognition is itself the cause of cognitional usage in regard to itself. Only in relation to desire, aversion etc. cognition which is other than them is needed to sustain relevant usages. Such a view cannot be defended because cognition cannot be the locus of sensory contact to qualify for being the object of usage engendered by itself. The cognition that 'cognition is a knowable' for example has itself as its object only by means of the transcendental contact— 'universalisation'. Divine knowledge is directly self-cognitive without any sense-object-contact. Now the second of the foregoing two views is subjected to criticism. The ground of the criticism is that the cognition of cognition whether perceptual (internal mental) or inferential cannot yield a foolproof cognition of validity. The cognition of cognition may not always apprehend the validity of its object.

Rebuttal continued

Text: ततः यदि प्रामाण्यं आपाततः स्फुरेत् अपि तथा अपि नियम-हेतोः अभावात् प्रमाणं एव इदं इति निश्चयः कुतः? सः च मृग्यते पारलौकिक-व्यवहार-अंगत्वात्। शंका-निवर्तनेन तत् अ-प्रत्यूहं निश्चितं एव इति चेत्? तत्-निवृत्तिः एव कुतः? प्रमाण-अंतरात् इति चेत्? तत् अपि निश्चय-फलं अन्यथा वा इति? अन्ययात्वे न शंका-विच्छेदः निश्चय-साध्यत्वात् तस्य। निश्चय-फलत्वे तु यः मृग्यते न असौ स्वतः इति।

Trans: So even if the cognition may accidentally reveal the validity of the cognition which is its object, there being no guarantee for such a revelation there cannot arise the definite conviction that the former is not other than valid. It is such a conviction that is sought after, for it is the necessary condition for activities related to otherworldly results. But couldn't doubt about validity be somehow removed so that there doesn't remain any obstruction to the cognition of validity? Well! this could be so but how is the doubt itself to be removed? If by means of some other valid cognition (or valid proof) the doubt is to be removed, then does this cognition result in conviction or not? If it does not then the doubt cannot be removed because this removal is the result of definite cognition. If on the other hand the cognition gives rise to conviction then that which is sought after (namely the conviction of validity) is not to be had through reflective cognition etc.

Expl: The cognition of cognition may sometimes reveal the validity of its object but it cannot do so invariably. But only a definite and dependable cognition of validity can prompt serious activities aimed at transcendental goals. Whatever can produce such a conviction must be other than the cognition of cognition etc.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: स्फुरण–मात्रं अपि तावत् अस्तु स्वतः इति चेत्? किं तेन? न च एतत् अपि। अन्–अनुसंहित–उपाधेः उपहित–प्रत्यय–अ–योगात्। न च विषय–उपधान–मात्रं प्रामाण्य तत्–आभास–साधारण्यात्। अपि तु अनुभवस्य सतः भूत–अर्थ अनुसंधानम्। न च अर्थ–अनुसंधाने अपि तस्य भूतत्वं अनुसंधीयते। आरोपितत्व–व्यावर्तक–विशेषण–अन्–अनुसंधानात्। अन्–अनुसंहितस्य च आरोप–साधारण्यात्। क्वचित् विशेषः अपि अनुसंधीयते इति चेत्? न क्व अपि प्राथमिकेन। अन्यथा अन्–अभ्यास–दशायां तत्र अपि संशयः न स्यात्। अभ्यास–दशा–उत्पन्ने तु अनुसंधानं व्याप्ति ग्रह–जनित–संस्कार–समुद्भव–स्मरण–बलेन भवत् प्रमाण–अंतर–शरीरे एव प्रविशति इति परतः एव अवशिष्यते।

Trans: Let then the mere revelation (without confirmation) of validity be produced by the cognition of cognition etc. Yes, but what use is this if it cannot serve the purpose of guiding confident activity? But even the revelation of validity cannot be caused by the cognition because if the property whose presence in the cognised object determines the validity of the cognition is not cognised then the cognition is not cognised as valid. Mere apprehension of an object by a cognition does not constitute its validity as it is common to illusions too. Validity in fact consists in the apprehension of the object as real. Certainly even if an object is apprehended by cognition it cannot be said that its reality too is apprehended by it because such a cognition does not apprehend the property of the object which excludes its illusory character. In some cognitions this property too is apprenended (as for instance in the cognition 'This is pot only') but not in the cognitions which apprehend only a cognition. If it were not so there cannot arise doubt regarding the validity of a cognition with which one is not familiar. In the case of the familiar cognition the apprehension of the object that arises is due to the recollection of concomitance of the major and middle terms which is produced by the residual traces of the initial cognition of this

concomitance and is thus included only in other valid cognitions of the inferential type. So it is the external validity-view that holds the ground.

Expl: It is now contended that even if validity is revealed by reflective cognition the external-validity-view could be upheld. It is replied first that mere revelation is of no use for action and second that the reflective cognition can apprehend only the objectivity of the cognition which is its object but mere objectivity is not validity. Unless the object appears as endowed with a property really characterising it its cognition cannot be a valid cognition. Even an invalid cognition cognises its object but the property which appears to characterise the object in the cognition does not belong to it. Only when a property inhering in the object appears in its cognition the cognition is recognised as excluding the character of having a qualifier which does not characterise its qualificand. A valid cognition is therefore definable as one in which the qualifier inheres in its qualificand. The objectivity of such a cognition is not determined by a qualifier incompatible with its qualificand. The primary cognition of a cognition therefore never apprehends its validity. As to the cognitions which have occurred several times, they are cognised as valid on the basis of inference. For example referring to a new cognition as of an earthy object one may have an inference like this: 'This cognition is of an earthy object because it has an odorous entity as the qualificand and earthiness as the qualifier, just like a similar earlier cognition.' Thus the memory of the concomitance of the middle and major terms experienced earlier leads to the fresh inference which establishes the validity of the cognition which is its minor term.

The followers of the Bhātta school opine that knownness is a special property of the objects which is perceptible to senses. On the basis of this perceived property cognition generating the property and belonging to the self is inferred. The cognition is inferred as valid and not as invalid. The primary cognition of an object as well as its secondary cognition apprehends it as being endowed with knownness, that is to say known as endowed with a property inhering in it. Thus the validity of a cognition is known by that cognition itself.

This view is rejected by the followers of Nyāya on the ground first, that cognition is not imperceptible and second that there is no evidence for the admission of knownness as a unique property of the known object. Knownness can appear in the cognition of objects by means of the transcendental contact known as 'Gñanālakṣaṇā'.

According to the followers of Muraāri Misra, in the cognition of a cognition the qualified object, the qualifier etc. appear in their respective forms so that the validity of the object-cognition stands fully revealed when it is cognised. No separate cognition of validity is called for. Against this view the followers of Nyāya argue that in the cognition of a cognition the qualificand and the qualifier appear in their respective general forms only.

For example if there is scope for doubt regarding the validity of the cognition of a pot then the cognition of this cognition will be of the form. 'I know the pot, or I know something as pot'. But this form of the cognition is compatible with the falsehood of its object. Only if the cognition has the form, 'I know this pot as pot' the cognition which is its object will be true.

Objection to the rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: तत्र अपि अनवस्था इति चेत्? न तावत् असौ दृष्टांत–द्वारिका, प्राक् एव तत्–निश्चयात्। फल–द्वारिका तु स्यात् अपि यदि प्रामाण्यं अवश्य–निश्चेयं अभ्युपेयते। अज्ञात–प्रमाण्येन कथं पर–प्रमाण्य–वेदनं इति चेत्? यथा विषय–संवेदनम्। अस्तु तर्हि धर्मि–लिंग द्वारिका। ताभ्यां अ–निश्चिताभ्यां अन्–अनुमानात्। तत्–निश्चयस्य च प्रामाण्य–निश्चय अंतरेण अनुपपत्तेः। न। द्वैत–अभावात्। यत्र हि लिंग–ज्ञाने धर्मि ज्ञाने वा तथ्य–अ–तथ्य–भावेन द्वैतं–उपलभ्यते तत्र तथ्यःत्व–अ–निश्चये लिंग–आभास–शंका–आक्रांत तया न निश्चीयते। यत्र तु तत्–ज्ञानं तत्–एक–नियतं तत्र तावता एव लिंग–निश्चयः तत्–आभास–शंका–अनुत्थानात्। एक–कोटि नियतः हि अनुभवः निश्चयः। ज्ञान–तत्–धर्म–ग्राहिणि च ज्ञाने न द्वैतं इति व्यवस्थितिः एव। प्रामाण्य–निश्चयः तु तस्य अपि परतः एव इति न्याय–संप्रदायः। इतः एव विशेषात् तादृशस्य स्वतः एव इति तात्पर्य–आचार्याः ।

Trans: But doesn't even the inferential deter.ination of cognition lead to infinite regress? No! The regress cannot be due to the necessity of the validtion of the earlier cognition, by similarity to which, the new cognition is validated because the earlier cognition is already known to be valid. Of course the regress may arise if the validity of the inference itself is called into question but there is no necessity to ascertain the validity of the inference itself. The inference is just like the cognition of an object which does not need to be validated in order to apprehend its object. (Alright)! Let then there arise regress through the cognitions of the minor and middle terms of the inference as these do not lead to inference without being rightly known and this right knowledge cannot arise without the knowledge of the validity of the inference in which they are involved. No! No duality of validity and invalidity is involved in the inference of the

validity of cognition. (In the inference of cognitive validity cognition is the minor term and validity is the major term. So there is no scope for the doubt of validity to penetrate this inference). But where in the cognition of the middle or minor terms duality in their form of truth and falsehood is involved (because the cognition is of the nature of doubt) there the truth of the cognition not being determinable the middle term becomes afflicted by the doubt of fallaciousness and is therefore not determined as valid. On the other hand where the cognition of the minor or middle term is wholly concerned with validity there the validity of these terms is determined simply by the noncognition of invalidity. A cognition apprehending only one qualifier of its qualificand is in fact a determinate cognition. It is an established fact that a cognition apprehending a cognition with its property doesn't involve the duality of truth and falsehood. But if the validity of this cognition too is sought to be ascertained this can be done only externally that is inferentially. This is the view prevalent in the Nyāya school. Only because of this special character of this inferential cognition Vācaśpatī the great author of Tātparyatīā has said that the validity of inference is known intrinsically (that is to say, normally the doubt of invalidity does not afflict inference).

Expl: It was stated above that in the case of recurrent cognition its validity is ascertained on the basis of its similarity to a known valid cognition. But how is this other cognition known as valid? The answer is that this is so known either by its similarity to another known cognition or the mind directly grasps its validity. So far as the validity of the inference establishing validity is concerned it is not always necessary to ascertain it. Even an inference which is not known as valid can yield the knowledge of the inferred. If it were not so no cognition would ever cognise its object. The cognition of validity is needed only to remove the doubt about validity if it arose or is raised. Where there is this doubt there the definite cognition of validity has to be invoked to remove doubt. In the case of the cognition of a cognition as valid there is normally no possibility of doubting the validity. The cognition is cognised along with its epistemic property. But if the validity of the cognition of cognition is sought after then we have to take recource to inference only. Generally however such a doubt does not arise or is not raised.

Query how reflective cognition does not involve duality and its answer

Text: स्यात् मतम् एतत् एव कथं निश्चेयं यत् एवंभूतं एक–कोटि–नियतं एव यावता तत्र अपि अनवस्थितिः इति चेत्? न। व्याप्ति–ज्ञानस्य साक्षात् आत्मनि अ–प्रवृत्तौ अपि सर्व–उपसंहारेण यं उपाधिं आदाय प्रवृत्तिः

तत्–धर्मवत्वात् तत्–जातीयत्वं हि तत्र उपाधिः। तत् च तत्र अपि अ–विशिष्टं अनुव्यवसायत्वात्। न च सामान्यतः नियम–निश्चये तत्–आलिंगिते विशेषे द्वैत–शङ्का–अवकाशः। यथा वाचकः शब्दः इति स्व–आत्मनः वाचकत्वं न साक्षात् विधत्ते वृत्ति–विरोधात्। तथा अपि सामान्येन यं उपाधिं अधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तः शब्दः तत्वत्वात् शब्द–शब्दः वाचकः न वा इति शंकया न परिभूयते न अपि अनवस्था इति एवं इह अपि इति।

Trans: It may be asked, 'How is this itself to be determined that the reflective cognition of the validity of cognition involves only validity and not invalidity as the qualifier of its qualificand so that if it were otherwise, there would arise infinite regress? The answer to the question is that when all reflective cognitions as such are known to be valid and thus the concomitance of validity and the generic property of reflective cognitions has been ascertained then, the reflective cognition of the cognition of minor, middle terms etc. also being endowed with the property, it is known to be of the same nature and as such it is known to be valid. Once it is generally ascertained that all reflective cognitions are valid no scope for duality is left in regard to a particular individual covered by the generic property. For example the statement that 'words are denotative' does not state directly the denotativeness of the word 'words' used in the statement as it has no such significatory capacity. Yet the generic property on the basis of which the general denotativeness of all words is stated in the statement inheres even in the word 'words' used in the statement. So no doubt assails anybody's mind whether the word 'words' is denotative or not nor does even the fallacy of infinite regress arise in explaining the meaningfulness of words.

Expl: If it is asked how the reflective cognition of the cognition of minor, middle term etc. is known to be valid and not vulnerable to doubt about its validity and how the attempt to establish the concomitance of validity and being such a cognition does not entail infinite regress, the simple answer is that when the generic concomitance of all reflective cognitions and validity is known to be valid then the particular instance of the reflective cognition is also known to be valid. The generic property of being a reflective cognition covers the particular instance. It is just like the realisation of the denotativeness of the word 'words' occurring in the statemenet 'words are denotative' which signifies that every word as word is denotative; the particular word 'Word is not directly stated to be denotative but being covered by the generic property 'wordness' its denotativity follows automatically. One has not to go on stating the

denotativeness of one word by another word or set of words.

The infinite regress referred to above could be supposed to arise in a slightly different way too. It was said earlier that no doubt regarding validity arises in the case of the cognition of minor, middle terms etc. Is it so because no property common to both validity and invalidity is not apprehended or some distinctive property associated with validity is apprehended to be present in the cognition? The first is not true because 'being a cognition' is such a property. The second too is not true because validity itself is a distinctive property and its cognition is inference which depends upon the cognitions of minor, middle terms etc. If these cognitions are suspected to be invalid another inference would be needed to remove the suspicion. Thus there would arise infinite regress.

Elucidation of the answer

Text: तर्काः च अत्र भवंति। यदि धर्मि–ज्ञानं व्यभिचरेत् निरालंबनं असत् आलंबनं वा भवेत्। निषिद्धं च तत्। यदि अनुव्यवसायः व्यभिचरेत् तदा अर्थ–कर्मकः अपि न स्यात। ज्ञान–इतरस्य अर्थ–प्राव[illegible]य–अभावात्। यदि तत्–जातीयं व्यभिचरेत् व्यभिचारः न क्वचित व्यवतिष्ठेत। तत्–अ–व्यवस्थितौ व्यभिचारः अपि न स्यात्। अन्यथाख्याति–रुपत्वात् तस्य। तत्व–स्थितौ च अन्यथात्वं स्यात् तत्–अवधिकत्वात्।

Trans: There are also counterfactual conditionals to support the concomitances mentioned above. For example: 'If the cognition of the minor term or the qualificand were false it would be either objectless or have a false object, but this is not acceptable,' 'If the reflective cognition were invalid it would not even apprehend the objectivity of the cognition which is its object, for nothing other than cognition is directly objective', 'If a cognition similar to the cognition of the presence of the pervader where the pervaded is present turned out to be invalid then non concomitance would be left without any scope or basis as it is of the nature of misapprehension. Only if there is reality there can be negation of it as it is dependent upon the latter.'

Expl: In support of the foregoing defence of the validity of reflective cognition certain conditional arguments are presented here. They are as follows: 'If the cognition of the minor were false then it would be objectless or, according to the Buddhist view the cognition would have an unreal object if it remained a cognition. If the reflective cognition were false it would not have an objective cognition as its object or the reflective cognition would not be of the nature of an immediate awareness of the

cognition which is supposed to be its object. If a generic property failed to appear in a particular instance of it or, in other words if the existence of the pervader did not extend over the scope of the pervaded then concomitance would have no basis at all.' The examples of this conditional are: 'If the cognition of smelling objects as earthy were not the cognition of an earthy object as earthy it would not have the smelling object as its qualificand.' That is to say if a cognition having something included among earthy objects as its qualificand were not one having earth as its qualificand then there would be no true cognition of the earth at all so that even things other than the earth would not be truely known. In that case the cognition of earthiness in nonearthy objects which is falsehood would also remain unknown.

According to one commentator the last has reference to the property of veridical cognition which excludes its illusorines mentioned earlier. So the conditional argument is: 'If reflective cognition were not concomitant with a cognition whose nature excluded the property of illusoriness then there being no property which excluded illusoriness even nonconcomitance would be left without any basis.'

Concluding the argument

Text: एतेन स्वप्न–जागर–अवस्थयोः अ–विशेषः इति निरस्तम्। असत्–ख्यातेः आत्म–ख्यातेः च निराकृतत्वात्। अन्यथाख्यातेः च तत्व–ख्याति–व्यवस्थां अंतरेण अनुपपत्तेः इति। सा च जागरे अपि यदि न स्यात् न स्यात् एव इति।

Trans: By thus establishing the distinction between true and false cognitions the contention that the dream and waking states of consciousness do not differ from each other is eliminated. The theories of the appearance of the nonexistent or of pure consciousness without any objects being already refuted and the theory of erroneous cognition being impossible to maintain without admitting the possibility of the cognition of the real, if this cognition did not take place even in the waking state it would not take place at all.

Expl: If dreams are illusory there must be something which is real and appears as such in some state. This is the waking state which is different from the dream-state. If the waking-state is sought to be proved illusory like the dream-state there would be no veridical state of consciousness. Thus this proof too would turn out to be unveridical.

Elucidation of the distinction between waking and dreaming

Text: तथा अपि कथं अनयोः अवस्थयोः विभागः कर्त्तव्यः इति चेत्? न।

लोक–सिद्धत्वात्। किं अनयोः लक्षणं इति चेत्? कर्तृ–कर्मकरण–देश–काल–प्रबंध–बाधः काक–तालीय–संवादवान् स्वप्नस्य, प्रबंधे काक–तालीयः कस्यचित् एव विषयस्य बाधः जागरस्य इति। एतेन बाध्य–प्रबंधः अवस्था–विशेषः स्वप्नः। प्रबंध–बाधक–आदिः बाध्यमान–प्रबंध–अंतः जागरितं इत्यपि द्रषटव्यं इत्येषा दिक्।

Trans: Still how to distinguish between these two states?' One may ask. The answer is, 'As is commonly done.' 'What then are the definitions of these states?' it may again be asked. The answer is as follows: 'Dreams are to be defined as states which have accidental 'internal coherence coupled with the absence of the continuity of agent, action, instrument, space and time appearing in it?' The waking state is defined as 'the state in which only some contents are cancelled and the continuity of its different contents is accidental'. On the basis of these definitions dreams and waking can also be alternatively defined as below: 'Dream is a state in which the continuity of its contents is cancellable while waking is the state which starts with the cancellation of an earlier continuity and ends with a state namely the dream in which all continuity is cancelled'. This is how this distinction is to be tackled.

Expl: The dream-state and the waking-state are different from each other. The first may be defined as the state in which the continuity or apparent organisation of all its contents is contradicted and whose internal and external coherence is simply accidental there being some correspondence with external reality. In the waking-state the coherence or organisation of contents is accidental because it is only by chance that the agent, action, instrument etc. come together in waking life. A dream is a variety of mental cognition and it is perceptual in character. Waking is also a special type of cognition. Both these states are definable in other ways too as explained above.

Final conclusion

Text: तस्मात् तथ्यं एव विश्वम्। मंद–प्रयोजनत्वात् तु सत्वरैः मुमुक्षुभिः उपेक्षितं इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः । तर्हि नैयायिकानां जगत्–परिरक्षणे कः अथं अभिनिवेश–अतिशयः इति चेत्? सहसा एव तत्–उपेक्षायां न्याय–आभास–अवकाशे प्रमाण–मात्र–विप्लवः भवेत्। तथा च न्याय–रुचिः प्रेक्षावान् न तत्वं अधिगच्छेत् इति भिया इति।

Trans: So the world is certainly real. The impatient seekers of redemption however have in their eagerness ignored the reality of the world, as

thinking about it is of no consequence to them. If it is so why should the logicians evince such a keen interest in defending the reality of the world? The answer is that if all of a sudden the world is discarded (without realising its conduciveness to redemption) there may take place confusion of all sources of valid cognition resulting from fallacious reasoning. As a result a perspicacious person of a logical bent of mind would not be able to attain truth by acting in such a rash manner.

Expl: The world is certainly real but the Vedāntins seem to be too eager to attain release to care for understanding the nature of the world. But the logicians feel that undue haste in this matter may land them in all kinds of confusion and fallacies and so they carefully consider the nature of the world.

SECTION III

The debate over the difference between qualities and their substantive loci

Text: अस्तु तर्हि गुण–गुणिनोः अभेदात् नैरात्म्यं क्षणिक–ज्ञान–मात्र परिशेषात् इति चेत्? उच्यते। अस्ति तावत् इह दर्शन–स्पर्शनाभ्यां एक–अर्थ–अनुसंधानम्। तत् इदं एक–एक–विषयं वा स्यात्, समुदाय–विषयं वा, तत्–अतिरिक्त–विषयं वा वस्तु अन–अनुरोधि–आकार–विषयं वा, अलीक–विषयं वा?

Trans: Let then there be nonexistence of self because the qualities and their loci are nondifferent from each other as then only momentary cognitions would be left in the world. No! We (deny this and) say in reply that there certainly occurs the (re) cognition of an identical entity through seeing and touching. Does this cognition have a single entity like colour or feel or the combination of the two or something other than these two, or some form not corresponding with anything or the nonexistent as its object?

Expl: Now another major theory opposed to the reality of self is being taken up for consideration. This is the theory that qualities and their supposed substantive loci are non-different. The consequence of this theory is that there is no self other than cognitions etc. which even according to N.V. school last only for two moments. In the text the word for momentary is to be taken in the broad sense of 'not permanent' and the word for cognition is not to be taken in the sense of the idea of the idealistic theory. In defence of the reality of self the argument is adduced that since through different sensory cognitions an identical reality is felt to be cognised there must be a common locus of the different qualities sensed by different sense-organs. This cognition of the identical entity cannot have different entities, a combination of different entities, a composite entity, the form of entities or the unreal as its object.

Rebuttal of the alternative that a single entity like colour or touch is the object of the identity-cognition

Text: न तावत् आद्यः। न हि यत् एव रुपं सः एव स्पर्शः इति। न च रूपं त्वगिंद्रिय–ग्राह्यं, अंधस्य अपि नीलादि–प्रत्यय–प्रसंगात्। न च एकं एव वस्तु करण–भेदेन अन्यथा प्रथते इति युक्तम्। अन्–आत्मकत्व–प्रसंगात्। भेद–अभेद–व्यवस्था–अनुपपत्तेः च।

Trans: As to the first it is not tenable. Certainly it is not the case that whatever is colour is also touch. Nor is colour tactually sensible; (if it were so) then even the blind can sense colours. Nor again does an identical entity appear differently due to different instruments of cognition. If this were so the supposed entity would have no identity at all and also the definite distinction between difference and non-difference would be jeopardised.

Expl: If the identity-cognition had only colour or feel etc. as its object then colour, feel etc. being different from one another the identity-cognition would be falsified. One may urge against this that perhaps colour and feel are identical though the generic properties characterising colour and feel are different from each other. So one and the same entity is visible as colour and tangible as feel. But then the incompatibility of the properties cannot be maintained nor also their inaccessibility to more than one sense-organ when the qualities endowed by them are not so. So even a blind person should be able to see if colour and feel are identical. If the distinction is justified on the basis of the difference of different exclusions represented by the properties then the socalled difference of exclusions can be questioned as the counterpositives of the exclusions turn out to be the same. Also the words 'blue' and 'earth' would become synonymous and water and light representing the qualities of feel and colour would become identical with earth representing smell. Of course the unfavourable contingency of colourness being cognisable when the feel is cognised can be avoided on the above view if it is argued that unlike colour and feel these properties are cognised only by the senses which are commonly supposed to sense the entities endowed by them. The clinching argument against the above view however is that if these properties coexisted they would be afflicted by the fallacy of overlapping as they coexist in earth while existing separately in light and air. Similarly blueness and potness would become overlapping on the above view. Further when a clay-pot is baked red it is not colourness that undergoes change nor is it the pot which remains recognisably the same. And the same pot could be partly red and partly blue which is not possible if the blueness and redness coinhered in the pot. There is also the undisputed testimony of experience that colour is not feel nor is feel colour.

The second of the above five alternatives being considered

Text: न अपि द्वितीयः। सः हि एकदेशतया वा, एककालतया वा, एककार्यतया वा, एककारणतया वा इति।

Trans: Nor is the second tenable. As to the alleged combination, is it due to coexistence, contemporaneity, coeffectuality or cocausality?

Expl: Four different determinants of combination are mentioned here. Of

course the earlier objection that the identity-cognition cannot be explained remains even if the second view is adopted as the entities to be combined are not cognised by the same sense; yet here the very possibility of combination is called into question.

The first of the above four alternatives of the second rebutted

Text: न तावत् उपादान–रूप–एकदेश–संभवः तयोः प्रति–नियत–उपादानत्वात्। संभवे तत्–एव द्रव्यं इति पर्यवासितं विवादेन। न अपि अधिकरणीभूत भूतलादि–आधारतया तत्–संभवः। चक्षुषा हि उपलभ्यमाने रूप–विशेषे घटः अपि चक्षुषा एव उपलभ्यमानः रूप–विशेषः तत्–आधारः इति शक्यते निश्चेतुम्। तयोः अधर–उत्तरभावेन एक–ज्ञान–संसर्गित्वात्। तत्–अधिकरणाः स्पर्शादयः अपि इति तु कस्य प्रमाणस्य विषयः? न हि स्पर्शादयः चाक्षुषे चेतसि चकास्ति। त्वचः अयं व्यापारः इति अपि नास्ति, तया अपि भूतल–घट स्पर्शयीः आधारः–आधेय भाव–प्रतीतेः। न च समुदाययोः तत्–संभवः परस्पर–आश्रयत्व–प्रसंगात्। एक–आधारतायां हि समुदाय–अनुसंधानं, समुदाय–अनुसंधाने च एक–आधारता–अनुसंधान–संभवः इति। अनवस्था प्रसंगात् च। भूतलस्य अपि समुदायत्वं कि–कृतं इति अनुयोग अ–निवृत्तेः।

Trans: As to the combination due to identity of locus, it cannot be due to the identity of the material cause (of the qualities), because each of the qualities has its own separate material cause (the colour for colour, the feel for the feel etc.) If there can be a common material cause it will be the substance itself so that if this is admitted the dispute will be over. Nor can there be coexistence because the floor or some other place is the common locus (of the qualities). If the pot, which is identical with a certain colour (as per the Buddhist view) and is sensed by the eyes themselves is seen on the floor which is identical with some other colour and is also sensed by the eyes then the former can be determined as located in the latter. This is because the two are related to the same (determinate) cognition as the located and the locus. But the qualities of feel etc. which are also located in the floor cannot be ascertained by any means of cognition. Certainly feel etc. are not sensed by the visual sense. It is also not the case that this coexistence is the result of the mediation of the tactual sense-organ in the said cognition. Even this sensē-organ can produce the cognition of locus-locatedness pertaining only to the feels

which are the floor and the pot respectively. Nor can the group of qualities be regarded as having an identical locus, as this assumption would lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence. In order to establish the identity of locus (of the qualities) the qualities are viewed as combined and to establish that these can be combined an identical locus for them is sought. Such a view entails infinite regress too. Even the locus—the floor—can be treated as a combination of qualities only because it too has an identical locus which again fares no better in respect of its identity.

Expl: If qualities can be combined on the basis of their common material cause then colour, feel etc. cannot be combined, as on the Buddhist view colour is caused by colour, feel is caused by feel and so on, so there cannot be a common material cause for all these qualities. It may however be urged that the physical locus of an object may provide the basis for the combination. Again on the Buddhist view every physical object is just a combination of the qualities it is credited with. So the floor on which a pot—which is colour, feel etc. put together—is placed may be supposed to engender the combination of colour, feel etc. But here it must be noted that the pot or its colour is seen to occupy the floor which also is colour because the floor is seen. But the eyes cannot feel. So only the colour may be taken here both to be the locus and the located. If these two are touched then the floor as touch and the pot as touch only would be perceived as the locus and the located. It is of course possible to view both these entities as a combination of all the qualities but then it was to explain the nature of combination that the idea of a unitary locus was put forward. Now the idea of combination itself is being used to explain the unitary character of the locus. So this procedure is entangled in circularity. Besides the locus-floor-too can be a combination, only if it too has a single locus. Thus there is sure to arise infinite regress in this explanation.

It may be noted here that in the Buddhist view colour, touch etc. cannot coexist (being discrete entities). So their coexistence has to be regarded as conceptual. Thus only if this coexistence is known the qualities will be known as combined and only if their combination is known their coexistence will be known. This is what is suggested above in the fallacy of circularity or mutual dependence.

The second alternative rebutted

Text: अतः एव न एक–कालतया अपि। तयोः एक कालतायां प्रमाण–अभावात्। भावे वा रासभ–करभयोः अपि एक–कालतया समुदायत्व–प्रसंगः। भेद–अ–ग्रहस्य प्रकृते अपि अ–संभवात्।

Trans: For the very reason that colour, feel etc., are not sensed by a single

sense-organ these cannot be combined even on the basis of their contemporaneity. There is no valid reason for this. If there is reason for it then an ass and a camel should form a combination if they exist at the same time. The cognition of difference cannot be supposed to prevent the appearance of combination of these two. In the present case too the non-cognition of difference is not possible.

Expl: Since the qualities are sensed by different senses they cannot be always contemporaneous and even if they were so they would remain different from each other and so not form any combination.

The third alternative of the second (alternative) rebutted

Text: अतः एव न एक–कार्यतया अपि। उपादेय–रुपस्य एक–कार्यस्य अभावात्। एक–उदक–आहरण–लक्षणा–अर्थक्रिया इत्यादि अपि न युक्तम्। रूपादि–अतिरिक्तस्य उदकस्य अनभ्युपगमात्। एकैकस्य अनेक–आहार्यत्वे प्रमाण–अभावात्। समुदायस्य च असिद्धेः।

Trans: For the reason mentioned (that each quality has its own material cause) the qualities cannot be combined even as giving rise to a unitary effect as there is no unitary effect which is brought about by the qualities. It is not correct to say against this that containing or fetching water is an activity which is produced by a pot which is the qualities put together, for water itself is not one entity but an assemblage of colour, touch etc. There is no evidence that each of these is produced (or efficiently caused) by a combination of qualities. That the combination produces each of the qualities is still unproved (for the proof of which the above coeffectuality is cited).

Expl: There being no common effect of all the qualities they cannot be combined on such a basis. The usual effects are not unitary but multiple in nature as each of these is in the Buddhist view a conglomeration of qualities. There is also no proof that each single quality constitutive of any object is the product of a combination of qualities, and if this is so then how the combination is formed will have to be explained.

The fourth alternative of the second (alternative) rebutted

Text: अतः एव न एक–कारणतया अपि इति। निमित्तं–अतरेण तु समुदाय–व्यवहारे अतिप्रसंगः।

Trans: For the above reason itself the combination cannot be based on cocausality. If without any ground the qualities are treated as combined then this usage would cover even noncombinable entities.

Expl: There has to be some cause for the combination. Otherwise even

things in different times and places would get combined.

The third alternative conceded

Text: तृतीये न विवादः।

Trans: There is no dispute regarding the third alternative.

Expl: That some thing other than qualities is the object of identity-cognition is quite acceptable to the logician.

Rebuttal of the fourth and the fifth alternatives

Text: न अपि चतुर्थः। सः हि विज्ञान–नयं आश्रित्य वा स्यात् द्वि–चंद्रादिवत् विसंवादात् वा? आद्ये तु रुपादिषु कः पक्षपातः? प्राप्तेः अर्थक्रिया–स्थितेः च न द्वितीयः अपि। ते द्वे रुपादीनां इति चेत्? न तेषां, किं तु तस्य एव इति किं न स्यात्? बाधकात् इति चेत्? न तावत् क्रम–यौगपद्य–विरहः रक्त–अ–रक्त विरोधः वा बाधकं, निषिद्धत्वात्। क्षणिक–परमाणु रुप–द्रव्ये–अन्–आक्रांतेः च। संबंध–अभावः इति चेत्? अ–संबंधः तावत् अस्तु। कथं तत्–वत् प्रतीयते इति चेत्? तेषां तथा उत्पादात् इति परिहारः अस्तु तव एव यथा शरीरं चेतनावत् इति। रुपादिभिः एव समस्त–अर्थ–क्रिया–सिद्धेः किं तत्–अतिरिक्त–द्रव्य–कल्पनया इति चेत्? न। तावत्–मात्रेण एव समस्त–अर्थक्रिया–सिद्धेः किं रुपादि–कल्पनया इत्यस्य अपि वाचाट–वचसः अवकाश–प्रसंगात्। प्रतीयमानत्वात् इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। एतेन अलीक–विषयता अपि निरस्ता।

Trans: Nor is the fourth alternative tenable. It could be entertained either on the basis of the idealistic theory or by espousing the view that the identity-cognition is an illusion like that of the double moon. If it is the first then why favour the qualities and treat them as real? (As per the idealistic theory both the identity-cognition as well as other-cognitions are devoid of any object.) As to the second it too is not tenable because the identity-cognition is true as it attains its object and it gives rise to significant activity (these two are criteria of reality in the Buddhist view). But can't one say that these two pertain to the different qualities? Well! why can't one say that it is only to the unitary locus of qualities that they belong and not to the qualities themselves? If there is any contrary reason for saying so it cannot be either the absence of simultaneous or successive causation or the incompatible cooccurrence of red and not red. (The

durable cannot be productive successively or simultaneously and the durable gross entity if unitary cannot be red and not-red at the same time). Both these reasons have already been rejected. Besides these reasons do not affect the momentary entity and the coloured atom. (These reasons are opposed only to the admission of durability and grossness). But can't it be said that the qualities do not inhere in anything? Well ! if so, let them be unrelated. Then it may be asked. 'How do things appear as qualified by colour? (To this the answer may be this): 'Just as in your (Buddhist's) view the body appears as conscious (without being conscious) so the qualities too may be supposed to come into being as engendering the cognition of objects as qualified by qualities (without their inhering in anything). But if all significant activity (supposed to be produced by a substantive entity) can be explained by means of the causality of qualities why admit a substance over and above the latter? Well! if so then there would be scope even for the glib retort that 'if all the concerned significant activity can be explained by means of the causality of the composite entity alone why admit the different qualities?' If the answer to the question is that the qualities are admitted because they are cognised then the other question too can be answered in the same manner. By this rebuttal stands rebutted the last alternative that it is the unreal that is the object of the identity-cognition.

Expl: It can't be argued that the substative locus of the qualities is not real as it is not causally effective. There is no evidence against the causality of the substantive entity. All the arguments so far adduced oppose only the durability and grossness of the substance. So if a momentary atomic entity endowed with colour etc. is admitted to be real the arguments do not oppose the admission. Even the nonadmission of the inherence—relation does not affect much the reality of the substance because the experience of things as endowed with qualities will have to be satisfactorily explained.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: अभेद–साधनं बाधकं इति चेत्? किं तत्? सह–उपलंभ–नियमः इति चेत्? न। सम–सह उपलंभ–नियमस्य असिद्धे। पीत–शंख उपलंभादौ श्वैत्य–अनुपलंभे अपि शंख–उपलंभात्। न असौ शंखः किंतु शंखः इव तैमिरिक–केशादिवत् इति चेत्? अहो गुणवत्–विद्वेषः यत् तैमरिक–केशाः करतल–परामर्श–प्रतिनियत–अर्थक्रिययोः अपायात् न संभवंति इति व्यवस्थापयति, इह तु तत्–संभवे अपि शुभ्रता–मात्र–अनुपलंभात् इति। व्यापकत्वात् इति चेत्? वस्तुनोः व्याप्तिः उपलंभयोः वा? आद्ये न विप्रतिपत्तिः। न च व्यापक–

अनुपलब्धि-मात्रेण व्याप्य-तत्-उपलब्धी निवर्तेते। दहन-अनुपलब्धौ धूम-तदुपलब्धयोः अपि निवृत्ति-प्रसंगात्। तत्र अपि वा किं न परिकल्पयसि धूमः इव असौ न धूमः इति, पावकवत्ता-अनुपलब्धेः इति? तस्मात्-नव्यापक-अनुपलब्धेः व्याप्य-निवृत्तिः, किंतु व्यापक-निवृत्तेः। सा च अत्र असिद्धा इति वाच्यम। तत् एतत् तुल्यं प्रकृते अपि। उपलब्धेः तु व्याप्तिः इह एव भग्ना। श्वैत्य-अनुपलंभे अपि शंख-उपलंभात् इति उक्तम्। स्यात् एतत्। पीतः एव शंखः उत्पन्नः इति चेत्? न। पुरुष-अंतरेण श्वैत्यस्य एव उपलब्धेः।

Trans: But isn't the proof for the nondifference of qualities and their loci opposed to the reality of substances? Yes, but what is the proof? Is it the necessity of simultaneous appearance? No! The necessary simultaneous appearance of qualities and their loci is not established. In the case of the cognition of the white conch it may be urged that even in the absence of the cognition of whiteness the conch is cognised (as yellow under the influence of jaundice for example.) But can't it be said that the conch (appearing as yellow) is not a real conch, only it appears like one as does the illusory hair to the epileptic? Well! what a prejudice is this against the reality of the object endowed with qualities? Obsessed by this the opponent of the locus of qualities is prepared to deny the reality of the illusory hair as it can neither be touched nor does it produce any significant activity while despite its being productive of significant activity and being tangible the locus conch is treated by the opponent as illusory because whiteness does not appear by itself in the cognition of the white conch! May it be urged that in the instant case whiteness pervades the conch, so on the disappearance (or noncognition) of whiteness the conch also should disappear? Well! then one may ask whether it is the things that are pervader and pervaded or their respective cognitions? If the first then there is no dispute. Certainly merely by the dissipation of the appearance of the pervader both the pervader and its appearance do not disappear. If they do then on the disappearance or noncognition of fire both the smoke and its appearance or cognition would be dissipated. Why don't you maintain there that what appears on the disappearance of fire is something resembling smoke but not smoke, so the pervaded itself is not dissipated by the dissipation of the cognition of the pervader. Only if the pervader is dissipated the pervaded is dissipated and this is not the case in the instance cited. If so then it is the same in the instance under consideration. As to the concomitance of the two cognitions it is found violated in the present case itself as even in the absence of the cognition of whiteness the conch is cognised. Could one say then (when the whiteness

is not cognised) that a new yellow conch comes into being? No! Some other person (not affected by jaundice) sees only whiteness in the conch.

Expl: It is argued by the advocate of nondifference that the co-cognition or non-cognition by what does not cognise the other is opposed to the difference of qualities and their loci. Now this obviously is not the case. With the eyes closed the conch is tactually cognised without being seen. Certainly touchness and colourness do not coexist so that if the colour is not seen the touch also is not felt. Of course even visual cognition of the conch is possible in the absence of the cognition of its whiteness. Some colour in the conch has to be seen (if whiteness is not seen) If the conch is to be visible. A particular colour like whiteness may remain invisible. Or one can say that yellowness itself is imposed on the white colour when the conch is illusorily cognised as yellow. But if the illusion of the yellow conch could be explained as the cognition of the conch itself as endowed with yellowness and not of the colour of the conch then the said co-cognition cannot be maintained. It is also a fact that the generic property colourness is not cognisable when the colour is not cognised yet it is not the same as the coloured substance. Moreover if this property and the colour are regarded as one then the above-mentioned necessity amounts to non-cognition if a particular colour is not cognised. This obviously does not hold of the conch illusorily cognised as yellow. Finally unable to defend the necessity of the co-cognition of qualities and their loci by any means the advocate of identity contends that a new object describable as of this or that colour comes into being every moment so that at no moment the socalled object and its colour are seen as separated. This is proved wrong by the fact that if the conch were really yellow nobody would see it as white.

Another objection and its rebuttal

Text: न अपि अ–समः एव सह–उपलंभ–नियमः हेतुः अनैकांतात्। अ–भास्वरं रुपं भास्वरेण सह नियमेन उपलभ्यते भिन्नं च इति। देश–अ–विच्छेदः इति चेत्? न अ–सिद्धेः। देह–देहिभ्यां अनैकांतात् च। न तयोः अ–विच्छेदः तत् अनुपलंभे अपि उपलंभात् इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। रूपादि अनुपलंभे अपि तद्वतां उपलब्धेः। तथा अपि न विपर्ययः कदापि इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। न हि देहादि उनुपलंभे देहि–उपलंभवत् देहि–अनुपलंभे अपि देहस्य उपलंभ–संभवः तव दर्शने। प्रतिपत्ति–निष्पत्ति–सामग्री–साहित्य–नियमेन सह–उपलंभः वा देश–अ–विच्छेदः वा स्यात् नियमेन विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासात् भेदः

च इति कः विरोधः? धर्म–विरोधः एव कः अत्र इति चेत्? तत् उपलंभे अपि अनुपलंभ; तत् अभिधाने अपि अनभिधानं, तत्–निषेधे अपि अनिषेधः इत्यादि। नीलं उत्पलं चलति इत्यादौ च व्यावृत्ति–भेद–निराकरणे पूर्वकः एव न्यायः अनुसंधेयः अन्यत्र उपाधि–भेदात्।

Trans: Nor can it be urged that a nonequipollent co-cognition is the ground of the non-difference of qualities and their loci because such a ground is overextensive. The faint whiteness of a pot for example is seen to be coexistent with the bright whiteness of the light and yet they are different from each other. But aren't these spatially disparate (so how can they be regarded as nondifferent)? No, (If coexistence too is introduced as qualification within the cocognition) the qualities are not coexistent with their loci. Besides the body and the self are not non-coexistent and they are cognised as one's own self; yet they are not one and so this (qualified) ground or middle term is found to be overextensive. But can't it be urged against this that the body and the self are not coexistent as the self is known to exist when the body does not exist? No! This is the case with qualities and their loci too. (Even when one specimen of a quality is absent the locus may be cognised as endowed with another specimen of the same quality). However isn't it the case that the opposite of this is never true namely that no quality is cognised if its substantive locus is not cognised (although the reverse may be true)? Well! this is the case with the body and the self too. If the self or consciousness is not cognisable there cannot be the cognition of the body (as per the Buddhist view itself) although the reverse can certainly take place. Moreover it is quite possible that the causal collocations of cognition and production of two things being invariably associated with each other they invariably appear together and occupy the same place and yet are mutually different because they appear endowed with incompatible properties. So why should these two be opposed to each other? But what after all is the incompatibility of properties? Well! in the present case this is illustrated by the noncognition of one even when the other is cognised, the nonmention of one even when the other is mentioned and the non-negation of one even when the other is negated and so on. In expressions like 'The blue lotus flutters' also it is the lotus as characterised by the blue colour that is really signified and not the exclusion of the nonblue by the lotus. For the rebuttal of the exclusion-theory only the earlier arguments have to be employed. (It has to be noted that) sometimes even exclusion appears as the qualifier in a cognition (as in the example 'This is a noncow not a nonhorse and so on').

Expl: If bilateral cocognition of qualities and their loci is proof of their identity, even the colours of a pot and the light surrounding it should be cognisable as one. If occupancy of the same place is an additional

condition for identity then body and consciousness should be one. If the noncognition of the other is also needed for the identity this too is available in the case of the body and its consciousness. In the consciousness the body is not cognised. Of course a person may cognise another's body devoid of consciousness but if the body is a momentary entity such a cognition is not possible. Moreover the cocognition, coexistence etc. can go along with the (internal) diversity of a thing if it is endowed with incompatible properties. This incompatibility does not pertain only to exclusions. In the cognition of a 'blue lotus' it is the blue and the lotus which are cognised as identical, not the respective exclusions. The cognition is not reduced to a purely identity-cognition because blueness and lotusness are different. Even if the generic property and the individual characterised by it are different they can appear together. Of course in cognitions like 'This is not a cow' even exclusion is cognised.

Another rebuttal

Text: अभेदे च धर्म–धर्मिणोः दूर–अ–दूरतया ग्रहणे पटु–अ–पटुनी कुतः? न च पुरुष–भेदेन तथा एव अन्यस्य उत्पादः? एकस्य द्वैरुप्य–अभावात्। न च अन्य–अन्यः एव असो। एक–देशतया तत्वेन प्रतिसंधानात्। न च सा भ्रांता। भिन्न–देशस्य तथा भूतस्य प्रत्यासीदता अपि अनुपलंभात्। न च निरालंबः एव तत् उपलंभः वृक्षादि–देश–प्रति–नियमः–अनुपपत्तेः ;

Trans: If the locus and the located qualities were mutually non-different how can the same thing appear vivid when viewed from a short distance but viewed from a long distance it appear hazy? May it be that in relation to different viewers situated at different distances the same thing comes into being as endowed with vividness and haziness? No! The same thing cannot be endowed with two different properties. May it be then that there are two things, one hazy and the other vivid? No! The thing is recognised to be the same and as the occupant of the same place. This recognition of the occupancy of the same place cannot be illusory. Even when a person approaches the thing from a distance he does not see it as changing its place of occupation. Nor is this cognition of the thing devoid of any object. If this were the case then the cognition would not be tied down to a particular object like the tree of a particular place.

Expl: If qualities were the same as the things endowed with qualities, then from near or far things should be seen alike. Only if these are mutually different the vivid and hazy perceptions of things at different distances can be accounted for. If fewer qualities are perceived the perception of the

thing as endowed with the qualities is hazy, otherwise it is vivid. The advocate of nondifference of things and qualities treats for this very reason vividness and haziness themselves as the qualities of things but relative to persons situated at different distances from them. This will not do. If both these qualities are present in the perceived thing why should one see only one and not the other? Nor does the thing change with change of place as it is recognised to be the same thing from place to place.

Objection to the rebuttal and its partial rebuttal

Text: न च अधिपति–प्रत्ययत्वात् तस्य इति युक्तम्। अनुभवानां तत्–देश–उल्लेख–अन–अनुरोधात्। उल्लेखे वा सः एव आलंवन–प्रत्ययः तावत्–मात्र–अनुबंधित्वात् ओलंबन–व्यवहारस्य। न च देशः अस्तु आलंबनं न तु वृक्षादिः इति सांप्रतम्। अनुपलब्ध–विशेषतया देश–देशिनोः अ–विशेषात्। न च दवीयांसः अपि विशेषाः स्फुरंति एव न तु निश्चीयंते इति युक्तम्। न हि योग–विमल–अंजन–धौत–दृष्टेः अन्यस्य तारा–व्यूह–गतयः प्रतिभांति इति शक्यं प्रतिपादयितुम्।

Trans: (Couldn't the aforesaid referential) specificity of cognitions be supposed to be due to their being generated by (corresponding) indeterminate cognitions having identical referends? Yes, but the indeterminate cognitions do not refer to the space of their objects. If they do refer to it then the space itself will be the object of the cognition. Only this mere reference by cognition is required for an entity to be treated as the object of the cognition. It is not proper to say against this that only space is such an object and not the trees that ocupy the space (and so the trees are not cognised as vivid or hazy). (If the trees cannot be both hazy and vivid the space too cannot be so). Could it then be urged that even the remotely-perceptible properties of an object are cognised as vivid by the indeterminate cognition; only the determinate cognition does not do so because some of these properties are not grasped by it? No! This cannot be. Except to a person whose vision is purified by the application of the collyrium of Yoga such remote objects as the movements of starclusters cannot be said to be vividly perceptible.

Expl: The indeterminate cognition preceding a determinate cognition and determining the form of the object of the latter is called the ruling cognition in relation to the latter. It is now argued that the specificity of the determinate cognition is dependent upon that of the indeterminate cognition. In reply it is stated that both the space and the spatial object must be treated alike as indeterminately cognisable. And if the spatial object is cognised as vivid or hazy space too would be so cognised. The

indeterminate cognition of an object cannot be said to be absolutely vivid as common people do not have such cognition of the movements of distant stars.

Another rebuttal of the objection

Text: अनिश्चय–अनुपपत्तेः च। अनुभूतः हि आत्मा न निश्चीयते इत्यत्र हेतुः वाच्यः। वासना–अन्–उश्द्भवः इति चेत्? न। निःशेष विशेषवंत धर्मिणं उपलभ्य विदूर वर्तिनः तत्–अखिल–स्मरणे अपि अनुभव–व्यापार–अनुसारि–निश्चय–अनुदयात्।

Trans: Moreover there is no reason why the determinate cognition of all the supposed contents of the indeterminate cognition should not arise. There has to be some cause why what is indeterminately cognised is not determinately apprehended. Could it be the non-evocation of the urge for such a cognition after the indeterminate cognition? Well! this cannot be so because after having the (indeterminate) cognition of an object as endowed with all its properties when a percipient recedes to some distance from the object he does not have an immediate perception of the latter despite his recollection of its earlier cognition.

Expl: The Buddhist says that an object is fully cognised by the indeterminate not by the determinate because there may not be the urge or disposition for the latter cognition after the first. But then if there is recollection of this cognition then even at a distance from the object the determinate cognition comprehending all the properties of the object should arise. If there is recollection there is bound to be there the urge causing the recollection.

A minor objection to the above rebuttal and its rebuttal

Text: तथा अपि च अनुभव–कल्पनायां सर्वः सर्वदा सर्व जानाति न तु निश्चिनोति इति किं न स्यात्? भ्रांति–वशात् तत्–विपरीत–विशेष–निश्चये अनुभूत–विशेष–अ–निश्चयः इति चेत्? न। अनुभव–वैपरीत्ये निश्चयस्य सर्वत्र अन्–आश्वास–प्रसंगात्। यत्र च विपरीतस्य अपि अ–निश्चयः तत्र का वार्ता? यथा पराचीनैः भागैः अर्वाचीनानां संयोग–विभागयोः इतिः।

Trans: If even in the absence of the determinate cognition of an object with all its qualities and properties its indeterminate cognition is considered possible then why shouldn't it be considered possible that every one knows everything indeterminately at all times although he does

not know it determinately? May it be the case that if on account of distortion a thing is mistaken for some thing opposed to (or other than) itself then its own nature is not determinately cognised? No! If the determinate cognition were discrepant with the corresponding indeterminate cognition then no determinate cognition would be dependable. But where there is no contrary indeterminate cognition as in the case of the remote object, the conjunction and disjunction of the frontal portion with the backward portions of the object is not (determinately) cognised. Why isn't then this conjunction or disjunction indeterminately cognised?

Expl: It is now argued that the indeterminate cognition is all-knowing although the determinate is not so as in the case of the illusion the contradictory illusory cognition prevents the emergence of the right cognition of the real entity indeterminately cognised. But if thus the determinate cognition were opposed to the indeterminate cognition then no cognition of anything would be dependable. It may be said against this that only if there is a contradictory cognition of a determinate cognition the latter is regarded as opposed to the indeterminate cognition. Not all determinate cognitions need be opposed to the indeterminate. This retort is not applicable to all cases. For example in an object at a distance the conjunction and disjunction of its frontal and backward portions, being located in visible and invisible parts of the object are not supposed to be visible and yet the object is supposed to be indeterminately cognised. But there is no contradictory cognition here. Why doesn't then the determinate cognition of the object as endowed with the conjunctions and disjunctions arise? The only sensible answer to this is that if all the components of a determinate cognition are cognised then the components as mutually-related are determinately cognised.

SECTION IV

The Theory of Non-cognition of self

Proof for the unreality of self and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि नैरात्म्यं अनुपलब्धेः इति चेत्? न।
सर्व-अ-दृष्टेः च संदेहात् स्व-अ-दृष्टेः व्यभिचारतः। दृश्यत्व-विशेषणात् न एवं इति चेत्? न। तत्-असिद्धेः। पर-उपगम-सिद्धेः अ-दोषः इति चेत्? न। स्वतंत्र-साधनत्वात्। यदि परः सहसा एव एवं न अभ्युपगच्छेत् नूनं साधनं इदं मूर्च्छेत्। यदि च परः दृष्टिं अवधूय दृश्यंत अभ्युपगच्छेत् एवं अपि संभवेत्। न च एवं शक्यं, तस्य तत्-उपहित-रुपत्वात् इति संक्षेपः। विस्तरः तु अ-संतः अ-क्षणिकाः इतिवत् ऊहनीयः।

Trans: Let then there be selflessness as the self is not cognised. No! Universal noncognition of self is doubtful and particular (or individual) non-cognition applies even to cognisable entities. But mayn't this fallacy of the proof be removed by qualifying the non-cognition as that of the cognisable? No. The self is not regarded by the Buddhist (or even the materialist) as cognisable or perceptible. (If he so regards it then the dispute is settled). But isn't it the case that the N.V. philosophers regard the self as cognisable or perceptible and so there is no defect in the proof? No. This proof is an independent inference set forth by the Buddhist (based on his own assumptions). If the opponent suddenly changed his stand and denied the perceptibility of the self then the cited middle term of the inference would collapse (being absent in the minor). Moreover if the opponent admitted the perceptibility of the self without its being perceived then (somehow) the above middle term could be present in the minor. But it cannot be so at all. Perceptibility is a property which involves the perception of the perceptible. This is the sum and substance of the criticism. Its details are to be thought out on the lines of the arguments that 'the unreals are nonmomentary' and so on adduced earlier.

Expl: Noncognition of self is the reason adduced for proving the unreality of the self. Total absence of the cognition of the self is doubtful. If however this absence is by itself to be taken as the middle term then in the inference, 'There is no self because it is not cognised at all' the words used to negate the self themselves produce the cognition of self. So there cannot be total absence of the cognition of self. If 'perceptibility' is introduced as the qualification of the noncognised in the inference then it

may be asked whether it is the non-perception by a person other than the one to whom a thing is perceptible or it is the nonperception of the same person. It cannot be the first because at least the intellect of the opponent not perceived by the defendent is admitted to be real by both parties. The second is ruled out because what is perceptible to a person is certainly perceived by him. The crux of the criticism of the argument is that unless a thing is perceived it cannot be called perceptible. So if the self is perceptible it cannot remain unperceived. This criticism is similar to the one addressed against the earlier Buddhist argument aimed at disproving the reality of the durable. In that criticism it was shown that without the reality of the minor term viz. 'the durable' nothing can be proved of it, but if it is real it cannot be proved unreal. Here too the self cannot be proved to be unreal by means of the middle terms that it is absent at some places, or is destructible or has anterior nonexistence, or has no spatio-temporal existence or does not produce any significant activity. Many of these proofs are of the nature of negative inferences which the Buddhist does not admit. As for positive inferences the positive concomitances of the relevant major and middle terms needed for the purpose are not established at all. And any kind of cognition of the absolutely unreal not being admissible an inference proving the unreality of the unreal cannot also be entertained.

In the above criticism it may be noted that a (counterfactual) conditional argument can be advanced by a debater without entertaining the reality of the antecedent term but he cannot trot out an inferential argument on the basis of a middle term acceptable to his opponent only.

Proof for the reality of self and its defence

Text: अथ आत्म–सद्भावे किं प्रमाणम्? प्रत्यक्षं एव तावत्। अहं इति विकल्पस्य प्राणभृत्–मात्र–सिद्धत्वात्। न च अयं अ–वस्तुकः संदिग्ध–वस्तुकः वा, अ–शाब्दत्वात् अ–प्रतिक्षेपात् च्। न च लैंगिकः अन्–अनुसंहित–लिंगस्य अपि स्व–प्रत्ययात्। न च स्मृतिः इयं, अन्–अनुभूते तत् अनुपपत्तेः। अनादि–वासना–वशात् अनादिः अयं अ–वस्तुकः विकल्पः इत्यपि न युक्तम्। नीलादि विकल्प–साधारण्यात्। इह वासनां उपादाय–अन्–आश्वासे प्रमाण–अंतरे अपि कः समाश्वासः यतः नीलादि–विकल्पेषु समाश्वासः स्यात्?

Trans: But what is the proof for the existence of the self? Perception itself for sure. The awareness as 'I' is a matter of experience for all living beings. Certainly this awareness cannot be unobjective or endowed with dubious objectivity as it is neither verbal nor subject to contradiction. It is also not

generated by the middle term in an inference. Even a person who has no knowledge of any middle term has self-knowledge. Nor is it recollection as what is not experienced cannot be recollected. It is also not reasonable to say that this awareness is an objectless cognition which is beginningless and is generated by a beginningless urge. This can be said of the common cognitions of blue, yellow etc. also. If self-awareness could be discredited on the ground that it is the product of some beginningless urge how can any other cognition be credited as valid so that one could depend upon the cognitions of blue, yellow etc.?

Expl: The best proof for the reality of self is immediate self-awareness which is common to all living beings and is uncontradicted by any other experience. It has a positive entity and not mere exclusion as its object. It cannot also be supposed to be the product of some beginningless inner urge having no real entity as its object. If self-awareness can be so discredited object-awareness too can be discredited in the same manner.

Statement of the conclusion of the proof

Text: तस्मात् वासना–मात्र–वादं विहाय आगंतुकं अपि किंचित् कारणं वाच्यम्। तत् च आप्त–अन्–आप्त–शब्दौ वा लिंग–तत्–आभासौ वा प्रत्यक्ष–तत्–आभासौ वा इति। तत्र यथा प्रथम–मध्यम–प्रकार–अभावात् नील–विकल्पः चरमं कल्पं आलंबते तथा अहं इति विकल्पः अपि। तत्र अयं प्रत्यक्ष–पृष्ठ–भावित्वे साक्षात् एव स–वस्तुकः तत्–अभासे तु मूले अस्य पारंपर्यात् स–वस्तुता इति।

Trans: For this reason the (absurd) hypothesis of the causation by the transcendental urge has to be discarded and some external cause (or ground) has to be adduced for the cognition of self. This cause or ground may be of the nature of the words of a reliable or unreliable person, a valid or invalid middle term or a true or false perception. Among these the first and the second not being applicable to the blue-cognition (for example) it is subsumable under the third cause or ground; so is self-cognition too. If this cognition arises after the indeterminate cognition of self then it is directly objective. But if it is caused by false perception then somewhere at the basis of it there has to be a veridical indeterminate cognition and so it must be indirectly objective.

Expl: Self-cognition may be based on valid or invalid perception. If the first then the indeterminate cognition on which self-cognition is based must have a real object. If however the cognition is based on erroneous perception then there has to be the indeterminate cognition of the object which is the object of imposition in the erroneous perception. So in either

case there has to be some object for the indeterminate cognition on which self-cognition could be grounded.

Objection that self being not externally-sensed is unreal and its rebuttal

Text: न च बाह्य–प्रत्यक्ष–निवृत्तौ एव निर्मूलत्वम्। बुद्धि–विकल्पस्य अपि तथात्व–प्रसंगात्। तत्र स्व–संवेदनं मूलं इह अपि मानस–प्रत्यक्षं इति न कश्चित् विशेषः।

Trans: Nor is self-cognition baseless or objectless because the self is not cognised by external senses. Even the cognition of intellect or consciousness would then be baseless or objectless. If self-consciousness is the ground of the reality of intellect then in the case of the self too the evidencing ground is the mental perception of the self. So there is no difference in the two cases.

Expl: Just as consciousness is its own evidence so the self is evidenced by mental and not external sensation. Not only the self, even pleasure, pain etc. are known to be real only through mental sensation.

Objection that self-cognition may have the body as its object and its rebuttal

Text: शरीर–आदि–वस्तुकः भविष्यति इति चेत्? न निर्–उपाधि–शरीर–इंद्रिय–बुद्धि–तत्–समुदाय–आलंबनत्वे अतिप्रसंगात्। स्व–संबंधि–शरीरादौ अयं स्यात् इति वाच्यम्। तत्र कः 'स्व'–अर्थः इति वचनीयम्। अन्–अन्यत्वं स्वत्वं सर्व–भावानाम्। तथा च यदा तेन एव तत् अनुभूयते तदा प्रत्येतुः प्रत्येतव्यात् अ–व्यातिरेकात् अहं इति स्यात्। अतः एव घटादयः न कदाचित् अन्–अन्य–अनुभवितृकाः इति न कदा–अपि अहं आस्पदं इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि त्वत्–मते अपि अहं–प्रत्ययः–शरीरादौ आरोप–रूपः एव ततः प्रत्येतुः अन्यत्वात्।

Trans: Couldn't the cognition have the body as its object? No! If the body, the senses, the intellect or their combination devoid of any qualification is the object of the cognition then any body, senses etc. would be the object of any self-cognition (so that anyone may feel any body as his own.) If it is urged that self-cognition refers to the body related to oneself then the meaning of the words 'one's own' will have to be explained. To be one's own for anything means not to be different from oneself. So when one cognises one's own self then the cogniser being nondifferent from the

cognised the cognition that 'I am' in reference to the latter arises. This is why pot etc. which can never be cognised by themselves can never be the object of self-cognition. If this is so then even in your (Buddhist's) view the cognition of self is nothing but an imposition on the body as the body is different from the experiencer.

Expl: Any body, senses etc. or their combination cannot be the object of self-cognition. If it is one's own body then the body should not be different from the experiencing self but this is not the case. So selfhood cannot but be an imposition on the body. Further if self-cognition is derived directly from the objects or if it comes in the wake of the cognition of the objects in either case there has to be some object for it but this object cannot be a momentary entity because a momentary entity is quite unlike the real self. The experiencing self is nothing other than what is the locus or the cause of self-experience.

Objection that consciousness is self and its rebuttal

Text: बुद्धौ मुख्यः एव इति चेत्? न। तस्याः क्रियात्वेन अनुभूयमानायाः भिन्नस्य कर्तुः 'अहं छिनद्मि' इतिवत् 'अहं जानामि' इति अनुभवात्। नीलादि–प्रतिपत्तेः एव अयं आत्मा तथा भासते इति चेत्? तर्हि प्रत्येतव्य–प्रतिपत्ति–आकारयोः तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वात् सिद्धं नः समीहितम्। अस्तु स्व–उपादान–मात्रं इति चेत्? न।। तत्–प्रतिभासने तत्–आकारस्य अपि प्रतिभासन–प्रसंगात्। आकारं अंतरेण आकारिणः अन्–अवभासात्। प्रवृत्ति–संतान–अन्यः बुद्धि–संतानः प्रतिपत्ता। वयं तं आलय– विज्ञानं आचक्ष्महे इति चेत्? अस्तु तर्हि प्रवृत्ति–विज्ञान उपादानं अनादि–निधनः प्रतिपत्ता। स. किं संतन्यमान–ज्ञान–रूपः तत्–विरपरीतः वा इति चिंता अवशिष्यते। निः शेषिता च असौ प्राक् इति।

Trans: But itn't this self-experience authentic in relation to consciousness? No. Consciousness is experienced as a kind of activity while the agent of the activity is quite different from it, and as in the experience, 'I cut' so in the experience 'I know' the agent is experienced (as the cause of the activity). May it be that as in the cognitions of the blue, yellow etc. the blue, yellow etc. appear as the forms of the cognition so selfhood too is the form of consciousness in which it appears and of which it is the very nature? Well! then the forms of the cognised object and of the cognition will fare equally well or ill so that just as the blue is different from blue-cognition so the self too will be different from self-cognition. Thus our

objective (the establishment of the difference of self and consciousness) is fulfilled. May it be said then that only the cognition which is the material cause of self-cognition appears as the self? Well! if the cognitions of blue, yellow etc. are the causes of self-cognition then as these cognitions refer to blue, yellow etc. as their respective forms so these forms too will appear in self-cognition. The formed cannot appear without the appearance of its form. Could it be urged then that the cognition-series differing from the series of objective-cognitions known as motivating-cognitions is the cognising self which is the said material cause and it is this which we term as 'store-house-consciousness?' Well! then let the knower be the beginningless and endless self which is the material cause of motivating cognitions. But whether this self is of the nature of a series of cognitions or something opposed to this remains to be ascertained but this question has already been thoroughly thrahsed out.

Expl: Now it is urged that cognition or consciousness is the self not the body. Then the question arises whether the same cognition is both the knowing and the knower or they are different. The first cannot be true, one and the same entity cannot be its own locus and material cause. The self is experienced as the agent of cognitions and as different from them. It may however be argued that self is the form of its cognition as blue etc. are forms of their cognitions but then the self like the blue etc. may be identical with its cognition but it has already been shown that the objective form is different from its cognition. In the same manner the difference of the knower too from its cognition can be proved. If the second of the above alternatives namely that a cognition preceding a given cognition which is its material cause is its cogniser is true then this cognition being of the form of blue, yellow etc. these must appear in self-cognition. In the Buddhist view form and formed are non-different from each other. In the N.V. view, in a cognition of cognition the latter appears as object only as involving its own object. Against this it may again be argued that the knower or the material cause of a cognition is a beginningless and endless series of cognitions differing from the series of objective cognitions which is given the name of storehouse-consciousness. This view almost coincides with the N.V. view of self except in its advocacy of the notion that the self is a series of cognitions. This notion has already been discarded.

Inferential proof for the self

Text: कः पुनः अत्र न्याय? प्रतिसंधानम्? तथ्यं इदं इति अ–सिद्धं, अ–तथ्यं च विरुद्धं, अ–विशिष्टं अनैकांतिकं इति चेत्? न। हेतु–अर्थ–अन्–अवबोधात्। न हि प्रत्यभिज्ञान–मात्रं अत्र विवक्षितम्। ततः किं? कार्यकारणयोः एव–संतान–प्रतिनियमः। सः अपि विरुद्धः इति चेत्।

एषः अपि न विवाक्षितः नः। कः तर्हि? पूर्व–अपर–धियां एक–कर्तृतया विनिश्चयः। एषः अपि तासां उपादान–उपादेयभावेन अपि उपपद्यते इति चेत्? न। स्थैर्य–स्थितौ तदभावात्। क्षणिकत्वे अपि न एक–जातीयत्वे सति तत्–उत्पत्तिः एव उपादान–उपादेय भावः। शिष्य–आचार्य–धियां अपि तथाभाव–प्रसंगात्।

Trans: What however is the inferential proof for the self? The answer is 'recognition'. But it is not established that the recognition (that the self is a durable entity) is valid and if it is invalid it is opposed to the identity of self and if it is a recognition in general then (the recognition of the identity of a burning flame being found illusory) it will be afflicted by the fallacy of deviation. No! The objector has not grasped the meaning of the above middle term. Certainly mere simple recognition is not meant by the middle term mentioned. Then what is it? It is the necessary sequential relationship of cause and effect. But isn't this too opposed to identity? Well! this too is not meant by us. What is it then? It is the definite ascertainent of the earlier and later cognitions being caused by the same agent. But can't this too be had merely through the material causality (of the earlier cognitions to the later ones)? No! In the durability-view there is no rational causal (material) relationship among cognitions. Even on the momentarist view material causality of a cognition does not consist in its being of the same nature as another cognition and being produced by it. If it were so then even the cognitions of the student and the teacher would be related by the relation of material causality.

Expl: The Buddhist now asks for an inferential proof for the reality of the durable self. The perceptual evidence of course is there but even this has to be presented in the inferential form in a debate. If recognition is the evidence then it cannot be simple recognition like that of the flame of fire which is illusory. Other such recognitions may or may not be valid. The relevant recognition is the determinate cognition of earlier and later cognitions as having an identical agent. This recognition is of the form 'Myself, who perceived the pot earlier am remembering it now'. The inference here is this: 'The later cognition is materially caused by the material cause of the earlier cognition or by a cause lasting since the genesis of the earlier cognition because it is experienced as being cocaused with its predecessor'. It may now be asked, 'Is the cognition of cocausality a proof for the continued existence of the cogniser or the identity of that which is the locus of the earlier and later cognitions? In the first alternative there is redundancy; any cognition is sufficient proof for cocausality of earlier and later cognitions. As to the second, no common valid cognition testifying the identity of the loci of earlier and

later cognitions is available. The self which is the locus is not perceptible like other objects and cognition too is not so perceptible. However the internal perception of a later cognition being located in the locus of an earlier cognition manifested in the form, 'I who saw this object am now touching it and so on' may be taken as the required proof.

Objecting to this the Buddhist says that even in a serial notion of self the earlier self may be treated as the cogniser in relation to the later and may be supposed to leave its effect in the cognition succeeding it. So there is no need to accept cocausality. This objection is answered thus: The causal relationship of the earlier and the latter which is supposed to replace cocausality may be direct or indirect. It cannot be direct because cognitions separated from each other by long intervals cannot be recognised to belong to the same person. If the relationship is indirect then the cognition of the teacher indirectly giving rise to the student's cognition via the utterance of expository sentences by the teacher could be recognised to belong to the student too. If intention, words etc. are supposed to interrupt the causal relationship then in the other series of cognitions too such interruption could be present.

Objection to the proof and its reply

Text: भेद–अग्रहे सति इति चेत्? न। प्रकृते अपि तत्–अभावात्। शरीर–भेद–अग्रहः तावत्–अस्ति इति चेत्? न । भिन्न–जन्म–ज्ञान–अ–व्याप्तेः। अनुपलब्ध–पितृकेण आपि बालेन अतिप्रसंगात्। घट–कपाल–क्षणयोः अ–तथा भाव–प्रसंगात् च। एक–आधारतया नियमः इति चेत्? न। तस्य वास्तवस्य क्षणिकत्व–पक्षे अपि विषम–समयानां क्षणाानां अभावात्। काल्पनिकस्य तु अतिप्रसंजकत्वात्। शरीर–बुद्ध्योः अपि समान–देशता–अभिमानान्।

Trans: Mayn't the former definition as qualified by non-cognition of the difference (of the objects of recognition) be the new definition of material cause-effect-relationship? (The cognitions of the teacher and the taught are known to be different from each other). No! In the instant case of different cognitions there is no non-cognition of their difference (and so there cannot take place any identity-recognition with regard to them). But isn't in this case too there is present the non-cognition of any difference of the body (in relation to which the different cognitions arise)? Well! in that case the new-born child (does not have even a vague awareness of its body of previous birth, so there is neither cognition nor non-cognition of the difference of the present body from the previous body and yet the child's) present body is causally related to its previous body. (If it were not the

child would not remember that its mother's milk is palatable). Besides the pot and the potsherds for example would not be causally related with each other as they are always cognised as different entities. May then the causality be supposed to be regulated on the basis of the cooccurrence of the cause and the effect? No. Real cooccurrence of cause and effect cannot be maintained even on the momentarist view as each one of these being momentary the two cannot occur at the same time. Imaginary cooccurrence however would extend to noncooccurrent entities too. Even the body and consciousness are felt to occur together.

Expl: It is now contended that material causal relationship coupled with non-cognition of the difference of the causally-related entities is the basis of recognition of the identity of the latter. Now the noncognition cannot be of the difference of the successive cognitions. They are cognised as arising from moment to moment. If the successive cognitions are said to be nondifferent as cognitions then the cognitions of the teacher and the taught would also have to be treated as nondifferent. If the difference here is the difference of the bodily loci of the cognitions then one's own identity cannot be cognised as one's body undergoes radical changes from time to time and this change is not uncognised. If however the difference is different specific property then a child even hazily aware of its present bodily nature cannot consciously connect its present body with its previous body. So it cannot recollect its previous experience with its previous mother's milk. Further a posthumous child may remember even the experiences of its unseen father not knowing its difference from the latter. Nor can material causal relationship be defined as generic similarly of the effect with the cause by which it is produced. The potsherds are not similar to the pot produced by them although they are its material cause. Collocation or coinherence coupled with production of one by the other also cannot define the relationship. The pot and the potsherds do not collocate either in time, space or their own parts.

Rebuttal of another possible objection

Text: एतेन–

अभ्रांत–समता–एक–अवसायः प्रकृति–विक्रिये।

ततौ हेतु–फलस्य उपादान–उपादेय–लक्षणम्।

इति निरस्तम्।

Trans: By the foregoing objections stand rebutted the definitions of two kinds of material causal relationship (which are supposed to hold between continuous and discontinuous series of entities respectively). The definition of the first is '(Being the object of the) nonerroneous cognition of identity based on the similarity of the entities concerned', and the

definition of the second is 'being related as a nature and its transformation.'

Expl: The Buddhists speak of two different types of material causal relationship one holding of the terms constituting a continuous series of momentary entities and another applicable to entities of which one is the transformation of another. The objection to the first is that although the cause and the effect may be alike the cognition of identity in relation to them cannot be nonerroneous. Moreover the potsherds and the pot for example are not like each other nor are they cognised as one. Either of these definitions does not cover the definiendum of the other.

Elucidation of the rebuttal

Text: काष्ठस्य तु प्रकृतेः विकृतिः अंगारः इति कुतः निश्चितं भवता? यावता वन्हेः एव अयं विकारः किं न स्यात्? वन्हि–संबंधि–काष्ठात् एव तत्–उत्पत्तेः इति चेत्? न। काष्ठ–संबंधेन वन्हेः एव तत्–उत्पत्तिः इत्यपि किं न कल्प्येत? पार्थिवं पार्थिव–उपादानकं इति निश्चयात् इति चेत्? कुतः एतत्? सभागेषु क्षणेषु तथा–दर्शनात् इति चेत्? एतत् अपि कुतः? अ–भ्रांत–समता–एक अवसायात् इति चेत्? अथ का इयं समता नाम? यदि साजात्यं सादेश्यं वा तत् प्राक् निरस्तरम्। एक–संतानत्वं चेत् तत् यदि तत्–उत्पत्ति–मात्रं चेत् निमित्त–नैमित्तिकयोः अपि तथाभाव–प्रसंगः। उपादान–उपादेयभावः चेत् कथं तेन एव तत् व्यवस्थाप्येत? ज्ञानेषु तत्–प्रतिसंधानं एव उपादान–उपादेय–लक्षणं इति चेत्? न। आत्माश्रय प्रसंगात्।

Trans: Taking up the second kind of causal relationship it is now asked, 'How is it ascertained that cinders for example are the transformation of the firewood which is the original entity? Can't the cinders be the transformation of fire itself? Yes, but isn't the former true because cinders are generated only by the firewood when it comes in contact with fire? Well! it is also conceivable that the cinders arise from fire connected with firewood. But isn't this so because there is the certainty that earthy objects have only earthy objects as their material cause? Yes, but why this certainty? 'The answer is, 'Because in the case of (similar) continuous momentary entities it is seen that their causality is determined by their similarity'. But why again this? (The answer would be), 'Because the terms of a continuous series are cognised as identical with each other on account of the valid cognition of their similarity'. But then what is this similarity? Is it generic identity or coexistence? Both have been shown to

be untenable earlier. Could it be then the fact of belonging to the same series as the other term and if this in its turn is nothing but being produced by the other term in the series then even the efficient cause and its product would be such. If however generic identity is material causal relationship itself then how can material causal relationship be determined by itself (because generic identity is supposed to consist of the latter)?. May it be urged then that the recognition of identity in the successive cognitions is itself the nature of the material causal relationship? No! Such a view would entail the fallacy of self-dependence.

Expl: Since two different types of causal relationship are admitted by the Buddhist there can be no definition common to them. Besides it cannot be explained why the firewood and cinder (for example) and not fire and cinder are related as the raw material and the finished product. If firewood and cinder being generically similar are supposed to be causally related as is the case with the terms of a continuous series then this generic similarity would have to be defined in terms of simple causality. This would result in the efficient cause and its product being related as raw material and finished product. (For example) in the Buddhist view the conglomeration of certain discerete causal conditions is productive of another conglomeration which is the effect. The potsherds which are a group of qualities like colour, taste, smell etc., produce the pot which is another group of qualities similar to these. The colour of potsherds is the material cause of the colour of the pot but it is the efficient cause of the touch of the pot and on. Now as per the above meaning of generic similarity colour and touch could be generically similar and so mutually-related by material causation.

In the above it may be noted that the problem under consideration is not that of the identity-cognition in relation to insentient entities like pot etc. although they are mentioned in the course of the discussion. It is only in connection with the elucidation of the nature of material causation that reference happens to be made to the identity of pot, potsherds etc. In fact the main object of the discussion is not the rebuttal of the Buddhist definition of material causation. Since the Buddhist bases the identity-cognition on material causation which be tries to distinguish from simple causation it became necessary to bring in detailed discussion of the two types of material causation advocated by the Buddhist.

Another definition of material causation and its rebuttal

Text: तत्–योग्यता इति चेत्? सा एव का इति चिंत्यम्। शक्ति–विशेषः इति चेत्? सः न तावत् प्रति–क्षण–नियतः। यथा हि तेन कर्तव्यं तथा तादृशा अपि तत् कर्तव्यं इत्यपि नियमः एव। अन्यथा तेन तत् कृतं

इत्यपि न निश्चीयेत क्षणस्य दुरुन्नेयत्वात्। तथा च निरीहं जागत् जायेत। आकस्मिकं च कार्यस्य तादृशत्वं आपद्येत। तथा च न नियमः उपलभ्येन। न अपि प्रति–संतान–नियतः शक्ति–विशेषः विशेष–अभावात्।

Trans: May then the competence to be recognised as identical be the definition of material causality? Well! it needs to be enquired what this competence itself is. May it be some special capacity of the cognitions? If it is it can't be confined to the individual and differ from individual to individual. If a certain individual has the capacity to produce, other individuals too like it would have the capacity to produce and this latter too is a necessity. Otherwise it cannot be determined that even the individual has been productive because the moment of the individual's action (or the momentary individual) cannot be easily identified. Thus the world would become devoid of all activity (the knowledge of good and bad being absent). Moreover the specific character of the effects of causes would be jeopardised in the absence of all activity so that no concomitance between any two entities would be found to hold in such a world. Nor is the said capacity necessarily related to certain series of cognitions. There is nothing to distinguish one series of cognitions (belonging say to the student) from another (belonging to the teacher).

Expl: Now the Buddhist contends that the capacity to be identified as one is material causation itself. This capacity is in fact nothing other than causality itself because only causally-connected cognitions etc. are identified as one. But this capacity cannot be restricted to momentary individuals which do not last even two moments to be recognised as identical. In fact it is the cogniser of the identity who can be supposed to have this capacity. However the recogniser-recognised relation itself may be equated with the relation of material causality. Now if one individual has the capacity or causality then all the individuals generically similar to it must also have the capacity or causality. In the case of a unique entity like space its causality in relation to sounds is inferred from the proof for its reality itself whereas in the case of the candidates for causation their causality is ascertained by means of their positive and negative association with their effects. The necessity involved in generic causality may be spelt out thus: 'Whatever is different from a certain effect produced by a certain cause and is generically similar to that effect must have been produced by a cause which is generically similar to the cause producing the former. If such generic causality is not established every new instance of causality would have to be independently established so that there will not be there any general cognition as to what kinds of things are good and what others are bad. Further if the abovementioned capacity were confined to certain

identifiable individuals then things which are not identifiable as one would not be related amongst themselves by material causality. The capacity cannot also be supposed to be restricted to certain series only because there is no property which can restrict the scope of the capacity. The properties of being a cognition or a series are too wide to exercise the restriction.

Objection to the last contention and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु वैजान्यं इति चेत्? न। अनुपलब्धि–बाधितत्वात्। न हि शिष्य–आचार्य–नील–धियोः मात्रया अपि जाति–कृतं विशेषं उपलभामहे। अ–दृश्यात्वात् अयं अ–दोषः इति चेत्? दृश्य–समवायिन्याः जातेः अ–दृश्यत्व–अनुपपत्तेः। उपपत्तौ वा घूमादौ अपि अवकाश–प्रसंगात्। तथा च अवांतर–सत्ववत् अवांतर–धूमः एव वन्हेः कार्यः स्यात् इति शंका–कलंकितत्वात् न धूम–सामान्यं अग्निं गमयेत्। आद्यस्य एव तथाभावात् इति चेत्? न तत्र अपि शंकायाः तदवस्थत्वात्। तस्मात् कारणस्य वैजात्ये प्रमाण–सिद्धे कार्यस्य सौसादृश्ये अपि अवांतर–जाति–भेदःकल्प्यते। हेतु–वैजात्यस्य फल–वैजात्यं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात्। अ–प्रयोजकत्वे तस्य आकस्मिकत्व–प्रसंगः। कारण–साजात्ये अपि कार्यस्य वैजात्यं सहकारि–वैजात्ये पर्यवस्यति इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः। अन्यथा प्रकृते परलोकः अपि न सिद्ध्येत्। अचेतन–उपादनकं अपि ज्ञानं अवांतर–जातीयं स्यात्। अ–चेतनं अपि अवांतर–जातीयं ज्ञान–उपादानं भवेत्। दृश्य–जाति–अभेदे अपि किंचित् एव निमित्तं भविष्यति इति शंकायाः समुत्थापयितुं शक्यत्वात् च इति।

Trans: Let then there exist some distinctive property among the cognitions constituting a particular series (not extending over other series). No! this cannot be because no such property is cognisable. Certainly we do not notice, in the least the generic distinction between the cognition-series belonging to the student and the teacher. But mayn't it be that although the distinction is there it is not noticeable and so the above reason is not falsifiable? No. A property inhering in visible entities cannot itself be invisible. If it can then even a familiar product like smoke may be endowed with some invisible property like ghostliness. The result of this would be that only a certain kind of smoke could be the product of fire

and not any and every smoke as is a particular momentary cognition of another particular momentary cognition in the Buddhist view. Thus the generic cognition of smoke would not lead to the generic cognition of fire. But couldn't it be contended that this may well be so and that only the first smoke-entity in the smoke-series is the product of fire? No! Even regarding this first entity the doubt may be raised whether it is the product of fire or some invisible cause. So if the generic diversity of certain causes is validly established then even if the products of the causes appear to be alike, corresponding generic diversity inhering in the products is postulated. This is because the generic diversity of the causes determines the generic diversity of the products. If it were not so then the generic diversity of the products would become accidental. On the other hand if the causes are generically identical but the products are not so then the generic diversity of the latter entails the generic diversity of the auxiliary conditions. This we consider to be the rational explanation of the whole thing. If this is not so then even the reality of the other world cannot be established (The series of cognitions constituting the current life-course of an individual may abruptly cease to exist without giving rise to another series of cognitions constituting the extra-mundane life-course). Further there could arise cognitions of a special type from non-cognitive causes and non-cognitive entities of a special type may even arise from cognitions if causal relationship were not governed by the above rule. Moreover even if all smokes (for example) are perceptually generically similar one can raise the doubt whether some smokes are produced by ghosts and not by fires.

Expl: It is now argued that different cognition-series differ because they are endowed with distinctive properties. However no such properties are found to characterise the cognition-series constituting respectively the consciousnesses of the teacher and the taught. Invisible properties inhering in different cognition-series and determining their identifiability cannot also be postulated. If they can then general causality would have to be given up. For example certain smokes may be supposed to be caused by some ghostly entities instead of fires. But how come then the fires produced by dry grass or the shining stone or the friction of pieces of wood with each other are supposed to be of different types? The answer is that the special natures of these fires are determined by the special natures of their respective causes namely, the dry grass, friction etc. The special natures of the different fires cannot be denied as the different natures of their respective causes are quite evident. In the instant case it cannot be argued that the identifiability as different from each other is caused by the special features of the respective cognitions of the teacher and the taught because this difference of feature can be accounted for simply by postulating different loci for the cognitions. There is no necessity to treat the cognition-series themselves as intrinsically different

from each other. If such special determinations of the causal relationship are not admitted then the self-mind-contact cannot be a common cause of such diverse mental states as cognition, pleasure, pain etc. Only because different kinds of sense-object-contact accompany the above common cause the different mental states are produced by the latter. If such differentiated causal relationship is not admitted then even extra-mundane existence would have to be denied. The consciousness-series constituting the mundane existence of an individual may as well cease to exist abruptly because of its special nature or it may produce another series of consciousness not connected with the current life-course of the individual. One cannot urge against this that a cognition-series cannot end abruptly without giving rise to another similar cognition-series. The subsequent cognition-series as well may be of a special nature needing for its production not cognition but some non-cognitive entity so that when this entity ceases to exist the individual ceases to exist permanently. One may urge against this that if a noncognitive entity produced cognition then even entities like pot, cloth etc. would be productive of cognition. If these entities are efficient or objective causes of cognition they could be its material causes too. Moreover a noncognitive entity cannot be caused by cognition and if the last term in the cognition-series remained unproductive it would be a non-entity rendering the whole series non entitative. These contentions may be met by the reply that special types of non-cognitive entities can be admitted to be both the cause as well as the effects of cognitions and the reality of extra-mundane existence can be denied with impunity.

Another explanation of identity-cognition and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि सहकारि–भेदात् नियमः इति चेत्? सः एव एकः कर्ता इति गीयते। अयं एकः एव कर्ता न तु तादृक् सहंकारि–परंपरा इति कुतः विशेषात् इति चेत्? तत्–कर्तकत्वं भिन्न–कर्तृकेभ्यः व्यावर्तते न तु तादृक सहकारित्वं इत्यतः विशेषात्। कुतश्चित् एवं अपि स्यात् इति चेत्? ननु सः एव विशेषः चिंत्यते। सः च तत्–स्वभावत्वं वा, तत–जातीयत्व वा, तत्–सहकारित्वं वा, तादृक सहकारित्वं वा इत्पतः न अतिरिच्यतै। तत्र प्रथमः असंभवी। द्वितीयः अतिप्रसंजकः। चतुर्थे नियामक–अभावः। ततः तृतीयः एव परिशिष्यते गति–अंतर–अभावात् इति।

Trans: Let then the identity-cognition be determined by some special auxiliary condition. Yes, (This is right), this socalled special condition

itself is called the agent. But it may be asked, 'On what special ground is it determined that this socalled agent is a single entity and not a series of auxiliary conditions?' (The answer to this would be that) the special ground is the fact that being produced by a certain agent is excluded from the class of those that are the products of several agents but the series of momentary conditions is not so excluded. If it is thought that there may be some special feature of the series which excludes it from the products of several agents then we have to find out what exactly this special feature is. Only four alternative conceptions are possible regarding this feature. It may be conceived as 'being of the nature of a potent individual cognition', 'being of the same generic nature as a potent individual cognition', 'being dependent upon a particular condition for its production' or (lastly) 'being dependent upon a series of conditions for its production'. Of these the first is impossible (as a series of entities is not the same as an individual momentary entity. The second is too wide, as a generic property like 'cognitionness' extends over cognitions belonging even to different persons. The fourth is simply undetermined as the series of conditions is common to the cognitions of different persons. Hence in the absence of all other alternatives only the third has to be adopted (as the special feature).

Expl: It is now contended by the Buddhist that there could be some special condition which prevents the cognitions of the teacher and the taught being recognised as belonging to the same person. But this condition cannot be just a series of momentary entities, as such a series is found to accompany even the cognitions of different persons. Could it then be just a certain momentary individual capable of producing the identity-cognition? No, because such an individual does not preexist all the different cognitions supposed to belong to an individual. The condition cannot also be equated with the genus characterising a particular individual cognition. Being a cognition is such a genus but it is common to cognitions of different individuals. So this condition determining the identity-cognition can be no other than (the property of) 'having a special cause (as their producer)' which is the self.

A new objection to the earlier explanation of identity-cognition elucidated and defended

Text: अथवा संभवन् अपि न अयं उपाधिः। तत्र तावत्–मात्रस्य अ-निबंधनत्वात्। तथाहि सर्वज्ञः स्व–प्रत्ययान् एक–कर्तुकतया प्रतिसंधत्ते न वा? आद्ये तत्–प्रतिसंधानात् एव प्रतिसंधातुः एकत्वं सिद्धं ज्ञानात् भेदः च। धियां अ–स्थैर्यस्य सर्वैः एव प्रतीतेः। प्रतिसंधातुः क्षणिकतायाः सर्वज्ञेन अपि अनाकलनात्। अथ न प्रतिसंधत्ते? न तर्हि

कार्य–कारण भाव–मात्र–निबंधनं प्रतिसंधानम्। न हि अस्ति संभवः यत्–अन्वये अपि यस्य अन्–अन्वयः तत् तावत्–मात्र–निबंधनं इति। प्रतिसंधत्ते न तु सत्यं तत्–प्रतिसंधानम्। अतः न तावत्–मात्रात् एक–कर्तृकत्व–सिद्धिः इति चेत्? तत् किं सर्वज्ञस्य अपि विपर्ययः? आहार्यः न दोष–जनकः इति चेत्? न। निबंधन–अभेदे अपि कथं एकः आहार्यः अन्यः तु स्वरस–वाही इति वाच्यम्। भेद–दर्शन–अ–दर्शनाभ्यां इति चेत्? न। प्रवृत्ति–विज्ञानानां भेदस्य अ–सर्वज्ञैः अपि दर्शनात्। विषयाः एव भिन्नाः प्रतिभांति न बुद्धयः इति चेत्? न। तासां अपि भेद–निश्चयात्। विषय–भेद–अप्रथने अपि ज्ञान–अभ्यास–दर्शनात्। यदि च भेद–ग्रहे अपि बुद्धिता–मात्रेण तत्–अ–ग्रहे–अभेद–आरोपः उपपद्यते पार्थिवतया वृक्षात् काष्ठं, काष्ठात् अंगारः, ततः भस्म अपि अभेदेन प्रतिसंधीयेत। न च एवम्।

Trans: Or even if there is causal relationship this relationship is not alone the determinant of recognition. To explain we ask: Does the omniscient being—the Buddha—recognise his own cognitions as having a single agent or not? If he does then by this very fact is established the oneness of the agent of recognition and also his difference from the cognitions. The unstability of cognitions is realised by everybody. But even the omniscient cannot have the cognition that the agent of recognition is momentary (The omniscient first experiences and then preaches, so he has to be a nonmomentary being to be a preacher and guide of all spiritual seekers). In case the omniscient does not recognise his cognition as having an identical cause then obviously recognition is not determined by the causal relationships alone. Certainly it is not possible that if a certain entity does not come into being despite the presence of a certain other entity the former is caused by the latter. But can't one urge against this that the omniscient does have the said recognition but the latter is not a veridical one and so on this basis alone it cannot be proved that the cognitions have a single agent? Well! if this be so then can the omniscient too be deluded so that he may have false recognition? It may be urged that the falsehood is deliberate and so it does not entail any fallacy. But if the causal relationship of cognitions is the same how can the omniscient's recognition of the latter be deliberate falsehood when others' recognition is not so? Do the apprehension and nonapprehension of difference in the cognitions by the omniscient and the laymen respectively make difference to the recognitions? No. The difference of objective cognition is realised even by laymen. Could one urge against this that only the objects and not

their cognitions are differently cognised by laymen? No. Even cognitions are differentiated by ordinary people. Even when the difference of objects is not manifest the cognitions of the objects are known to recur. If however non-difference as cognition is taken to be imposed upon the series of cognitions despite their differentiated apprehension then as earthy objects the tree and the stock of wood, the stock of wood and the cinders and the cinders and the ash could be recognised as identical.

Expl: A very novel objection to the view that mere causal relationship is the basis of the recognition of causal identity is now set forth by the non-Buddhist. If the omniscient recognises the causal identity of his cognitions be cannot be mistaken. He realises that he is different from his cognitions which are momentary. If he does not recognise the causal identity of his cognitions this implies that mere causal relationship of the cognitions does not make them recognisable as having an identical cause. Divine recognition cannot however be regarded as false. It cannot also be deliberate falsehood because there is nothing distinguishing divine and mundane recognitions. Could the nonapprehension of the distinction among cognitions in a series be responsible for the recognition of common people to be false while God being aware of the distinction (may be supposed) only to indulge in self-imposed falsehood? No. This cannot be the case because the distinction of objective cognitions is quite welknown to common people. If cognitions are identified as cognitions then the tree despite its difference from the stump can be identified with it as both are earthy objects. Similarly the stump with the cinders and the cinders with the ash can well be identified.

The objection that non-cognition of storehouse-consciousness leads to recognition considered and rejected

Text: स्यात् एतत्। आलय-भेद अग्रहात् प्रतिसंधानं इति चेत्? सः हि अहं आस्पद-प्रवृत्तिसंतानात् अन्य एव वा स्यात् तत्-अंतः पाति-कादाचित्क-अनेक-अहं-प्रत्ययं-रुपः वा? न तावत् आद्यः। न हि अहं-अहमिकया मिथः स्वतंत्रं संतान-द्वयं अनुभूयते। सति अपि वा परस्परं अन्-उपादान-उपादेय-भावात् न परस्पर-प्रत्याकालित-अर्थ-अनुसंधान-बंध तथा त्वे अपि वा चैत्र-मैत्रादिषु अपि प्रसंगः। उभयोः वा उभय-उपादानत्वे एकं अपि अनेक-आश्रयं इति किं अपराद्धं अवयवि-संयोगादिभिः? न च आलय-विज्ञान-उपात्तं प्रवृत्ति-विज्ञानं न किंचित् उपादत्ते इति युक्तम्। तथात्वे निमित्ततां अपि न यायात्। उपादानत्व-व्याप्तत्वात् निमित्ततायाः। अन्यथा

निमित्तता–मात्रं उपगम्य एकस्य निवृत्तौ सर्व–संतान–उच्छेदः।
अ–विशेषात्। अँ–इति ब्रुवतः चरम–क्षणानां –अ–किंचित्करणे
शक्ति–विहतेः अ–सत्व–प्रसंगः। तथा च पूर्वक्षणानां अपि इत्यनेन
पर्यायेण अ–किंचित्करं जगत् आपद्येत इति साधु कार्यकारणभावः
प्रतिसंधान–निबंधनः समर्थितः स्यात्। तस्मात् अन्यत् एव निमित्तं
किंचित् उपाददीत। तथा च न प्रतिसंधानं अपूर्व–अनंत–संतान–
प्रवृत्तिः च प्रसज्येत। एव च

अशक्तिः अनुपादानात् अन्य–आदानात् अनंतता।
मिथः न प्रतिसंधिः च संकरे अनेक–संश्रितिः इति।

Trans: Let then be this (explanation of the said recognition) namely, that the noncognition of the storehouse-consciousnesses it is which results in the recognition. No! If it were so then the storehouse-consciousness may either be quite different from the objective cognition concerned with the ego-sense or it may be some accidental ego-sense included in the series of objective cognitions. It cannot be the first of these two. Certainly two different—(objective and subjective) series of ego-senses are never experienced. Even if such different series are admitted they cannot be mutually related by causality and so there cannot obtain any relationship between the objects of the two recognitions (that is to say the same object cannot be apprehended by both the recognitions so that the objectively-recognised ego would turn out to be different from the subjectively recognised ego). If despite the absence of causality the two recognitions are supposed to have the same object then whatever is cognised by one person could be recognised by another person. (If to overcome this difficulty) it is contended that both the objective and subjective consciousnesses are supposed to be mutually-related by causality then it follows that even a single entity can have multiple location. If this is true then what can be wrong with the inherence of the unitary composite entity in its several parts which is denied by the Buddhists? Could one urge against this that the storehouse- consciousness alone is the material cause, not the objective consciousness (so that multiple-location of a single entity is not required to be admitted)? No! If this were the truth then the objective cognition cannot be even the efficient cause of another objective cognition as efficient causality is concomitant with material causality in the Buddhist view. (If a thing is the material cause of some thing it is also the efficient cause of something else). If this rule is not admitted then some entity in a series being only an efficient cause it cannot be materially productive of any further entity in the series with the result that the series

would terminate with this unproductive entity itself. Since all cognitive entities are alike as cognition, if one of these turns out to be unproductive other such entities in other series too would turn out to be unproductive. If this contingency too is condoned then the last terms in all series being unproductive they would have to be reckoned as unreal and if these are unreal the terms preceding them would also be rendered unproductive and so unreal. Thus the whole would be rendered unreal. Is not this a nice way of defending causality as the basis of recognition? If on this account some cognition other than the objective and subjective or storehouse-cognition is supposed to be materially caused by a storehouse-cognition in order to uphold its efficient causality then since the cognitions of the same series do not happen to be causally related they cannot be the objects of recognition. Besides each storehouse-cognition would have to be deemed as the material cause of some cognition which is not included in its series with the result that an infinite number of new cognition-series would have to be postulated as populating the world. To sum up, if the objective cognition does not materially cause any cognition it cannot be even an efficient cause and so it would cease to be productive. If however it produces some cognition other than that belonging to its series then there arises the fallacy of infinite regress and also, as there is no causal relation between the storehouse-cognition and these other cognitions, these cannot also be the objects of recognition. If both the kinds of cognitions are supposed to be the material causes of the objective cognition then multiple location of a single entity would have to be admitted.

Expl: Earlier it was maintained by the non-Buddhist that even common people are aware of the mutual difference of objective cognitions and so they cannot mistakenly identify them with each other. As against this it is now argued by the Buddhist that the non-cognition of the difference of storehouse or subjective cognitions on the part of common people may make them identify these cognitions with each other. In reply to this the non-Buddhist says that this storehouse-cognition cannot be other than the objective ego-cognition, as two such- cognitions, objective and subjective, of the ego are not experienced. Of course the 'I' cognition and the cognition of the form 'I' know myself' can be two ego-cognitions. But if these are different and independent of each other then not being causally related with each other they would not yield the awareness of an identical entity. And if the causal relationship is not supposed to be needed for the recognitive cognition then the cognitions of one person could be recognised as his own by another person. If both the cognitions are supposed to be the material causes of each of them then the latter being based on (or inherent: in) the two different cognitions a single entity would have to be regarded as multiply-located. If this is condoned then the inherence of the composite entity in its various parts would also have

to be condoned. Causation is also a kind of location, the location by inherence-relation of the effect in the cause. Thus two alternative suppositions get ruled out namely that the objective cognition is neither the material cause nor the effect of the storehouse-cognition and that it is both these together. Now the third supposition would be that the objective cognition is only the effect and not the material cause of any cognition. This is countered by the non-Buddhist's argument that if the objective cognition may remain unproductive of any subsequent cognition as the cognition preceding the moment of release then other cognitions too may remain unproductive and thus all cognition-series may come to an abrupt end. The last supposition is that an entirely new cognition-series is generated by the objective cognition. This entails the postulation of an infinite number of cognition-series to be generated by the infinite number of objective cognitions. Also there being no causal relationship between these cognition-series and the storehouse-cognition the possibility of recognition will remain unexplained on this supposition.

It may be noted here that causal relationship of the two types of cognitions is not at all needed for their recognition nor for the recollection by one of what is cognised by the other because the storehouse-cognition is itself the experiencer and the recollector. It is also self-cognitive. Causal relationship has also nothing to do with the cognition of nondifference of the cognitions. What may be said to be needed for this is the similarity, or more precisely the identity of the storehouse-cognition. So it is better to accept the notion of self as the locus of all cognitions.

Rebuttal of the second of the above alternatives

Text: न अपि द्वितीयः। तस्य अपि भेद–अग्रहः स्वरुपतः वा स्यात् विषयतः वा? आद्ये पूर्व–अहं–इति प्रत्यय–मात्रात् वा प्रवृत्ति–विज्ञानेभ्यः अपि वा? न प्रथमः। अहं इति अज्ञासिषं, अहं इति जानामि, अहं इति ज्ञास्यामि इति त्रैकाल्य–उल्लेखस्य भेद–निश्चयं अंतरेण अनुपपत्तेः। कथंचित् उपपत्तौ तदर्थस्य एव प्रतिसंधिः उचितः न प्रवृत्ति विज्ञान–अर्थानां अपि। न च तेभ्यः अभि भेद–अग्रहः इति च उक्तं एव। न अपि विषयतः। सः हि आकारः वा वस्तु–अंतरं वा अलीकं वा इति। न आद्यः, दूषितत्वात्। न द्वितीय, स्वयं अनभ्युपगमात्। यः अपि अभ्युपगच्छेत् सः अपि विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासात् भेदं इच्छेत्। तत् निवृत्तौ च तत्–निवृत्तिम्।

Trans: Nor is the second a tenable alternative. If it is tenable then the

non-cognition of difference in respect to the second type of cognition may either relate to its own nature or the nature of its object. If it relates to the nature of the cognition then it may relate to the anterior ego-sense alone or it may encompass even the objective cognitions. The first of these alternatives will not do. The expressions 'It is I who cognised, 'It is I who cognises' and 'It is I who will cognise', through which one's cognition of oneself is conveyed refer to the three differing periods of time and this is not possible without difference being cognised. If somehow as the objects of the ego-sense, there can take place the cognition of the temporal character of the self then this alone should be the object of recognition and not the objective cognitions too. It has already been stated that there is no non-cognition of difference in respect of the objective cognitions. Nor again is there non-cognition in respect of the object of the said cognition. If there is the non-cognition then the object may be the form of the cognition or some other object or the unreal. It cannot be the first as it has already been shown to be unacceptable. It cannot be the second. The Buddhist himself does not admit such an object. And whoever admitted such an entity would regard it as multiple only on the basis of there being the appearance of the coexistence of incompatible properties. If there is no such appearance the object would not be deemed as multiple in nature.

Expl: Rebutting the second of the above alternatives the non-Buddhist says that the differences of ego-cognitions referring to the different times at which they occur cannot be ignored. The self is known in these cognitions as the agent of the cognitive activities occurring at different times. If the differences can be ignored because all the cognitions refer to the same entity as the locus of the cognitions then this entity alone can be the object of recognition or recollection and not the different objective cognitions. The ego-cognition being self-cognitive has itself as its object and this itself is recollected or recognised latter. As to the object of the ego-cognition it cannot be the form of the cognition or any entity other than the self and this entity cannot be multiple in nature.

The third of the three alternatives mentioned above rebutted

Text: न तृतीयः। अहं इति विकल्पस्य स–वस्तुकतायाः प्राक् एव प्रसाधनात्। अ–वस्तुकत्वे अपि न तत्र प्रकृत–उपयोगि–भेदाग्रह–संभवः। सद्–असत्–आरोपित–सत्व–आरोपित–असत्व–व्यधिकरण–अव्यपदेश्य–भेदेन षड्–विस्य अपि भेदस्य अग्रहः अभेद–आरोप–औपयिकतया तत्र न संभवति इत्युक्तत्वात् इति।

Trans: The third alternative too is untenable. The objectivity of the self-

concept has already been established. Even if the concept were non-objective it cannot be of use in sustaining the noncognition of difference needed for recognition. It has already been stated that for the illusory imposition or erroneous cognition of nondifference the non-cognition of any one of six different types of difference is needed and none of these can be had in the present case. The six difference types are: 'The real, or the unreal difference, the difference whose reality or unreality is imposed and the noncoexistent or ineffable difference.

Expl: Even if self-cognition is unobjective the non-cognition of difference needed for recognition in the present case cannot be obtained by the denial of objectivity. Of the six types of difference mentioned above the first, the real difference cannot be cognised or uncognised in respect of the unreal. The non-cognition of the unreal difference which is the second type is of no use as it is available everywhere. The non-cognition of the difference whose reality is imposed and which is the third type is impossible. The object of imposition cannot remain uncognised. The fourth difference-type whose unreality is imposed must be a real difference and it cannot agree with the unreal. The fifth and sixth difference-types are such that their noncognition is available in every instance.

Another proof for the identity of the agent being elaborated

Text: अथवा इह अनुभवः काल–अंतर–भाविनीं स्मृतिं जनयेत् तत्–जनितः वा संस्कारः? सः अपि अतींद्रियः प्रत्यक्षः–सिद्धः वा। अतींद्रियः अपि तावत्–काल–अवस्थायी संतन्यमानः वा? अध्यक्ष–सिद्धः अपि तदुत्तर–बुद्धि–धारारूपः, तदन्यः वा, तत्–विशेषः वा? विशेषः अपि अनुभव–प्रभवत्व–मात्रं वा अनुभवितृ–संतान–वैजात्यं वा? तत्र न प्रथमः। अनुत्पन्न–अन्–अन्वय–ध्वस्तयोः अविशेषात्। न अपि दृश्यः अन्यः । तस्य अनुपलब्धि–बाधितत्वात्। न अपि अनुभव–प्रभवत्वमात्रं विशेषः। न हि कर्मकर–कर–उपनीतं एव बीजं क्षितिं आसाद्य अंकुरं कुरुत्ते न तु प्रमाद–पतितम्। तथा नीलादि–अनुभव–प्रभव–संतानः पीतादि–अनुभवेन एव उपनीयतां नीलादि अनुभवेन एव वा इति न कश्चित् विशेषः। एवं च अन्–अनुभूते अपि स्मरण–प्रसंगः न च अनुभूते अपि इति।

Trans: Alternatively it may be asked: 'In your view is it an experience or the impression produced by it that generates its recollection occurring at a

later time? If it is the impression then is it an invisible one or that which is perceptually established? If the impression is invisible then is it one that lasts till the emergence of the recollection or is it a series of momentary entities? If however it is what is perceptually-established then is it of the nature of a succession of cognitions following it or something different from this or is it some special feature of the succession? As to this special feature, is it nothing but the property of being generated by experience or the property of being generically dissimilar to the series of experiencing agents? Among these alternatives the first is untenable as the unborn and the absolutely destroyed are like each other (so the experience which is totally dead as soon as it is born cannot produce its recollection of a different time). Nor is there any visible effect of the experience other than the series of experiences succeeding it as the assumption of such an entity is contradicted by its non-detection. Nor is the special feature mentioned above the same as the property of being produced by experience. Certainly it is not the case that only that seed which is sown in the soil by a labourer burgeons into a shoot and not that which has accidentally fallen into the soil. Similarly either the experience of the yellow or even that of the blue could quite well bring about the occurrence of the series usually generated by the experience of the blue and so there would be no speciality in either of the causes. Thus the undesirable contingency follows that even that which is not experienced could be recollected and even the experienced remain unrecollected.

Expl: Now the non-Buddhist takes up for criticism another likely explanation of recognition and recollection based on the aforesaid causal relationship of cognitions The explanation is that experience occurring at one time or the impression left behind by it (which may be invisible or visible) being of the nature of either the series of cognitions generated by the experience or something different from it, produces the recognition or recollection. If the impression is invisible it may either last till the emergence of recollection or it may be followed by a series of cognitions culminating in the recollection. If on the other hand the impression is perceptible then it may be endowed by the special feature namely 'being generated by experience' or some special property distinguishing it from the series of cognitions succeeding the experience. Against such an explanation it is argued that every experience being momentary the impression generated by it-which may be identical with the series of cognitions (or experiences) following the experience-it may be supposed to be the cause of recollection or recognition. This view has already been criticised earlier. If however the impression is something special differing from the cognitive series succeeding the experience there is no evidence for admitting such an entity. If a special type of cognitive series succeeding the experience and endowed with a distinctive property is supposed to be the nature of the impression then it is contended that the distinctive or

special property has nothing to do with the result, that is to say the recollection produced by the impression. Merely because an impression is generated by a certain cognition it is not productive of certain recollections. A seed produces the sprout irrespective of how it gets embedded in the soil, whether by being sown in it by someone or being wafted there by the breeze. So even a blue-recollection-producing cognitive-series may be generated by a yellow-cognition instead of the blue cognition; keeping this fact in view if the blue-cognition as cognition is supposed to produce blue-recollection then even yellow-cognition can do so (as it too is a cognition).

The point of the above argument is that the coobjectivity of an experience and its recollection cannot be determined simply on the basis of the fact that some impressions or cognitions are generated by the experience which produces the recollection.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: शालि–प्रभवस्य बीजस्य शालित्व–प्रतिसंधानवत् नियमः इति चेत्? क्षीर–जंबूरस–पायि–नील–धवल–कलरव–जनित–विपरीत–पारावतवत् अ–नियम–दर्शनेन तस्य अ–प्रयोजकत्वात्। वैजात्यं तु विशेषः भवेत् यथा क्षीर–अवसेकात् अम्लत्वं परिहृत्य माधुर्यं. उपादाय अनुवर्तमाना आमलकी कालांतरे अपि मूले माधुर्य उन्मीलयति। लाक्षा–रस–अवसेकात् वा धवलिमानं अपहाय रक्ततां अनुवर्तमानं कार्पास–बीजं कुसुमेषु रक्तताम्। न च एवं प्रकृते। जपाकुसुमादि–उपधान–संनिधाने अपि तत्–रुपतां अनादाय धवलिमानं एव संदधानस्य स्फटिकस्य इव विज्ञानस्य विषय–उपधानं अपगमय्य चित्–रुपतामात्रेण अनुवृत्तेः। सर्व–आकारत्वं एव सर्व–ज्ञानानां किंतु कश्चित् आकारः पटुः अन्ये तु अपटवः इति स्व–दर्शन–श्रद्धावतः विरुद्ध–धर्म–अध्यासात् अपि न भीः। न हि सः एव पटुः अपटुः च इति संभवति। न च स्व–सविदित–रुपस्य अपाटव–अर्थं पश्यामः।

Trans: May it be that just as the seeds produced by the paddy are recognised as the producers of paddyseeds so even the blue-cognition produced by the yellow-cognition could be the producer of the yellow-recollection and thus the causality of cognition in relation to recollection is regulated? No! (This cannot be true) In the case of two blue and white piegeons (for example) it is seen that if the blue pigeon is fed milk and the white one fed the juice of the rose-apple-fruit regularly then the

offsprings of the two turn out to be white and blue respectively. So being caused by a certain entity cannot be taken to determine the nature of the resulting entity. Of course the cognition-series succeeding an experience of blue say, may have the speciality of being different in nature from a series which does not include the blue-cognition. For example the goosberry-plant watered with milk gives rise at a later date to sweet taste in its fruit or the cotton-seed on being irrigated by the lac juice sheds its whiteness and takes on the red colour and transmits it to its flowers. Such however is not the case with cognitions and recollection. Like the crystal which, despite its proximity to (the condition of) japa or other flowers does not take their colour but retains its own white colour, cognition too continues to exist only as cognition despite its being conditioned by its objects. If the Buddhist were to urge against this that cognition has all the objective forms but some of these forms are vivid while others are hazy then it seems he has no fear even of the cooccurrence of incompatible properties (by which principle he swears) despite his blind faith in the principles of his school. Certainly it cannot be that one and the same entity is both vivid and non-vivid. Indeed we don't find any meaning in ascribing non-vividness to that which is by nature self-luminous.

Expl: Controverting the aforesaid objection the Buddhist urges that even indirect causality of the cognition pertaining to a certain object can be reckoned as determinative of the resulting recollection being concerned with that object. Citing a counter-example to this the opponent denies that this could be the case. Moreover the said indirect causality is not either productivity or material causality. If a new series like that of the blue-cognitions intervenes between an earlier yellow-cognition and the resulting yellow-recollection then this cannot be supposed to have the earlier yellow-cognition as its material cause. Indirect causality cannot be mere determination for then the cognition of the disciple could be supposed to have the cognition of the teacher as its indirect cause. To belong to the same causal series cannot be a qualification to this because what constitutes a certain causal series is not easy to define. Having thus rebutted other alternatives mentioned above, the alternative that the said causality, or more precisely, the effectuality consists in the peculiar and distinctive nature of the cognition-series having the blue and not the yellow etc. as its object—is taken up for rebuttal by the opponent. The crux of the rebuttal is that by its own nature as cognition no cognition is distinguished from another cognition. If objective distinction were the basis of the cognitive distinction then a blue-cognition arising from a yellow-cognition cannot have the distinction peculiar to a yellow object and so it would not give rise to the recollection of the yellow. If different special properties are supposed to be intrinsic to the cognitions of different objects then the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow would have to be treated as being endowed by two incompatible

properties.

Lastly it is contended by the Buddhist that every cognition having the form of its object inherits the forms of all the objects of the cognition that precede it but that some of these forms may be nonvivid while only one may be vivid. But such a view is simply untenable in view of the Buddhist's own view that all cognitions are self-conscious.

Rebuttal of the last of the above-mentioned alternatives

Text: निराकार–पक्षे अपि यावान् अर्थः बुद्धेः विषयः तावति स्फुटा एव सा। यत्र च अ–स्फुटा न असौ तस्य विषयः। तथात्वे वा विषय–इतर व्यवस्था न स्यात्। स–अंशे तु अर्थे युक्तं एतत् इति दर्शितं प्राक्। तस्मात् अतींद्रयः संस्कारः परिशिष्यते। सः च न संतन्यमानः, तत्र एव स्मृति–आदि–प्रसंगे प्रवृत्ति–संताने फल–अनवकाश–प्रसंगात्। अन्यत्र संस्कारे अन्यत्र फले अतिप्रसंगात्। परंपरया एक–उपादानतया नियमे संस्कार–अंतर–संताने अपि स्मृति–प्रसंगात्। तस्मात्–स्व–उपादाने एव स्मृतिं करोति इति गत्यंतर–अभावात् आपात–तिक्तं अपि उपेयं एव। तथा च स्मृतेः कालांतर–संबंधात् संस्कार–तदुपादानयोः स्थैर्य अ–यत्न–सिद्धं अ–वर्जनीयं च इति।

Trans: Even in the view that cognition is formless cognition is definitely vivid in respect of all the things that are its objects. As to those things in relation to which the cognition is not vivid, they are not its objects at all. If even non-vivid things are its objects then the distinction of objects and non-objects will remain undetermined. Only in the case of things having parts the cooccurrence of vividness and its opposite is acceptable and this has already been explained earlier. Thus only the last alternative that the invisible impression left behind by experience produces recollection remains unrebutted. But this impression cannot be serial in nature because then its result—the recollection—will take place in the impression- series itself because the recollection relates to this series only. (The self which is included in the series of motivating cognitions would not have any recollection or recognition as the result of the revival of the impression). If the impression and its result had different locations then anybody would recollect anybody else's experiences. If however it is maintained that an impression produces recollection in a series which has the same material cause as that of the former (and the objective cognition-series inclussive of the self is such) then even the impression-series generated by yellow-cognition would produce the blue-recollection. So the conclusion, although apparently unpalatable has to be willy-nilly admitted

that an impression produces recollection only in its material cause. There is no other go. Thus because of the recollection of an experience occurring at a different time than that of the experience, the durability of the impression and its material cause is automatically established and it cannot be denied.

Expl: Even if cognition is regarded as formless it cannot be vivid and nonvivid with regard to different objects as it has not parts, one vivid and another non-vivid. If therefore, it is the invisible impression produced by an experience that is supposed to give rise to recollection, then only the impression-series will be the locus of the recollection not the self which is constituted by a different cognition-series. If the cognition-series constitutive of the self is supposed to be caused by that which causes the impression itself and so occurrence of recollection in the self is justified then even the blue-impression-series indirectly generated by the yellow-cognition are indirectly caused by the yellow-impression and so the blue-recollection should take place in the yellow-cognition-series. And this recollection would be realised merely as recollection and not as 'I recollect' because no impression has the 'I' form to be realised as such. Moreover it is very difficult to define precisely the nature of a series.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: एतेन धर्म–अधर्मरुरूपः संस्कारः व्याख्यातः। तथा च यः य, संस्कारः क्वचित् संताने आहितः सः तत्र एव फल–आधान–योग्यः न अन्यत्र इत्याद्यपि निरस्तम्। अतिरिक्त–संस्कार–पक्षे हेतोः व्याधिकरणात्वात्। विशेष–लक्षणस्य च स्वरुप–असिद्धत्वात्। अ–विशिष्ट–उत्तर–कार्य–प्रवाह–मात्रस्य च विरुद्धत्वात् इति।

Trans: By the above explanation is (also) explained the delayed productivity of merit and demerit or the residual effects generated by them (as there is a permanent locus in which the latter and their remote results are brought together by means of intermediate causal linkages). Hence also stands rebutted the concomitance maintained by the Buddhist that every impression engenders recollection only in that series of which it is a member. If the impression is something different from the cognition-series then it does not occur in the self which is included in the objective-cognition-series. (Thus the self will not have recollection). As to the contention that impression is endowed with a distinctive nature of its own which distinguishes it from the cognition-series generated by an experience, no such property being known the contention cannot be upheld. If any series of entities succeeding an experience is equated with the impression of the experience then even objects like pot, tree etc. are

such entities, but since no recollection takes place in them the concomitance mentioned above is afflicted with the fallacy of the incompatibility of major and minor terms.

Expl: Continuing the rebuttal the opponent says that no impression can produce its result in the series of which it forms part. And since according to the Buddhist the impression is different from a cognition-series the recollection produced by it cannot coexist with it. Also the impression cannot be equated with a special type of cognition- series or a special type of cognition. There is no proof for holding such a view. Any and every series of entities also cannot be identified with the impression for obvious reasons.

A countersuggestion and its rebuttal

Text: न च अतींद्रिय अपि संस्कारः सौगत–नये संभवति। तस्य ज्ञानत्वे परोक्षत्व–अनुपपत्तेः। अज्ञानत्वे ज्ञान–उपादानकत्व–अयोगात्। संतान–अंतरत्वे ज्ञानस्य अपि पारोक्ष्ये तत्–अंतः पात्तिनः स्मृत्ति–सुखादेः अपि तथाभाव–प्रसंगात्। तत् इदं उक्तरूपं प्रतिसंधानं निमित्ततया व्याप्तं, अ–निमित्तकत्वे नियम–अनुपपत्तेः। तत् च अनेक–कर्तृकत्वे नास्ति इति व्यापक–अनुपलब्ध्या विपक्षात् निवर्तमानं निमित्तवति एककर्तृकत्वे विश्राम्यति इति प्रतिबंध–सिद्धिः। एवं च सति अन्वयः अपि नर्तकी–भ्रू–लताक्षेपादौ द्रष्टव्यः। सा एव हि भ्रूलता, ते एव वा परमाणवः प्रतिसंधीयमानाः न अज्ञान–निमित्तत्वेन अवस्थिताः। विरुद्ध–धर्म–विरहि–विषयत्वेन तु विशेषणीयं अत्र प्रतिसंधानम्। अन्यथा यः एव बालः त्वया दृष्टः सः एव युवा मया दृश्यते इत्यनेन अनैकांतात्।

Trans: Nor can there be a (durable and) invisible impression in the Buddhist view. If such an impression were of the nature of cognition it cannot be invisible (as the Buddhists hold all cognitions to be selfluminous). If it is different from cognition it cannot have cognition as its material cause. If however impressions are taken to be a different series of invisible cognition then recollection, pleasure, pain etc. being included in this series they would all become invisible. Thus the recollection as specified above is necessarily efficiently caused by something. If it were uncaused its occurrence would become irregular. But this causedness cannot go along with multiple causation and so the pervading term causedness not being found to be present in the multiply-caused entity its

exclusion from the latter entails the concomitance of causedness with unitary causation. Thus the above concomitance is established. Under this condition even the positive concomitance of the above two terms can be instantiated in the batting of her eyebrows by a dancing damsel. Certainly the recognition of the batting of the eyebrows or the conglomeration of the atoms constituting the eyebrows as the same is not based on ignorance. However the recognition here has to be qualified by the adjective 'having an object which is devoid of any property incompatible with its nature'. If it is not done so then in the case of the recognition expressed by the statement, 'The very boy you had seen earlier is being seen by me now', the middle term would be found to be deviant. (Here the recognition of the identity of the person is not a valid basis for identity).

Expl: The impression can be neither invisible nor cognitive in nature for reasons mentioned above. The upshot of the whole argument is that the recognition of identity itself is the best proof for identity unless it is contradicted by some valid cognition. Both negative and positive concomitances of recognition and recollection with unitary causation are available. Whatever is not caused by a single cause is not caused by or located in a single cause. Whatever is caused or located is caused by or located in a single entity.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: न च असिद्धं इदं विशेषणं देहस्य एव चेतनत्वात्। मा एवम्। देहत्व–मूर्तत्व–भूतत्व–रूपादिमत्व–आदिभ्यः। न च भूतानां समुदाये पर्यवसिते चैतन्यम्। प्रति–दिनं तस्य अन्यत्वे पूर्व–दिवस–अनुभूतस्य–अ–स्मरण–प्रसंगात्। न अपि प्रत्येक–पर्यवासितम्। कर–चरणादि–अवयव–विश्लेषे तत्–अनुभूतस्य स्मरण–अ–योगात्। देहस्य चेतनत्वे बालस्य प्रथमं अ–प्रवृत्ति प्रसंगात् च। इच्छा–द्वेषौ अंतरेण प्रयत्न–अनुपपत्तेः। इष्ट–अभ्युपायता–प्रतिसंधानं विना च इच्छा–अनुपपत्तेः। इह जन्मनि अननुभूतस्य प्रतिबंधस्य अ–स्मृतौ प्रतिसंधान–अ–योगात्। जन्मांतर–अनुभूते च अनुभवितरि भस्मसात्–भूते अन्येन स्मरण–अयोगात्। अनुभवादीनां च प्रवृत्ति–अंतानां कार्यकारणंभावस्य इह एव जन्मनि निश्चितत्वात्। तथा च तदभावे तदभावस्य सुलभत्वात्। अन्यथा तु अतिप्रसंगात्। अतः एव न इंद्रयाणि चेतयंते दर्शन–स्पर्शनाभ्यां एकार्थ–ग्रहणात्। न

च मनः तथा। तस्य करणत्वेन एव अनुमानात् इति प्रतिबंध–सिद्धिः। परलोकि–आत्म–सिद्धिः च। अनादिः च असौ, वीत–राग–जन्म–अदर्शनात्। अनंतः च, सतः अनादित्वात्। द्रव्यं च, समवायिकारणत्वात्। विभुः च, नित्य–द्रव्यत्वे सति अ–मूर्तत्वात्। अ–मूर्तः च, निष्क्रियात्वात्। निष्क्रियः च, नित्यत्वे सति अस्मदादि–प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, प्रत्यक्ष–धर्म–आश्रयत्वात च।

Trans: Doesn't the foregoing qualification (of recognition) hold good of the body as the body itself is sentient? No! (this is not so.) The body is not sentient because it is a body, has definite shape, is a material entity and is endowed with qualities like colour, smell, taste etc. The (configuration) or organisation of the five elements cannot be endowed with sentience because with each passing day this configuration not remaining the same, what is experienced on a certain day will be forgotten on the next day. Nor is sentience confined to different limbs of the body. If it were so then the severence of any of the limbs like hands, feet etc. what is experienced by the severed limbs would not be remembered. If the body itself is sentient the newborn baby would not make its very first movement because in the absence of desire and aversion no effort whatsoever can take place. And no desire can arise without the recognition that certain things are the causes of what is desired. But this recognition cannot arise if there is no recollection of the concomitance (of the nature of certain things and their desirability) which is not experienced in this life. The body experiencing this concomitance belongs to a previous life and so when it has turned into ashes another body taking its place cannot recollect the past experience. But the causal relationship holding between experience etc. at one end and disposition to action at the other is established in this very life. So if there is no experience there is no disposition to action. If this were not so there will be irregularity in action. For this very reason the senses are not sentient. Besides by seeing as well as touching we apprehend the same object. Nor is mind sentient because it is inferred as an instrumental entity only. Thus the above concomitance is established and also the reality of the transmigrating self. This self is beginningless because it is desireless and only what has desire has earthly existence. It is also endless because being real it is beginningless. It is an eternal substance without any definite form. It is formless because it is motionless, it is motionless because it is eternal and directly introspected by us and also because it is the locus of perceptual attributes.

Expl: If the body itself is regarded as sentient then there is no cooccurrence of incompatible properties in the body and so it can be the object of the ego-sense. This view is countered here by showing how

neither the limbs, the senses nor the whole body can be sentient. The dispositions to action of a newborn baby are caused by desire which is caused by the baby's physiological inference which is caused by the recollection of certain foods being gratifying for which again the experience of eating certain foods in the previous life is needed. So there is eternal, ubiquitous, motionless, shapeless and passionless self which is the material cause of various attributes like pleasure, pain etc. Even things like pot are devoid of the attribute of dimension in the moment of their origination but they are not eternal. The self is motionless because it is eternal as well as the locus of perceptible attributes.

Conditional arguments in favour of the above conclusions

Text: तर्काः च अत्र भवंति। आदिमत्वे प्रथम–प्रवृत्ति–अनुपपत्तौ सर्वथा एव अ–प्रवृत्ति–प्रसंगः। सांतत्वे अनादेः सत्व–अनुपपत्ति–प्रसंगः। अ–द्रव्यत्वे निर्गुणत्व–प्रसंगः। अ–विभुत्वे दहन–पवनादेः क्रिया–अनुपपत्ति–प्रसंगः। न च संयुक्त–संयोगात् तदुत्पत्तिः। साक्षात् क्रियावत्–द्वारकस्य तस्य अभावात्। अ–तथाभूतस्य च तत्–हेतुत्वे अतिप्रसंगात्। मूर्तत्वे नित्यस्य अस्मदादि–प्रत्यक्ष–धर्म–अनाधारत्व–प्रसंगः। विशेषगुणवतां आरंभकत्व–प्रसंगः च। सक्रियत्वे मूर्तत्वप्रसंगः इति शास्त्रार्थ–संग्रहः।

अणुः एव असौ विज्ञान–अ–समवापिकारण–संयोग–आधारत्वात् मनोवत्। अणीयांसं अणोः अपि इति बाध–प्रतिरौधौ इति कश्चित्। तत् अयुक्तम्। आत्मनि अ–विभौ मनसः अणुत्व–असिद्धेः। तत् संयोग–क्रमात् एव क्रिया–क्रमः उपपत्तेः। आगमः तु महतः अपि महीयांसं इति प्रथम पादं अपहाय–उपन्यस्तः। तत् अलं अनेन।

Trans: In support of the above there are these conditional arguments: 'If the self had a beginning it cannot have at all its first disposition to action.' 'If it had termination then as beginningless it cannot have existence.' 'If it were not a substance it will be devoid of attributes.' 'If it were nonubiquitous then fire, air etc. will be motionless.' 'Nor can the motion arise through the contact or conjunction of the body with fire, air etc. 'Such a motion is mediated by the motion of a moving entity which is not available in the present case.' (The space conjoined to the body is itself immovable, so its conjunction is ineffective in moving any object). 'If an immovable object produced the movement then all kinds of movement could arise.' 'If an eternal entity had definite form it cannot be endowed

with attributes which are perceptible to us. Also an eternal entity endowed with definite shape and special attributes would be productive of another entity.' 'If the eternal had motion it would have definite shape'. This is the sum and substance of the teaching of philosophy on this subject. This self is surely atomic in size like the mind because it is the locus of the contact which is the nonmaterial cause of cognition. Someone objects that the statements. 'The self is smaller than the smallest', contradicts the ubiquity of the self and is opposed to inference. But the objection is untenable. If the self is not ubiquitous the mind, cannot be of atomic dimension. Only because of the sequential nature of self's contact with mind the sequential nature of all actions is possible to maintain. As to the Upanisadic statement, it is quoted here leaving out its first part which describes the self as larger than the largest.

Expl: If the self were not ubiquitous it would not come in contact with fire, air etc. so that they would cease to have any movement. The self produces these movements through the body which moves. If contact even with an immobile medium can produce movement then space being in contact with everything everything should start moving by itself. Mere merit cannot produce any movement. It is the self with merit that by its contact with things brings about their movements. If the eternal self had definite shape its qualities would be imperceptible to us as the size of such an entity will be atomic. Moreover if the eternal entity were endowed with specific qualities it would, like the atoms of earth, water etc. be productive of new substantive entities.

Objection to the need of self-knowledge and its rejoinder

Text: स्यान् एतत्। सिद्धः अपि अयं ईदृशः हेयः एव। आत्म-दर्शी हि तदुपकारिणि रज्यते तदपकारिणं च द्वेष्टि। राग-द्वेषौ च मूलं संसारस्य। यः तु न तं पश्येत् न असौ तदुपकार-अपकारिणं अपि। ततो न रज्येत, न द्विष्यात्। न संसरेत् इति जांगलिकेन विषविद्यावता नैर्विष्यवत् मुमुक्षुणा अपि नैरात्म्यं एव भावनीयं इति चेत् ? न। अन्-आत्म-दर्शिनः मुमुक्षुत्व-व्याघातात्। न हि आत्मानं अ-प्रतिसंधाय कश्चित् दुःखं हातुं इच्छेत् सुखं वा अवाप्तुम्। मया स्वर्ग-अपवर्ग-फल-भागिना भवितव्यं इति अभिप्रायस्य यावत्-अभियोगं अनुवृत्तेः। अननुवृत्तौ अभियोग-निवृत्तौ फल-असिद्धेः। इयं च नैरात्म्य-दृष्टिः नास्तिक्यं द्रढयेत्। तत् च प्रबल-विषय-तृष्णा-परिप्लुतं अनर्थं अनन्तं प्रसुवीत। न चेत् एवं कुतः 'यावत्-जीवेन् सुखं

जीवेत्' इत्यादयः अपि निःशंकं उल्लापाः? यदुक्तं उपकरिणि रज्येत अपकारिणं च द्विष्यात् इति तदेवं एतत् इति। यः हि मोक्षं उपकारं मनुते सः तत्–हेतौ रक्तः तं उपाददानः तत्–परिपथिनं द्वेषात् अलं–प्रत्ययात् वा परिहरन् एव समीहितं समासादयेत् न तु विपर्ययात्। यः तु भोगं सः अपि तथा इति अनुकूलं एव प्रतिकूलत्वेन गृहीतं मंदैः। अन्यत्र अनुरज्येत अन्यत्र अपि द्विष्यात् इति तु न दृष्टं गो–वैद्यके अपि इति।

Trans: Let then there be this objection. Even if this self is proved to be real it is certainly worth rejecting. One who is aware of his selfhood does take interest in one's benefactor and does turn away from one's malefactor. The emotions of love and hate are the root of mundane existence. One who has no awareness of self has also no awareness of the benefactor or the malefactor. So he will not love or hate anybody and be involved in the world. Thus as the forester having expert knowledge of poisons is always interested in eliminating poison, the seeker after redemption will always take interest in establishing selflessness. No! This is not the correct view to take. A nonselfaware person cannot be a redemption-seeker. Certainly in the absence of self-cognition none would like to get rid of pain or attain happiness. The intention to attain heavenly bliss or redemption in a man lasts as long as he is active in seeking these ends. If the intention disappears, the activity along with its result also disappears. This vision of selflessness will reinforce the negativistic outlook. And this outlook will give rise to innumerably disastrous consequeness abounding in the irrepressible craving for objects of sensory gratification. If it were not so how would there be the confident declarations from the housetops, that 'one should enjoy pleasure as long as one lives?' As to the statement (made by the opponent) that one would come to love one's benefactor and hate the malefactor, it is quite so. Whoever regards redemption as beneficial will take interest in the cause of redemption, seek it and only, either through aversion or indifference to the factors that obstruct redemption achieve his desired object, not otherwise. On the other hand whoever regards enjoyment as beneficial will achieve it in a similar manner (by avoiding obstructions to it). Thus men of low intelligence have misunderstood that which is good for them as bad. But even in the veterinary science it is not seen that one takes interest in what one regards as maleficient to oneself or turns away from the beneficient.

Expl: It is now objected that even if the self is real self- attachment causing entanglement in mundane existence is bad. The reply is that without self-awareness nothing will be sought after or avoided. In the absence of self-awarenes a negativistic outlook denying everything transcendental would take hold of one's mind so that one would not strive to attain release. If

there is no self nothing can be good or bad and so there cannot be any activity even for obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain.

Another objection to the need of self-knowledge and its rebuttal

Text: तथा अपि दुःख–हेतुत्वात् इंद्रियादिवत् असौ हीयतां इति चेत्? यादृशः दुःखहेतुः तादृशः हेयः एव। सोपाधिः च तथा। निर्–उपाधिः अपि हीयतां इति चेत्? न। अशक्यत्वात् निष्प्रयोजनत्वात् च। न हि तस्य हानं विनाशः नित्यत्वात्। न अपि विप्रयोगः व्यापकत्वात्। न अपि अ–प्रतिपत्तिः। यथा यथा तदर्थं यत्नः तथा तथा प्रतिपत्तेः। उपेक्षातः इति चेत्? कृता एव एतावंतं कालं उपेक्षा तथा अपि तत्–हान–असिद्धेः। निष्प्रयोजनं च एतत्। सोपाधेः हि त्यागः दुखहानाय निरुपाधेः तु किमर्थम्? पुनः सोपाधित्व–शंकया इति चेत्? न बीज–अभावात् इति। कुतः पुनः उपादेयः? तथा सति भावना–क्रमेण निःश्रेयस–सिद्धेः। किं अस्य उपादानम्? विवेकः। कुतः? अनात्मनः शरीररादेः।

Trans: But notwithstanding the above isn't the self worth discarding like the senses etc. because it is the ground of suffering? Yes! In the manner in which it is the ground of suffering it is certainly worth discarding. And as conditioned the self does engender suffering. But why not discard the self even in its unconditioned state? No! This is neither possible nor fruitful. Certainly the discarding of self is not its destructions because it is eternal Nor is it separation from it because it is abiquitious Nor is it its nonapprehension. As one goes on avoiding self-knowledge one gains in self-knowledge. But can't one avoid self-awareness by remaining indifferent to it? Yes, certainly we remained indifferent in this matter so long, despite this the selfawareness could not be got rid of. Moreover such as attempt is futile. The discarding of the conditioned self is needed of course for bringing about the destruction of suffering but what can the discarding of the unconditioned self be needed for? Is it needed because there could be doubt that the self may be conditioned? No! There is no ground for the doubt. Why should the unconditioned self be contemplated? Because by means of continuous contemplation of it release is attained. What is the nature of the contemplation of self? It is discrimination. Discrimination from what? From the body etc. which are other than the self.

Expl: One can be separated even from the ubiquitous at one place but after separation there is bound to be another contact.

Even if one does not strive for it one cannot help having self- awareness. What is really needed is the discriminating cognition of the self. The self being everywhere and always there cannot be non-attainment to it except in the sense of not having discriminating cognition of it.

Proof for discriminating self-cognition

Text: किं पुनः अत्र प्रमाणम्? न्यायः आम्नायः च। शरीरं एव हि तावत् मूर्धा-अभिषिक्तं अनात्मानं आत्मानं मन्यमानस्य तदुपादाय तदनुकूल त्रैलोक्य-विषया तृष्णा विजृंभते तथा तत्प्रतिकूल-विषयो द्वेषः। न च एतत् केवल-आत्मदर्शिनः संभवति निरूपाधेः पुत्र-वित्त-लोभ अभावात्। तैः अनुपकार्यत्वात्। छेद-क्लेद-दाह-शोषादि-अनुपपत्तेः विधि-निषेध-अनधिकारात् च। जन्म-जाति-वयः-वित्त-संस्कारादि-उपग्रहेण तत्प्रवृत्तेः। ततः अनात्मनि आत्मग्रहः निदानं संसारस्य। मिथ्याज्ञानं च तत्वज्ञानात् निवर्तते। तच्च श्रवण-मननादि-क्रमेण उत्पद्यते। कारण-निवृतौ च कार्यं न जायते। उत्पन्नः च धर्म-अधर्म-प्रचयः भोगेन क्षीयते इति न्यायार्थ सार संक्षेपः।

Trans: What after all is the proof (for regarding the discriminating knowledge of self as essential)? It is inference and scriptures. For one who regards nonself as self the body is the be-all and end-all of existence and so clinging to the body such a person has inordinate craving for all the things in all the worlds,which cater to bodily pleasure and has aversion for things which are anything but pleasant. But one who regards the self as absolute is not affected by these passions; one who has discarded all limitations has no attachment to progeny or riches because he is not benefited by these. He cannot be cut, dried or burnt etc. by anything and he is beyond the pale of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions. Scriptural commandments are applicable to a person only under the limitation of birth, caste, age, property and consecration. So the false cognition of nonself as self is the ground of worldly existence. This false cognition is dissipated by right knowledge. As to this right knowledge, it arises gradually through listening to scriptural statements, then meditation thereon and so on. The cause (of attachments and aversion) being thus eliminated the effect is also eliminated. As to the accumulated merit and demerit, they are dissipated by enjoying their results. This is the sum and substance of the proof for the above (proposition).

Expl: The proof that discriminating knowledge of self leads to redemption

is that the false cognition of body etc. as self engenders attachment to pleasurable things and aversion to things that are painful to the body. Once the absoluteness of the self is realised all attachment and aversion disappear. It should be noted here that right knowledge does not by itself destroy all merit and demerit as is maintained by some thinkers. According to them right knowledge dissipates erroneous cognition along with the urge to think erroneously which are at the back of all good and bad actions. Even expiation and enjoyment of the fruits of action do not destroy action and the merit and demerit that produce it. This is not the right view to take. Only through the elimination of the urge to action does right knowledge destroy action and lead to release.

Scriptual testimony for the above

Text: आम्नाय–सार–संक्षेपः तु 'अशरीरं वाव संतं' इत्यादि। तदप्रामाण्यं प्रपंच–मिथ्यात्व–सिद्धांतभेद–तत्वोपदेश–पौनः–पुन्येषु अनृत–व्याघात–पुनरुक्त दोषेभ्यः इति चेत्? न। स–तात्पर्यत्वात्। निष्प्रपंचः आत्मा ज्ञेयः मुमुक्षुभिः इति हि तात्पर्यं प्रपंच–मिथ्यात्व–श्रुतीनाम्। आत्मनः एकस्य ज्ञानं अपवर्ग–साधनं इति अद्वैत–श्रुतीनाम्। वहिः संकल्पत्यागः निर्मनस्क–श्रुतीनाम्। दुरुहः अयं इति पौनः पुन्य–श्रुती नाम। आत्मा एव उपादेयः इसि आनंद–श्रुतीनाम्। गारुडवत् अनुष्ठाने तात्पर्यं प्रकृत्यादि–श्रुतीनाम्। तन्मूलानां सांख्यादि–दर्शनानां च इति नेयम्। अन्यथा 'जैमिनिः यदि वेदज्ञः कपिलः न इति का प्रथा? तौ उभौ यदि वेदज्ञौ व्याख्या–भेदः तु किंकृतः ? इति।

Trans:- The summary of the essence of scriptures is contained in the Upanisadic remark above quoted and others which say that 'The good and the bad do not affect that which exists without any body'. But isn't the scripture unreliable as—falsehood, contradition and repetetiveness afflict respectively its statements pertaining to the unreality of the world, the diversity of doctrines and tautological assertions? No! The scriptual statements have different imports. The statements asserting the falsehood of the world have the import that the self is to be realised by the seekers of release—as transcending the world and its objects. The statements referring to nondual reality have the import that the knowledge of absolute self leads to release. That the self is difficult to realise is the import of scriptural tautologies. That all external endeavour has to be given up is the import of the references to the self as beyond mind. That self alone is to be realised is the import of those statements which refer to self as bliss. The statement referring to primal matter as sentient is

intended to convey the necessity of meditation for self-realisation. (As the forester dealing with poisonous creatures strives to resucitate an unconscious person bitten by a snake so does the seeker of self strive to realise self-consciousness). Even the statements supporting the Sāṃkhyan theory which is the basis of the doctrine of Prakrti etc. has to be interpreted in the above manner. If such interpretations are not made then on what basis can one say that Kapila is better acquainted with the scriptures than Jaimini? But if both are knowledgeable about the scriptures how come there is so much difference in their interpretations of the latter?

Expl: Even the scriptures maintain that self-knowledge is essential. But the scriptural statements need to be properly interpreted so that the apparent falsehood, self-contradiction and the tautological character of them would be dissipated.

Proof for the validity of scriptures

Text: प्रामाण्यं तु तस्य कुतः इति चेत्? आप्त–उक्तत्वात्। तत् असिद्धं इति चेत्? न। विश्वस्य कर्तुः अनुमान–सिद्धत्वात्। विवाद–अध्यासित सकर्तृकं कर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् इति।

Trans: But what is the proof of its (scripture's) validity? It is the fact of their being taught by a reliable being. But isn't this an unestablished fact? No! The reality of the creator of the world who is a reliable being is proved by inference itself. The inference is like this: 'This world whose createdness is a matter of dispute has a creator because it is an effect'.

Expl: If the minor term in the inference cited above means, 'that whose creator is a subject of dispute' then since the creator is yet to be established the minor would remain unestablished. If however the minor term is 'that whose createdness is debatable, then even ordinary objects would be such. Thus there appears to be no property determining the minorness of the minor term. 'To be produced without the aid of the body' cannot also be such a determinant. The destruction of the body being dependent upon the body the body cannot be included in this minor term. 'To be produced by an agent not dependent upon the body' is a modification which takes care of the above difficulty but since destiny is a common cause of the fructification of everything and destiny depends upon the activity of the body nothing can satisfy the above qualification of the minor term. For this very reason the minorness-determining property cannot be specified as, 'To be uncaused by that which is caused by the body'. Everything that is born is born by the operation of destiny which is the effect of body-operations. Moreover if destruction is included in the minor, there being no material cause for it the major term would not hold

good of it. If however destruction is excluded from the minor the middle term would deviate from the major in relation to destruction.

As to the major term in the inference, it cannot be 'direct production by effort' as everything is produced by destiny which is produced by effort. Further the inference may end by proving eternity of human cognition itself. There will then be no necessity to infer the reality of the divine attributes. 'The cognition of the material cause' which forms part of the major term is also very difficult to define because 'the material cause' cannot mean 'the material cause of anything'. The material causes of different things are different. The material causes of ordinary things are known even to common men. If the material causes of the earth or the world is meant then the earth must be included in the minor term of the inference. Further immediate cognition which forms part of the major term is not found to cause the common man's efforts and the desire to act is caused by the cognition of something being the cause of one's own desired object.

The middle term, producedness is also difficult to define. To exist for some time only, is not producedness. Even anterior nonexistence is such (but it is not produced). Nor 'being the counterpositive of anterior negation' is producedness. Destruction is such. 'Being endowed by the generic property of Sattā' may be introduced as a qualification in the definition to exclude destruction from the purview of the definition but 'Sattā is not acceptable to Buddhists.

If effort itself is the cause of a product, the causality of being endowed with effort will be disputable. The causality of the eternal and ubiquitonus being in relation to anything may also be questioned as the positive and negative association of such a being with the alleged product can never be established.

Most of these objections will be met if the dyad is taken as the minor term in the inference of God's existence. Or we can have one inference with dyad and another with the earth or the world as minor term. The eternal and universal knowledge of the author of the world or the dayd is proved by the law of parsimony coupled with the impossibility of a being of limited knowledge creating a world of vast dimension.

Objection to the inference and its reply

Text: विशेष–विरुद्धः अयं हेतुः इति चेत्? न। विरोधि–विशेष–अप्रतीतौ विरोधस्य प्रत्येतुं अशक्यत्वात्। तत्प्रतीतौ वा सह–उपलंभ–नियमेन विरोधस्य बाधितत्वात्। सर्वथा एव अप्रतीतस्य अभिप्राय–गोचरत्वं अपि कथं इति चेत्? स्वार्थीनुमान–सिद्धत्वात्। तत् अपि कथं सिध्यतु इति चेत्? अप्रतीत–प्रत्यायकं प्रामाणम्। न तु अप्रतीतेन विरोधः

शक्य-निश्चयः इत्यतः विशेषात्। का पुनः अनुमानस्य एवं-भूत-प्रत्यायने शक्तिः अस्ति इति चेत्? आकांक्षा-अनुपपत्ति-नियम-भेदेन त्रिविधः संबधः। तत्र आकांक्षा-नियमाभ्यां अन्वयी। अनुपपत्ति-नियमाभ्यां व्यतिरेकी इति विभागः

Trans: But isn't the middle term in the inference namely 'producedness' incompatible with the special type of producedness viz. the producedness due to an embodied being (the locatedness of the middle in the minor like the world implies the eternity and omniscience of the creator of the world while the concomitance of producedness and having a creator to produce implies bodily creation. 'These two are incompatible with each other) No! The special property or character of producedness mentioned above is not implied by the concomitance and so it is not apprehended at the time of the inference. If however such specialities are apprehended before inference they will be apprehended as invariably coexistent with the properties implied by the location of the middle in the minor. So the incompatibility of the two is simply ruled out. But then how are the absolutely unapprehended properties like eternity, omniscience etc. intended to characterise the creator? (Aren't they simply nonexistent)? The answer is that such properties are apprehended in the course of one's own inferential discovery. But how can even this inference for oneself lead to the apprehension? This can, because a valid source of cognition does produce the knowledge of what is not known without it. But incompatibility of one property with another cannot be determined unless the latter is actually apprehended. This is the speciality of the cognition of incompatibility. But then what is the nature of this capacity of inference to produce the cognition of an otherwise-un-cognised property (or entity)? Well! the capacity consists of three kinds of relations depending upon three kinds of necessity relating to presupposition and inexplicability. Of these the relation depending upon the necessity of presupposition is known as positive and that (or those) depending upon inexplicability is (or are) known as negative.

Expl: The foregoing inference is objected to on the ground that the properties of the creator imported into the inference by the concomitance of the major and middle terms and the fact of the location of the middle in the minor are mutually incompatible. Creation by an embodied being is implied by the concomitance and creation by a disembodied being is implied by the location of the middle in a minor like the world. The objection is countered by urging that the concomitance of createdness and producedness does not imply the embodiedness of the creator and so this fact is not known before inference. If however any speciality of the creator is apprehended it will invariably be apprehended along with other

properties supposed to be implied by the location of the middle in the minor. It may however be asked how what is not otherwise known (included in the terms of the inference) is known by means of it. The answer is that such knowledge is obtained by means of three different types of relation which are based on the necessity involved in inference to make known what is not known. The relation of presupposition subsists between the cognition of generality and particularity when a particular object of the general cognition being denied another particular object is affirned for the validation of the general cognition. Inexplicability obtains in a cognition when the major cannot exist in the minor without being qualified by a specific property. The relations engendered by these two are the existence of the middle, which has no contraminor, in cominor; the non-existence in the contraminor of the middle when it has no cominor and, when the middle has both cominor and contra-minor its existence in one and nonexistence in the other. By means of these the presence in the minor of the major under a specific aspect is established by inference. For example, a purely positively concomitant middle like 'knowability' leads to the inference of noneternity in sound when it is discovered that there is no other property which could be described as different from a property inhering in sound and different from noneternity. The general concomitance of knowability with such a major term leads to the inference of simple noneternity when the presence of any other property in sound is found to be impossible. In the different example of a certain stout person going without food in day-time, taking food in the night is a special qualification without affirming which the fact of taking food cannot be affirmed. In yet another example viz. the inference that 'Desire which does not inhere in the known eight substances must be inherent in some substance because it is an attribute' the inherence of desire in a ninth substance is concluded on the basis of the denial of its inherence in all the eight substances.

Another objection to the inference and its rebuttal

Text: अस्तु तर्हि सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं शरीराजन्यत्वात् इति चेत्? न। अ–समर्थ–विशेषणत्वेन असिद्ध–भेदस्य अ–तुल्यवलत्वात्। असिद्धि–परिहारे विशेषणं समर्थं इति चेत्? एकां असिद्धिं परिहरतः द्वितीय–आपत्तेः। अन्यथा विवादध्यासितं न अदृष्ट–हेतुकं शरीराजन्यत्वात् इत्यनेन अपि जन्यत्वस्य सत्प्रतिपक्ष–प्रसंगात् इति।

Trans: Let then there be the fallacy of the possibility of contradictory inference in the present inference, based on the middle term 'not produced by any embodied being' ('The inference is. The world is not produced by any creator because it is not produced by any embodied

being'). No! The fallacy cannot occur because the qualification 'by any embodied being' inserted in the body of the middle term is redundant (as it serves no purpose) and as such the qualified middle term fails to have concomitance with the major. Thus it is not as strong as the middle term of the opposite inference. But isn't it a fact that the qualification is competent to avoid the fallacy of the absent middle term which arises if 'simple non- producedness' is used as middle term (because no created object is non-produced)? No! By trying to avoid one fallacy you are saddled with another fallacy (the fallacy of nonconcomitance mentioned above). If despite there being the fallacy of redundant middle, the qualification is taken to be effective then we can even have an inference like, 'No entity of disputed causality is caused by destiny as it is not produced by an embodied being', contradicting the divine creation of world.

Expl: If the fallacy of the possibility of contradictory inference is adduced in the above inference the answer is that the middle term in the contradicting inference includes a superfluous qualification. This fallacy is unavoidable even if simple non-producedness is not present in the minor. One may ask, 'Why deny a middle term with superfluous qualification as fallacious?' If it is argued that the qualification does not determine the middleness of the middle term then the nature of this determination needs to be explained. If determination is nothing but an aspect of the determined entity then we cannot have a valid inference like, 'This is substance because it has colour' as the concomitance of colour, and other qualities with substance could be taken to be determined by the property of attributeness itself instead of by colourness. Moreover the absence of producedness is different from the absence of producedness by an embodied being. The determinants of the counterpositiveness in the two absences are quite different from each other. Perhaps it can be argued that the inference condemned above as fallacious seeks to prove an unknown creator for the world while the object of the contradicting inference is to prove the absence of any known creator for the world. Nothing unknown can be denied. Thus there is no real contradiction at all between the inferences. But if the absolute absence of producedness is sought to be inferred then there will be contradiction as even an unknown creator would be covered by such a negation. The reply to this is that the redundant middle term is otiose and 'nonproducedness' turns out to be an adventitious property infecting the middle with the fallacy of conditionality.

Yet another objection to the inference and its rejoinder

Text: तर्हि तर्क–अ–परिशुद्धि–अस्तु दूषणं, शरीर–निवृत्तौ बुद्धि–निवृत्तेः, बुद्धि–नित्यवे शरीर–अनुपयोगवत् प्रयत्न–नित्यतायां ज्ञान–इच्छा–

अनुपयोगात् इति चेत्? न। प्रयत्नस्य द्वि–धर्मकत्वात्। सः–हि ज्ञानकार्यः ज्ञान–एक–विषयः च कर्तृत्वम्। तत्र कार्यत्व–निवृत्तौ कारणतया ज्ञानं मा पेक्षिष्ट। विषयार्थं तु तदपेक्षा केन वार्यते? न च अस्य स्वरूपेण एव विषय–प्रवणत्वं, ज्ञानत्व–प्रसंगात्। अयं एव हि ज्ञानात् प्रयत्नस्य भेदः यदयं अर्थ–अ–प्रवणः इति। न च निर्विषयः एव अस्तु इति वाच्यम्? अकारणत्व–प्रसंगात्। तथा च सः अपि एकः कथं सिद्धयेत्? मा सैत्सीत् इति चेत्? न। तत्र साधनस्य निर्दाषत्वात्। दोषे वा सः एव वाच्यः। सर्व–विषयत्वात् तस्य किं विषय–नियमार्थेन ज्ञानेन इति चेत्। तस्य स्वरुपेण अर्थ–प्रवणत्व–अभावात्। भावे वा ज्ञानत्व–प्रसंगात् इत्युक्तम्। जीवन–योनि–प्रयत्नवत् विषय–व्यवस्था भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। जाति–अंतरत्वात्। एक–जातीयत्वे तस्य अपि इच्छा–पूर्वकत्व प्रसंगात् इच्छायाः वा तत्कारणत्वं न स्यात्। तां अतरेण अपि तज्जातीयस्य–उत्पत्तेः। तस्मात् कृति–जातीयस्य ज्ञानइच्छाभ्यां एव स्व सविषय–व्यवस्था। सः च साधयितुं इष्टा इति।

Trans: Let then the inferences be invalidated by certain conditional arguments. To explain: 'If there is no body there cannot be intellect which is the (partial) product of the body but if for eternal intellect the body is not needed then for eternal effort also intellect and will will not be needed. So the divine author of the world will have to be devoid of intelligence and desire'. No! (this cannot be the case). Effort is endowed with two different characteristics, it is the product of knowledge and it has the same object as knowledge. This effort itself is agency. Now the divine effort being eternal it need not require knowledge as its cause but how can one deny it the need of knowledge for acquiring its object? Certainly by its very nature effort cannot be prone towards an object for then it would turn into knowledge. In fact this itself is what distinguishes effort from knowledge namely that it is not prone towards any object. But let it then be simply objectless? No! In that case it will cease to be the cause of action etc. And then how can even divine effort be proved to be real? 'Let it remain unproved,' it may be contended. No! The proof for it is faultless. If there is some fault in the proof it needs to be pointed out. But may it not be that the effort having everything for its object it does not need knowledge to determine what its object is? No! It has already been stated that intrinsically effort is not prone towards any object, for otherwise it would be identical with knowledge. But couldn't the effort have an object

as the vital effort has (viz. vital activity of breathing etc.)? No! The vital effort belongs to a quite different category. If both these belonged to the same category then even vital activities will be voluntary or desire will not be the cause of effort as something like it (the vital effort) comes into being even in the absence of desire. Hence whatever is of the nature of effort must have its objectivity determined only by knowledge and will. And this objectivity needs to be established.

Expl: Here it is sought to be established that the divine effort though eternal must be accompanied by divine knowledge and desire because effort borrows its object from the accompanying knowledge and desire. If effort were objectless it would not lead to specific activity. This effort is quite different from vital involuntary movements of internal organs. These movements are caused by destiny in contact with the self.

Objection that concomitance itself cannot be known and its reply

Text: तार्किक गर्ववाहः तु आह्–ननु सपक्ष–विपक्षयोः दर्शन –अदर्शन मात्रस्य शतशः प्रवृत्तौ अपि व्यभिचार–उपलंभात्, तत्–लक्षणस्य अनुपलब्ध–व्यभिचारस्य अपि तथा भाव–संभावना–आक्रांत त्वात् लक्षणांतरं प्रतिबंधस्य वक्तुं उचितम्। तच्च उपाधि–विरहः वा स्यात्, तदुत्पत्तिः वा, विपक्षे बाधकं वा इति संक्षेपः। तत्र न प्रथमः। अदृश्य–उपाधि–अभाव–निश्चय–उपाय–अभावात्। दृश्येन एव उपाधिना भवितव्यं इति च नियम–अनुपपत्तेः। न अपि द्वितीयः। सा हि अन्वय–व्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चीयते। तौ च दृश्य–शरीरवत् चेतन–निष्ठौ वा स्यातां उपाधि विधुर–दृश्य–अदृश्य–साधारण–चेतन मात्र निष्ठौ वा। न प्रथमः। विटपादौ व्यभिचारात्। प्रकृत–असिद्धेः च। न द्वितीयः। घटादि–कार्य–व्यतिरेक–समये तत्प्रयोजक–कुलाल–व्यतिरेकवत् दृश्य–चेतन–मात्र–व्यतिरेकस्य निश्चेतुं अशक्यत्वात्। न हि कुलालदि–दृश्य–व्यतिरेके तस्य–अवश्यं व्यतिरेकः, विटपादौ अपि तथाभाव–प्रसंगात्। तर्हि संतान–अंतर–अनुमानं अपि कथम्? कुंभकार–व्यतिरेके दृश्य–अदृश्य–चिन्मात्र–व्यतिरेक–असिद्धिवत् स्व–चित्त–व्यतिरेके अपि कंपं प्रति चिन्मात्र–व्यतिरेक–असिद्धेः इति चेत्? वाद–अंतरत्वात्। स्व–पर–संतान–साधारण–चित्–मात्र–अ–विनिर्भाग–वृत्ति–दृश्य–देह–मात्रस्य एव प्रत्यक्ष–अनुपलंभाभ्यां

कंपं प्रति कारणत्व-प्रतीतेः परचित्तस्य अपि कारणत्वं प्रतीयते इति। न अपि तृतीयः। विपक्षे बाधकाभावात्। देश-काल-नियमादीनां स्व-कारण-आयात-संनिधिना कादचित्केन प्रति नियत-शक्तिना कारणेन अचेतनेन अपि उपपत्तेः इति।

Trans: The Buddhist putting on the air of a logician does however (pompously) say this: 'Since despite the perception and nonperception of the middle in the cominor and contraminor respectively hundreds of times the former is known to deviate from the major and since even the definition of concomitance is vulnerable to the fallacy of deviation despite the fact that no deviation of it has been detected, some other definition of concomitance needs to be formulated. Such a definition may be either the absence of conditionality (in the middle term) or the fact of the causation of the middle by the major or the contradiction of the opposite. Of these the first is not tenable. There is no means to determine the absence of invisible conditions (in the middle). And there is no necessity that all conditions should certainly be visible. Nor is the second tenable. Causality for sure is determined on the basis of positive and negative association. These associations may pertain to the visible conscious body or just to simple absolute consciousness irrespective of the visible or invisible body (that may be conscious). It cannot be the first of these. In the case of the tree the definition is found to fail as there is no sentient body in the tree and yet it is productive. Moreover the definition is of no help in proving the divine creator of the world to be a disembodied being. The second (too) is not the case. Just as it is easy to conclude to the absence of the potter—who is the author of the pot—in the absence of the pot so it is not possible to determine the absence of all visible conscious beings on any occasion. Certainly if the visible potter etc. are absent it is not the case that all visible conscious beings are necessarily absent, for if it were so then in the case of the production by the tree, potter etc. are absent and so all conscious agents also should be absent. (If it were so then even God would not be the creator of saplings). 'But then how do we infer the consciousness-series which is the other self (or person)? ' it may be asked. The answer is that just as in the absence of the potter it is not possible to conclude therefrom the absence of all visible and invisible consciousness so even when one's own consciousness is absent at the time of the occurrence of another person's bodily movement the absence of all consciousness at the place cannot be maintained. (So the cauality in respect of the movements by a consciousness other than one's own can be maintained). The answer to the foregoing is that this is a quite different problem (not specially concerned with the nature of casusality). Even when the problem is specifically set forth it can be tackled by maintaining

that the causal relation of consciousness to bodily movements can be determined on the basis of the positive and negative association of the visible body as such irrespective of the difference between one's own and other bodies, and as invariably associated with consciousness as such. Even the causality of the consciousness of others to bodily movement is ascertained in this general way in one's own body.

Even the third of the above alternatives is untenable because the opposite view that even in the absence of consciousness effects can take place is not controvertible. The spatio-temporal and other regularities of an effect can very well be explained by means of certain accidental causal conditions endowed with specific capacities (to produce certain effects) and brought into the proximity of the effect by their own causal conditions.

Expl.: Now the very concomitance of the middle and the major terms which is the basis of the inference is being questioned on three different grounds. First the unconditionality of the concomitance is shown to be undecidable. Next the causal relationship which is at the back of most concomitances is said to be impossible to ascertain in the present case.

As Gñānasrī says in the following verse:

Text: दृश्यः चेत् व्यतिरेक–सिद्धि–मनसा–कर्ता समाश्रीयते?
तत् त्यागे अपि तथा तृणादिकं इति व्यक्तं विपक्षे क्षणम्।
कार्यत्वस्यं विपक्ष वृत्तिहृतये संभाव्यते अतींद्रियः ।
कर्ता चेत् व्यतिरेक–सिद्धि–विधुरा व्याप्तिः कथं सेत्स्यति?

'If the agent or creator positively and negatively associated with the effect is a visible one then such a creator is not to be seen before the sprouting of grass. But if to avoid the occurrence of 'producedness'—-the middle term in the inference-in a contraminor the creator is regarded as invisible then the negative association which is one of the bases of concomitance is impossible to ascertain.

Dharmakīrtī expresses more or less these very ideas in the following verses:

Text दृश्य एक व्यतिरेकः अयं दृश्य–अदृश्यसमः यदि।
तृणादौ व्यभिचारः स्यात् दृश्य–एक व्यतिरेकतः ।।
दृश्याभावे अपि अदृश्यस्य दृगादौ यदि संशयः।
तस्य अन्यत्र अपि शंकायां संदिग्ध–व्यतिरेकिता ।।

'If the absence of visible sentient beings is equivalent to the absence of all sentient beings then in the case of grass etc., there being no visible sentient agent there all sentient agents must be supposed to be absent in the instance. If however the presence of invisible sentient agents is suspected in the case then such a suspicion is possible in all other cases so that the negative association of sentience and an effect can never be established.

Reply to the objection

Text: उत्तान–उल्लपितं एतत्। विकल्प–त्रयस्य अपि उपपत्तेः। तथा हि चत्वारि जगति भावाः भवंति। विरोधी बहिः–वृत्तिः, सह–वृत्तिः अंतः वृत्तिः च इति। न च पंचमः प्रकारः काक्षितुं अपि शक्यते। विरोध–अविरोधयोः, साहित्य–असाहित्ययोः, आधिक्य–अनाधिक्ययोः परस्पर–निषेध–रूपत्वात्। तत्र द्वयं अत्र न उपाधित्वेन शंकनीयम्। अकार्यस्य एव अकार्यस्य अपि वा सकर्तृकत्व–प्रसंगात्। न च इदं इष्टम्। अकार्यस्य कारणवत्तामात्रेण सहज–विरोधे कारक–विशेषस्य कर्तुः अनवकाशात्। न अपि तृतीयः। तुल्य–योग–क्षेमयोः अ–विशेषात् व्यभिचार–शंका–अनापादकत्वात् च। चतुर्थः तु स्यात्। सः अपि न शरीर–अंतर्भूत–वृत्तिः। चेष्ठमान–शरीर हेतुकस्य अपि कस्यचित् अपूर्व–हेतुकत्व–प्रसंगात्। न च इदं इष्टम्। चेष्टा–चेतनयोः अविनाभाव–भंग–प्रसंगात्। न अपि सहवृत्तिः, देहस्य अनुपाधित्वे तस्य अपि अनुपाधित्वात् तयोः तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वात्। अ–तथाभावे सहवृत्ति–नियम–अनुपपत्तेः।

Trans: All this is irresponsible raving. All the above three alternatives can be justified. To explain: There are four kinds of properties (related to other properties) namely those opposed to a given property, those overextending it, those coexistent with it and those overextended or pervaded by it. A fifth kind cannot even be expected to exist. Opposition and non-opposition, coexistence and noncoexistence and overextension and non-overextension (which are involved in the above relations of properties) are by nature mutually contradictory. Among these the first two, the opposed and the overextended cannot be suspected to be the conditions adversely affecting the middle term because then either only the non-producible or the non-producible also will be inferred as created, by the inference. If the condition is opposed to the middle term it will not

overextend the major term while pervading it so that it becomes equivalent to it. Thus only the non-producible, which is opposed to the middle will be proved to be created. But if the condition overextends the middle then there will be things created which are other than the produced ones. And the non-produced being naturally opposed to causation there cannot be a creator who is a special type of cause for it. The third (too) is not admissible. The condition being equivalent to the middle term both fare alike in every respect so that if the middle leads to the inference the condition too would lead to the inference and also it would not precipitate any suspicion regarding the validity of the middle term. The fourth of course is possible. But it cannot be a property that is pervaded by the property of 'being produced by the body'. If it were so then the property of 'being created by some embodied person like the potter', which is required to be the pervader of the major term in the inference would entail the absence of the latter in a cloth (for example) which is not created by the potter. Nor is the condition coexistent with the property of bodily creation. If this property does not condition the middle the property coexistent with it would also not condition it. If it were not so then it would not be invariably coexistent with bodily createdness.

Expl: If a property is opposed to another it is concomitant with its absence. If it overextends another property it is coexistent with it as well as its absence. If it is coexistent with another property it is equivalent to it. If lastly it is pervaded by another property it does not pervade it. Now a certain property may or may not be opposed to another property. If it is not opposed then it must coexist with it. If the property also coexists with the absence of the other property it overextends it. If it does not coexist with the absence of the other property it may either be pervaded by the other property or be equivalent to it. Now if the alleged condition is opposed to producedness and conditions the middle term it must pervade and determine the major term so that every created object would have to be non-produced or non-created. On the other hand if the condition overextended the middle then both produced and non-produced entities would have to be created entities. The untenability of the other two types of conditions has already been made clear above. Thus the possibility of conditionality in the inference is rebutted in a general way.

Rebuttal of bodily-creation as condition

Text: शरीरस्य च न उपाधित्वं कर्तु–अव्यापकत्वात्। तत्कार्यत्वस्य उपाधेः विद्यमानात्वात्। न अपि आयतनतया तथाभावः भोग–उपाधित्वात्। न अपि उपकरण–प्रापकतया साक्षात्–प्रयत्न–अनधिष्ठेयता उपाधित्वात्। अन्यथा अपि तत्प्राप्तेः इति। न अपि अधिक–वृत्तिः।

शरीर–विनाकृतस्य कर्तुः स्वयं अनभ्युपगमात्। अस्तु पाक्षिकः अभ्युपगमः। तेन च कार्यत्वमात्रात् कर्तृमत्वसिद्धिः। शंकित–उपाधित्वात् इति चेत्? न च उपाधेः एव तत्सिद्धिः। तस्य स्वयं संदिग्ध–असिद्धत्वात् इति चेत्? न। उभयथा अपि अशरीरि–कर्तृ–व्यवस्थिति–नियमात्। किं तु कथंचित् उपाधिं आदाय सः व्यवतिष्ठतां यद्वा कार्यत्वं आदाय वा इति संदेहः परिशिष्यते गत्यंतर–अभावात् इति सः अपि निर्वायते। न तावत् देह–व्यतिरेके अनित्य–ज्ञान–संभवः। तयोः कार्यकारणभाव–नियमात्। तत् नित्यं भवत् सर्व–विषयं च। नियत–विषयतायाः अनित्यत्वेन व्यापनात्। विषय–नियमस्य सामग्री–शक्ति–समवधान–अधीनतया नित्यात् तस्याः स्वव्याप्यं उपादाय निवर्तमानायाः अनित्ये विश्रामात्। सर्व–गोचरे च ज्ञाने चिकीर्षा–प्रयत्नयोः अपि तथाभावः, तदेकविषयत्वात् तयोः। तथा च कंचित् उपाधिं आदाय अशरीर–पूर्वकं अपि किंचित् एव कार्यं कर्तृ–पूर्वकं भविष्यति इति शंका–पिशाच्याः क्व अवकाशः? एवं अन्यत्र अपि अनया दिशा उपाधिशंका निराकरणीया इति निरुपाधि–संबंध–सिद्धिः। विपक्ष–संभवे च साधन–प्रयुक्त–साध्य–सद्भाव–सिद्धौ साध्याभाव–प्रयुक्त–साधनाभाव–लक्षणस्य व्यतिरेकस्य अपि सिद्धेः न तदर्थं पृथक् अपेक्षा इति।

Trans: Body-ceatedness (or embodiedness) however cannot be the condition in the inference as it does not pervade the major term namely 'having a creator'. A creator needs his body to create something because the body happens to be-as the sustainer of the self-an accessory to creation. Nor is the body pervasive of creation. The body is needed only as a condition of enjoyment of pleasure and pain. Nor again is the body needed for obtaining the instruments of action as the instruments will be needed only if things cannot be handled directly by the creator. But even without the mediation of the body things (or instruments) can be handled (by the divine being). Nor is the condition overextensive of bodily creativity for the objector himself does not admit a creator who is without a body. May it be urged then that there may as well be a bodiless creator so that it being doubtful whether the middle term is conditioned or not the createdness of the world cannot be inferred from simple producedness? Well! if it is so then the condition itself being equivalent to the major

term, the bodiless creation of the world could be established from the condition itself. But such a retort cannot be made as the occurrence of the condition is regarded as doubtful by the opponent himself. However whether the conditionality is there or not in either case bodiless creativity is sure to be established. The condition being both pervasive of and pervaded by the major term (as it overextends bodily creativity) is equivalent to it and so it will lead to the inference of bodiness creativity if it is taken to be established. If it is not established then the middle which is unconditioned will itself lead to the inference. Now there remains the doubt whether the major term is established on the basis of the condition or the middle term ('producedness') because there is no third basis for establishing the major. So this doubt too is now being removed. (Now) if there is no body there cannot arise noneternal cognition as the two are invariably causally related. So if the cognition is eternal it must have everything as its object. Having a definite object is concomitant with non-eternity. The restriction to certain objects (of cognitions) is determined by the capacity of relevant causal collocations. This capacity of causal collocations being excluded from the eternal the objective restriction which is concomitant with it is also excluded from it and thus it gets established in the noneternal. And corresponding to the cognition having everything as its object the relevant will and effort too will have everything as their objects as cognition, emotion and volition have identical objects. This being so how can there be any occasion for the sport of the wraith of the doubt based on some kind of conditionality of the middle term, that only some entities are bodilessly created. In the cases of other inferences too the doubt regarding conditionality has to be eliminated in a similar manner. Thus the unconditional relationship of the major and minor terms is established. When thus the major as determined by the middle is established then contrariwise the absence of the middle as determined by the absence of the major is also established. There is no need to eliminate conditionality for the establishment of negative concomitance too.

Expl: Bodily creativity or causality cannot be the condition affecting the middle term in the inference. Body is needed for the production of a thing either because it is auxiliary to the production or the ground of one's being or the means of procuring the instruments for production. God can deal with things directly. If the alleged condition overextends bodily causality then even a nonbodily creator could be proved by the inference. So whether the condition is true or not in either case a bodiless creator of the world is established by the inference. If the condition engendered the doubt that certain things may be without any creator it is dissipated by the consideration that an eternal creator has eternal cognition, emotion and volition having the whole world as their objects.

Rebuttal of the second objection to concomitance

Text: द्वितीये अपि श्रवण–संपुटं अवधाय कलकलः त्यज्यताम्। तथा हि दंडादिषु उदासीनेषु दृश्यः अदृश्यः वा नाना–कारक–अ–विनिर्भाग–वृत्तिः चेतनः निवृत्तः न वा इति त्वं एव प्रष्टव्यः। न चेत् कुतः कारणानि उदासते? निवृत्तः चेत् कथं अदृश्य–व्यतिरेक–संशयः? तथा अपि यादृशस्य अन्वयः तादृशस्य व्यतिरेकः अपि उपयुज्यते इति चेत्? कः अत्र विप्रतिपद्यते? कारक–प्रयोक्तुः उभयत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्। देही तादृशः इति चेत्? कः अस्य अर्थः? किं देह–व्यापार–संपादन–द्वारा एव सर्वाणि कारकाणि प्रयुंक्ते चेतनः आहो देहं प्रयुंजानः एव इति? न पूर्वः। देहस्य अपि कारकतया देहांतर–प्रयोज्यतायां अनवस्थानात्। न द्वितीयः, विष–शकल–चालनादौ व्यभिचारात्। देहं धारयन् इति चेत्? सः अयं देहः धार्यः किं कारकया तत्कारकांतर–प्रयोगार्थं अथ स्व–कर्म–उपात्ततामात्रेण? प्रथमे न विरोधः देहस्य क्वचित् कार्य–कारकतया अधिष्ठान–नियमात्। यत्र तु न तत् कारकं तत्र अपि तत् अधिष्ठेयं इति कः चेतनः अभिदध्यात्? द्वितीये अपि यः साक्षात् अधिष्ठातुं अशक्तः सः साक्षात् अधिष्ठेयं उपादाय तत् प्रयुंजीत। न तु एकस्य साक्षात् अधिष्ठान–अयोग्यं अन्यस्य अपि तथा इति नियमः। देहे एव व्यभिचारात्। तृतीये तु अजा–गल–स्तन कल्पः कायः न स्व–उपयुक्त–अंश–विवेचने स्वं निवेशयति यथा धूममात्रं प्रति तार्ण–दहन–अन्वय–व्यतिरेकयोः आलोकवत्ता इति। यदि च अकारकस्य अपि अतत्प्रयोजकस्य अपि अवश्यं अपेक्षा स्यात् यः एव कुलाल–कायवान् घटस्य कर्ता सः एव करभ–शरीरवान् अपि दंडादीन् प्रयुंजीत। न खलु स्व–कर्म–उपात्ततामात्रेण करभ–कुंभकार शरीरयोः कश्चित् विशेषः। कार्य–विशेषे काय–विशेषः अनुपयोगी अपि अपेक्षणीयः च इति व्याघातः। अव्याघाते वा कुंभे कर्तव्ये करभ–शरीरं अपि अवश्यं अपेक्षणीयं अविशेषात् इति। तस्मात् संदशवत् अयः–पिंडवत् कारक–तत्प्रयोजकतया एव शरीर–अधिष्ठान नियमः न तु शरीरत्वेन एव। न च शरीरस्य सर्वत्र कार्ये कारकत्वं तत्प्रयोजकत्वं वा

इति। एवं तर्हि न प्रतिनियत–देह–अधिष्ठान सिद्धिः। अंकुरादि–कारक–अधिष्ठात्रा अपि तत्सिद्धेः इति चेत्? न। वादांतरत्वात्। यदा अपि तत्प्रस्तावः तदा अपि न कार्यमात्रेण कारक–अधिष्ठानमात्रेण वा तदनुमानं, ततः कर्तृमात्र सिद्धेः। किंतु हर्ष, भय, शोक, स्मितादि–लिंगैः तान् उन्नीय तैः भोक्तृ अनुमानं इति न किंचित् एतत्।

Trans: Even with regard to the second objection, turn both your ears and attend to what we say without indulging in meaningless talk. To explain: You yourself have to be interrogated whether when the stick etc., the causes of the pot, are in-operative, the sentient and visible or invisible agent who is invariably associated with the functions of the different causal conditions related to the pot, is present or not. If not present how can there be doubt regarding the absence of invisible sentient agents? May it be urged in reply that even the absence of that sentient being whose presence is required for the production is to be considered (for determining the negative association of cause and effect)? Yes! nobody doubts this. The agent and the operator are common to both positive and negative associations. But isn't it the embodied being who is the agent and the operator? Yes! but what is the meaning of this statement? Does it mean that the sentient being employs all the conditions through the instrumentality of the functions of the body or by employing the body itself? It cannot be the first. The body too being a condition (of some result), if it depended upon another body for being activated there will be infinite regress. The second too cannot be the case. In the mentally-induced movement of a poisonons object the activity of the body is absent. Could then the statement mean that, as possessing the body the sentient being is positively and negatively associated with the effect? If so then it has to be made clear whether this body is to be possessed as a condition or for manipulating other conditions or just because one has been born into it as the result of one's actions? As to the first there needn't be any objection to it. For certain things the body happens to be a condition and so it needs to be necessarily depended upon (for producing those things). But 'where the body is not a condition there too it has to be depended upon' is a statement which no sensible person would ever make. Even as regards the second it may be said that what is not directly depended upon is manipulated by means of that which is directly depended upon. But there is no rule that what is not dependable for one is not so for others too because such a rule fails in the case of the body of another person itself. So far as the third is concerned the body being just like the ineffective udder in the neck of the goat it does not intrude itself in the ascertainment of the association of the operation of the conditions and their result. It is just like the presence of light in the positive and negative

association of smoke and the dry-grass-fire. If however even the inoperative and ineffective body were necessarily required for bringing about any result then the very person who, with the body of a potter produces the pot would use the stick etc. for the purpose, as being endowed with the body of a camel. Certainly there is no difference between the bodies of the potter and the camel in respect of their being acquired as a result of the actions of previous births. May one say against this that for producing a certain thing a certain body, although of no use, is required? No, it is contradictory to say that a thing is of no use and yet it is required for a certain production. If there were no contradiction then for producing the pot even the camel's body may be needed. Just like the burning ironball caught with the pincers the body is needed as a rule for production only as a condition or as its basis. It is not needed for anything as a body. Certainly the body is not a condition or its basis in relation to every product. This being so it cannot be proved that different bodies are the grounds of different productive operations. But then couldn't the being who is the ground of the conditions of the production of saplings be also the ground of the conditions of all productions (and thus there will be no need to admit many selves)? No! It is a different issue altogether. Even when the issue is raised it is not on the basis of any production or the grounding of any condition that the different selves are inferred. Only on the basis of smile etc., the emotions of pleasure, pain, fear etc. are inferred from which the self as the enjoyer of these emotions is inferred. So there is not much to think in this issue.

Expl: As to the objections against the determination of the causality of a sentient being having no body it is contended that when certain known conditions of an effect are seen to be inoperative the absence of both visible and invisible sentient creators of the effect does not remain unknown. Of course the absence of the divine being supposed to be endowed with eternal cognition, conation etc. cannot be expected to be known at all yet it is not necessary to know this in order to know the generic causality of sentience to all effects. Positive and negative associations of individual causes and effects alone are ever observed but on the basis of these and in the absence of contrary instances generic causality is established. The body does not always play a part in this causality. If every agent dealt with everything only by means of the body how can he deal with the body itself in the absence of another body? Many things are achieved simply by contemplation without moving the body in the least. The body is of course the basis of certain activities and is also used for sustaining activities directed at other things. The activity of speech belongs to the body and so is based upon it. The activity of weaving is based upon the body but is directed upon the yarn. In most other cases the body is not unvolved as a basis or as an actor It is there because the agent is an embodied being. A particular body like that of the potter or

even that of the camel is not needed for the production of the pot or cloth although every human being has inherited his or her own body as the result of past actions. The body is needed only as the agent of its own activities and as the sustainer of the activities directed at other things. Thus the embodiedness of the creator of the world remains unproved.

The third objection to concomitance rebutted

Text: तृतीये अपि ईर्ष्या–कषाये चक्षुषी निमील्य न्याय–अनुसारः श्रूयताम्। इह जगति नास्ति एव तत्कार्यं नाम यत्कारक–चक्रं–अवधीर्य आत्मानं आसादयेत् इति अविवादम्। तच्च सर्वं चेतन–उपहित–मर्यादम्। अन्यथा तत्–लक्षण–व्यवस्था–अनुपपत्तेः। तथा हि आधेय–कारक–उपहित–मर्यादं अधिकरणस्य रूपम्। आधारत्वात्। अपनेय–अपगंतृ–कारक–उपहितं च स्वरूपं अपादानस्य, तदवधित्वत्। करणीभूत्–कर्म–उपहितं च रूपं संप्रदानस्य। तदभिप्रेयत्वात्। करण–उपहितं च रूपं कर्मणः। तत्–व्याप्यत्वात्। कर्तृ –उपहितं च रूपं करणस्य। साक्षात् तद्व्यापार–विषयत्वात्। समस्त–कारक–उपहितं च रूपं कर्तुः। तत्प्रयोजकत्वात्। ज्ञान–चिकीर्षाप्रयत्न–आधारत्व–व्यवस्थितेः च न चक्रक–इतरेतराश्रय–दोषः। एवं सति कर्तृ–व्यावृत्तेः तत्–उपहित–सीम–समस्त–कारक–व्यावृत्तौ अ–कारक–कार्य–उत्पत्ति प्रसंगः इति स्थूलः प्रमादः।

भवेत् एवं यदि कर्त्रा कारकमात्रस्य व्यप्तिः स्यात्। सा एव तु कुतः इति चेत्? कुतः पुनः अव्याप्तिः? न हि षट्भ्यां अन्यत् कर्तृ–अनुपहितं कारकं अस्ति। न च एषां एव कर्तृ–उपधानशून्यं लक्षणं अस्ति। एकैकं अपोह्य शेषतः कार्य–संभावनायां सर्व–अपोह–संभावना–प्रसंगात्। न च समस्त–विशेष–अपोहे सामान्य–स्थितिः यतः षट्–कारक–व्यावृत्तौ अपि कारक–मात्रतः कार्य–प्रत्याशा स्यात्। एक–प्रवृत्तौ तु सर्व–प्रवृत्तिः अ–प्रत्यूहा इति श्रृंखला–बंधेन व्यवस्थितेः।

Trans: Even as regards the third objection, we ask you to close your eyes which have become aflicted by jealousy and listen to our rational discourse. It is indisputable that in this world there is no such effect which can come into being by discarding the cycle of different types of agents. And this cycle is determined by consciousness. If it were not so then their

respective definitions cannot be strictly laid down. To explain: The locus is that whose nature is determined by the locative agent. It is so because it is that which contains. The support is that whose nature is determined by the agents which are the source of removal and that which is removed. These two are the limiting conditions of support. The dative is that whose nature is determined by action intended as instrument. This is so because by means of action the object of action is intended to be affected. The accusative is that whose nature is determined by the instrument. It is so because the accusative is concomitant with the instrument. The nature of the instrument is determined by the doer or the primary agent because the former is directly the object of the primary agent's activity. The nature of the primary agent is determined by all other agents because it is needed for all their operations. And as the primary agent is defined as the locus of cognition, conation, volition etc. there is no possibility of the fallacies of circularity and mutual dependence. This being so if there is no primary agent the other subsidiary agents too, which are determined by the primary agent will not be there and so there will be the possibility of the origination of effects without causes. This is a major drawback in the above assumption.

But this could be so if all the subsidiary agents were concomitant with the primary agent but isn't this itself questionable? No! How can there be absence of concomitance? Certainly there is no subsidiary agent other than the six which is not determined by the primary agent. Nor are these definable without introducing the determination by the primary agent into the definition. If it is thought that an effect can take place even without the primary agent then even in the absence of other agents the organisation of the effect can be supposed to be possible and thus even when all agents are absent the effect may be supposed to arise. Certainly when all the subsidiary agents are absent no agent as such or the cause in general can exist. If one of these exists the existence of all others is unavoidable as the nature of these is mutually implicated.

Expl: Replying to the third of the foregoing objections to the concomitance the opponent says that all effects are directly or indirectly caused by different causal agents and the natures of all of these are determined by sentience. The locative agent is that which is qualified by the primary agent or the accusative. The ablative has two limiting conditions, viz. that from which separation occurs and the entity separated. The dative agent is that which is qualified by the action which is treated as instrument. In the relevant aphorism of Pāṇinī this is the definition given. The action is the object of instrumental operation. The instrumental case-unlike the accusative—is directly determined by the primary agent. Now in this web of relationship the primary agent determines the instrument, the instrument the accusative and this latter is determined by the primary agent. Thus the definitions of the agents

appear to be circular and mutually dependent. These fallacies are avoided if the primary agent is defined as explained above. Since the natures of the subsidiary agents involve each other if one of these is absent or denied all the others will be absent or would have to be denied.

Objection to the above and its reply

Text: अथ मतं तव एव इयं प्रक्रिया अस्माकं तु कार्येण अनुविहित–भाव–अभावं चेतनं अचेतनं वा कारणं उच्यते। संहतौ तु सर्व–स्व–प्रधानम्। उपादान–इतर–व्यवस्था तु कथंचित् इति चेत्? न। तथा अपि निरुपादानत्व–प्रसंगात्। जाति–प्रतिनियत–हेतुत्वेन तत् अवश्यं अभ्युपेयम्। तस्य प्रमाणसिद्धतया अपन्होतुं अ–शक्यत्वात् इति चेत्? न। उपादानमात्रस्य तद्धेतुत्वे निमित्त–वैचित्र्ये अपि एकजातीयत्व–प्रसंगात्। निर्निमत्तं वा प्रसज्येत। उपादानात् एव तथाविधात् तदुपपत्तेः। न किंचित् एकं एकस्मात् सामग्र्याः सर्व–संभवः इति चेत्? कुतः एतत्? निमित्त–सहितस्य एव उपादानस्य प्रत्यक्ष–अनुपलंमाभ्यां कारणत्व–अवधारणात् इति चेत्? न। दृश्य मात्र–विषयत्वात् तयोः। दृश्यत्वं तस्य कथंचित् अविवक्षितं इति चेत्? न। चेतने अपि तथा किं न स्यात् इति? तस्मात् उपादान–निमित्तयोः यथा परस्पर–सहितयोः एवं कार्य–शक्तिः तथा चेतन–अचेतनयोः अपि इति एकनिवृत्तौ इतरनिवृत्ति–प्रसंगः।

अपि च मृत्पिंड–दंडादिषु स्व–व्यापारे पारतंत्र्यं तावत् नियमेन उपलभ्यते। तदिदं दंडादित्व–मात्र–अनुबद्धं वा स्यात् अदृष्ट–विशेष–उपग्रह–अनुबद्धं वा अचैतन्य–मात्र–अनुबद्धं वा इति निपुणं निरुपय।

Trans: It is urged (against the above) by the Buddhist that what has been explained about the different agents is the opponent's own view whereas in his view the sentient or insentient entity which is known to be positively and negatively associated with the effect is called the cause. When the two types of cause come together sometimes to produce an effect each one of them is the primary cause. That, one of them is the material and another nonmaterial cause and that, one is primary and the other secondary is decided somehow (on some basis). This contention of the Buddhist is incorrect. If without the primary agent an effect can come into being then

it should come into being even without the material cause. It cannot be argued against this that the material cause has necessarily to be admitted to explain the generic similarity of the effect to its cause and this being validly established it cannot be ignored. If the material cause alone produced the effect then despite the diversity of efficient causes the effect would be generically identical with the material cause. Or the effect being produced only by the generically similar material cause it should have no efficient cause. But is it not a fact that no single effect is produced by a single cause because everything is produced by the causal collocation? Yes, but why is it so? If it is so because the material cause only as accompanied by the efficient cause is ascertained to be the cause by means of positive and negative association then it may be said that these associations concern only visible entities. May one urge against this that the visibility of the cause is not relevant at all? Well! if so then in the case of the sentient cause too its visibility should not be regarded as a relevant feature. So just as the material and the efficient cause are capable of producing their effect only when they are together so the sentient and insentient also will produce their effect when they are together. If one of them is absent the other too will be absent.

Moreover in the case of the block of mud or the stick it is found that these entities are other-dependent in respect of their movements. Is this dependence determined by the generic natures of these entities or the influence of special destiny or mere insentience of themselves? This needs to be fully elucidated.

Expl: It may be contended that all the different agents may be defined without involving the primary agent in their definitions. For example the instrumental agent need not be defined as that which is directly handled by the primary. Qualities, motions etc. are not capable of being handled. The instrument is that cause which is the locus of operation and it is the cause in its own intrinsic character. The accusative is the bearer of the fruit of the action of another entity. The dative is not necessary for the production of any effect. The locative agent too can similarly be defined without bringing in the primary agent. So either the sentient or the insentient is the cause of different effects. Where both these are needed neither is secondary to the other each one being in itself a primary cause. The distinction of the material and the non-material cause can be based on the relation and non-relation of a cause to the main activity leading to the production of the effect. The necessity of the material cause for the effect can be justified on the ground that the effect is generically similar to the former but this by itself cannot suffice for the production of the effect as the efficient causes too are needed. This is known through positive and negative association which need not be perceptible. The perceptibility of the association could be irrelevant to causality. Similarly in the case of the sentient too its perceptibility need not be supposed to be relevant to its

positive and negative association with its effect.

Now the opponent seeks to establish the dependence of the insentient as insentient upon the sentient for producing its effect. He asks whether the insentient sticks etc. are dependent for their movements upon the sentient by their very nature or because they are under the control of the destiny of the agent who uses them or because they are isentient.

The first and second of the above alternatives rebutted

Text: तत्र न प्रथमः वेमादीनां स्वातंत्र्य–प्रसंगात्। तेषां वेमादित्व–मात्र–अनुबद्धं इति चेत्? न। दंडादीनां स्वातंत्र्य–प्रसंगात्। न च एतत् कार्य–विशेष–नियतं, गवाभ्याजनादौ दंडादीनां प्रसंगात्। न द्वितीयः। तस्य जाति–विशेष–अनियतत्वे घटार्थ अपि तेषां कदाचित् स्वातंत्र्य–प्रसंगात्। तन्नियतत्वे सः एव उच्यताम्। न च घट–पट–शकट–कटाहादि–गतं दंड–वेम–वासी–संदंशादिगतं वा सामान्य–विशेषं उपलभामहे। अस्ति असौ यतः शरीरि–कर्तृकत्व–अनुमानं इति चेत्? न। घटत्वादेः एव तथाभावात्।

अस्तु वा संस्थान–विशेषः। न च सः ए अत्र निबंधनम्। तस्य अभावे अपि जल–अनलादीनां चेतन–प्रेर्यत्व–दर्शनात्। न च शरीर–प्रयोज्यं यत् तदेव चेतन–प्रेर्यं इति नियमः। शरीरस्य एव स्वातंत्र्य–प्रसंगात् इत्युक्तप्रायम्।

तस्मात् अचैतन्य–मात्र–निबंधनं एतत्–दंडादिषु। तथा च परमाण्वादिषु अपि तस्य भावात् तथा भावः दुर्बारः। तदेतत् कार्यं कारणवत्तया व्याप्तम्।

सा च विपक्षे असंभवंती स्वव्याप्यं आदाय व्यावर्तमाना सपक्षे विश्राम्याति इति उभयमुखी प्रतिवंथसिद्धिः।

Trans: Among the three alternatives mentioned the first cannot hold because then the loom etc. which are different from the sticks etc. would become independent causal conditions. If the looms are supposed to be dependent as looms and so on then the sticks etc. would become independent. Nor is this dependent nature of sticks etc. restricted to their causality relating to pot etc. because then in driving the cattle, sticks etc. would become independent causes. The second alternative too cannot hold. If predestination is not restricted to things of certain types then even the stick as the cause of the pot may be so from predestination and so

become a free cause of the pot. If this is not so then the generic property of things whose causality is predestined has to be mentioned. Certainly we do not observe any generic property common to the pot, the cloth, the cart, the cauldron etc. or the stick, the loom, the chisel, the pincers etc. But can't we say that there is such a property on the basis of which it is inferred that the pot etc. are produced by embodied beings? No! Potness etc. are alone the properties which lead to the inference. There are no properties common to different types of objects. Or let the possession of some configuration which is common to the different objects be such a property. But can't the possession of this property itself by things be the basis of their being created by sentient beings? No! Even in the absence of this property water, fire etc. are operated upon by sentient beings. Certainly it is not a rule that only what is operated upon by an embodied being is operated upon by a sentient being. In that case the body itself will become an independent agent as it is not operated upon by another body. Hence the dependent nature of sticks etc. must be due only to their insentience. This insentience being present even in atoms, destiny etc. these too must be under the control of a sentient being. Thus this property of having a cause is concomitant with being an effect. Contraminors like sky etc. are uncaused entities and they are also non-effects. In this manner both positive and negative association of causedness and effecthood get established.

Expl: To explain that the insentient causal conditions are dependent only because they are insentient the opponent shows that the individual natures of these causes do not determine their dependence.

Destiny too cannot make the predestined to do their work. But it cannot also be stipulated as to what kind of effects are caused by predestined causes. There is also no observable property of all effects which could be taken to be the basis of the predestination of their causes. Configuration too is not such a property as it is absent in water, fire etc. Body-operatedness cannot be such a property as it is absent in the body itself. One part of the body may act upon another part but the body as a whole can not act upon itself.

Elucidation of the nature of concomitance which is needed for the inference

Text: कः पुनः अयं प्रतिबंधः। स्वाभाविकः संबंधः। कः स्वाभाविकार्थः? निरुपाधित्वम्। कः पुनः उपाधिः? साध्य-प्रयोजकं निमित्तांतरम्। किं अस्य लक्षणम्? साधन-अव्यापकत्वे सति साध्य-व्यापकत्वम्। कथं पुनः एवंलक्षणकः अर्थः प्रत्येत्व्यः निराकर्त्तव्यः वा? विपर्यय-अविरोध-वाधकाभ्याम्। किं बाधकम्? अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-

भूयोदर्शन–साहायकं आचरन् अनुत्तरः तर्कः। सः च आत्माश्रय–इतरेतराश्रय–चक्रक–अनवस्था–अनिष्ट–प्रसंग–भेदेन पंचविधः अपि क्वचित् व्यभिचारं निराकुर्वाणः क्वचित्–तत् निबंधनं उपाधिं अवधून्वन् सहायीभवति इति फलतः न कश्चित् विशेषः। तदुदाहरणानि च अत्र यथायथं परिचेयानि इति।

Trans: What is then this concomitance? It is natural relationship. What is the meaning of 'natural'? It is 'unconditionality'. What is a condition? It is a certain cause (other than the middle term) which determines the occurrence of the major. What is its definition? It is pervasion of the major coupled with nonpervasion of the middle. How is such a fact to be ascertained or denied? The presence of conditionality is ascertained or denied if the existence of the middle without the major in the contraminor is not contradicted or is contradicted. What is it that contradicts the said presence? It is the counterfactual argument which aids the multiple observations of positive and negative associations of the major and middle terms and the testimony of this argument cannot be questioned. And this argument though of five kinds namely selfdependence, mutual dependence circularity and infinite regress is of help to concomitance in some cases by removing the fallacy of the deviation of the middle and in some others by removing the condition which is the ground of deviation. The result in both cases is the same. The examples of these five different types of arguments are to be found in this very text.

Expl: Explaining the nature of concomitance the opponent defines it as a natural relation. This does not mean 'born of nature' because even eternal entities have this relation. Unconditionality is the meaning of naturalness. To be unconditional for the middle means to be coexistent with a major which deviates from everything that deviates from it. The condition mentioned here is equivalent to the major term. Once the counterfactual argument is set forth the concomitance of the movement of the insentient and sentient activity will thereby be established and then there can be no question whether anything can come into being without a cause. All the five types of these arguments are of the nature of the contingency of the undesirable yet they are distinguished from one another as a cow is from the bull although both are called 'cows'.

Self-dependence is depending upon that which depends upon oneself. Direct dependence upon that which depends upon oneself is mutual dependence. Dependence upon what depends upon what depends upon oneself is circularity.

An objection and its reply

Text: अथ न्याय–दुर्बलस्य प्रतिबंदीकरणं यदुत एवं शशविषाणस्य अपि सिद्धिः स्यात्, दृश्य–मात्र–नियतत्वात् प्रत्यक्ष–बाधस्य। न च दृश्य–त्व–निवृत्तेः एव विषाणत्व–निवृत्तिः। अव्यापक–निवृत्तौ अव्याप्यनिवृत्तेः अयोगात्। विषाण–गत–कार्यत्व–प्रयुक्तत्वात् च दृश्यत्व–व्याप्तेः। तेन तन्निवृत्तौ अपि न अकार्यस्य शशशृंगस्य निवृत्तिः इति। तच्च महार्थ–सिद्धया कृतकृत्यस्य न परिभ्रंशाय, निष्प्रयोजन–विषयत्वात्। तथा अपि संभावितस्य अकीर्ति–भिया न उपेक्षां अर्हति प्रतिबंदिः इति चेत्? तर्हि मा भैषीः, इयं उन्मोच्यते। तथा हि अर्थतः शशीय–शृंग–साधन–प्रवृत्तः इदं प्रष्टव्यः। किं ते विषाण–शब्देन अन्यदेव किंचित् अभिप्रेतं रोमादि, विषाण–जातीयं वा द्रव्यम्? प्रथमे सिद्धसाधनं लोक–विरोधः च। लोके तद्विपरीतस्य एव अर्थस्य विषाण–शब्देन अभिधानात्। द्वितीये तु अन्वय–व्यतिरेकाभ्यां संस्थान–विशेष–कार्यत्वात् व्यवहार–लक्षणायाः तदभिव्यक्तेः कथं तद्रहितेषु परमाण्वादिषु तत्संभवः? संभवे वा कथं न तत्र घटत्वादिकं अपि? ॐ इति ब्रुवतः कथं न जाति–संकर–प्रसंगः? कारणं बिना कार्य–संभव–प्रसंगः वा? न वा अन्वय–व्यतिरेकौ कार्यकारणभावे प्रमाणं इति सर्वं समाकुलं एव आकुल–मतेः। तस्मात् अतींद्रियं नित्यं विषाणं एव न भवति यच्च विषाणं तत् प्रत्यक्ष–बाधितं एव। कुतः तदनुमान–अवकाशः?

Trans: Now the Buddhist weakened by our arguments seeks to turn the tables against us in this manner. He urges that in the manner in which divine existence is established even the existence of the hare's horn could be established. The negation by perceptual testimony is confined only to perceptible objects. But simply from the negation of its perceptibility the hornness of the hare's horn cannot be negated as the pervaded term cannot be denied on the basis of the denial of the pervading term. (Here 'perceptibility' is taken as the pervaded term because the objector thinks that there are both visible and invisible horns). And it may be that the perceptibility of the horn is due to its being a product. So even if this nature is absent, an unproduced (hare's) horn can very well be present.

Now this counterargument cannot cause any disturbance to one who has succeeded in establishing a great truth (viz. divine existence) as the counterargument is simply futile. Still it can be urged that the argument may bring bad name to the respectable opponent and so it cannot be ignored. Well! if this is so we reassure our sympathisers and rebut the argument. Thus: we ask the person who by implication seeks to establish the reality of the hare's horn, whether he means by the word 'horn' something like 'hair' or an object like horn? If it is the first then the argument entails the fallacy of proving the already proved and it also conflicts with common usage. Commonly something quite different from hair is denoted by the word 'horn'. If then the second alternative is true then since the manifestation of the generic property hornness is known to be due to a special configuration of a certain object how can it take place in the atoms etc. which are devoid of this configuration? If it can, then even potness etc. could (be manifested) there. If this is admitted to be possible can't there be an overlap of generic properties or the genesis of the effect without its cause? Nor will then positive and negative association be an evidence for causality. Thus everything will turn topsy-turvy in the view of such a confused person. Hence it is to be admitted that an invisible or eternal (hare's) horn cannot exist at all. As it is contradicted by perception how can there be any ground for its inference?

Expl: Now the Buddhist urges that like God even the hare's horn could be proved to be real. There can be invisible and eternal hare's horns just as there is the invisible and eternal divine being. In reply the opponent says that what is ordinarily known as horn is connected with certain types of creatures only; if anything else could have horns then it could be endowed with potness etc. too. The manifestation of a property in a thing is due to its inherence in things of a certain type. Hornness is manifested only by certain visible entities having a certain configuration.

An objection to the above reply and its reply

Text: एवं तर्हि नित्यं ज्ञानं इत्यापि व्याहृतम्। इंद्रियादि–विकार–मात्र व्यक्ति–व्यंग्यत्वात् ज्ञानत्व–सामान्यस्य इति चेत्? न। अतत्–अभावत्वात् अतत्–आक्षेपकत्वात् च। न हि मातृत्वस्य वंध्यात्ववत् नित्यत्वस्य अभावः ज्ञानत्वम्। अचेतनानां अपि चेतनत्व–प्रसंगात्। न अपि नित्यत्वं ज्ञानत्वाभावं आक्षिपेत्। ज्ञानत्वेन अ–विरोधात्। विरोधमूलस्य विपक्षे बाधकस्य अभावात्। दर्शन–अदर्शनयोः च अर्थ–प्रनृवणवत्व–अ–प्रवणत्व–उपाधि–ग्रस्तत्वात्। रुपत्व–अनित्यत्वयोः चक्षुमात्र–ग्राह्य–व्यक्तित्ववत्। न च इंद्रियादि–

विकार: ज्ञानत्व-अभिव्यक्ति-हेतुः। अर्थ-प्रवण-व्यक्ति-मात्रस्य एव तन्निरपेक्षस्य तथा भावात्। एतत्-अनपेक्षस्य तस्य अतिप्रसंजकत्वात् इति।

Trans: But if this is so (viz. that a certain configuration of the locus is needed for the manifestation of a certain property) then it cannot be true that the cognition (of God) is eternal. The property of cognition is manifested only when there is some change in the sense- organs etc. No! (This is not so) because the property of cognition is not the negation of eternity nor does it imply it. Just as barrenness is the negation of motherhood so the property of cognition is not the negation of eternity. If it were so then even insentient non-eternal entities like pot, cloth etc. would be endowed with the porperty of cognition. Nor does eternity entail the negation of the property of cognition. There is no opposition between the two as the opposite view is not contradicted. The inferential proofs however, of all cognition being observed as noneternal and no eternal thing being observed as cognitive are afflicted respectively by the fallacies of the (limiting) conditions of objectivity and non-objectivity. It is just as in the proof of noneternity of all colour which is afflicted by the condition 'being objects cognised by the eyes only'. Nor is any change in the senseorgans the cause of the manifestation of the property of cognition. All objective entities irrespective of their dependence upon sensory change are the cause of the manifestation of the property of cognition. Sensory change not depending upon objectivity cannot be such a manifestor as it would manifest other properties too.

Expl: It is now contended that no cognition can be eternal as its manifestation depends upon changes in sense-organs. In reply it is stated that there is no opposition whatsoever between eternity and cognitionness. It cannot be inferred that divine cognition is noneternal because it is cognition or the entity alleged as cognition is not cognition because it is supposed to be eternal like the sky. The first inference is afflicted by 'producedness' as condition and the second by 'non objectivity' as condition. Eternity or noneternity have nothing to do with the cognitive nature of cognition which is determined by its objectivity, Just as the colourness of colour is determined only by its being perceptible by the eye and not by its being noneternal so there can be even an eternal colour like that of the water atom. Mere change in sense-organs cannot be the cause of the manifestation of cognitionness as even pleasureness, painness etc. are so manifested. If the change is qualified by objectivity then the qualificand may as well be dropped. Anything that is objective could be the cause of the manifestation. Even if pleasure, pain etc. are objective their objectivity is of a different type than that of cognition.

Minor objections and their reply

Text: अथ क्षुद्र–उपद्रवाः। केवलस्य कर्तृत्वे विश्वस्य वैश्वरूप्य–व्याघातः सतत–उत्पत्ति–प्रसंगः च। अदृष्ट–अपेक्षायां कल्पना–गौरवम्। ततः एव तदुत्पतेः। स्वार्थ–प्रवृत्तौ अनीश्वरत्व–प्रसंगः। परार्थ–प्रवृतौ अदुःखमय–सर्ग–प्रसंगः। एवं एव प्रवृतौ अचैतन्यम्। एकत्वे प्रमाणाभावः। अनेकत्वे तु असार्वज्ञम्। प्रति–नियत–सामग्री–विज्ञत्वात् इत्येवमादयः।

Trans.: Now minor objections. If God by himself is the creator then the world cannot be multifarious in nature and it would continually be born. If God needs destiny to produce the world then there is redundancy as destiny alone can be supposed to produce the world. Again if God strives for His own benefit, He ceases to be God. If He strives for other's benefit then the world would be devoid of suffering. If the striving is purposeless then God becomes an insentient creature. If God is supposed to be unique there is no proof for this supposition. If He is supposed to be many then He ceases to be omniscient because each omniscient being would have knowledge of only those causal collocations with whose products He is concerned as the creator.

Expl: Minor objections to the reality of God are: His dependence upon destiny for creating the world, His purpose or lack of purpose in engaging in creative activity and His oneness or manyness. These objections are minor because both their affirmation and negation are contradictable.

Reply to the objections

Text: तत्र कारणचक्रस्य एकं उपादाय शेष–वैयर्थ्य–प्रसंजने सर्व–वैयर्थ्य–प्रसंगः। अन्वय–व्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिद्ध–कारणभावस्य न वैयर्थ्यं इति चेत्? अनुमित–कारण–भावस्य अपि एवम्। प्रमाण–सिद्धत्व–अ विशेषात्। यच्च यदनुगुणत्वेन कल्पितं तस्य तेन एव विफलीकरणे सर्वत्र अदृष्टं उपादाय दृष्ट–वैफल्य–प्रसंगः। तथा च तदपि न स्यात् प्रमाणाभावात्। दृष्टेन हि अदृष्टं उन्नीयते। परार्थं च प्रवृत्तिः: स्वार्थ अभावात्। न च दुःख–सृष्ट्या कारुण्य–अपवादः। जनक–अध्यापक–चिकित्सकादिषु व्यभिचारात्।

अथ दौर्जन्यात् एव किं न एवमिति चेत्? न। दोषाभावात्।

तदभावः च मोहाभावात्। तदभावः अपि सर्वज्ञत्वात् इति।

Trans: As to the above objections, if in the causal circle one is pre- empted as the cause and the remaining are discarded as superfluous then all the causes will be rendered superfluous. But can't it be urged that what is ascertained to be the cause by positive and negative association is not superfluous? Yes! but then what is inferred to be the cause will also not be superfluous because both are established with equal validity. Moreover if that for the sake of which a certain thing has been posited is taken to render the latter redundant then in all cases the causality of destiny would render the known causes superfluous. It is by means of the known that the unknown is inferred. So far as divine striving is concerned it is aimed at other's good because God has no self-interest. Nor is His compassion contradicted by the creation of pain because such an assumption is falsified in the cases of parents, teachers, doctors etc.

But couldn't the creation of pain be due to malevolence itself? No! There is no evil in God and the absence of evil in God is due to absence of infatuation and the absence of this is due to God being omniscient.

Expl: If the causality of destiny were to render divine causality superfluous then the instrumental cause would render the accusative superfluous or this would render the instrumental superfluous. Since God is inferred as the ground of destiny destiny cannot render God superfluous. If it did then it too will be rendered superfluous by rituals etc. to justify whose remote causality in respect of heavenly happiness destiny as an intermediate cause has been postulated.

God is supposed to will the destruction of the sufferings of worldly creatures. He does not will the nonoccurrence of the sufferings because if the causes of sufferings are there the sufferings can only be destroyed.

The disproof of non-omniscience in God

Text: एक–द्वयणुककारी च परमाणुं अदृष्टं उपकार्य–भ्यणुकादि–भोग–पर्यंतं द्रव्यादिपदार्थ–षट्कं च जानाति नूनं इत्यविवादम्। एषां उपादानादि–रूपत्वात्। अवच्छेद्य–अवच्छेदकभाव–अपरिज्ञानेन वा उपादानादि–परिज्ञान–अनुपपत्तेः। यश्च यज्जातीयं एके कर्तुं ज्ञातुं वा समर्थः सः तज्जातीयं सर्वं. एवेति नियमः। सामर्थ्यस्य जाति–नियत त्वात्। केवलं समर्थः अपि सहकारि–असंनिधेः न कुर्यात् न जानीयात्। तत्र प्रथमः इष्यते। कार्यस्य काल–देश–नियम–उपलंभात्। द्वितीयः तु संभवेत् अपि यदि कार्यं अस्य ज्ञानं स्यात्। न

च तत्तथा। कथं इति चेत्? शरीर–अपाये तदाश्रितानां इंद्रियादीनां अपायात्। न च अन्वयव व्यतिरेक–सिद्ध–हेतुभावस्य अभावे अपि हेत्वंतरात् कार्य–जन्म। निर्हेतुकत्व–प्रसंगात्। न च अहेतुकं कार्यं नाम। ततः स्वतः सिद्धा एव अस्य ज्ञान–चिकीर्षा–प्रयत्न–शक्तिः यद्गोचरा तज्जातीय–समस्त–गोचरा इति सार्वज्ञ सिद्धिः।

Trans: One who produces the dyad knows the unseen atom and all the six categories of reals beginning with the triads born out of atoms and culminating in the enjoyment of various objects (by living beings). This is indisputable. These are of the nature of the material causes of the world. Without knowing the determining properties and things determined by them it is perhaps not possible to know the nature of the material causes. This is a rule that one who is competent to do or know a thing of a certain kind does also know all things of the same kind because competence is determined by the generic property of the things to which it is related. But even the competent being will neither do nor know things if the auxiliaries (of knowing or doing) are not available to him. Of these the first, namely the not doing of things by the competent being is acceptable because the (doing or) production of things is restricted to certain times and places. The second could be true if at all, only if the knowledge of this being were a product. But it is not so. Why? Because when the body is not there the senses which are located in the body will not be there. Certainly when the things whose causality has been established by positive and negative association are absent the corresponding effect is not produced by other causes. If this happened the effect would be rendered causeless. Certainly no effect is without a cause. Hence it is selfevident that God's power to have knowledge, will and effort in relation to a certain thing is related to everything of the same kind and thus God's omniscience is established.

Expl: Since the beginningless and endless series of effects like the dyad etc. are the minor term in the inference, the law of parsimony dictates that the knowledge of all these must be a single entity. This knowledge must have its objects with their respective qualifiers. It cannot be partial because the limited objectivity of certain cognitions is due to their being caused by sense-organs etc., but this is not the case with divine cognition or knowledge which being uncaused encompasses every object.

A question and its answer

Text: शरीर–अपायः एव कथं इति चेत्? दृश्यस्य प्रत्यक्ष–बाधितत्वात्। अदृश्यस्य अपि सावयवतया मूर्ततया च निबिडतर–पाषाण–मध्य–

वर्तिनि भेकादौ कार्ये कर्तव्ये न अभग्नस्य प्रवेशः। न च परमाणुरूपं तच्छरीरम्। अन्-अंतरालत्वेन निर्मनस्ककतया इंद्रियाश्रयत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। न च बहिर्वृत्ति मनः ज्ञान-जनन-उपयोगि, शरीर-वैयर्थ्य प्रसंगात्। न च दविष्ठः एव सूर्यादिः तत्कुर्यात् इति सांप्रतम्। कारक-अनधिष्ठानात्। शरीरस्य तदायतनतया प्रयत्नस्य अव्यापकत्वात्। तथा अपि व्यापकत्वे तु असमवायिकारण-अननुरोधेन अकारणकतया तदेव नित्यत्वम्। न च उद्देश-मात्र-संबंधेन क्रिया-हेतुत्वम्। अस्मदादिप्रयत्नस्य अपि तथा भावप्रसंगात्। न च संयुक्त-संयोगात् अधिष्ठानं, साक्षात् अधिष्ठानस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। विष-अपनोदादौ कथं इति चेत्? न। तत्र अस्मदादेः ज्ञानमात्रं प्रति यत्नस्य अविरोधात्। विष-अपनोदादौ तु तत्सहकारिणः तज्जान्य-अदृष्ट-सहकारिणः वा अन्यस्य एव तत्रत्यः यत्नः क्रियहेतुः इति। सर्गादौ तु न शरीर-गंधः अपि इति सर्वथा कलेवर-विगमात् अकारणतया बुद्धेः सर्वज्ञत्वं अनिवार्यं विश्वेषां कर्तुः एकस्य इति।

Trans: But how can there be absence of body to the creator of the world? It can be so because a visible body is not perceptible and even an invisible body if composite and of a certain shape it cannot bring into being a frog within a solid stone without the stone being broken into pieces. Nor is the body atomic in size. Having no gaps within itself it cannot contain mind and so, not being endowed with sense-organs it cannot fulfil the definition of a body. Certainly a mind existing outside a body cannot be of use in producing cognition, for then the body would be useless for generating cognition. But isn't it proper to say that the distant sun produces the frog within the stone? No! The sun is not the cause of the effort which may produce the frog's body. It is the body which is the locus of effort and so the effort cannot extend beyond the limits of the body. If despite this the effort is regarded as all-pervasive then it does not depend upon the non-material cause of the body and so is uncaused, and this fact itself constitutes its eternity. Certainly the body cannot be the object of effort simply because it is the object of cognition. In that case even our efforts can produce effects at a distance (from our body). But couldn't the sun etc. be the cause of the movement through the relation of inherence in the conjoined (the sky is conjoined with the sun and the producers of the frog are conjoined with the frog)? No! Only the direct cause of movement is meant here. But then how is snake-poison in the body of another person

is removed by the snake-charmer without coming in contact with the latter? The answer is that in this case the efforts of the charmer are directly connected with the consciousness of a deity (which revives the snake-bitten person). As to the elimination of the poison from the body the effort of someone or God aiding the incantation of the charm or the merit arising from the latter is the cause of the movement resulting in the depoisoning of the body. At the beginning of creation however there is not the slightest possibility of the existence of any body and so the body cannot be the cause of creation. Thus the omniscience of the author of the world is simply undeniable.

Expl: That God cannot be embodied is proved by the fact that even inside a stone in which no solid body can penetrate frogs are born only by god's will. God cannot have a body of atomic size for such a body cannot contain the mind needed for producing movements. Of course the atom does not fulfil the definition of a body as it is not 'the last composite entity possessed of the movement whose nonmaterial cause is the contact of the willing self with the body.' If the qualification 'last composite entity' is dropped from the definition, even atoms could be supposed to take the form of a body. But since the effort and movement do not co-exist it is not possible to explain satisfactorily how the frog can be born inside a stone. The effort in a body cannot produce movement beyond the limits of the body. Indirect contact with a body is of no use. Everything is connected for the matter of that with the ubiquitous sky which is conjoined with all striving selves. So when a person is moving he should be able to move everything.

In the case of the elimination of poison from another's body the incantation of a charm along with the presence of its auxiliary is needed to produce the effect at a certain time and place. God may be such an auxiliary cause.

Establishing validity of scriptures

Text: अस्तु तावत् असौ सर्वज्ञः कर्ता वक्ता तु कथं इति चेत्? न। वचन शक्तौ सत्यां परार्थ–एकतानत्वात्। यः हि हित–अहित–विभागं विद्वान् परार्थ–अभिप्रायः सः स्थान–करण–पाटवे सति अ–विदुषे अवश्यं उपदिशेत्। यथा अंधाय दक्षिणेन याहि वामेन मा गाः इति पृथक् जनः अपि, तथा भगवान् इति। स्थान–करण–पाटवं अ–सिद्धं देहाभावात्। तेषां ताल्वादि–विवृतादि–रुपत्वात्। न च तदंतरेण वर्ण–निष्पत्तिः तदुत्पत्तेः अवधारणात्। न च तत्कारणानि अनधितिष्ठतः तत्कर्तृत्वं ईश्वरस्य अपि इति चेत्? न। यस्य कार्यस्य यत्कारणं

अन्वय–व्यतिरेक सिद्धं–तत्कारण–अधिष्ठानयोः स्थूल–सिद्धयर्थं तदवयव–परंपरा–कारण–अधिष्ठानवत् अवश्यंभाव–नियमात्। न च सर्वत्र कार्ये कायः कारणं इति प्राक् उपेक्षितः। पितृत्वात् वा उपदेशानुमानम्। तथापि कतमः आगमः तेन प्रणीतः इति चेत्? वेद–आयुर्वेदादिः, इत्मरि–करि–कर्णज्वरः सिंहनादः।

Trans: Let then there be this Omniscient Creator but how can He be a Teacher? The answer to the question is that being a competent speaker He is wholly engrossed in the wellbeing of others. A being who has discriminative knowledge of good and bad and is altruistically inclined will certainly exhort the right path to the ignorant if his speech-organs and accents etc. are perfect. Just as even the layman directs the blind person on the road (by saying), 'Turn to the right not to the left' so God too directs all men. But how can God have efficient speech-organs etc. when He is bodiless and the efficiency of the organs consists in their diverse movements? Without these movements articulate sounds cannot be produced as the movements are known to cause the sounds. No! Even God who does not support these causes can be the originator of articulate sounds. It is necessary to have the causes and their sustaining ground for the production of the effects with which the causes are positively and negatively associated. It is just like the necessity of the series of parts and their sustaining grounds for the production of a composite entity. But not for all effects is body needed as a cause and so for the production of dyads etc. the causality of the body has been denied and ignored earlier. Even on the basis of his parenthood (the fact of) God's teaching of scriptures can be inferred. But what are the scriptures He has created? They are the Vedas, the medical sciences etc. These are the roars of the lion which are excruciatingly painful to the ears of the elephant-like enemy (namely the haters of the Vedas).

Expl: How can God be the teacher of humanity if he has no body and therefore no speech-organ without which no articulate sound can be produced? To this question the answer is that if speech-organs are needed for making exhortation then it must be admitted that God incarnates himself in human body for the purpose and creates the scriptures, the medical science etc. in the course of his teaching. But for the production of the dyads etc. God does not need a body and so in the earlier inference God's embodiment was not mentioned.

Proof for God's omniscience

Text: तथा हि न तावत् अयं आयुर्वेदः अप्रमाणं संवादस्य प्रायिकत्वात्।

विसंवादस्य काकतालीयतया कर्तु–कर्म–साधन–वैगुण्य–हेतुकत्वात्। पुनः तत्साद्गुण्ये ततः एव फल–सिद्धेः। न च निर्मूलः तथा भवितुं अर्हति। अतिप्रसंगात्। न च अन्वय–व्यतिरेकभावः अस्य मूलं आवाप–उद्वापेन योगानां अनंततया अर्वाचीनेन अशक्यत्वात्। विषादौ तथाकरणे बहुतर–अनर्थ–प्रसंगात्। कः प्रेक्षावान् अनाकलित–वस्तुतत्वः पाटन–प्लोषण, छेदन–क्षारण–शिरावेधन–लंघनादि योग्यार्थं कारयेत् कुर्यात वा? न च उपदेशस्य उपदेश–पारंपर्यमात्रं मूलम्। अवश्यं उपदेशस्य क्वचित् प्रमाणे विश्रांतेः इति व्याप्तेः। न च नित्यागम–संभवः वाक्यत्वात्। तस्मात् अतींद्रियार्थ–दर्शिपूर्वकः अयं इति परिशेषः। तथा च अनेन दृष्टांतेन महाजन–परिगृहीतत्वात् वेदाः अपि सर्वज्ञ–पूर्वकाः इति उन्नीयते।

Trans: The medical science created by God is not inauthentic as the confirmation of its statements is very common. If any statement of it is falsified the falsification is accidental and it is due to the faultiness of the various causal conditions (of actions prescribed). If the proper conditions of the prescribed actions are assembled the result is certainly achieved by means of these conditions themselves. If the medical science were baseless its statements cannot be confirmed. If even baseless statements could be confirmed even the utterances of unreliable persons could be confirmed. Nor are the observed positive and negative associations the basis of the prescriptions contained in the medical science. The observations of the results of mixing and separating different medicines for treating different disorders being infinite in number a modern man cannot carry them out. Moreover such observations and experiments relating to poisons if made are likely to cause serious harm. Which sensible person who has not acquired the knowledge of the real nature of different things would engage in activities like tearing, drying, cutting, dessicating, piercing the nerves, starvation etc. or persuade others to engage in these activities for their training? But a continuous (and unending) tradition of exhortation or teaching cannot be at the back of the present exhortation because ultimately every exhortation must come to rest in some valid source of knowledge. This is the rule. Nor can the scriptures be eternal because they are in the form of ordinary statements. Hence by way of the elimination the conclusion is reached that the medical sciences owe their existence to the being who can visualise even invisible things. So by means of this example or the middle term 'being upheld by eminent people' the scriptures too are proved to be authored by an omniscient being.

Expl: To prove that the author of the Veda is an omniscient being the example of the authorship of medical science is here adduced. The prescriptions of medicines contained in the medical sciences are found to be authentic. Seldom do they prove ineffective. Some of these have to use even poisons. But the knowledge of these cannot have been attained by means of trial and error. The permutations and combinations of innumerable herbs and medical material are infinite and they can be tried on human beings at grave risk to life. This knowledge cannot be beginningless. There must be some direct observer or knower from whom all this knowledge must have descended. This knower is the omniscient God. Just like the medical science the scriptures too must have an omniscient being as their author as they are venerated even by eminent people like the sage Manu and others.

'Greatness' explained

Text: ननु महत् शब्दः अत्र यदि प्रामाणिकवचनः तदा संदिग्धासिद्ध-विशेषणः हेतुः। अथ बहु-अर्थः तदा सुगतादि-आगमैः अनेकांतः तेषां अपि वा सर्वज्ञ-पूर्वकत्वं इति-चेत्? न। बहुत्व-अतिशयस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। कः अतिशयः? सर्व-दर्शन-अंतः पातित्वम्। कः तैः परिग्रहः? तदर्थ अनुष्ठानं, स्वीकृत-व्यवहार-व्याकरणादिः-पालनीयत्वं, स्वीकृत-प्रमाण्य-आयुर्वेदादि-स्वीकृत-अर्यत्वं च। तथा हि नास्ति एव तद्दर्शनं यत्र सांवृतं इत्युक्त्वा आपि गर्भाधानादि-अत्येष्टिपर्यतां वैदिकीं क्रियां जनः न अनुतिष्ठति स्पृश्य-अस्पृश्यादि-विभागं वा न अनुमनुते। व्यतिक्रमे च आचमनादि-स्नानादि-प्रायाश्चित्तं वा न अनुतिष्ठति। न सर्वत्र सर्वेः जनः एवं इति चेत्? मा भूत्? न हि सर्वैः रोगिभिः आयुर्वेदार्थः न अनुष्ठीयते इति न तस्य महाजन-परिग्रहः। अपि तु सवदर्शन-अंतः-पातिभिः इत्येव। तथा अपि न सर्वः वेदार्थः एवं इति चेत्? मा भूत्। न हि सर्वः वैद्यकार्थः एवं, अपि तु कश्चित् केन अपि। एवं तर्हि सौगतादि-आगमार्थः अपि कश्चित् अहिंसादिः सर्व-दर्शन-अंतः पातिभिः अनुष्ठीयते एव कश्चित् इति सः अपि महाजन-परिगृहीतः स्यात्? न। संदेहात्। किं अयं अहिंसादिः वैदिकः एव अर्थः बिडाल-व्रत-न्यायेन श्रद्धा-आपादनाय शौद्धोदनि-प्रभृतिभिः उपनिबद्धः आहो स्वयं दृष्टः, एव इति? न तावत्

स्वयं दृष्टः श्रमणकादि–आगम–साधारणत्वात्। यस्तु असाधारणः मंडली–करणादिः केश–उल्लुंचनादिः वा न असौ सर्वैः अनुष्ठीयते। वैदिकः तु असाधारणः एव निषेकादिः तथा इति। अपि च वाचक–अप्रभ्रंशादि–विभागः अस्तु न वा, तद्–व्यवहारः तावत् सर्वैः एव तीर्थिकैः अ–विगानेन स्वीकृतः। तथा शिक्षा–ज्योतिः–छंद–निगम–निरुक्तादिः अर्थः च। तेषां च वेद–रक्षा एव परमं प्रयोजनं इति।

Trans: Now if the word 'great' means 'reliable' then the middle term in the inference of omniscient authorship of the Vedas becomes afflicted by the fallacy of doubtful occurrence in the minor as the reliability of Manu etc. may be questioned. If the word means 'many' then the scriptures authored by the Buddha and others not being regarded as authored by omniscient persons the new middle term in the inference becomes deviant. Alternatively these scriptures may be regarded as composed by omniscient persons. The correct meaning therefore of the word 'great' is 'excess of greatness': 'What then is this excess', it may be asked. Excess is acceptance of the important things stated in all the great philosophies. What is conformity of such people? It is first the practising of whatever has been accepted, second it is the use of words which have been sanctioned as correct by the grammer of Pāṇinī whose validity has been accepted by all and third it is the recognition of the truth of certain statements of the Vedas by the Medical science whose validity has been accepted by these eminent people. To explain (these conformities:) There is absolutely no philosophical school the follower of which, despite his avowal of all mundane activities as illusory in nature does not practise the Vedic rituals starting from that relating to conception and ending with that which pertains to funeral service or does not consent to the discrimination of touchables and untouchables or finally does not carry out expiatory activities like bathing, ablution etc. But isn't it true that not all people follow all these practices? Yes! what of it? Certainly the medical science is not neglected by eminent people because not all persons follow the teachings of this science! The upholding of the authority of this science by people who admit the truth of the statements of the different philosophies is itself the following of this science by eminent persons. But still isn't it true that all Vedic injunctions are not followed by the followers of the Vedas? Yes, but it doesn't matter. Even all medical prescriptions aren't followed by everybody, only some of these are followed by some persons only. But if then some exhortations contained in the schools of the Buddha and others pertaining to nonviolence etc. are practised by eminent people should these not be considered as acceptable to eminent persons? No! There is doubt in this case whether the teachers like the son

of Suddhōdana have themselves realised the efficacy of what they prescribed or they plagiarised the Vedic injunctions themselves as their own and taught them to their followers to win their veneration. It is just like the provebial cat undergoing penance to win the trust of the mice-population. Certainly these teachers would not themselves have realised the efficacy of their injunctions as these are common to the gospel of the Jainas etc. too. The injunctions peculiar to the Buddhists, the Jains etc. like drawing charmed circle, uprootting the hair from the head etc. are not practised by all. But the Vedic injunctions like those relating to impregnation etc. although of a special nature are practised universally. Moreover whether there may be any difference between the denotative and the corrupt form of words or not the usage pertaining to this difference is accepted without deprecation by all thinkers. They have also accepted as true the teachings of the six auxiliaries of the Vedas. The object of all these is only the preservation of the Vedas.

Expl: It is now asked, 'who are the eminent people? What constitutes their eminence? The reply is that those who accept the essential teachings of all philosophies are eminent. They practise the injunctions of the Vedas, and the grammer and medical science which they follow are intended to preserve the purity of Vedic diction and are concerned with certain Vedic injunctions. Of course not all people follow all the Vedic injunctions just as not all commands of the Buddha are followed even by his followers. Yet these commands are not such whose importance has been realised even by the Buddha himself. They may even have been borrowed from the Vedas. Such is not the case with Vedic injunctions and commands which are not found in alien gospels.

An objection to the above and its reply

Text: स्यात् एतत्। व्याकरणादीनि तावत् सर्वैः अभ्युपगत–अर्थानि। वेदा अपि तैः पालनीयाः भवंतु। ते एव इति तु कुतः? संसार–मोचक–आगमः अपि तत्पालनीयः किं न स्यात् इति चेत्? न। तत्कर्तृभि, तथा अनभ्युपगमात्, अव्युत्पादनात्, असाधरण–लिंगाभावात्, विरुद्ध लिंग–सद्भावात् च। नहि वेदशब्दार्थौ इव सुगतादि–आगम–असाधारण–शब्दार्थौ अनुरुध्य तेषां प्रवृत्तिः यतः एवं उन्नीयेत। प्रत्युत विरोधः एव। तैः तदप्रामाण्य–व्युत्पादनात्। तस्मात् सर्व–अभ्युपेत–व्यवहार–व्याकरणादि–पालनीयत्वं अपि वेदानां एव न अन्येषाम्। सर्व–अभ्युपेत–प्रामाण्यैः आयुर्वेदादिभिः स्वीकृतः च एषां अर्थः, प्रतिपदं तदीय शांतिक–पौष्टिक–प्रार्याश्चित्त–तप–जप–दान

होमादि–उप देशात्। न च एष भागः तत्र अप्रमाणं एव। तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वात्। एतदेव असिद्धं प्रक्षेपस्य अपि संभवात् इति चेत्? न। अध्येतृ–अध्यापयितृ–संप्रदाय–अविच्छेदात्। 'अन्यथाकरणे च अस्य बहुभ्यः स्यात् निवारणम्' इति न्यायात्। तस्मात् एवंरूपः अपि महाजन–परिग्रहः वेदानां इति सः अयं ईदृशः महाजन–परिग्रहः असर्वज्ञ–पूर्वकत्वे असंभवन् सर्वज्ञ पूर्वकत्वेन व्याप्यते।

Trans: Let then be this objection against the above. Let it be conceded that the grammar etc. are such that their teachings are universally accepted and that the purity of the Vedas is preserved by them. But why should it be conceded that the Vedas alone are preserved by the grammer? Even the gospel of the Buddha, the liberator of the world may be considered to be such? No! The authors of the grammars do not hold such a view and their grammars do not explain the usages of the terms used by the Buddhists. There being no noncolloquial words in Buddhist literature as they abound in the Vedas and mostly colloquial words being contained in the former, the traditional grammars are not concerned with them. Certainly the traditional grammars have not concerned themselves with the peculiar words and their meanings contained in the Buddhist gospel as they are concerned with Vedic words and their meanings. Instead they are totally opposed to the Buddhist usages as they explain the impropriety of these usages. On this account the Vedic usages alone are upheld by the universally authoritative schools of grammar. Similarly the universally authoritative medical science too has upheld the teachings of the Vedas. This science continually exhorts the performance of the sacrifices, charity, recitation, penance, expiation and other activities promoting prosperity and peace taught by the Vedas themselves. Certainly this portion of the teaching of the medical science cannot be inauthentic, for then other portions of it too could be treated as inauthentic. Couldn't this be an extrapolation? No! There is an uninterrupted continuity of the school of the teachers and students of this science. If extrapolation in such a science could be suspected it could be suspected elsewhere too.

Thus the Vedas are upheld by eminent people in all the abovementioned ways and this is not possible without their having an omniscient author. So the omniscient-authorship of the Vedas is established.

Expl: The traditional grammars have concerned themselves with Vedic usages not with the usages abounding in Buddhist and other literatures. The Vedic usages are mostly non-colloquial while the Buddhist usages like those of the words 'Skandha', 'Dhatu' etc. are colloquial to which the

grammars are opposed. The medical science too supports the Vedic teachings as it deals with all the activities like penance, recitation etc. which the Vedas exhort. Such Vedas whose authority is upheld by eminent people in various ways cannot have been authored by a non-omniscient being.

Reply continued

Text: यथा हि पूर्व–विरुद्ध–अपूर्व–व्याकरणादि–वैद्यकादिषु विगानात् अपरिग्रहः तथा तथाविधे धर्मशास्त्रे अपि। व्यामोहात् भवन् अपि कस्यचिदेव न तु सर्वेषाम्। अथ पूर्वाविरुद्धं चेत्? तथापि पूर्वस्य पूर्ववत् अपरिग्रहे केनचित् परिग्रहे वा कथं तन्मूलस्य अन्यस्य सर्वैः परिग्रहः? न च नासीत् एवं पूर्वं धर्मशास्त्रम्। मानांतरस्य अत्र वस्तुनि कुंठतया अनुष्ठाना–अभाव–प्रसंगात्। तथा च धर्माभावे तत्कार्यस्य सुखस्य अपि अभावे रागानुत्पत्तौ लोक–समीहोच्छेदे लोकोच्छेद–प्रसंगः।

Trans: Just as the grammar and the medical science etc. which happen to be inconsistent with earlier grammar, medical science etc. are not upheld by knowledgeable people because the latter are condemnable so also will be the case with this modern science of religion. If someone upholds it because of his prejudices not all persons will be so deceived. But if the present science of religion is not opposed to those which preceded it then the latter cannot be one which is upheld only by someone or not upheld by anybody at all because then the present one based upon it cannot be universally upheld. May it not be that there was no science of religion preceding the present one? No. No other evidence than this science is there to support the fruitfulness of religious practices and so nobody would engage in these practices. Thus the religious activities having ceased to exist the results of these namely happiness would also cease to exist and then nobody would be 'interested to anything' whatsoever. This would lead to the destruction even of lust with the result that all life would be wiped out from the world.

Expl: To prove that the Vedic authority is upheld by knowledgeable people only because the omniscient God is the author of the Vedas a counterfactual evidence for this fact is being adduced here. Only because the present Vedas are preceded by the earlier ones which were upheld by earlier knowledgeable people that the present ones are also so upheld. This chain of earlier and latter Vedas extends to beginningless antiquity. No science of religion like the Vedas can abruptly come into being and be able to provide authoritative support to religious activities.

Conclusion that scriptual authority is upheld by beginningless tradition

Text: तस्मात् महाजन–परिगृहीत–पूर्व–पूर्वागम–पूर्वकत्वात्, प्रवाह–नित्यत्वात् वा प्रलयविच्छेदे सर्गादौ सर्व–अनुविधेय–पुरुष धौरेय–पूर्वकत्वात् वा महाजन–परिग्रहः न तु पूर्वागम–अनपेक्ष–अर्वाचीन–पुरुष–पशु–पूर्वकत्वात्। पूर्वागम–प्रामाण्य–अ प्रामाण्ययोः उभयथा अपि तस्य विप्रलंभकत्वात्। प्रामाण्ये हि तद्विरुद्धाभिधानं विप्रलंभः एव। अप्रामाण्ये अपि उपायं अविदुषः अनुष्ठाने तदाभासानुष्ठाने वा असर्वज्ञस्य उपदेशः विप्रलंभः एव इति।

Trans: For the reason mentioned above the upholding of the authority of the present Vedas by experts may be due either to their being preceded by a continuous series of earlier Vedas upheld by earlier experts or the series of th earlier and later Vedas being eternal like the continuous flow of a river or when as a result of the periodical deluge of the world the Vedas are destroyed a supreme Being who is universally venerated revives them and then the experts uphold their authority. Certainly this fact cannot be due to the authorship of the Vedas by some modern man of straw who does not care for the tradition of earlier Vedas. Whether the earlier Vedas are reliable or not in either case such a mannikin cannot but be a deceiver. If the first alternative is true then any statement contradicting the statements of the earlier Vedas made by this person is nothing but deception. If on the other hand the earlier Vedas are unreliable then the modern author exhorting people to transgress the injunctions of earlier Vedas or follow new opposite injunctions when he is not knowledgeable about these matters, cannot be other than a deceiver.

Expl: So if there are earlier Vedas then the present Vedas may be supposed to be upheld by experts because the earlier ones had been so upheld. If there are no earlier Vedas then the upholding of the present Vedas may be due to there being a continuous unending series of Vedas since beginningless time. When at the beginning of each creation this series is disrupted the present Vedas could be supposed to derive their authority from their authorship by a supreme being. In no case however a modern author can endow the Vedas with the authority that they are known to possess.

Rejection of the above two alternatives

Text: तत्र न प्रथमः। वेद परंपरानुपलंभात्। अर्वाचीनानां पाठ–पारतंत्र्य–

मात्रेण प्रवाह–उपपत्तौ तत्कल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्। नापि द्वितीयः। वेदह्रास–दर्शनात्। यतः इदानीं अश्रूयमाणस्य अपि वेदस्य अर्थः अनुष्ठीयते निबध्यते च मन्वादिभिः। पुरुषाणां अपचीयमान–शक्तिकत्वात् च। यथा हि अश्वमेध–राजसूयादि–अनुष्ठान–शक्तेः अपचयः तथा अध्ययनशक्तेः अपि। न च पूर्वं अपि न अनुष्ठिताः एव राजसूयादयः तदर्थस्य वेदराशेः वैयर्थ्यप्रसंगात्। न च नित्यानुमेय–वेद–संभवः। वर्णानां नित्यत्वे अपि आनुपूर्व्याः पाठ–आश्रयत्वात्। न च आनुपूर्वीशून्यवर्णाः पदं नाम। न च आकांक्षा आदि–उपेत–पद–कदंबात् अन्यत् वाक्यं नाम इति गुरुरपि लघुरेव। तस्मात् पुरुषाणां अनुष्ठान–शक्तिवत् अध्ययनशक्तिः अपि युग–क्रमेण अपचीयते ततः वेदानां शाखोच्छेदः तदर्थानां अनुष्ठान–उच्छेदः वर्णाश्रमाचार व्यवस्थाविप्लवः च इति। अतः एव भगवतः व्यासस्य पुरुष शक्ति–अपचयं अवेक्ष्य वचनानि 'अल्पायुषः अल्पसत्वाः' इत्यादनि। वेदोच्छेदं अवेक्ष्य 'प्रति मन्वंवतरं च एषां श्रुतिरन्या विधीयते' इत्यादीनि। अनुष्ठानोत्सादं अवेक्ष्य 'दांनमेकं कलौ युगे' इत्यादीनि। आचारविप्लवं अवेक्ष्य 'प्रजास्तस्य भविण्यन्ति शिश्नोदरपरायणाः' इत्यादिनि। तथा च श्रूयमाणा अपि वेदाः उच्छेदं उपयांति वेदात्वात् वाक्यत्वात् वा उच्छिन्न–शारवावत् इति न्यायात्। यथा च एतत् तथा 'पर्वताः अपि चूर्णीभविष्यंति पार्थिवत्वात् घटवत्,' समुद्राः अपि शोषं एष्यंति जलाशयत्वात् स्थलीपल्वलवत्, सूर्यः अपि निर्वास्यति तैजसत्वात् प्रदीपवत्, ब्रम्हापि प्रैष्यति शरीरित्वात् अस्मदादिवत्' इत्यागमाविरोधेन अनुमीयताम्।

Trans: Among the alternatives mentioned the first is not tenable as a series of different Vedas existing in different periods of time has not been found. The continuity of the present Vedas may be due only to the dependence of the recitation of Vedic text by the student upon the recitation of the same by his teacher. Thus there is no ground for postulating different Vedas at different times as the basis of the recitative similarity of the Vedic text. Nor is the second alternative tenable because it has been found that there has taken place a degeneration or disruption of the Vedic lore. This is so because even such Vedic injunctions are

practised today and are mentioned by the sages like Manu that are not contained in the extant Vedas. Moreover men's powers of understanding gradually deteriorate. Just as the capacity of men to perform the sacrificial rituals pertaining to Aśvamādha, Rājasūya etc. have deteriorated so also has deteriorated their capacity for studies. But can't it be said that even in ancient times these sacrifices were not performed? No! If it were so then the bulk of the Veda concerned with them would be rendered superfluous. It cannot also be the case that the Vedic texts supposed to enjoin the performance of rituals prevalent today are only a matter of inference at all times (as they were never actually available). Even if alphabets are eternal their different sequences are not so and they depend for their occurrence on their sequential recitation. Certainly there cannot be words without sequence of letters. Nor is there a sentence without a syntactic sequence of words. So Prabhākara nicknamed as 'Gurū' but formulating the view that the unseen Veda is eternally inferrible has not lived upto his reputation as 'the teacher'. Hence like the capacity to act the capacity to study possessed by men goes on decreasing with the passage of different epochs of time. As a result of this different recensions of the Vedas become obsolete, the practices relating to injunctions contained in these recensions are disrupted and the established system of conduct relating to different castes and stages of life is thrown in disarray. For this very reason the great sage Vyāsa, noting the degeneration of men's capacities has remarked, 'Men are born with short spans of life and limited vital capacities and so on'. Observing the disruption of the Vedic tradition he has remarked, 'For such people there is required a new scripture at every change of cycle of Manu and so on.' Noting again the discontinuity of ritualistic practices Vyāsa remarks, 'Charity is the sole virtuous activity in the age of Kali and so on'. Noting the prevalent confusion of conduct Vyāsa remarks, 'Then there will be born people who are absorbed in gratifying their palate and sex and so on'. Thus it can be inferred that even the extant Vedas which are known are sure to disappear because they are Vedas, or are composed of sentences just as is the case with the recensions that have disappeared. This is the inferential conclusion. In a similar fashion it can also be inferred that even all the mountains will some day crumble to dust because they are earthy objects like the destructible pot; even the oceans will some day dry up because they are reservoirs of water just as a small pool of water is; even the sun is sure to be extinguished because it is a luminous entity like the light; and even Brahmā the creator God will come to end because like us he too is an embodied being'. All these inferences are in accord with scriptures.

Expl: Of the three possible grounds for the expert support of Vedic authority the first two are shown to be untenable by the opponent. There cannot be a series of different Vedas at different times preceding the present Vedas whose recitative identity can be maintained even on the

basis of an identical text continuing to exist upto the present. There can not also be an uninterrupted continuance of the same Vedic lore from beginningless time for the obsolesence of many earlier Vedic practices and observance of others ungrounded in the extant Vedas is a proof that many recensions of Vedas must have become extinct. Gurū's view that such Vedas supporting some apparently nonvedic practices are only inferrible, not ever actually available is however not acceptable. There has been alround disruption due to degeneration of people's capacity to act, to know, to perform rituals and so on. Vyāsa has noted this degradation pervading all walks of life and has made appropriate observations. So it is certain that even the extant Vedas may one day become obsolete and extinct. Everything else that is destructible in this world is sure to go out of existence some day. Just as words etc. are perishable entities so also all producible substances are sure to be destroyed at the time of annihilation. Even the long-living sages along with Brahmā the creator are sure to go out of existence some day.

Objection to the above and its rebuttal

Text: स्यात् एतत। भविष्यन् उच्छेदः अनुमितः। सः तु भूतः अपि इति कुतः इति चेत्? यतः उच्छेदानंतरं पुनः सर्गेण भाव्यम्। अन्यथा संसारिणां कृतहानप्रसंगात्। न च विश्वनिर्माणं अंतरेण भोग-ज्ञानयोः संभवः। न च तेन विना कर्मप्रवाह-संरोधः। ततः यथा भविष्यन् विश्वसर्गः उच्छेदपूर्वकः तथा अयं अपि इति। समय-नियमः तु प्राणिनां कर्मवैषम्ये अपि वर्षादि-नियमवत् उदयास्त-नियमवत् वा द्रष्टव्यः। कर्मणां एव एवंस्वभावत्वात्। एतदर्थं एव हि पुराणेषु सृष्टि-प्रलययोः दिवसरात्रिव्यवहारः। तथापि सर्व प्राणिनाश-यौगेपद्ये किं प्रमाणं इति चेत्? द्विः सप्त-भौम-भुवन प्रासाद-भंगे अपि निर्भयाः एव ग्राम-कुटीहट्ट-वन विहारिणः शरीरिणः इति महती प्रेक्षा। तस्मात् सर्गादि-महाजन-मन्वादि-परिग्रह-पूर्वकः अयं अद्ययावत् अनुवर्तते इति न अनवसर दोष-अवकाशः अपि इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः।

Trans: Let then be this objection to the above. The future annihilation of the world is inferrible as above but how can it be inferred that there had occurred annihilations in the past? This is possible because after every annihilation there has to be creation. Without it the past actions of worldly beings would remain unrequited. Not without the creation of the world there can take place experiences of pleasure and pain and cognition. Nor again without these there can be cessation of the flow of action. So just as

the future creation is preceded by annihilation the present one too is preceded by it. As to the regular occurrence of creation and annihilation notwithstanding the diversity of the fructification of the destinies of different beings, it is to be explained like the regularity of rainfall etc. or the regular alternation of day and night. The destinies themselves are of such nature that their fructification remains suspended during annihilation. On this very account creation and dissolution are described as day and night in the epics. But despite this what is the proof that all living beings will simultaneously go out of existence in annihilation? Well! it is indeed a very unusual thought that when this universe divided into fourteen worldly mansions is surely going to be destroyed the inhabitants of small villages and market-places should have no fear for their security.! Hence the Vedas happen to be upheld by sages like Manu who are the first progeny of God at the time of creation. The same Vedas continue to exist till today.

Expl: Just as there are dissolutions in times to come so there have been dissolutions in the past too. The proof for this is that there is this creation in which alone the destinies of past beings can have fructification. Different destinies fructify at different times but like the regular alternation of day and night creation and dissolution take place at appointed times. But even at the time of creation there are sages like Manu to uphold the authority of the Vedas.

It is to be noted here that destinies are not supposed to dissolve with dissolution. They continue to exist as long as they are not dissipated through the enjoyment of their pleasant or painful consequences.

A query and its answer

Text: तदेवं कथं मन्वादिभिः परिगृह्यंतां वेदाः इति चेत्? आयुर्वेदवत् आप्तोक्तत्व-निश्चयात्। सः एव कुतः इति चेत्? अध्यक्षतः। तेषां अपि अतींद्रियार्थ-दर्शित्वात्। तादृशां तेषां तत्परिग्रहेण किं प्रयोजनं इति चेत्? अस्मद्व्यवहारेण अस्मद्-अपत्यादि व्युत्पाद्यतां तथा च धर्म-संप्रदायः प्रवर्ततां इति भूतदया स्वाधि कार संपादनं च।

अथवा सर्गांतर-गृहीत व्याप्ति-प्रादुर्भावे सुप्तप्रतिबुद्ध वत् पितृत्वेन अविप्रलंभकत्व उच्चावच-भूत-निर्माण-दर्शनेन सार्वज्ञं अनुमाय आप्तत्व-निश्चयः तस्य तेषाम्। यद्वा भगवानेव संप्रदाय-प्रवर्तन-व्यसन-व्यग्रः काय-सहस्त्राणि व्युत्पाद्य-व्युत्पादक-भाव व्यवस्थितानि निर्माय तदातनं महाजनं परिग्राहितवान् 'नटन-

उपाध्यायः इव स्वयं नटित्वा इति सर्वं सुस्थम्। पक्षत्रये अपि अत्र पुराणादि–संकथा अपि अस्ति इति।

Trans: It may be asked, 'why should the sages like Manu uphold Vedic authority at the time of creation?' The answer is that these sages are convinced that the Vedas like the medical science are taught by a trustworthy person. But how is this conviction acquired? By means of perception. Even these sages are able to visualise invisible objects. But if the sages are such what purpose will be served by their upholding of Vedic authority (They could directly cognise what is virtuous and what is not). The purpose or intention is that through their conduct their off spring should be guided towards the right path and thus the religious tradition be perpetuated. This is compassion for living beings and execution of their own responsibility.

Alternatively, on the revival of the cognition of concomitances apprehended in an earlier incarnation these sages infer the non-deceiving nature of God on the basis of His being the parent of the worlds and His omniscience on the basis of the creation of this world of multifarious objects and thus they get the conviction of God's trustworthiness.

Or God Himself possessed with the desire to propagate the right way of life created different human forms of teachers and taught and made the eminent persons of those times to assume these forms to uphold the Vedic authority just as the coach in acting gives coaching by acting himself. For all these three views of how the Vedas came to be upheld by earlier sages there is support of the statements of the epics.

Expl: The ancient sages are able themselves to ascertain the trustworthiness of God and then uphold the authority of the Vedas so that common people may follow the teaching of the Vedas. If the sages are not supposed to be omniscient then on the basis of a concomitance apprehended in earlier incarnations these sages infer the trustworthiness and omniscience of God. But these facts have to be known separately. Mere trustworthiness of God will not do. It may also be that God incarnates Himself thousandfold as teachers and the taught. Some of these teachers are the sages who are persuaded to uphold the Vedic authority. This is just like an actor-teacher teaching acting through his own acting.

Another query and its reply

Text: स्यात् एतत्। परमेश्वर–प्रवर्तितः अयं एष वेदसंप्रदायः सर्गांतर वेदापेक्षः एव इति सेश्वररमीमांसापक्षः कापिलपक्षः वा स्यात् इति चेत्? न। किमर्थं पुनः इयं अपेक्षा पूर्ववेदे जगन्नाथस्य? न तावत् वेदार्थ–

उपलंभाय। नित्य सर्वज्ञत्वात्। ना पि रचनार्थम। स्वभावतः सर्व-कर्तृतया आदर्शानिपेक्षणात्। नापि विरोध परिहारार्थम्। प्रतिपाद्यानां तदनुसंधान-विधुरत्वात्। अवैधुर्ये वा कर्तुः सार्वज्ञ-विज्ञानादेव समस्त-विरोध-विधूननात्। तथापि पूर्व-सगर्तिरवेद-व्यवहारः अपि परमेश्वरस्य गोचरः इति चेत्? कः संदेहः? यदि च एतदेव वेदस्य प्रवाह-नित्यत्वं न केवलं एतस्य किंतु घटादेः अपीति न्याय एव दर्शनम्। अन्यथा मीमांसा एवेति। क्व सेश्वर मीमांसे ति? तस्मादुक्तरूपः परिग्रहः न अन्यथा संभवति इति प्रतिबंधसिद्धिः। तथा च आप्तोक्तत्वात् प्रामाण्य सिद्धिः।

Trans: Let then be this alternative view namely that this Vedic tradition started by God is dependent upon the Vedas of past creations only or that the sage Kapila himself is the perpetuator of the Vedic tradition. The first view is put forth by theist Mīmāṇsākas while the second is advocated by the followers of Kapila. But why should the Lord of the worlds feel the need of earlier Vedas? Certainly not for acquiring the knowledge of the contents of earlier Vedas as He is eternally omniscient. Nor for having a model for composing a new Veda; God being omnipotent will never need a model for any creation. Nor is it for eliminating inconsistencies in the present composition that He will need a model. Those to whom He has to impart the knowledge of the present Veda do not know anything about these inconsistencies. If they are aware of these on account of their omniscience they must also be aware of the omniscience of the author of the Vedas. Thus all inconsistencies will be dissipated. But isn't the Vedic lore of earlier creation too known to God? Yes! undoubtedly, and if this is all that is meant by the eternal continuity of the Vedas then not only these but even a thing like pot could be regarded as eternal. Such a view coincides with the Nyāya view itself. If this is not admitted then there cannot be theist Mīmāṇsā but only pure Mīmāṇsā. Hence the upholding of Vedic authority of the kind mentioned above cannot be accounted for without admitting the creation of the Vedas by an omniscient being. Thus the concomitance is established and because a trustworthy being like God is the author of the Vedas they are proved to be valid.

Expl: The view of theistic Mīmāṇsā is that God composes the Vedas of the present creation on the basis of those of past creation. But if God is omniscient He would never need to know the Vedas of the past for any purpose. However it can be maintained that God knows the contents of the Vedas and activitities based upon them that belong to past creations. This is Nyāya view itself. Thus being authored by God the most trustworthy

Being, the Vedas are proved to be valid.

An objection and its reply

Text: कथं पुनः सुगतादि–आगमेषु न आदरः–छांदसानाम्? वेद–विद्वेषि–दर्शनांतः पाति पुरुष–प्रणीतत्वात् इति मा शेकिष्ठाः। जिनेंद्र–जगदिंद्र प्रभृति–प्रणीतेषु अपि आदरात्। तत्कस्य हेतोः। महाजन–परिग्रहीत–पूर्वागम अ–विरुद्धतया तदनुसारित्वात्। कुतः तर्हि? सिद्ध–प्रमाण्य वेदाविरोधात्। कथं तर्हि कतिपयैः अपि तत्परिग्रहः? अलस–भीरुभिः दुःखमय–जात्य–कर्म–विद्वेषात्। उदुंबर–गर्तीय–तंतुवायवत्। नत्वेवं वेदे, कर्मण्येव निर्भरत्वात्। त्रैवर्णिक–बहिष्कृतैः अनधिकारिभिः अनन्यगतिकत्वात्, कीर्ति–प्रज्ञाकरवत्। नतु एवं श्रुतौ, परैःपूज्यानामपि अत्राप्रवेशात्, इतः पतितानामपि परैरुपादानात्। भक्षपयादि–अद्वैतरुचिभिः च रागात् सरभादिवत्। न त्वेवं आम्राये, तद्विभाग–व्यवस्था–परत्वात्। कुतर्काभ्यांसिभिः च मोहात्, काणाचार्यादिवत्, न त्वेवं ब्रम्हणि, आबाल–भावं प्रवृत्तेः। अविवेकिभिश्च पाषंडिसंसर्गात्, शौंडिकादिवत्। न त्वेवे प्रकृते, पित्रादिक्रमेण प्रवर्तनात्। योगाभ्यासाभिमानिभिः च अव्यग्रताभिसंधेः, सुभूत्यादिवत्। न त्वेवं प्रस्तुते, प्रथमतः कर्मकांडे एव नियोगात्। अयोग्यैः आजीवनात् सामान्य–श्रमणकवत्। न त्वेवं प्रकृते, आगंतुकानां अनधिकारात्। कुहक–वंचितैः समीचीन–प्रत्ययात्, दीपंकर सुषिर–दर्शि–बालिशवत्, न त्वेवं प्रकृते, तदभावात्। किंतु महाजन–परिग्रहात् वक्तृ–प्रामाण्यं अनुमाय। आयुर्वेदे नैरुज्यकामवत् इति।

Trans: Why is it then that the followers of the Vedas do not have any regard for the gospels of the Buddha and others like him? Well! Do not think that this is so because these gospels are authored by persons who entertain the truth of doctrines treated in philosophies antagonistic to the Vedas because the Vedic thinkers have regard even for the gospels of Jinendra and Jagadindra who happen to be such persons. What is the reason for this regard then ? The reason is that these gospels are not opposed to those ancient ones which are upheld by knowledgeable people. Instead they are in agreement with them. If so then why do the

Vedic thinkers disregard the alien gospels? They do so because these are antagonistic to the Vedas whose authority has already been established. If so how is it that even a few persons uphold these gospels? Because these persons being lazy and coward hate to fulfil their casteic obligations as is found in the case of a native weaver of the village called Udumbergarta. This weaver forsook Vedic religion and embraced Buddhism on account of his laziness in fulfilling his religious obligations. Such is not the case with the Vedic people because they have to be wholly devoted to their duties. Also some persons who are ostracised by all the people of the three main castes and are not sufficiently qualified have upheld these gospels because they have no other go. Such are the scholars called Kīrtī and Prajānkara. Such is not the case in the Vedic camp. Even those who are worshipped by aliens are not welcomed in this camp while even those who are turned out by Vedicists are welcomed by aliens. Others who have an eager palate for all kinds of eatables and drinks without any discrimination like Sarabha also follow the alien gospels because of their love for them but this is not possible for the followers of the Vedas as the latter attach great importance to what should or should not be drunk or eaten. The practitioners of sophistries like Kāṇāchārya and others also turn to alien gospels prompted by their prejudices. But nobody can turn to the Vedas because of his prejudices as the initiation in the Vedic path is started right from adolescence. Others like Śoundika who lack the capacity for discrimination have also adopted these gospels because of their liason with atheists. None would be allowed thus to enter the Vedic fold as admission to it is hereditary. Still others like Subhūti who, being proud of their practice of yoga are keen to attain mental poise take to these gospels. But nobody can be thus directly admitted to the Vedic camp as one has to go through the disicipline of karma for gaining the entry (in the camp) Again like the good-for-nothing mendicant called Sāmānya who entered the alien fold to earn his livelihood none will be allowed to enter the Vedic fold. No stray visitor is allowed entry in the Vedic fold. Certain others who like the child which peeping through the hole of an illuminated drum is deluded into thinking that there are many lights there, are misled by charlatans and take the bad for the good also adopt these gospels but such are not the followers of the Vedas. They follow them only after ascertaining inferentially the trustworthiness of the author of the Vedas on the basis of the upholding of the authority of the latter by eminent persons. This is behaving just like the person who is keen to get rid of illness and so follows the prescriptions of the medical science.

Expl: Here some of the important reasons that have prompted many wellknown persons to embrace Buddhism etc. are mentioned. These persons are cowards, helpless, incompetent to earn their livelihood, misled by charlatans and lack disciminative capacity and so on. But those who want to follow the Vedas have however to go through a strict course of

discipline and avoid all the defects of character that appear to stand out amongst the followers of alien gospels.

A query and its detailed reply

Text: किं पुनः अमीषां मूलम्? न हि एतावंतः ग्रंथराशयः पर–विप्रलंभनार्थं प्रणीयंते। न च विश्वमेव विप्रलभ्यं इति चेत्? भवतु किंचित् मूलं किमनेन चिंतितेन? अति–निर्बंधे तु क्षणिक–नैरात्म्यादि प्रतिपादकानां तर्काभ्यासः। प्रतिपादितं च तथा। शून्य साकारादि प्रतिवादकानां तु दुरभ्यासः। योगशास्त्रेषु अभ्यस्यतः स्वरुप–शून्यं इव भाव्यं एकमेव इति प्रतिपादनात्। चैत्य–चीवरादि प्रतिपादकानां तु स्वस्थितिं अभिसंधाय दर्शनांतरा–स्थिति–द्वेषः। स्वस्थितौ प्रमाणं अनपेक्ष्य परस्थितौ विगानात्। ब्रम्हचर्य प्रतिपादकानां तु वेदाः एव। न्यायाविरुद्धं परतंत्रोक्तं अपि आनुकल्य प्रसिद्धेः गृह्यते इति विमर्शात् । मंत्र–कोष–प्ररितपादकानां तु प्रणव–बीज–जातयः सर्वसाधारण्यः। श्रद्धेय–देवतानां आंकस्तु अधिकः। श्रद्धा–परिगृहीतः च आकारः देवता इति हस्तसमालोचः। सत्य–तपः–शालिनां वचनं मंत्रः। विषयवत्यां चिंतायां चित्तस्यैर्थं प्रयोजनम्। कथमन्यथा महर्षीणां शाप अनुग्रह–क्षमता? कथं वा चतुर्भुज–अष्टभुजाद्यवस्थाः इति दुरुहत्वात् इति। एक–विप्रलंभनार्थं वा केनचित् कियदेव प्रणीतं तेन अनुष्ठितं अपरैः तदनुयायिभिः गृहीतं अनुष्ठितं व्याख्यातं विवर्द्धित च इति किं अनुपपन्नम्? तस्मात् विरुद्धागम–व्युदासेन वेदाः एव अर्वाचीन–पुरुष–पूर्वकत्व–व्युदासेन परमेश्वर–प्रणीतत्वात् एव भूतार्थ–भागस्य अप्रमाण्यशंका–व्युदासेन प्रमाणं एवेति नियमः।

Trans: But still what can be the basis of these alien gospels. Certainly such a vast collection of treatises would not have been authored merely to mislead others and certainly the whole world cannot be misled? Yes! there may be some basis but why worry about it? If however one is very keen to know this here are the bases of the different doctrines etc. taught by the Buddhists. The basis of the doctrine maintaining universal momentariness and selflessness is the practice of sophistry and this has already been stated. The basis of the doctrines stating universal emptiness or those referring to forms of cognition is distorted practice. The science of Yoga

has prescribed that a student of Yoga should try to cultivate the state of emptiness of the mind. This has been misinterpreted as the truth of nothingness or emptiness of the world. The basis of the doctrines prescribing obeisance to the sacred pillar and the discarding of cloths which entrench themselves on their own presuppositions, is their aversion to opposed points of view. These doctrines do not seek any valid support for their own positions but take to task the positions opposed to them. The basis of the doctrines teaching celibacy are the Vedas themselves because even the alien doctrines that are not illogical are recognised as in accord with one's own position by a thinker. The basis of the doctrines dealing with a host of incantations are the root-letters like the 'Om' which are common to all Vedic incantations. However the imposition of the symbol of the diety worshipped on the incantation by the aliens is their own innovation. To defend this imposition by the contention that a deity is the same as the form that is entertained for devoted contemplation is sheer tickery. It may however be urged that the mere utterances of men who practise penances and are by nature truthful become incantations and the purpose of meditating upon some deity-like object is to stabilise the mind. How otherwise the great sages would be able to curse or bless anybody or how the same deity would be described as having four hands and eight hands etc.? But these contentions are not acceptable. (If the mere utterances of sages are incantations these would be unlimited and if any object of meditation can be a deity then no deity can be conceived to have a definite form). The fact about the Buddhist and other alien doctrines is that some teacher laid down certain views for misleading a few persons. He practised these views. Those who followed him accepted, practised, elucidated and supplemented these views and thus the alien doctrines have spread. There is nothing inexplicable in this process. Hence as a result of the elimination of the alien doctrines, the dissipation of the doubt regarding the validity of the historical portion of the Vedas and the possibility of any modern person being the author of the Vedas having been ruled out, the Vedas alone are proved to be necessarily valid as they are authored only by God.

Expl: Here it is shown in detail what the real sources of the various questionable doctrines of the aliens are. Sophistry is the source of the doctrines of momentariness and selflessness. Misunderstanding of Yoga is the source of the doctrines of emptiness and of cognitive forms. The source of the practices of the pillor-worship and nudity is mere hatred for opposite views. The doctrine of celibacy has its source in the Vedas themselves. The doctrine of incantations also is based in the Vedas where root-letters for different deities are given. The forms of deity imposed upon these letters by the aliens are their own. They do not think that there are any real incantations or any real deities. All this is disputable.

A query and its reply

Text: कथं चरमः इति चेत्? महाजन–परिग्रहस्य तत्साध्यस्य वा सर्वज्ञ–पूर्वकत्वस्य पुरुषदोषाभावस्य वा प्रामाण्य–हेतोः भूत–भाव्यार्थ–भागयोः साधारणत्वात्। किं तस्य फलमिति चेत्? स्वार्थ–प्रतिपादनम्। किं तेन प्रयोजनम्? यथायथं उपादानं हानं मोक्षाय। तत्र अनर्थहेतूनां तत्वज्ञानात् हानं अर्थहेतूनां उपादानं आत्मनः मोक्षः इति।

Trans: How is the last (that is, the dissipation of the doubt regarding the validity of the historical content of the Vedas) proved? It is proved by the fact that the espousal by eminent men or the divine authorship based upon it or the absence of human failings which are the grounds of validity are all common to both the historical and the imperative portions of the Vedas. 'What is the object of the historical statements?,' it may be asked. The answer is, 'Conveying its meaning', 'What is to be achieved by this?' it may be asked again. The answer is, 'Acceptance of the various spiritually beneficial objects as they are available, discarding of objects of the opposite kind and salvation'. Among these, the causes of spiritual evil are eliminated by means of right knowledge which also procures the means of spiritual good' and as a result of it the salvation of the self.

Expl: The historical and declarative statements of the Vedas are as valid as the imperative ones as they are also upheld by eminent men and authored by God. What they state is conducive to the elimination of spiritual evil, procurement of spiritual good and as a result of this, to the attainment of release.

Explanation of the nature of release

Text: कः पुनरयं मोक्षः? आत्यंतिकी दुःखनिवृत्ति अत्मनः। किं आत्यंतिकत्वम्? तज्जातीय–अत्यताभावविशिष्टत्वम्। तेषां अभावः कथम्? कारणमात्र–उच्छेदात् । अपुरुषार्थोऽयमिति चेत्? न। असत्यस्य, अ–काम्यस्य, अशक्यस्य, दुरंतस्य तथाभावात्। नत्वयं तथा। सत्योऽयम्। प्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्। सर्वैरभ्युपगमात्। काम्यश्च दुःखस्य स्वभावहेयत्वात्। सुखार्थं तद्धानमिति चेत्? न। अतद्धेतुत्वात्। व्याप्तेरिति् चेत्? न। असिद्धेः। न हि दुःखाभावः सुखेन व्याप्यते इति। सुखं तावत् तेन व्याप्यते इति चेत्? तर्हि सुखे सति अवश्यं दुःखाभावः भवेदिति सुखप्रार्थना इति विपरीतापत्तिः। न। अवेद्यत्वात् असौ काम्यः

इति चेत्? न। दुःखार्तानां तदभाववेदनं अनभिसंधाय एव तत्जिहासा दर्शनात्। कथमन्यथा देहमपि जह्युः? अविवेकिनः ते इति चेत्? किमत्र विवेकेन? इष्यमाणता–मात्र–अनुबंधित्वात् पुरुषार्थत्वस्य गम्या–गम्ययोः कामवत्। बहु–तर–अनर्थ–प्रसक्तिशंकया तु शास्त्रं अनुकूलयंतः ते इतरेभ्यः भिद्यते। अपि चैवं कंटकादि–जन्म–दुःख–निवृत्तिः अपि पुरुषार्थः न स्यात्। अवेद्यत्वात्। प्रथमे विद्यते तावदेसौ इति चेत्? तुल्यं मोक्षेऽपि। न अध्यक्षेण इति चेत्? तर्हि दुरित–क्षय कामस्य कर्मानुष्ठान आनर्थक्यप्रसंगः। तदभाव–तत्फलाभावयोः अपि अनध्यक्षत्वात्। उपलब्धि–योग्यतापन्न–अनिष्ट–निवृत्ति–रूपत्वात् अयं अदोषः इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। दुःखवत् सुखस्यापि उच्छेदात् अकाम्योऽयमिति चेत्? न। तृष्णया दोषतिरस्कारेण प्रवृत्तिवत् अलंप्रत्ययेन गुण–तिरस्कारात्, निवृत्तेः अपि दर्शनात्। मधुविष–संपृक्तं अन्नं अत्रोदाहृणम्। संति च केचन अलंप्रत्ययवंतः। न च समत्वं, दुःखस्यैव प्राचुर्यात्। दुःखे सुखहेत्वननुषंगे ऽपि सुखे दुःखहेत्वनुषंगनियमात्। तथा हि न्यायाोपार्जितेष्वेव विषयेषु कियती सुखखद्योतिका कियंति च अर्जन–रक्षणादिपिः दुःखदुर्दिना नि? अन्यायोपार्जितेषु यद्भविष्यति तन्मनसापि चिंतपितुं अशक्यम्। विदांकुर्वतु च संतः यदि कंटकादिजन्येषु दुःखेषु लेशतःऽपि सुखानुषंगः। अस्ति च स्वर्गादिसुखेष्वपि बहुलः दुःखशल्य संभेदः। अतएव विविच्य भुज्यतां तुष–तंडुलवत् इत्यशक्यमिति। शक्यश्चायं निर्वर्त्यत्वात्। स्वंतश्च, अपरावृत्तेः अनर्थवासनाननुकूल–अभिसंधित्वात् च इति।

Trans: What then is this release? It is the absolute elimination of sufferings from the being of the self. What is this absoluteness? It is, (the property of) 'being qualified by the absence of everything of the nature of suffering'. How can there take place absence of all sufferings? It can if all causes of suffering are destroyed. But isn't this an object that is not sought after by men? No! Only that which is unreal, unwanted, impossible and unencompassable is such (is not sought after). But the above is not such. This is real because its reality is testified by valid means of knowledge, is admitted by all and is also the object of desire as suffering is intrinsically the object of aversion. But isn't the removal of suffering intended for the

procurement of happiness? No! It is not the cause of happiness. But aren't these two mutually concomitant? No! The concomitance is not established. Certainly absence of pain is not pervaded by happiness. But isn't happiness pervaded by absence of suffering? Well! in that case people will crave happiness in order to get rid of pain and thus there will result the opposite undesirable contingency that absence of suffering will turn out to be the ultimate goal of life. But not remaining unfelt can't absence of suffering be a desired object? No! suffering people are eager to get rid of suffering even without having the knowledge of the absence of suffering. Otherwise how would they sometimes even commit suicide (which results in total unconsciousness)? But aren't such people irrational? Yes! but what has reason to do with this issue? The desirability of objects alone determines their being the goal of human endeavour. As is the case with the general lust for women whether sexual intercourse with them is moral or not. If this is so the difference between the rational and irrational people consists in the fact that the former, fearing the possibility of the occurrence of great evil (from immoral actions) follow the dictates of the scriptures while the latter do not do so. Moreover on the above view even the elimination of the suffering caused by thorn-pricking etc. cannot be a desired object as it is not deliberately sought after. But isn't it known as soon as it takes place? Yes! but the same is the case with release (or absence of suffering) as it too is known by means of inference and verbal testimony. One may urge against this that there is no perception of absence of suffering. But then one who desires to wipe out his sins will be wasting his time in performing expiatory rites as the absence of sins and of the suffering caused by them are not perceptible (and so he would never know that his sins are wiped out or that he will have no suffering). Mayn't it be urged against this that this elimination of suffering is a thing which is cognisable (though not cognised) and this is sufficient for the elimination to be the object of human endeavour? Yes, but it is the same with total absence of suffering. It may next be asked 'If with suffering happiness too is dissipated in the state of release how can the absence of suffering be a desirable goal?' The answer to this is that just as owing to his excessive desire for a certain object a man ignores its short-comings and is attracted towards it, so being overwhelmed by the sense of satiety towards some object a man may even deprecate its good qualities and turn away from it. A dish concocted out of the mixture of honey and poison is an illustration of this. There are people who are imbued with this sense of satiety. Nor is it the case that happiness and suffering are contained in equal measure in life because suffering definitely exceeds happiness. Even if suffering is not laced with the conditions of happiness, happiness is necessarily laced with the conditions of suffering. To explain: Even in things rightfully acquired how few sparks of happiness are contained and how innumerable are there the rainy or evil days of

suffering resulting from the labours of earning and preserving what has been acquired? As to what will be the case with things or wealth acquired by wrong methods it can't be even imagined. Let people consider for themselves whether there is the slightest admixture of happiness in the sufferings caused by thorn-pricking etc. Even heavenly pleasure is pierced through and through by the shafts of suffering. For this very reason the advice that happiness is to be separated from suffering as chaff from grain and then enjoyed is simply impossible to follow. The said absence of suffering is possible because it can be brought into being; its end-result is good because the revival of suffering thereafter can be stopped and the desire for the absence of suffering is not conducive to the intensification of the craving for any undesirable object.

Expl: Release is defined here as absolute absence of pain or the destruction of pain which does not coexist at the same moment with any pain occurring in the self which is the locus of the former. An alternative definition is, 'The destruction of pain which does not coexist with the anterior absence of pain'. Such absence of pain is an intrinsically desired object. It need not be known in order to be desirable. The dissipation of happiness too in release does not make the utter dissipation of pain any less desirable. One may be too overwhelmed by a sense of satiety and not feel attracted to any pleasure. The absolute absence of pain is possible and achievable as it is not to be followed by a revival of pain. The desire for this absence is not also going to promote any craving for any other object.

Rebuttal of the view that happiness is eternal

Text: नित्यं तु सुखं न सत्यम्। योग्यानुपलंभ–बाधितावात्। श्रुतिस्तत्र मानमिति चेत्? न। योग्यानुपलब्धिवाधिते तदनवफाशात्। अवकाशे ग्रावपलवन–श्रुतेरपि तथाभावप्रसंगात्। नापि काम्यं सदातनत्वात्। न हि यत् यस्यास्ति सः तत् कामयते। भ्रान्तेरेवं कंठस्थचामीकरवत् इति चेत्? न। स्वसंवेद्ये तदभावात्। नापि शक्यम्। न हि तन्निर्वर्त्यं नित्यत्वात्। नापि विकार्यम्। अपरिणामित्वात्। नापि संस्कार्य अनाधेयाति शयत्वात्। न प्राप्यं नित्यसंबधवत्वात्। न ज्ञेयं ज्ञानस्यापि नित्यत्वात्। अनित्यत्वे वा शरीरादिकारणापाये तदनुत्पत्तेः। उत्पत्तौ वा तेषां अकारणत्व–प्रसंगात्। तथा च सर्वः सर्वदर्शी स्यात्। आत्ममनः सयोगादेः सर्वत्रा अविशेषात्। ज्ञान–ज्ञेययोः नित्यत्वेऽपि तत्संबंधो जन्यते। स च षट्पदार्थ व्यतिरेकादुत्पन्नोऽपि न निवर्तते ध्वंसविदिति चेत्? न। भावाभावयोः प्राकारांतराभावात्। तत्र सः नाभावः।

प्रतियोगि–अनुपपत्तेः। भावत्वे त्ववश्यं उत्पन्नो निवर्तेत उपाध्यंतराभावात्। अविद्या विध्वंसनमेव तत्प्राप्तिरिति चेत्? अत्र न नो विवादः। न हि एकविंशति प्रभेद–भिन्न–दुःखव्यतिरिक्ता अविद्या नाम्। तद्विध्वंसतनं च पुरुषार्थ इति प्रतिपादनादिति। दुरन्तं च तत्। तदभिसंधेः सुखसंस्कार–सहकारितया तदुद्भवे विशिष्टसुखाभिलाषिणः वैषयिकेपि प्रवृत्तिसंभवात्। 'अलाभे मत्त–काशिन्याः दृष्टा तिर्यक्सु कामिता। इत्युदाहरणादिति।

Trans: It is however not true to say that happiness is eternal as such a statement is contradicted by the noncognition of the cognisable. But can't the scripture be a proof for this? No! If noncognition contradicts the statement then sceoptural testimony has no legs to stand upon If it were not so the scriptural statements describing the floating of stones would have to be treated as true. Nor is eternal happiness an object of desire as it is always there. Certainly one doesn't desire what one already has. Can't one do so under the influence of illusion as one sometimes desires to retrieve a golden necklace which one is already wearing? No! There cannot be any illusion regarding happiness which as consciousness is considered self-luminous by its advocates. Nor is it procurable (in any way). It is not producible as it is eternal. It is not changeable as it is unhangeable. It is not refinable because no excellence can be imported into it. It is not obtainable as its relation is eternal. It is not knowable as knowledge too is eternal. If knowledge is not eternal it cannot arise in the absence of the body which is its cause. If however knowledge can arise without the body then the body cannot be its cause so that everybody would be able to know everything, the conjunction of self and mind needed for knowledge being available at all places. May it be urged that although knowledge and its object are eternal their relationship which is different from all the six types of categories is noneternal but like the destructive negation it does not go out of existence? No! There cannot be an additional category of object over and above the existent and nonexistence. The relationship cannot be a nonexistence because it has no counterpositive. If however it is an existent then, because it comes into being it necessarily goes out of existence as there is no condition other than 'being born' and 'being destroyed'. (The relation between these is intrinsic). If the destruction of ignorance itself is supposed to be the relation between eternal knowledge and happiness then we have no objection to the view. Certainly ignorance is not different from the twenty-one different types of pains or evils (mentioned elsewhere). It has already been stated that the destruction of these pains is the goal of

human existence. The desire for eternal happiness however has no favourable consummation. This desire being the cause of the residual impression of happiness it may give rise to it and then one who craves for superior types of happiness may run after even sensual happiness if the former is not available to him. As the saying goes, if a ravishing beauty is not available for sexual gratification to a young man, he runs after even an animal to satisfy his lust.

Expl: Happiness cannot be eternal and if it were so it cannot be the goal of human endeavour in any manner whatsoever. It cannot even be sought to be known, for its knowledge too is supposed to be eternal so that it is never unknown. If the destruction of ignorance is itself the knowledge then this view merges with the Nyāya view. But the desire for eternal happiness cannot yield a favourable result as it would produce the craving for more and more happiness of the superior type and if that were not available one may turn even to lower types of happiness.

A question and its answer

Text: स्यात् एतत्। आत्मा तु किं स्वप्रकाश–सुख–स्वभावः अन्यथा वा इति पृच्छामः। श्राद्धोऽसि चेत् उपनिषदः पृच्छ। मध्यस्थो ऽसि चेत् अनुभवं पृच्छा। नैयामिकोऽ सि चेत् न वैषयिक–सुख–ज्ञान–स्वभावः इति निश्चिनुयाः। तदतिरिक्ते तु सुख–ज्ञानव्यवहारे बीजाभावात् तद्व्यवहाराभावः। अनुग्रह–अभिष्वंग–इंद्रिय–प्रसादादि–लक्षणं हि कार्य तद्व्यवहार–बीजम्। अर्थप्रवणत्वं स्मृति संस्कारादिकार्यं ज्ञानव्यवहारादि बीजं लोके। तयो श्चअभावः–आत्मनि। इति।

Trans: Let then there be this query. We ask 'Is the self by nature self-luminous or not?' The answer to this is this, 'If you have faith ask the Upaniṣads. If you are impartial ask your own experience. If you are a follower of logic then decide that the self is not of the nature of pleasure and knowledge arising from sense-object-contact. There is no basis for treating the self which is different from pleasure and knowledge as identical with these. The bases of the usage of the word 'pleasure' are effects like the elation of the senses, attachment and favouring or treating as one's own', and the bases of the usage of the word 'knowledge' are effects like 'objectivity,' 'recollection' and 'residual impressions' etc. and these effects are absent from self.'

Expl: The self has been variously described in the Upaniṣads. A man of faith should consult only the Upaniṣads to know what they really mean the

self to be. If a man is not inclined towards any particular view of self he should go by his personal self-experience to decide what the real nature of self is. If however a person is of logical temperament he can easily decide that the self is other than pleasure, knowledge etc. and is in fact their locus.

Conclusion

Text: तस्मात् —

श्रुते श्रुत्वाऽत्मानं तदनु समनुक्रांतवपुषः।
विनिश्चित्य न्यायादथ विहतहेयव्यतिकरम्।
उपासीत श्रद्धाशमदम विरामेक विभवः।
भवोच्छित्यै चित्तप्रणिधि विहितैः योग विधिभिः॥

उपास्यमाने च तस्मिन् प्रथमं बहिरर्था भासंते यान् आश्रित्य कर्म मीमांसोपसंहारः चार्वाकसमुत्थानं च। तत्प्रतिपोदनार्थं च परांचि खानीत्यादि, तद्धानाय परं कर्मभ्य इत्यादि। अथार्थाकारः यमाश्रित्य त्रैदंडिकमतोपसंहारः योगाचार समुत्थानं च। तत्प्रतिपादनार्थं आत्मैवेदं सर्वंमित्यादि। तद्धानार्थ अगंधमरसमित्यादि। अथार्थाभावः यमाश्रित्य वेदांतद्वार मात्रोपसंहारः। शून्यता–नैरात्म्य समुत्थानं च। तत्प्रति पादनार्थ असदेवेदमग्र आसीदित्यादि। तद्धानाय अंधं तमः प्रविशंति, ये के चत्महनो जना इत्यादि। ततो विवेकः यमाश्रित्य सांख्यमतोपसंहारः शक्ति–सत्व–समुत्थानं च। तत्प्रतिपदनार्थं च प्रकृत्तेः परस्तादित्यादि। तद्धानाय नान्यत् सदित्यादि। ततः केवल आत्मा प्रकाशते यमाश्रित्य अद्वैतमतोपसंहारः। तत्प्रतिपादनार्थ न पश्यर्तात्याहुः, एकीभवतीत्यदि। तद्धानार्थं नाद्वैतं नापि च द्वैतं, इत्यादि। ततः समस्तसंस्कारा भिभवात् केवलोऽपि न विकल्प्यते यमाश्रित्य चरमवेदांतोपसंहारः। तत्प्रतिपादनार्थ यतो वाचो निवर्तते अप्राप्य मनसा सहेत्यादि। सा चावस्था न हेया मोक्षनगर–गोपुराय माणत्वात्। निर्वाणं तु तस्य स्वयमेव। यमाश्रित्य न्यायमतोपसंहारः तत्प्रतिपादनार्थं अथ यो निष्कामः आत्मकामः आप्तकामः सः ब्रम्हैव सन् ब्रम्हाप्येति न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामंति तत्रैव समवलीयंते, इत्यादीनि। तस्मादभ्यासकामोऽपि

अपद्वाराणि विहाय द्वारैरेव पुरद्वारे प्रविशेत्। यतो मार्ग, विमार्ग, संमार्गसंमोहं आशंकमानैः उच्यते 'लक्ष्येण धनुषां योगः इति।

Trans: Hence having learnt about the self from the scriptures and thereafter deciding by means of logic which is systematically formulated (by rebutting alien doctrines), that 'the self is quite other than its discardable appendages like the body, mind, senses, objects etc. one' who has cultivated spiritual wealth comprising faith (in the Vedic statements), control of mind, fortitude, nonattachment to sensory objects and so on, should embark upon the meditation of self by means of the Yogic practices which are aimed at the concentration of mind. By so doing the meditating person attains release from the world.

In the course of meditating or reflecting upon the self, first only external objects come to view. The school of Mīmāṇsā has evolved as a result of studying these external objects. Also the school of C'ārvāks has arisen by studying these objects. A verse of the Katha Upaniṣad refers to this view of self which the C'ārvāk has elaborated. To discard this there occur the Upaniṣadic texts stating that the self is not actions or things related to action. Now comes the stage of meditating upon the self as indentical with objects. The doctrine of Tridandins that everything that is there is self is based upon this meditation. The view of Yogāc'arā Buddhists that all this world consisting of five skandhas is self or consciousness itself also arises from this meditative basis. To discard this too there are the Upaniṣadic statements which aver that the self is devoid of all qualities, substances etc. Now arises the stage of meditating upon the self as excluding all objective and subjective reality. The doctrine of the advocates of the transformation of Brahman that there isn't anything apart from Brahman is based upon this meditation on the exclusive self. This doctorine is only a via media to the Vedānt of Advaita. The view of the utter emptiness and selflessness advocated by Buddhists also arises from this meditative basis. The Upaniṣadic texts stating that the unreal alone was there at the start of creation refers to this view. To repudiate this view there occur statements in Upaniṣads which assert that the destroyers of self fall into deep darkness and so on. Then comes the meditative stage of distinguishing the self from a real world. The Sāmkhyan doctrine is based upon this. The view that Śakti alone is the cause of the world while the self is pure and uninvolved in it also takes its rise from this meditation. The Upaniṣadic statements that the self is beyond Prakrṛi and so on support such a view. This is discarded by the Upanisadic statements that there is no other real than the self and so on. Then comes the meditative stage referring to the self as the only reality. The Advaitic view is based upon it and also the Upaniṣadic statements which aver that on attaining Brahman-knowledge nothing else is seen and the seer becomes one with

the seen and so on. This too is discarded by other texts stating that there is neither duality nor the reverse of it in Brahman and so on. Thus all traces of all experiences having been eliminated even the pure self is not determinately cognised (an indeterminate cognition of such a pure self then takes place). The ultimate Vedānt is based upon this meditative stage. Describing this state there are the texts which state that this pure self is beyond speech and mind. This stage of the indeterminate cognition of self is however not discardable as it is like the coping stone of the city of redemption. Release from this state too of the self takes place of itself and on this is based the doctrine of Nyāya. The texts stating that 'being satiated with all objects of pleasure and having realised its own nature and being, this self comes back to itself and so on' validly describe this last meditative state. Hence one who desires to meditate correctly should avoid the wrong paths to meditation and make his entry through the right path so that if there arises any confusion about the right and wrong path to release then by entering through the right path the arrow, so to say, will hit the target.

Expl: Concluding the protracted discussion and exposition of the nature of self the author lays down the stages through which release of the self in the form of its divestation from all its specific attributes is attained. There is first attentive listening to Vedic texts describing the nature of self. Then the logical discrimination of self from everything with which it is confused. After this start the series of meditations attempted by persons who have cultivated deep faith, sense-control, fortitude, and disgust for worldly pleasures. This attempt is based on Yogic practices which lead to the concentration of mind.

The meditation starts with the affirmation of the activistic life which is concerned with external objects only. Mīmāṇsā is the philosophy which deals with this stage of meditation. C'ārvāk philosophy also takes its rise from this affirmation. The next stage of meditation is that of the affirmation of the world of external objects itself as self. The Tridanda philosophy deals with the objects of this meditation. The Yogāc'arā philosophy of idealism also takes its rise from this meditation. This stage is followed by one in which the world of objects is totally absent. With this is concerned the philosophy of Brahman-transformation. The Buddhist philosophies advocating emptiness and selflessness also arise from this meditative stage. Next comes the meditation on self as distinguished from the real world evolving from Prakrti and the philosophy of Sāmkhya deals with it. Then comes the meditation on the absolute self with which the philosophy of Advaita deals. This is followed by that ultimate meditation in which even the absolute self does not remain the object of determinate cognition as then all traces of experiences are wiped out. Only an indeterminate cognition of such a self is possible and this is beyond the grasp of speech and mind. The release of the absolute self even from this indeterminate cognition occurs not because of any mental state

succeeding it but by means of time associated with the destruction of the self's destiny. The Nyāya philosophy deals with this stage of meditation. The text of the Upaniṣad referring to this highest stage of meditation says that the self which is satiated with everything, seeks to know itself (through its contact with mind) and thus attains its object directly and attains Brahmanhood. Being absolute in its nature it thus merges into itself.

Concluding verse

Text: बहुतर परतंत्र प्रांतर ध्वांत भीत–
स्तिमित पाथिकरक्षासार्थवाहेन यत्नात्।
तदिद मुदयनेन न्यायलोकागमानाम्।
व्यतिहृतिमवधूय व्यंजितं वर्त्म मुक्त्यै ॥
नास्य श्लाघामकलितगुणः पोषयन् प्रीतये नः।
कोऽर्थः चित्रस्तुति–शतविधौ शिल्पिनः स्यात् प्रकर्षः?
निंदामेव प्रथयतु जनः किंतु दोषान् निरूप्य
प्रेक्षान् तथ्यस्खलितवचनं प्रीणयेदेव भूयः ॥

Trans: The author Udayana, the path-finder for those who are frightened and dazed by the pitch-darkness pervading the discarded regions of many an alien school, has unfolded for the former the path of release by removing the obstructions to logic, commonsence and scriptural testimony.

We will not be pleased by the praise of this work by one who is not competent enough to appreciate its merit. How can a painter be glorified if a host of blind men shower praise upon his painting? Let people indulge in criticism of this work only by pointing out its drawbacks. Knowledgeable people are definitely pleased if their attention is drawn to the factual slips unwittingly committed by them.

Expl. The author says that in this work be has tried to do justice to logic, commonsense and scriptures and reconciled them with each other.

An Analytical-Critical Survey of the Polemics in *Ātmatattvaviveka*

Ātmatattvavivēka, also known as *Bauddha-dhikkāra* represents—as the later term indicates—a sustained and relentless attempt to thoroughly expose and, thus subject to ridicule the major Buddhist doctrines. The author of the treatise, the great Udayana, is the outstanding exponent of the stand-point of the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika school. No Buddhist scholar came forward to meet the arguments contained in the treatise. Even earlier Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika authors like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatī etc. attacked the Buddhist arguments very vigorously in their wellknown works, like *Nyāya-Bhāṣya, Nyāya-Vārtika* (a commentary on the latter) *Nyāya-Vartika-Tātparyaṭīkā* (the commentary on the latter) etc., yet the Buddhist could not be effectively silenced by these attacks. Gñansrīmitra, Ratnakīrtī etc., the great Buddhist scholars who came after Vācaspatī, blunted the edge of his arguments by giving a sophistical twist to their counter-arguments directed against the latter. The situation in debate between the Buddhist and Nyāya scholars around this time must have been rather desperate. Vācaspatī gives vent to his feeling of utter desperation in the colphonic verse of his work (Tātparyaṭīkā) thus: O heartless barbarians! I have almost killed myself while trying to refute your doctrines, by subjecting my body to all kinds of trials and tribulations. Please take pity on me and do not try to tar the reputation of your opponents.' Vācaspatī expresses through these words his awareness that the Buddhist arguments are formidable and that they are not completely and finally disposable by his counterarguments.

It is at this point that Udayana the commentator of Vācaspatī boldly takes up the challenge to demolish the Buddhist doctrines once for all by writing a polemical treatise mainly devoted to the task of poohpoohing Buddhism by pushing every one of its arguments to its absurd logical extreme. The Buddhist arguments are attacked at their strongest, very often the author himself putting up strong defence for them (which is not forthcoming even from their redoubtable champions like Dharmakīrtī or Ratnakīrtī) with a view to give a keen edge to his criticism of them. Every conceivable alternative in the defence of the Buddhist position is taken up for consideration and then rejected, thus leaving no scope whatever for a later revival of the same position on a different ground. This is the reason why no Buddhist scholar came forward to redefine the concepts of momentariness, other-exclusion etc., so as to make them invulnerable to Udayana's criticisms. The argumentation between Buddhism and Nyāya came to

a standstill with the advent of Ātmatattvaviveka.

It may here be asked: 'The discussion and establishment of the reality of self forms only a part of the fourth section of the treatise, the remaining portions of the treatise are concerned with other doctrines of Buddhism which are not directly opposed to the reality of self; what then is the justification in describing the treatise as, 'A Rational inquiry into the real nature of 'self' by the descriptive title given to it by the author?' To get a satisfactory answer to the question it is necessary to realize that the Buddhists are not opposed to the Nyāya concept of the embodied self only, even the concept of the self of things or their 'durable' identity is an athema to them. The word 'self' is used by Buddhists in the comprehensive sense of 'identity' which is simultaneously the identity through time, space, substance and common genus. The external object or the internal self is supposed to exist for more than one moment, occupies more than a single point of space (unless it is an atom), is the repository of many qualities and is also generically similar to many other objects. The Buddhists are opposed to every one of these aspects of the identity of all things. Their doctrine of universal momentariness militates against temporal identity of things; their doctrine of the non-composite nature of all things goes against the spatially-pervasive or spread-out character of things. Similarly their doctrines of the purely adjectival nature of all reals and the other-exclusivist nature of universals are opposed respectively to the substantive and generic identity of things. Thus the Buddhists set forth a theory of the nature of reality itself through their doctrine of selflessness. Udayana is therefore justified in criticizing all the doctrines of Buddhism which are the bases of the concept of the absolutely-discrete as real maintained by the latter. In the first section of his treatise Udayana takes up for detailed critical consideration the doctrine of universal momentariness. The doctrine of non-compositeness of the real is considered later. A separate section is devoted to the discussion of the non-substantive nature of the real where the non-difference of substance and its qualities is criticized. The doctrine of apoha or the exclusivist nature of generic identity is considered in the course of the discussion of momentariness itself.

Many different arguments are adduced by the Buddhists to prove momentariness of the real. By momentariness is meant the existence of things for a single moment or the ultimate unit of time, only. This moment is the same as the moment of the origination of things. Thus all the reals come into being and also exist for a single moment and in the immediately next moment they go out of existence completely or without leaving any residue in the form of past existence. There is nothing like past or future existence. Nyāya is totally against such a view. Except certain entities like the last sound-vibration in a series of sound-

vibrations every entity exists at least for two moments, namely the moment of its coming into being and the moment next to it. Nothing however ephemeral can go out of existence in the very next moment of its origination for, both origination and destruction are caused events. If a certain causal collocation brings a thing into existence then another causal collocation will be required to throw it out of existence. This collocation cannot coexist with a thing at the very moment when it has originated. For example a clay-pot can be struck by a stick only after it has come into being. So the destructive collocation of causes to demolish a thing can take place earliest only in the second moment of the occurrence of the thing. The destruction of the thing cannot occur earlier than the third moment of its existence. The Buddhists are able to maintain their momentarlist view of reality—without infringing the law of causation—only because they regard things as innately destructible, which means that things are self-destroyed. No extraneous cause is really needed for the destruction of a thing. But though self-destroyed, things are not self-caused in the Buddhist view.

Buddhism is the advocate of radical change which means de novo origination of things and their total destruction immediately often their origination. This fact is indicated by the doctrine of 'Pratitya-samutpada' which is the characteristic Buddhist doctrine of causality. According to its usual explanation the (prior) occurrence of the cause gives rise to the later occurrence of the effect, which means that the cause is such only because it (invariably) antecedes the effect without coexisting with it. Similarly the effect is the effect of the cause only because it immediately follows the occurrence of the cause, without coexisting with it. This absolute coming into and going out of being of things is radical change which is also called the momentariness of things by the Buddhists. Stcherbatsky the great Russian Buddhist scholar describes this change as 'taccato change' to distinguish it from the kind of change advocated by the Sāmkhyans. Stcherbatsky has given the name 'Leggato change' to describe the continuous uninterrupted change of things which according to the Sāmkhya thinkers is the very nature of things. The commonly-observed differences among things are in reality only the differences of their forms (or manifestations). The distinction of qualities and substances is also a variety of the distinction of form and formed things in the Sāmkhyan view.

The Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika view of change is a sort of compromise between the Buddhist and the Sāmkhyan views. Both continuity and discontinuity (in different respects) of the change in things are maintained by this school. So far as the qualities like colour, taste, smell, feel etc. of things are concerned their change is discontinuous. When one quality fades out another quality similar or dissimilar to it takes its place. There is no coexistence of different but generically similar qualities in the same

thing. A thing cannot be both yellow and green or hot and cold at the same time. Different colours permeating different parts of the same thing are regarded as a unique complex colour in this school. This is true of other qualities also. The thing endowed with the changing qualities however remains unchanged in its identity from beginning to end. Thus notwithstanding the inherence of changing qualities in things the identity of the latter remains unaffected. But even with regard to qualities the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika school does not subscribe to the view that the qualities are momentary in existence. Qualities may exist for two or more moments but certainly not for a single moment only as momentariness means. The Mīmāṇsā view on this matter is the Sāmkhyan view with a difference. Qualities of things are no better than their different aspects. So change of qualities is the same as the change of aspects which certainly affects the being of things. This change is continuous but not every change of aspects so affects the being of things as to alter it completely or to transform one thing into another. Unlike the Sāmkhya, Mīmāṇsā maintains that there are differences in things which are not reducible to differences of mere forms.

Advaita Vedānt is diametrically opposed to Buddhism in denying all change and regarding all experience of change as mere appearance. Even phenomenal change is only an inseparable state of being of a thing. A sitting or walking Devadutta is the same as a young or old Devadutta. Even the qualities, properties or genera characterizing things are not other than so many different states or aspects of them. So the appearance and disappearance of qualities need not be taken to affect the identity of the thing to which they belong. The distinction of things and their states is however relative at the phenomenal level while it is nonexistent at the numenal level. For example the dark colour of an unbaked claypot is just a state or aspect of it not differentiable from it, for an unbaked clay-pot cannot but be dark in colour. However the clay-pot itself may be looked upon as a state or aspect of the clay of which it is made. Clay occurs as clay-pot or other clay articles if it is moulded into other shapes and so all the clay-articles can best be viewed as no better than aspects or states of clay.

Having had thus a bird's eye view of all major Indian philosophical views regarding change we now turn to the various arguments the Buddhists have marshalled in support of their momentarist theory or the theory of absolute change. The first argument is based on the appearance of incompatible properties in the so-called durable entity. For example the seed of mango is productive of mango-sapling only when it is sown in the soil, not when it lies idle in the granary. If the seed remained identical in both the conditions it would be endowed with both capacity and incapacity for producing the seedling. Since capacity and incapacity are incompatible properties the entity

appearing to be endowed with them cannot be one and the same. The Buddhist may here argue directly that the seed in the granary and the seed in the soil cannot be identical as the former is unproductive of seedling while the latter is so. But production and non-production are properties whose incompatibility coupled with their apparent coexistence in the seed entails its diversity. Moreover in the Buddhist view non-production is non-existence (of production) which therefore is nothingness. It cannot be considered as combinable with production.

Now the question arises,'what is the nature of capacity?'. If capacity is productivity itself then its absence will be the same as non-production. But as stated above these cannot be taken to be incompatible as the same thing is observed to be productive and non-productive at different times. The Buddhist has therefore first to establish the incompatibility of certain properties and then on the basis of the incompatibility proceed to prove diversity as above. If capacity is equated with competence then perhaps the said incompatibility can be maintained, as the same thing cannot be both competent and incompetent. Now the nature of this competence will have to be specified. There are three ways in which competence can be specified. One is to identify it with the collocation of causal conditions. Any thing which is accompanied with the collocation of auxiliary causal conditions is invariably productive of its effect. But like production collocation too cannot be treated as a property. To things in certain circumstances this collocation may be available and in certain others it may not be available. A property on the other hand is not a variable characteristic of a thing.

Another way of specifying competence is to equate it with non-productivity due to the absence of causal auxiliaries. This definition fares no better than the previous one as non-production is absence which is nothing in itself. It cannot be treated as a property of the cause. But if as the Nyāya logicians say, competence is nothing but the generic property of things which determines their causality (as stickiness for example determines the causality of the stick relating to the production of the pot) then the argument for momentariness loses all point. Even the idle seed is competent in this sense of competence as seedness characterises it and all other seeds. The Buddhist can save his argument only if he denies the generic property seedness to be determinative of the causality of the seed and postulates a special property like 'immediate productivity' as the determinant of the causality of the productive seed only. But there is no proof for postulating such a property. The fact that certain seeds produce the seedling without delay (those sown in the soil) and others do not do so (the idle ones) but require the collocation of auxiliaries to be productive, cannot be cited as a proof for the postulation of the unique property. The difference between immediate and deferred production

can well be explained otherwise. It may perhaps be urged against this that the seed which is surrounded by auxiliaries is seen to be immediately productive. So 'immediate productivity' has to be regarded as a natural property of the productive seed. This contention is not correct. If the cause accompanied with auxiliaries is productive this only proves that the cause together with the auxiliaries is immediately productive. It does not prove that the cause alone is characterized by the said property . If due to some sudden obstruction even the cause accompanied with auxiliaries does not produce its effect then even such a cause cannot be supposed to be immediately productive. Such an unproductive cause would not differ from a cause which is unaccompanied by any auxiliary. Moreover if immediate productivity is postulated as the determinant of causality then 'immediate productivity at a particular place' may as well be postulated as such a determinant. It is true that not all causal individuals are productive of the effect and that too in all circumstances but the casual individual that is productive is so under its generic character only. Besides if immediate productivity were the intrinsic property of the productive seed then the accompaniment of the auxiliaries would not be needed for activating such a seed. If only in the midst of auxiliaries the productive seed is supposed to acquire the property then the property cannot be intrinsic.

It may yet be contended that the cause must be by nature either immediately (after its origination) or mediately (or sometime after its origination) productive. These two are mutually —opposed properties. So either of these must characterize the cause. It cannot be devoid of both of them. If the cause is characterized by the property of mediate or delayed production then there being no conceivable limit on the delay, the production may not take place at all during the tenure of the cause. So the other alternative of immediate production has necessarily to be adopted. This contention may be met thus: In different senses both the above (apparently) mutually-opposed alternatives can be entertained. The production by a cause is delayed if the collocation of the auxiliaries is not available to it. But if the full complement of auxiliaries is available to it as soon as it comes into being it goes into production immediately. Thus both the properties—if they are such—can coexist in the cause. Can it be urged against this that it is very likely that the competent cause alone is accompanied with auxiliaries, so the competent which is immediately productive has alone the advantage of being accompanied by auxiliaries? No! The contention is untenable as it fails to explain the distinction between the ineffective (in seedling-production) pebble and the idle seed as both are incompetent as implied in the contention. The distinction cannot be satisfactorily explained on the ground that the pebble is absolutely incapable of producing the seedling while there is some possibility of the idle seed

giving rise—through a succession of intermediate seed-entities-to a productive seed-entity. If the idle seed is indirectly productive one should be able to know when it is so. Perhaps one may reply that there is doubt about this. If so the nature of the doubt needs to be explained. Three different doubts may arise in the case. One is the doubt whether the cause can be productive even if there is collocation of all auxiliaries. Another is the doubt whether the cause can be productive even if unaccompanied by the auxiliaries. The last is the doubt that although the cause does certainly produce the effect if accompanied by auxiliaries yet one cannot say when the auxiliaries are likely to collocate. Of these the first two doubts have no scope in the case of the validly-ascertained causality of the cause and its auxiliaries. The third doubt however can arise but the doubt presupposes that all the causal entities (the idle and the active ones) are alike in that the collocation of the auxiliaries can occur with any one of them and then it can quite well be productive. None of these (causal) entities can be earmarked as the one which alone is competent and so accompanied with auxiliaries. Even the incompetent (for seedling - production) pebble is so often found to be accompanied by the auxiliaries like soil, water, air, heat etc. without being productive.

It is obvious from the above that the Buddhist, by slightly changing the tack is now trying to connect the intrinsic competence of the cause with the collocation of the auxiliaries. He is suggesting that these two are necessarily connected so that unless a cause is (really) competent it cannot be accompanied by auxiliaries. It is rather rash to suggest this as auxiliary-collocation is quite extraneous to the cause and its competence. Yet if experiential evidence were available for this suggestion it may be accepted. But as is shown very convincingly by means of positive and negative instances, competence cannot be supposed to be necessarily connected with the collocation unless both the cause and the collocation of auxiliaries are taken to be jointly competent. This would mean that each of these is not separately capable of producing the effect for which the simultaneous presence of both is essential. This is one sense of competence which is not unacceptable to N.V. This does not support or go against the other sense of competence in which the cause itself is competent but it does not help establish any distinction between the cause when it is accompanied and when it is not by the collocation.

Since the exclusive causality of the productive causal entity stands now repudiated the Buddhist changes the tack again and seeks to prove the causal determinacy of the property of 'immediate productivity'. This means that the causal entity is a cause 'as an immediately productive entity' and not 'as an entity representative of its generic type'. The seed for example is the cause not as seed but as an immediately-productive

entity. This would exclude the unproductive seed-entities from the class of seedling-causes. The causality of the auxiliaries however is not affected by the transfer of determinacy to 'immediate productivity'. The cause is productive only in the company of the auxiliaries but it is so only as an 'immediately productive entity'. Several objections can be taken to such a view. First, there is no basis whatever for such a gratuitous assumption. A pot for example produces its various effects in the whole span of its existence only as an entity of the genus 'pot'. There is no ground whatsoever to support the view that the varied productivity of the pot is determined not by potness but by the exotic property postulated by the Buddhist. In the absence of any proof the postulated property would only be an imaginary entity. Besides if such postulations were to be made in other cases like, say the sense-organs (which are regarded as invisible and therefore only as inferred, by the N.V. logicians), then the causality of these in respect of various sensations would have to be discarded in favour of the view that some entity (not necessarily the sense-organ) which is 'immediately productive' is the cause of sensations. It would not then be necessary to specify a particular entity as the cause of sensation. Any entity endowed with the said property can play the role of the cause. Further, the hypothetical property cannot be treated as a generic property.

A generic property cannot overlap another property but the postulated property overlaps the property of paddyness as some paddy is productive and some is not and things other than paddy are also productive . The Buddhist may retort against this that as he does not admit generic properties the said property could be regarded by him as a non-generic property. But even a non-generic property cannot be supposed to be overlapping as it would not be distinctive of that in which it is reposed. Moreover if the characteristic generic property like seedness of the seed did not determine, through the causality of the seed the characteristic property—seedlingness—of the seedling, then the seedling would be producible even by things other than the seed. It will not do to say against this that since things differing from the seed do not have the seed-characteristic they do not produce the seedling. If this were the truth then, since things other than paddy do not have the characteristic property of the paddy they would also not be productive of any seedling which is the product of paddy. The fact is that any property characterising a thing is admissible only if its existence is called for by positive and negative association of the thing as endowed with the property and its effect. In the instant case if the seed as seed is not required for the production of any effect the admission of the reality of seedness characterising seed would be gratuitous. If this were not so then the seed could as well be endowed with the property of pebbleness. Mere perceptual testimony cannot be a proof for the reality

of a property. The Buddhist himself does not set much store by perceptual testimony for establishing the reality of things. It is the criterion of 'Effectiveness in producing some significant activity' 'that is adopted by the Buddhist as a criterion to test the reality of things and properties. So if the 'seed' as 'seed' is not found to be effective in producing any significant activity (but is so only as endowed with the property of immediate-productivity) then seedness cannot be a real property of the seed.

It has therefore to be admitted willy-nilly that if seedness for example, invariably characterises the seed there must be some entity whose causality pertaining to the seed is determined by seedness. The cognition of the seed cannot be the entity (caused objectively by the seed) the causality relating to which is determined by seedness. Not all cognitions of the seed are objectively caused by the seed. The yogic cognition of the non-existent future seed or its recollection does not depend upon the actual existence of the seed. Even the normal sensory or non-perceptual cognition of the seed does not necessarily depend upon the seed as seed or upon all seeds. It is not the case that every seed is invariably known. Many come into and go out of being quite unknown to anybody. Can one maintain against this that there is some invisible entity whose production by all the seeds is determined by seedness ? No ! This view cannot be accepted because if the seed is the material cause of the entity produced, then the entity cannot inhere with the seedling in the seed. A noncorporeal entity also cannot have the seed as its material cause as the Buddhist does not admit noncorporeal entities. The seed cannot be an efficient cause either of the entity (produced by it). Some other efficient causes also being required for the generation of the entity and these other causes not being necessarily coexistent no entity can be taken to be the necessary product of the seed (or the cause). If one urges against this that the seed by itself is productive (only) of one of the entities namely, the seed-series, the seedling and the seed-cognition (and so the seed character of the seed is ensured) then even in the case of the production of the seedling by a seed the production of seed-cognition or another seed by the seed cannot be avoided. Besides if the seed is intrinsically productive of these diverse effects it can produce these even in the absence of the auxiliaries. The point of these arguments is that nothing can be specified as the invariable product of all seeds including the idle and the active seed. Thus the foregoing contention of the Buddhist entails the absurd contingency of denying the natural generic property seedness of the seed to be the causal determinant and postulating an exotic property to be such a determinant besides assigning an unseen effect to the visible cause like the seed (as argued above) and an invisible determinant like the exotic property, of the causality of the

visible effect like the seedling.

The crux of the above argument and counter-argument is this. The Buddhist seeks to prove that the nature of the productive seed is different from that of the unproductive one. Only the productive seed is endowed with the nature of 'immediate productivity'. This proof is countered by the argument that even the idle seed unproductive of seedling is real and so must be productive if not of seedling then of something else. But such a view results in absurdity. Besides, just as the Buddhist distinguishes the productive seed from the unproductive one so the common man distinguishes the seed as such from other things which can never produce the seedling. If all non-seedling-productive things like the idle seed, as also pebbles etc. are lumped together as devoid of immediate productivity then the common distinction of seeds and things other than the seed would be left unexplained. Also there would result the abnormality of treating the idle seed as productive of different effects on different occasions and yet being endowed with an identical nature and being commonly regarded as generically similar to the productive seed.

It is possible to meet this objection by urging that even the inactive seed does not remain the same unchanging entity from moment to moment. So at one moment one of the inactive momentary seeds may give rise to one effect while at others the other momentary seeds in the series may give rise to other effects. There needn't be a common effect for all the different seeds to produce so that the latter could all be identified as seeds and distinguished from things like pebbles. The Buddhist cannot attach much importance to this distinction. For him it is just like the distinction between the effective and inactive seeds. But even the Non-Buddhist cannot give a satisfactory account of the distinction inasmuch as the ineffective (in producing the seedling) pebble is just like the idle seed. There is no effect which every seed including the idle one—may be supposed to produce, as the latter does not produce anything at all. If seed-nature or seedness is taken to determine actual productivity it cannot be supposed to characterise the idle seed. On the other hand if seedness is regarded as determinative of the productivity of the seed only if it is combined with causal auxiliaries, (that is to say, only if the seed is under certain conditions) then seedness being unconnected with the auxiliaries it cannot be supposed to determine the productivity of the seed at all.

However both the Non-Buddhist and the Buddhist have to explain the distinction in respect of causality between seeds as such and the pebbles. The Non-Buddhist may do so by taking recourse to possibility of productivity which is common to all needs whether they produce or do not produce. Seedness may be supposed to encompass both the actually-producing and those capable of producing seed-entities.

Capability here is to be taken in the sense of 'producing while accompanied by auxiliaries'. The Buddhist too may explain the distinction by treating the idle seed as indirectly giving rise to the production of the seedling through a series of unproductive seed entities. The cases of the seeds which remain totally unproductive throughout their existence can be explained by the Buddhist more or less on the same lines as the Non-Buddhist does. Possibility of production in the case of such seeds may be understood more or less in the same manner by both the Buddhist and the Non-Buddhist.

Now slightly changing the ground the Buddhist sets forth his earlier argument for momentariness in a different form. Conceding the point raised by the opponent that an entity of a certain type can be productive while another exactly like it may not be so due to presence or absence of causal collocation in the two cases, the Buddhist nevertheless maintains that a single entity cannot be (under any circumstances) both productive and non-productive. If an entity is productive it cannot be otherwise simply because the two properties of productivity and non-productive are mutually incompatible and so cannot coinhere in the same entity. Replying to this argument the opponent urges that none of the three (well-known) possible forms of incompatibility hold good of the relationship of productivity and non-productivity characterising a causal entity. First, two properties which negate each other are mutually incompatible as are for example eternity and non-eternity. Productivity and non-productivity however are not such mutually-opposed properties. Nothing in the world is absolutely non-productive as everything on the Buddhist view itself is productive of something or other and in the Non-Buddhist view also everything is continually productive all through its existence. Productivity and non-productivity have therefore to be taken in the qualified sense like 'productivity at one time and non- productivity at a different time'. These two are not opposed to each other at all. Productivity and non-productivity at the same time are of course mutually incompatible but the Non-Buddhist does not say that these properties characterise any causal entity. The second possible form of incompatibility for any two properties consists in their being concomitant with each other's negation as are for example heat and coldness. Now productivity and non-productivity being opposed to each other, production by a thing at a certain time will exclude non-production by it only at that time and not at any other time. If it did so at other times then it will be productive at all times which is an absurdity. So this alternative fares no better than the previous one. The third form of incompatibility is mere difference which does not prove the difference or diversity of the entity (characterised by the different properties).

Now if by this strategy production and non-production are sought to

be reconciled with each other so that the same entity could be taken to be productive at one moment and just the opposite of it at another then it should be possible for the same inanimate substances to have different dimensions at different periods of their existence. Even other attributes like weight, smell, feel etc. inhering in the substance could be different at different times. This possibility cannot be ruled out logically. But the perceived nature of the substances is such that if they are endowed with a certain dimension at the time of their origination they cannot come to have a different dimension at any subsequent time. The reason for this is that a substantive gross entity cannot have an increase in its dimension without giving rise to another substantive entity out of its own parts. But the same parts of an entity cannot sustain through material causality two entities endowed with different dimensions. Two (material or gross entities cannot occupy or inhere in the same limited) space. One of them has got to exclude the other. Of course a new entity can be fashioned out of the components of the old entity by the addition of some additional material to them. This would result in a total change of the composition of the older substance. A mere mechanical aggregation of material components however does not lead to the origination of a new substance.

One may here raise the query that if two different dimensions are not ascribable to the same substance even at different times, are then both production and non-production at different times ascribable to the same causal entity? In reply it may be stated that unqualified production and nonproduction—as shown previously—are not opposed to each other. Production and nonproduction at the same time are however mutually opposed and these cannot be ascribed to the same thing. Everything is necessarily productive but not necessarily productive at a particular time. Production at any time during its existence is enough to qualify a thing to be called 'necessarily productive'. Even absolute nonproduction—due to non-availability of auxiliary-collocation throughout its existence cannot rule out the necessary productivity of a thing. Just as a thing can be necessarily productive even if it is productive at some unspecified moment of its existence, it can remain so even if no auxiliary-collocation were available to it for being productive. No distinction need here be made between non-production during the major portion of the span of existence of a thing and its total non-production.

This answer is not very convincing. It may be conceded that production at some time or other is adequate to meet the demand of the necessity of production by a thing. But how can this make a totally non-producing cause necessarily productive? As mentioned above many causal entities remain unproductive all through their existence for lack of the availability of auxiliary collocation. Can such entities be

necessarily productive in the absence of any production whatsoever ? If something other than production say competence—is said to be necessary, then production may best be just an occasional consequence of competence and so even if competent the causal entity may remain unproductive. But how to understand this competence ? If the generic property inherent in the causal entity and determining its causality is equated with its competence then the question has to be faced as to how seedness, for example, determines the causality of the unproductive seed? If there is no production by a seed there cannot be even causality in it, so how can there be any determinant of it?

Leaving aside this point if we turn to another related point which is raised here by the Buddhist we find that the N.V. rejoinder to it is rather unconvincing. The Buddhist asks how what is necessarily competent at one time loses the competence at another time or what was incompetent at one time acquires competence at another. The query is obviously based on the assumption that competence is productivity which does not characterise a causal entity (if it is thought durable) through all its existence. The N.V. rejoinder to the point is that competence is not lost or gained by any cause as competence consists in the production of the effect when the auxiliary collocation is available to the cause. If the collocation is not available the cause by itself would not produce its effect but this non-production does not amount to its incompetence. It is not necessary that the auxiliaries which are the products of their own respective causes should be at the bek and call of the causal entity. So necessary competence and occasional productivity can go together (in the cause).

What is unsatisfactory in this rejoinder is the assertion that the cause coupled with the auxiliaries is necessarily competent or productive. No objection need be taken to this assertion as the effect is invariably produced when the cause and the auxiliaries are jointly present. But if this is the truth of the matter how can one say that the cause by itself is competent? The very idea of the intrinsic competence of the cause is rendered otiose by the above explanation. From what the author—Udayana—says here in reply to an objection of the Buddhist it appears that the idea of a cause being intrinsically productive if it is accompanied by auxiliaries does not seem to him paradoxical. But if there is no paradox here then even the idea that the cause is intrinsically accompanied by auxiliaries should also not appear to be paradoxical. Further, as the cause is described as intrinsically competent the auxiliaries too could be so described. It is rather puzzling to say by way of explanation of the paradox that auxiliaries are not all available always to the cause as they are dependent upon their own causes occurring at different times for their production, so that despite the cause being intrinsically competent it is only occasionally

productive. The author seems to be trying his level best to keep competence and productivity apart (as not involving each other) but again and again he is brought back to some kind of admission or confession that they involve each other.

Now the non-Buddhist seeks to turn the tables against the Buddhist by using his own mode of argument. In view of the temporal adverbs 'when' and 'then' used by the Buddhist in his arguments (like, when the seed is competent it should then produce the effect even if unaccompanied by the auxiliaries) if adverbs of place like 'where' and 'there' are used then it can be proved that even the momentary entity is diversified into innumerable different entities occupying different places (where different effects come into being). This predicament can be avoided only by maintaining the absurd proposition that all the (supposedly) different places are the places where production takes place. So if a momentary cause its seen to be productive at one place it should be taken to be simultaneously productive at all places. It cannot be productive at one place and unproductive at others in spite of the fact that it is not seen to be present at all other places. Another likely remedy to the predictament is rather a desperate one. It is to switch over to the idealistic view according to which all places and things in those places are nothing but conseriousness itself. Thus one is not required to admit any kind of diversity in things. But on this view one has to give up the law of causation too on which the very criterion of reality applied by the Buddhists is based. Besides the argument for momentariness is also based on the causal law. If however the infinite diversity of the momentary entity corresponding to the infinitely numerous places of possible production of the effects of the former is conceded, then each of the entities (into which the momentary entity is differentiated) will also have to be treated as diversifiable. The argument for the further diversity of the diversified would be just like the original argument. If a momentary entity at the place P1 is productive only at P1 and not at some distance from P1 then it is different from the entity productive at the distance. Here it is to be noted that production by a cause does not occur at every point of space. So there are always available places at which a certain cause must be regarded as unproductive. Thus reality will be reduced to what is called 'a point-instant' in modern physics.

These arguments cannot be faulted, for they are based on the very principle which is the pivot of all Buddhist arguments for momentariness ('namely the principle of the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties'). If a momentary entity is (effective or) productive at all places despite its absence there it must produce the effect at every place. If it does not do so then it is both productive and non-productive. Can one urge against this that although an entity is

endowed with the nature which remains the same throughout space yet it has inherited from its own causes the peculiar trait of being productive only at the place which it occupies, then the same can be said of the durable entity too. Such an entity though endowed with a nature which remains the same through all changes of time yet it may be supposed to have inherited the peculiar trait of being productive only on being accompanied by the auxiliaries. If non-production at a different place than the place of occupation of a causal entity is not incompatible with production at its place of occupation then nonproduction in the absence of auxiliaries and production only in their presence by the cause, also, will not be incompatible with each other. The upshot of this argument and counter-argument is the simple oft-repeated truism that a thing can be both productive and non-productive at different times depending upon the availability or nonavailability of the collocation of auxiliary conditions to it. The other truism that also follows from the above is the obvious fact that production by a cause at a certain place is opposed to nonproduction at the same place and not at any other place.

An argument similar to the foregoing could however be adduced by the Buddhist. It would run like this : Whatever produces a certain effect at a certain moment does continue to produce it throughout its existence. (This is positive proof). Also whatever does not produce an effect at a certain moment does never produce it. (This is negative proof). These arguments appear to disprove the effectiveness of the durable entity in producing anything because it is not seen to be continually productive. As against this argument it may be asked whether it is aimed at the individual causal entity or a class of such entities. If the first is true then the proof is otiose (or ineffective) because absolute ineffectiveness of an individual (causal entity) is due to its absolute incompetence (as is the case with pebbles in respect of the seedling). Even an unproductive entity is competent for production as is evident from the fact that on being accompanied by the auxiliaries it does produce the effect. If the second alternative is true then in a class of entities we come across both production and nonproduction. Some members of the class are unproductive because they are unaccompanied by auxiliaries while others, (being accompanied by auxiliaries) are productive. There is nothing inconsistent in this.

Having failed to prove incompatibility between production and non-production in the individual cause or a class of causes the Buddhist now seeks to prove incompatibility between collocation and non-collocation of auxiliaries. A cause having the collocation is not the same as that which does not have it. This is the crux of the argument-series which is now being launched by the Buddhist. That the coming together of one causal condition with another to bring into being a

joint product involves inconsistency is now being shown by means of certain dubious assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that, of any two objects one is just the negation of another. So if these two were to be taken to coexist it would be tantamount to taking an entity to coexist with its own absence. If for example 'b' is equivalent to non-a then ba will be equivalent to a-non-a and this amounts to self contradiction. The second argument goes still further and denies the very possibility of the negation of a positive entity. As the Sāmkhyans maintain, the real positive entity cannot be unreal and so it cannot be the counterpositive of its own negation. Next, conceding per impossible that the real can exclude its absence it is denied in the third argument that the real can do so while it exists. So long as the real exists the possibility of its absence cannot be envisaged. The fourth argument disputes the possibilities of the real and its absence occurring (and existing) at the same place. The fifth denies the cooccurence coupled with coexistence of the real with its absence. Going a step further the sixth argument objects to cooccurence coupled with coexistence at a particular spot of the real and its absence. How the collocation of a cause with the auxiliary conditions involves the six different types of coming together of a positive entity and its negation will be clear in the course of the non- Buddhist's refutation of the arguments. It is obvious that the crux of all these arguments is the Buddhist contention that collocation or temporal, spatial or any other kind of relationship between any two things for any purpose is simply inconceivable. To prove this the Buddhist is prepared to join hands with the Sāmkhayan thinker whose view of reality is diametrically opposed to his.

Controverting the first of these arguments the Non- Buddhist says that he does not admit that things are of the nature of mutual exclusion. Such a view is simply absurd. If of the two entities a and b, b is nothing but not-a then a too will be nothing but not-b. So neither a nor b will be what they are ordinarily supposed to be. The second argument is ruled out by the fact that the Sāmkhayan doctrine that the real can never be nonexistent is not acceptable either to the N.V. or even to the Buddhist. The third argument may apply only to anterior and posterior negations of things which do not coexist with them. But the relational non-existence of things does certainly cooccur with them. If there is a pot at a certain place its absence can quite well exist at a different place contemporaneously with the pot. As to the fourth which states that a cause cannot coexist with the absence of the auxiliaries , that is to say, the cause and the auxiliaries have always to be together, it is urged that if the cause and the auxiliaries are quite different from each other it cannot be stipulated that the two must always go together. There cannot be a necessary relationship of any kind between different things. Moreover the several causes of the auxiliaries are quite different from

that of the main cause and they come into being at different times. How can it then be ensured that all these causes of causes should occur together at the same time so that the collocation of the main cause and the auxiliaries may invariably take place at a certain time ? It may be urged against this by the Buddhist that destruction being intrinsic to things everything is destroyed of itself in the very next moment of its origination. This being the case the origination of things from their causal collocation can be understood only as origination of one conglomeration of discrete entities from another conglomeration of such entities. The view of necessary self-destructibility of things will be taken up for critical consideration later. As to the fifth argument it may be flatly stated that the coexistence of a thing and its absence is not at all involved in the collocation of auxiliaries and it has never been asserted by the non-Buddhist.

It is obvious from the foregoing criticisms that the Buddhist contention that no two things can ever come together is not well taken. Even for the Buddhist things are not intrinsically mutually exclusive. Of course to discard the generic universal Buddhists take the latter to be the same as the exclusive nature of things. For example a claypot is a claypot because its being excludes everything other than itself. In the N.V. view the being of the claypot is the same as the universal potness.This potness certainly excludes things other than pots. But it also includes or subsumes all pots under itself. If exclusion were the whole of the being of a thing then the thing will not have an identifiable nature at all.

Now the Buddhist attacks the very concept of collocation. He argues that collocation is conjunction of the different auxiliary causal conditions of an effect. This conjunction is non-pervasive by nature. Two things of which one is conjoined with another as the monkey (for example) is conjoined with the tree on which it is perched the conjunction involved is non-pervasive. If the monkey is sitting on a certain branch of the tree it is in conjunction with the branch only. The rest of the tree is devoid of the monkey. Thus the conjunction or contact of the monkey with the tree and similarly all conjunctions are by nature non-pervasive of at least one of the conjuncts. So all the auxiliary causes of a seedling for example, like water, soil, air, sun etc. are the same both when conjoined and when disjoined (their conjunction not being pervasive of all of them). This being so it may be asked why these various causal conditions in their separate occurrence do not produce the seedling. To say in reply that all these together are needed for the production does not mean anything other than the fact that each of these is needed for the production. The togetherness of these is simply their nonpervasive conjunction. If to overcome this difficulty conjunction is taken to be pervasive of the conjuncts then a

sound arising at a certain place in the space should be audible all over the world as space (or sky) is the same throughout the world. Also if only a part of a claypot for example, is dyed red the whole pot would be and appear as red as the conjunction of the red-material with the surface of the pot would be pervasive of the latter. Because of these undesirable contingencies it is necessary to regard conjunction (or togetherness of whatever objects it may be) as non-pervasive and conjoined entities as different from the nonconjoined (separate) ones. Thus it follows that the seed sown and watered in the soil is quite different from the seed lying by itself in the granary. The totality of the causal conditions of an effect is also different from the mere numerical aggregate of these conditions.

The rejoinder to this contention by the author is not very convincing. Udayana argues that the above difficulty arises in the case of the atom also. It may be asked about an atom if it is veiled on both sides of itself by another atom facing it say, from the eastern side. If it is,then the first atom will be invisible. But if it is not veiled on either side then it should be visible from both sides. So it has to be admitted that the (first) atom is veiled on one side and not veiled on the other by the atom facing it. However this fact of simultaneous veiling and unveiling of the atom does not entail its duality or the incompatibility of the properties of veiling and unveiling. Likewise in the case of the conjunction of the cause and the auxiliaries also it can be maintained that although the cause does not suffer any change on account of its conjunction with the auxiliaries it is productive when so conjoined and not productive when not so conjoined. Both conjunction and non-conjunction can characterise the same entity in respect of different times (as veiling and unveiling do in the case of the atom in respect of different spaces).

The puzzling thing about this rejoinder is that the Buddhist does not admit the reality or perceptibility of atoms. Nor does he admit that if there are atoms they must have different surfaces. The N.V. thinker, who admits atoms does not say that they have different surfaces or any surface at all. The atom being indivisible it cannot have any surface. Nor is it perceptible in the N.V. view. The argument would affect the Buddhist position only if the divisibility as also perceptibility of the atoms is acceptable to the Buddhist if at all he conceded the reality of atoms. But if the atom is by nature indivisible it cannot be either divisible or perceptible. The point that Udayana is trying to drive home to the Buddhist by means of the argument is a simple one namely. that one and the same enitity can be both conjoined and unconjoined with another depending upon the different parts of itself or the conjoined entity as also the different times at which the conjuction does or does not obtain. To support this point it is not necessary to take recourse to the dubious example of the atom presuming that it has different

surfaces and that it is perceptible. Neither the Buddhist not the non-Buddhist admits this. The simple familiar illustration of a monkey perched on the branch of a tree would convincingly show that conjunction is non-pervasive if the conjuct-the-monkey-is both sitting and not sitting on the tree if the different parts of the tree are taken into consideration while making such a statement.

So far the inference of momentariness based on positive concomitance of reality and momentariness was critically considered and shown to be fallacious in different ways. Now the inference of the unreality of the (so called) durable entity based on negative concomitance is being taken up for detailed and somewhat lengthy criticism. The inference runs like this: 'The (so called) nonmomentary entity is unreal because it cannot be productive of its effect either consecutively or at once as is the case with the unreal hares' horn or the sky-lotus'. Here the concomitance of reality (which is the negation of the major term) and consecutive or non-consecutive productivity (the negation of the middle terms) is required for the inference to proceed. The non-Buddhist takes objection to this inference on the multiple grounds of its minor, middle and the instantial terms being all unreal in the Buddhist view. The durable entity, non-production either consecutively or otherwise, and the hare's horn are non-existent terms. Even the major term 'unreal' in the inference could be characterised as nonexistent. There does not exist anything which is describable as unreal. We usually refer to hare's horn etc. as unreal but this reference is interpreted as denying reality to the hare's horn or denying that the hare has horns. If the word 'unreal' is interpreted in this way then we need not deny meaning to the word. The point of the above objection of the non-Buddhist is that no direct meaning can be attached to an inference whose minor, middle and instantial terms stand for non-entities.

Now an important and pertinent question is being asked by the Buddhist. He asks his opponent how if the non-entities cannot be meaningfully talked about he can even say that these cannot be talked about. Even this denial—the denial of usage regarding the non-entities—is meaningless as there is no real referend for it. The imaginary hare's horn cannot be the referend of this denial as we can talk quite significantly about imaginary entities. Thus the non-Buddhist will be contradicting himself even if he denies meaning to a discourse about the unreal. Replying to this question the non-Buddhist asks three counter- questions. The first question is whether the self-contradiction of the referenc to the unreal (even by way of its denial) can be taken as a proof for it. The second question is whether the self-contradiction is a proof against the rationality of the negative discourse about the unreal. The third question is whether despite its self-contradictory character the

reference to the unreal has got to be accepted at all. The answer to the first question is that the self-contradiction of the negative reference cannot yield any proof for the unreal. Certainly it cannot be taken as a proof for the reality of the unreal. Even the Buddhist would not like to have such a proof for, then the durable which he takes to be unreal could be proved as real. As to the second question the answer is 'yes'. There is no doubt that in the strict sense there cannot be a significant reference even by way of negation to the unreal. But then how is it that the non-Buddhist goes on discoursing about the unreal instead of keeping mum? In reply to this the non-Buddhist says that the discouse though flawed by self-contradiction serves a useful purpose which is to dissuade people not knowledgeable enough from indulging in discourse about unreal entities. The usual object of a significant discourse namely the ascription of some positive or negative predicate to an entity is not at all arrived at by the negative discourse about the unreal. There is not only no predication either positive or negative when the reality of the unreal is denied. It is just a total cancellation of the likely act of any kind of predication that an ignorant person may be induced to indulge in. Even the Buddhist engages in the discourse about the unreal (and that a positive one) to prove that the durable cannot be real. His purpose in doing so is also more or less the same as that of his opponent. He intends to rule out the undesirable contingency of admitting the durable as real. Of course the unreal can be an object of cognition in the Buddhist view. He has no difficulty in explaning the references to the unreals occuring in his syllogism. In this he has an advantage over his opponent who does not admit any cognition of which the unreal is the object.

The third of the above questions can have only a negative answer. If a usage is irrational it cannot be accepted on any ground.

The Buddhist not to be silenced by the explanation of his opponent as to what he intends by his discourse about the unreal harps on the same fallacy of self-contradiction with which he earlier charged the opponent's discourse. Whatever the purpose or intention of the opponent's discourse may be it cannot cover up the self-contradiction involved in it. The retort of the opponent to this charge is that the opponent is not interested presently in justifying or upholding any position. His main object in referring to the unreal is to demand of the Buddhist to provide a valid basis for his inference involving unreal terms. The Buddhist cannot adduce any such basis, for there is no basis for talking about the unreal. But in the absence of a valid basis the Buddhist cannot adduce an invalid basis as this itself will prove to be a fallacy in his position or it will be an indirect confession that his view is erroneous. In case he keeps mum (fearing self-contradiction in his reply) he makes himself vulnerable to the charge of ignorance which is

a fallacy. If the self-contradiction can be got over by accepting the negative discourse one may not object to it but in whatever way the discourse is sought to be understood the self-contradiction is unavoidable. The hare's horn, the sky-lotus etc. are unreal and so the reference to them implying that they are discoursable is an obvious contradiction. To be unreal is to be undiscoursable. The contradiction cannot be avoided by treating the scope of the negative discourse as limited only to the affirmation of the unreal, that is to say it may be contended that the unreal cannot be affirmed (to exist) but there is nothing wrong in denying it. By way of rejoinder to this contention it may be asked whether there is something which is not the object of any affirmative or negative discourse. To say that there is, is to flatly contradict oneself. If there is no affirmative or negative discourse about a thing how can it be a piece of reality? Moreover the very usage that there is absence of both kinds of discourse regarding the hare's horn, the sky lotus etc. is itself a kind of discourse of which the latter becomes the object. Even for a significant denial of the two kinds of discourse it is necessary to have something as a counterpositive of which the denial could be made. What can be this something which is qualified as beyond the scope of any discourse ? Thus the contradiction is inescapable in whatever way the discourse regarding the unreal is interpreted.

This raises a problem even for the non-Buddhist. If all references to the unreal are flawed by selfcontradiction words like hare's horn, sky-lotus etc. should have to be dubbed as meaningless and therefore semantically alike. Negations of hare's horn, sky-lotus etc. would also then be rendered meaningless. Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika has of course devised a mode of interpretation to salvage these negations. For example, to say that 'there is no hare's horn' means that the hare does not have horns the negation sign being interposed between the component words of the compound word 'hare's horn'. Thus negative references to the unreal can somehow be taken care of. But what about the positive references like, 'The hare's horn' is a non-entity or unreal' which appear to predicate a property like non-entity of the unreal? That there is such a property (although there cannot be anything endowed with the property) cannot be denied. The property cannot be predicated either of the hare or of the horn. But can it be predicated of the hare's horn either (when it is unreal) and if it cannot be predicated of anything what meaning can be ascribed to the statement? Perhaps like the foregoing statement this statement too needs an oblique interpretation, say that the property of unreality or hare's hornedness is not a property of reality' ! This may give rise to another difficulty namely that a property like hare-hornedness (if not that of unreality) is not conceivable at all. Whatever may be the solution of this problem both the Buddhist and

the non-Buddhist have to devise an agreed or even a differing interpretation of the above statements to render them meaningful. The Buddhists have no compunction in upholding the discourseability of the unreal as is evident from the cognisability of the unreal which they advocate. The non-Buddhists however do not admit that the unreal can be significantly referred to or talked about. So both the Buddhists, and the non-Buddhists try to account for the discourse about the unreal without dismissing it as meaningless. If it is so, then the foregoing objection against the inference that it involves unreal terms cannot be sustained.

Continuing this critique of the view of the possibility of the negative discourse about the unreal the author asks why the positive discourse about the unreal should be deemed impossible if the negative one is considered possible. In both cases there is no rational ground to sustain the discourse. It may be contended against this that in the case of an unreal like the barren women's son there is the insentience (or absence of sentience) of the latter as the ground of the latter's non-speakership say, although there is no ground for ascertaining his speakership (a positive property). But this is not correct as even the barren woman's son is definitely endowed with the positive property of sonness. None can say that the barren woman's son is not a son without contradicting oneself. It can't be urged against this that the statement 'that the barren woman's son is a son' has really no sense as the latter is not a son in reality. This is true of insentience also as no property can characterise an unreal entity and moreover insentience is not mere exclusion of sentience but is a positive property excluding sentience and such a positive property is not ascribable to the unreal. If it is urged that the negative particle in the word 'insentient' stands merely for exclusion of sentience from the former then the same can be said of 'sonness' also. We may regard 'sonness' not as a positive property but as the mere exclusion of 'non-sonness'! The positive may be viewed as the mere exclusion of the negative and the negative as the mere clinching exclusion of the positive. There is no proof as to how negation is to be understood in these cases.

If it be contended against this that the mere exclusion of nonsonness ('in the case of the barren woman's son') does not fulfil the effectiveness—criterion of reality and as such it cannot be used as middle term in any inference then a similar contention can be made in the case of insentience also which is sought to be inferred of the barren woman's son. The Buddhist however may urge against this that even among exclusions (which is the real nature of the generic universal) only those are usable as middle terms that exclude only those things that differ from the loci of the exclusion . For example 'potness' which is of the nature of a certain exclusion can be a middle term as it

excludes only those things that are other than pots. It does not exclude pots too. Such is not the case with the 'sonness' (or the exclusion of 'non- sonness') supposed to characterise the barren woman's son as it excludes both those that are other than sons as well as those that are sons. Neither sons nor those who are other than sons are born of barren women. Such a retort is applicable even to insentience charateristic (as maintained by the Buddhist) of the baren woman's son. Thus insentience is also excluded from everything (both sentient and insentient things).

One may take objection to this retort on the ground that 'Speakership'(mentioned as a property of the barren woman's son) does not characterise any unreal thing as it is a property of the real only. The real and the unreal cannot go together. The objection however can be met by asking how this incompatibility between the real and the unreal is ascertained. It cannot be ascertained as the result of the cognition of the unreal as divorced from the real speakership. The unreal is not known by any valid means of cognition. If it is it cannot be an unreal. Nor again the incompatibility can be taken to be ascertained by means of the noncognition of speakership as divorced from the real. This is tantamount to the non-cognition of speakership as associated with the unreal which is different from the real. Such a non-cognition is impossible to have as the unreal is not accessible to any valid cognition. Speakership as dissociated from the real (and as associated with the unreal barren woman's son)cannot also be treated as a mere concept (having no real basis). Even speakership as associated with the unreal can then likewise be viewed as a concept. Perhaps one may urge here that speakership is agency in relation to speech (both of which are real), how can then speakership be attributed to the unreal? The rejoinder to this is that even nonspeakership is nothing other than agency in relation to activities other than speech and so it too cannot be attributed to the unreal. Here it may be noted that of the two senses of negation viz; simple denial (of the deniable or negatable) and the (implicit)affirmation of what is other than the denied, it is the second sense which corresponds to the one mentioned. There is no positive content in the first sense. If agency of every kind is denied to the unreal because it is devoid of capacity of every kind this is so only because the unreal is unreal. But the unreal is such only because it is devoid of all capacity. Thus unreality and absence of agency are found to be mutually dependent which leads to the fallacy of circularity. Absence of successive or simultaneous productivity of the unreal may be cited as the proof for its unreality but once the 'sonness' of the unreal (barren woman's son) has been apprehended it is quite easy to prove thereby the speakership, successive or simultaneous productivity and reality of the unreal son. There does not arise then the possibility of proving the

absence of successive or simultaneous productivity of the unreal once its speakership etc. have been established. So it must be admitted that all sensible usage depends upon valid proof which if transgressed is sure to lead to all kinds of irregularity. Valid proof or inference requires the prior apprehension of the minor term of the inference because the major term is predicated of the minor in the inference. For any significant predication it is necessary that the subject of predication should have been cognised beforehand. Nobody ever says of an unknown person that he or she is fair or dark in complexion or even asks what his or her complexion is.

The Buddhist however objects to this rejoinder on the ground that though uncognised (or uncognisable) entities cannot be objects of usage (or be talked about) yet it cannot be maintained that tortoise hair, hare's borns etc. which are unreal are not cognised. Certainly we do know what words like 'tortoise' hair etc. mean, otherwise we cannot use these words significantly. It is therefore wrong to delimit usage to rationally-established entities only. The author proceeds to answer this objection by showing how it is based on a misconception. It is true that words like 'hare's horn' or some middle term or even the senses do produce the false cognition of the hare having horn. This is cognition of a thing as what it is not. In such a cognition both terms,'the hare' and 'the horn' involved in the false cognition being real no unreal thing needs to be admitted. All the different modes of cognition-true or false-arise depending upon their objects (even if they are distorted in some of them). The Buddhists do not admit this. They hold that the utterly unreal is the object of the cognition produced by words like 'the hare's horn'. On this view words like 'tortoise' hair may come to signify even hare's horn as both tortoise's hair and hare's horn are unreal. There is no difference in respect of unreality between the hare's horn and the tortoise's hair. The N.V. can explain the meaningfulness of these words which are compounded of words whose meanings do not cohere with each other with the help of the false relationship of the real entities denoted by the component words. But the inference of some property in the unreal denoted by the above compound words or any other kind of cognition of some property in the unreal cannot be justified in the above manner. As the author has remarked above, just as about the unknown Devadatta the query whether he is fair or dark is irrelevant so any kind of predication about the unreal is simply senseless or irrelevant. The prior cognition of the subject of predication is essential for all predication-positive or negative-about it. Of course the mere affirmation or the denial of the unreal like, 'There is or is not a hare's horn' does not require such a prior cognition of the latter as the proposition is transformable into one which has only the hare as its subject.

The Buddhist may defend his position against the aforemantioned difficulty (of a word for one unreal meaning any other unreal) by regarding each of these (compound) words to stand only for a particular unreal. But how to lay down the conventions for the differing usages when-as stated above—all unreals are alike as unreals and therefore non-existent ? There has to be some identifiable distinction between the (socalled) hare's horn and the (so called) tortoise's hair for the conventions to hold good. If the compound word is supposed to acquire meaning only through the combination of the conventional meanings of the component words then there would be no need to posit the unreal. The combination of the (incompatible) reals themselves can yield the meaning of the compound word. It cannot be an alternative to this view that words mean without any convention, for then even without learning the meaning of a word one should be able to know what it denotes as soon as one hears it. Some Buddhists may urge that words etc. produce the cognition of the ureal under the determination of a transcendental disposition. There is no need for the separate cognition of the hare and the horn etc. as mentioned above for the cognition of the unreal which therefore is not the cognition of a composite. On this view, if the disposition alone is taken to engender the cognition then the disposition being always there the cognition too will be there always. If the disposition is supposed to be generally latent and only occasionally revived then there has to be postulated some cause for the revival. It can not be something other than the disposition for then both this cause and the disposition would be needed for engendering the cognition. Prhaps the gradual maturation of the disposition itself is the revival of the latter if no extraneous cause needs to be postulated. But now the question shifts to the maturation. If the maturation is supposed to take place of itself in course of time then the cognition is sure to arise as soon as the disposition has matured and thereafter it will stay put as long as the disposition lasts. Moreover, the process of maturation being internal to the disposition which itself is internal to cognition or conciousness the objective determination of the latter would be jeopardised. There would be no need to admit the external existence of objects as this would (in any case) be internally determined by the (maturing) dispositions (directed towards the latter). To avoid these difficulties some external cause over and above the disposition can be postulated but whatever the nature of this (hypothetical) cause it cannot make the sensory, inferential or verbal conditions of cognitions to apprehend what is nonexistent.

Further it is not possible to apprehend the convention relating words like 'hare's horn' and their meanings (or the unreals meant) without which one cannot have any cognition of the meanings of these words as uttered in one's hearing. If someone is supposed somehow to

apprehend the convention he cannot communicate the apprehension to anybody else. He cannot verbalise the convention by saying that 'the hare's horn' is meant by the word 'hare's horn' as there is no such entity to which reference can be made (as the meant entity).'But isn't it a fact that the person who uses these words meaningfully has some idea of what he intends to denote by the words? And if there is this intention will it not suffice to make the word meaningful? it may be asked.' The answer is that verbal conventions are neither known nor established in this manner; unless one knows the meaning of each word uttered by another person one cannot treat them as meaningful. A vague idea of what a speaker intends to convey by means of a whole sentence is not at all helpful in the apprehension of the meaning of each word constituting the sentence. In case some ineffable entity is supposed to be denoted by 'hare's horn' etc. then even tortoise's hair could be meant by the words as both hare's horn, and tortoise's hair are ineffable (both being unreal). It may yet be argued that each speaker or hearer is disposed by his or her own individual disposition to associate the words for the unreal with the (particular) unreal without depending upon others to obtain the knowledge of the convention. There would be no need to make reference to the unreal in the apprehension of the convention. The disposition may directly lead to the knowledge of the convention. This argument is simply untenable as in such a solipsistic situation none will be able to know whether his or her use of the words (for the unreal) corresponds with those of others, as a result of which mutual verbal communication would be rendered simply impossible. The various ways in which verbal conventions are established are impossible to adopt in the absence of communication between the person who lays down the convention and his interlocutors. Thus the words 'hare's horn' etc. cannot give rise to the cognition of any unreal entity. If such a cognition could arise from these words it would be quite ineffective in daily life as the dream-cognitions of a dumb person.

Dharmakīrtī the great Buddhist logician argues against this that even in the N.V. view the mistaken or illusory cognition like that of the nacre as silver the unreal identity of real contents viz. the nacre and silver is involved, so it cannot be denied that the unreal does appear as content in illusions. Likewise in the negative example instantiating the coexistence of unreality and non-momentariness there is no need to have a real entity as locus (of the two properties). Even in the absence of a real locus it is possible to conclude that that which is not momentary is not real (without giving rise to the query as to what it is that is not momentary and not real). By way of rejoinder to this argument the N.V. philosopher says that as a matter of fact even the socalled unreal identity of the real contents is not involved in illusion. The illusory character of the illusion is determined only by the

incompatibility of the property misperceived and the object of perception. Thus there is no need to perceive an identity between nacre and silver in order to mistake the nacre as silver. The mere incompatibility of silverness with nacre is sufficient to endow the cognition with the illusory character. Even granting that an unreal relational content appears in illusion the aforementioned conclusion cannot be derived from it, for a negation can be understood only in one of two ways namely as the absence of a thing or property in another in which it is not present or the identity of a thing with the absence of another. The first is illustrated in the cognition of the negation of trees in a mountain which is barren of all greenery. In the above case however an unreal like the hare's horn devoid of successive or simultaneous causality not being cognisaible the negation of such causality cannot be taken to be cognisable. The illustration of the second is the cognition of the barren mountain as identical with the absence of all trees. In the view of Prabhākara negation is identical with its locus. In the above case the absence of successive or simultaneous causality as identical with the unreal is never cognised. So even on the assumption of an unreal locus the cognition of the absence of causality or reality in it is not possible. In the present case the supposed locus of the absence of all causality is the unreal which being nonexistent the negation is not validly cognisable. Ordinary negations like those of real entities (pot,tree etc.) cannot thus be uncognisable as they and their loci are real and validly cognised.

The Buddhist who denies the reality of all negations or absences may contend against the above that even ordinary negations are objects of common usage only because their counterpositives are by nature exclusive of them. Thus a pot is by nature exclusive of its absence and consequently the absence of the pot is also treated as exclusive of the pot by its nature. There is therefore no need to admit the reality of any absence or negation to explain any negative usage. This contention is not justified as the positive character of real entities (which is not the same as the exclusion of negation) is undeniable. Moreover the exclusion of its negation by a positive entity does not go to prove that the negation too is exclusive of the positive entity. Could it be urged against this that it is the very nature of a positive entity and its negation that identification (or determination) of either of them is ipso facto the exclusion of the other; there is no need to admit the reality of negation for the purpose of this determination (or identification) which may be treated as just a matter of usage? Such a view can be entertained only if negation is taken to be a rationally-established entity because one speculates about the nature of only such an entity. Nobody first detemines what a certain nature is and then fixes upon a thing as what is accordant with the nature. This does not mean that a positive entity

like the pot does not by nature exclude its absence or this absence does not by its nature exclude the pot (because absence is a nonentity in the Buddhist view). Each one of these has its own specific nature, the positive and the negative respectively and neither depends upon the other for its reality or cognition. The pot is cognisable as pot without its exclusion of its absence being cognised. The absence of pot is cognised as non-existence without its exclusion of the pot being cognised. Such is not the case with the unreal. It has no nature (or reality) at all. It cannot exclude anything. Thus the inference of momentariness set forth by the Buddhist is vitiated by the non-availability of any negative example.

It is possible to meet this and the foregoing arguments by the suggestion that in the absence of a real minor term and an example an imaginary minor term and an imaginary example could be used for the inferential demonstration. In fact all the terms—minor, cominor and contra-minor, needed for any inference may be divided into two groups consisting respectively of real and imaginary terms the former being rationally obtained and the latter imaginatively procured. Thus in the inference of fire in the hill by means of the middle term knowability, although the latter is absent in the imaginary tortoise's hair which is devoid of fire (the major term in the inference) and so the fallacy of deviation appears to be avoidable yet the lake—which is the real locus of the absence of the major term—being available the middle must be absent from it—which is not the case. The inference has therefore to be treated as fallacious. Similar are cases of fallacious inferences like, 'Sound is non-eternal because it is visible' and 'Sound is eternal because it is artificial'. In these inferences too the presence of the middle in an imaginary minor and the coexistence of the middle and the major in the fictitious sky-lotus are respectively available despite the fact that such presences in real loci of the terms cannot be had. If minor, middle and major terms in an inference are all real then only real presences of the middle and the major in the minor, co-minor and absence in contraminor need to be sought to preserve the validity of the inference.

Such a contention cannot however be upheld. If imaginary absence in an imaginary locus of the middle term is supposed to free the latter from the fallacy of deviation then even the imaginary presence in the imaginary locus of the middle can render it fallacious. Presence and absence are alike in respect of imaginariness. Thus even the valid middle term smoke in the inference of fire from smoke would be invalidated by its imaginary presence in the tortoise's hair in which fire is absent. A real fallacy cannot therefore be got rid of by means of fictitious validity. One may urge against this that even imagination cannot bring together the real and the unreal which are mutually-

incompatible although two or more unreals can very well be imagined as related. The real smoke in the above valid inference cannot therefore be supposed to be present in the unreal tortoise's hair (which is taken to be devoid of fire). In the other inference however nonmomentariness and noncausality being unreal these can very well be imagined to coexist in the tortoise's hair which too is unreal. But this retort cannot be accepted as correct as an imaginary smoke and the tortoise's hair are both of the same nature (both being unreal). If there are instances of real smoke (the smoke in the kitchen is real) then absence of smoke (as in the pond) is also real (and so is incompatible in nature with the tortoise's hair). Thus this strategy of availing of imaginary terms for the inference of momentariness simply fails.

As mentioned earlier the foregoing critique of the author that noncausality (or the absence of successive or simultaneous causality) being existent nowhere it cannot be predicated even of the unreal, is as unsound as the earlier one. Even for the N.V. the statement 'Nothing is devoid of causal effectiveness' is quite significant. In whatever way the statement is interpreted by the N.V., the interpretation would be quite acceptable to the Buddhist too. Even without referring to the absence of causality and stating that nothing is a noncause one can make a significant statement like, 'No real property is non-coexistent with causality' which is equivalent to the statement 'every entity is a cause?' Alternatively the Buddhist can establish his thesis of universal momentariness by means of the purely positive inference using a positive example only. There is no necessity to take recourse to a negative inference for this purpose. As to the question how the concomitance of reality and momentariness can be established the answer would be similar to the similar question regarding how the negative coexistance can be established.

Now the author turns to a quite different defence of the thesis of momentariness earlier referred to by the Buddhist. This defence is based on the view (upheld only by the Buddhists) that everything is necessarily destructible and so destruction of things is uncaused, which implies that everything is subject to destruction as soon as it comes into being (that is at the very next moment of its coming into being). This view admits of five different interpretations each of which is now being subjectical to criticism. The first interpretation is 'Identity of the destructible and its destruction.' If distruction is innate to things then they cannot be different from each other. Buddhists upholding such a view are therefore given the nikname destructionists or वैनाशिकाः in Sanskrit. Obviously this view is simply indefensible as then everything being of the nature of destruction there will not be any variety or multiplicity in the world (destruction being the same for all things). One may urge against this that the non-existence (or destruction) of a

thing is nothing other than its incompetence or effectiveness at all times other than the time or moment at which it is effective for production of a thing which is productive at its moment of origination may itself be looked upon as its own non-existence at all other moments when it is not productive. Such a view may also help answer the question as to how a thing can be supposed to be identical with destruction which is a nonentity. (The unproductive thing need not be regarded as a nonentity). The logical basis of this view is the doctrine of momentariness for the unproductiveness of things at all moments other than the moment of their origination is precisely what the doctrine of momentarism means. So destructiveness amounts to defending momentariness by means of the prior assumption of momentanism.

Moreover if the nonexistence (which is the same as ineffectiveness) of a thing at other times is the same as the thing (because a thing is supposed to be identical with its nonexistence) then it follows that the thing exists at other times too. This entails eternality of things. But if a thing is supposed to exist at other times as it does at its moment of origination then again it follows that a thing exists at all times. If because of ineffectiveness at other times things are not supposed to exist then, then they may be taken to be ineffective either at their own time for production taking place at other times or they are ineffective at other times for productions taking place at their own times. On the first alternative things will be nonexistent at their own times as they are not effective then. Thus ineffectiveness cannot be taken to be relative to the future products only (as things are effective in the present). There is no such thing as ineffectiveness and consequent nonexistence of a thing in relation to some other thing. Ineffectiveness or unproductiveness relating to a certain thing of another does not take away its reality (for then the latter would cease to be effective even in the present). The second of the above alternatives too is not tenable. If the ineffectiveness of a thing at a latter time pertains only to this time and not to the time when the thing exists then the latter cannot have anything to do with the ineffectiveness. If, on the other hand the ineffectiveness is supposed to pertain to the time when the thing exists then even at its own time the thing would be rendered nonexistent. If the present ineffectiveness of a thing is supposed to be related somehow to a future time then the thing must be taken to be present both in the present and the future which is not compatible with its momentariness.

Now the Buddhist turns to another version of the necessity of non-existence. He maintains that non-existence as different from the thing (to which it pertains) has no determinate (character) nature . This means that non- existence cannot be treated as an entity by itself. But then it would neither be caused nor spatio-temporally limited, so that it won't be anywhcre or at any time or be everywhere or at all times. The

admission of the first of these alternatives is possible either if all spatio-temporal relationship is denied to nonexistence or if non-existence itself is denied. The first of these latter alternatives entails the eternity of the things whose non-existence it is because the latter does not occur anywhere or at any time. If the second alternative is adopted it would entail the eternity of non-existence or destruction as the existence of the thing is absolutely excluded in the assertion of its non-existence .

According to the third version of necessity of non-existence propounded by the Buddhist non-existence is the effect of its counter-positive. But it needs to be established by means of a valid argument that a thing by itself gives rise to its destruction as soon as it has come into being. Experience does not vouchsafe the truth of this assertion. Perhaps it may be urged that the effect that is produced by an entity after its origination is identical with its destruction because it is different from it or it is the same as the absence of the entity. On the first alternative even the auxiliary (causal) conditions that help the cause to produce its effect should be destructive of it as they are different from it. The second alternative can be maintained only if when the effect has come into being the cause is never seen to be existent or if there is a common usage identifying the effect with the absence of its cause or lastly if there is some evidence against the commonly-accepted distinction of the effect from the non-existence of the cause. The first of these three alternatives is simply untenable. When the pot — the effect of clay— has originated it is not seen that the clay—the cause—goes out of existence. In certain cases this may be so but there is no relation whatsoever between the origination of the effect and the cessation of the cause. It would be ridiculous to urge against this that the cause appearing to survive the origination of the effect is different from that which caused the origination. There is no evidence whatsoever to counter the experiential testimony regarding the uninterrupted existence of the cause even after it has given rise to its effect. Usage also does not favour the identification of the effect with the destruction of its cause. One may account for the absence of the usage on the ground that the effect not being really different from the cause the cause is not taken to be destroyed when the effect appears to have originated. But such an explanation can apply only to those cases where the effect is palpably and visibly dissimilar in nature to the cause. Such is the case (for example) with ash and firewood. Only when the firewood is burnt out the ash is generated. No one can or does mistake the ash for the firewood. But this assumption of the identity of the effect and the destruction of the cause gives rise to the paradoxical view that the effect has the destruction of its cause itself as its locus; for example when a piece of cloth is destroyed by tearing, the yarns constituting the cloth, are separated from each other. These therefore would be identical with

the destruction of the cloth (being the product of the destruction). But the cloth is also produced from these yarns and so is located in them (as they are its material ause). Thus the-effect-cloth-is found to be located in the very destruction of its cause. One cannot say against this that the yarns from which the cloth is produced are different from the yarns which result from the tearing of the cloth. The difference is not visible at all. If it is postulated only to ward off the pedicament just mentioned then on the same ground the difference of the effect from the destruction of its cause can also be upheld. Further the supposed basis of the difference of the earlier and later yarns (viz. the identity—for example of the cloth with the destruction) being itself based on the difference of the cloth from the yarns there arises the fallacy of circularity in the assumption of difference. Besides if a thing is destroyed as a result of the earlier destruction of its parts then the parts cannot survive the destruction of the thing and so they cannot be identical with the destruction of the thing. Also common usage does not support the view that a thing is identical with the destruction of the parts which help produce it.

Again it may be argued against the foregoing that the later yarn cannot be either generically or specifically opposed to the earlier yarn. On the first alternative the later yarn would cease to be a yarn as it belongs to a genus excluding the earlier yarn. On the second alternative the Buddhist cannot maintain that the effect is generically opposed to the cause and so is the same as the destruction of the cause. The Buddhist may contend against this that the said opposition between the earlier and later yarns is quite conceivable. Doesn't for example a piece of cloth which differs from another piece of cloth coexist with the latter and is also generically identical with it? The point of this contention is that just as generic identity is not opposed to difference it need not be opposed to the destructive relation holding between the generically identical entities (as difference is nothing but opposition in nature). This contention is met by the clarification that a thing and its destruction are mutually related as a counterpositive and its non-existence and so they cannot be mutually identical, coexistent and of the same generic nature, as otherwise the counterpositive will cease to be a counterpositive of the destruction , be simultaneous with it and also be endowed with properties incompatible with its own nature (and coexistent with its destruction). It may be argued against this that a property like producedness being common to both a yarn and its destruction for example, the two could be regarded as identical in nature but at the same time the destruction could be opposed to the yarn. The reply to the argument may be like this: If there be a series of yarns originating successively then the first yarn in the series will have the second as its effect which will destroy it; after the emergence of the

third yarn the second will be gone; also the destruction of the first yarn which is the same as the second yarn, will be gone; in such a situation the first would have to be reborn as its destruction is destroyed. May one say, to ward off this predicament that all the yarns subsequent to the first are of the nature of its destruction? No ! If the fact were so then the yarns subsequent to the second cannot destroy it. Besides if a later term in a series emerges at a place far away from the place where an earlier term in the series emerges and thereafter ceases to exist then there should be two (or more) destructions of the earlier term occurring at different places.

A counterquestion is now being posed by the Buddhist to press his point. As nonexistence is different from its counterpositive the anterior and posterior negations of a pot for example would have to coexist with the pot in the potsherds. Similarly since the pot exists where the non-existence of the pot exists (in the potsherds) it would exist even in itself in which its non-existence exists. This would give rise to a series of pots existing one upon another. If therefore it is said that the pot does not exist were its non-existence exists then since the pot does not exist in its non-existence the nonexistence would exist there. In this non-existence again there would exist another non-existence of the pot and thus an infinite series of non-existences one existing upon another would be precipitated. Perhaps the usage (or possibility) of a non-existence existing in non-existence can be explained without admitting more than one non-existence. But then even in the case of a certain non-existence occurring in a locus it could be maintained that the non-existence characterising the locus is not different from it. However the distinct identity of nonexistence from that of the locus is upheld because the positive locus cannot be taken to account for the usage relating to a negative entity. The positive locus by itself cannot account for the experience of the location of nonexistence in it simply because it is other than the object which is non-existent in it . But the non-existence of a thing in its non-existence itself need not call for the postulation of more than one nonexistence which is the locus. That this nonexistence is by nature opposed to the existence of its counterpositive should suffice to account for the experience of a non-existence characterising a nonexistence.

The Buddhist now advances another argument to prove the necessary nature of destruction. The argument is that if destruction is totally different from the entity subject to it then the latter cannot be destroyed because its nature cannot be affected by the destruction. Here, if by 'nature' the generic nature like 'potness' is meant then nobody can say that destruction destroys this generic nature of the destroyed entity. Destruction is noncontemporaneous with the destroyed entity and when it takes place its counterpositive (not its nature) is sure to go out of

existence.

If these arguments have failed to support the Buddhist's point he may trot out certain other arguments to prove the necessity of destruction. For example he may urge that destruction has no material cause and it is not itself a material cause of anything. So destruction is not produced by anything or it does not depend upon anything for its production. This argument is afflicted by the fallacy of the conditionality of the middle term the condition being 'positivity in nature'. Every necessary or unproduced entity is positive in nature but every caused entity is not so. Certain negations are caused but they are not positive. If the anterior negation which is unproduced is not positive and so positivity is denied to be the condition afflicting the inference then mere difference from destruction could be taken as the condition afflicting the middle term in the inference. This condition pervades unproducedness in all loci other than destruction which is the minor term itself (in which the presence of the major cannot be taken to have been established.)

So far the Buddhist's attempt has been to prove the proposition that things are destructible by nature (and so they last only for a moment) by showing that the effect is the same as the destruction of the cause. Since, what invariably and immediately succeeds the origination of an entity is its effect and when the effect comes into being the cause goes out of being, therefore the effect is taken to be identical with the destruction of the cause. The twists and turns that the proof of this proposition takes lands the Buddhist in inconsistencies and fallacies. An important point needs to be noted here. Granting that things are destructible by nature it is not at all necessary for the Buddhist to maintain that the effect is destructive of the cause. Firstly such a position is simply uncommonsensical as the effect is regarded by everybody as produced by the cause and even sustained in existence by it. Of course a thing is destroyed only after it has originated and therefore what comes after the origination can alone be taken—if at all—to destroy the originated thing. But this destroyer need not be the effect. If it is always the effect that is taken to destroy the causes then there will never be an absolute end to a causal series every effect needing a subsequent effect to destroy it . Besides the notion of natural or intrinsic destructibility of things is almost incompatible with the notion of the destruction of a thing by its effect unless the effect is regarded as identical with the cause. But to treat destruction as the very nature of things also does not appear to be sensible. If both origination and destruction constituted the nature of things will there be any origination at all ? One may say that unless a thing originates it cannot undergo destruction; so at least one moment's existence of a thing is necessary for its destruction to take place. But then how destruction

which is taken to be one of the intrinsic properties or natures of a thing can be supposed to be caused by origination which is also one of its properties?

A different version of the supposed necessity of destruction is now set forth by the Buddhist. To be necessary is to be pervasive; all things are pervaded by destruction because they are destructible. This version however does not accord with the Buddhist's own view that one thing is pervasive of another only if the two are (partially) identical or the causal relation obtains between them (the cause being the pervader of the effect). Necessary coexistence which is the basis of the pervasion relation holding between two things in the non-Buddhist view is also not at all observable between a thing and its destruction. The coexistence cannot be spatial as a thing originating at one place may be destroyed at quite a different place. If a thing is destroyed by the destruction of its parts then the thing and its destruction cannot be coexistent anywhere. Temporal coexistence too cannot obtain between things and their destruction as the two are totally opposed to each other. When a thing exists its destruction cannot occur and when it occurs the thing cannot exist. Mere futurity of destruction to the thing destroyed cannot ensure its pervasive character. When a pot is destroyed its parts survive it but they do not co-exist with it or pervade it.

A likely counter argument by the Buddhist to the above needs here to be disposed of. The Buddhist may urge that if destruction depended upon the causality of anything other than the destroyed entity then these causes being generally several their collocation may (as likely as not) be prevented from taking place. If this happened then certain things may not be destroyed at all and thus be everlasting. This argument is quite easy to refute. The mere fact that the production of a thing requires the collocation of many different causal conditions does not imply that the production may not take place at all. Even the potsherds resulting from the destruction of the pot require the cooperation of many different conditions, yet the Buddhist does not even hint at the possibility that the potsherds may not come into being at all. It is true that the causal conditions and their several causes are quite different from each other and that they come into being at different times and places. But the collocation of these, once they have come into being, is brought about usually by a human being with a view to produce some effect. Even natural forces working inside the structure of things help bring about the collocation of destructive conditions which precipitate the destructions of the latter.

There are now certain minor arguments seeking to prove uncansedness of destruction which can easily be disposed of. There are the inferences like, 'Destruction does not originate because it is an absence like the anterior absence of a pot'. (Anterior absence is

regarded as beginningless but destructible). If destruction originates it is destroyed or ceases to exist like the anterior absence. 'Both these inferences are invalid. There can also be counterinferences like, 'The anterior absence does not originate because it is an absence or because it is destructible like destruction and a pot respectively' or 'The anterior absence if unproduced is indestructible because it is unproduced like the sky or indestructible like the hare's horn'. Just as the middle terms in these counterinferences are irrelevant to the major terms so in the inferences of the Buddhist the middle terms are irrelevant to their respective majors and thus they are afflicted by fallacies.

The testimony of common experiences is also strongly in favour of the beginninglessness of anterior absence and the endlessness of the posterior absence or destruction. The statement, 'The pot will be produced' remains true from beginningless time till the pot has been produced and the statement. 'The pot is destroyed' remains true eternally after the destruction of the pot. If the anterior absence is producible there will be an infinite series of anterior absences one preceding the other. There is not only no reason for admitting a series of anterior absences of the same thing, there will also arise on such an admission the possibility of the beginninglessness of the existence of the pot. If destruction is taken to be destructible the destroyed entity would emerge into existence. One could meet these unfavourable possibilities by maintaining that like the anterior absence of a thing all the series of anterior absences relating to the first, second, third, fourth etc anterior absences are all equally necessary for the production of a thing; similarly like its destruction, the destruction of this destruction and so on are all equally destructive of the thing. But all these assumptions are not only gratuitous and violative of the law of parsimony they are also self-inconsistent.

At this point the Buddhist may point out a difficulty in the opponent's position. When there exists the destruction of a pot the destruction of the anterior absence of the pot cannot be supposed to exist as then even the anterior absence of this destruction would have to be admitted to exist at some other time. So the destruction of the anterior absence which is the counterpositive of the destruction would have to be taken as coexistent with the destruction of the pot. Likewise when there exists the anterior absence of a pot the anterior absence of the destruction of the pot cannot be supposed to exist as then even the destruction of this absence can be supposed to exist at some other time; thus it follows that the destruction of a pot coexists with its anterior absence. This difficulty can however be overcome if it is admitted that just as the anterior and posterior absences of an entity are opposed to its existence so the anterior absence of a thing is opposed both by the thing and its destruction and likewise the posterior absence

(or destruction) of a thing is opposed both by the thing and its anterior absence. Thus the possibility of the above-mentioned coexistences can be avoided.

Having thus failed to establish momentariness by proving destructibility as intrinsic to the very being of things the Buddhist now turns to the main proof for durability that his opponent usually adduces. This proof consists of the experience of recognition and the impossibility of the universals being momentary. Certain recognitions like that of the identity of the burning flame are illusory no doubt (the flame being continually fed by oil-changes occuring from moment to moment), but there are veridical recognitions too and on the basis of such recognitions of the identity of things their durability can be established. A true cognition of diversity is necessarily associated with the coexistence of incompatible properties in the object in which diversity is apprehended. In the recognitive cognition of the unchanging flame there occurs deception because the continual replacement of portions of wick and small quantities of oil remain uncognised. As a result the incompatible properties of destruction and non-destruction of oil and wick characterising the flame fail to be observed .

It may be asked here, If recognition can be falsified by some cognition like that of the coexistence of incompatible properties in the object of cognition then the falsifiability of this cognition too cannot be ruled out. Some later cognition may falsify it. This will give rise only to universal scepticism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has no fool-proof answer to this question. It can only say that if there is a genuine doubt about the veridicity of a cognition or recognition it can be dispelled by means of another investigative cognition. If even this cognition is subjet to doubt we have to take recourse to another investigative cognition. But the doubt cannot be indefinitely prolonged to cover all cognitions beause even for a sincere doubting to be possible some indubitable cognition has to be had as a bais. The purely logical doubt is not entertainable according to Nyāya Vaiśēṣika school. Besides it should be noted that in no doubt the subject of the doubt can be subject to doubt. The reality and durability (at least for two moments) of the subject is a necessary presupposition of the possibility of every doubt.

Now turning to veridical recognition the Buddhist may contend that undetected co-existence of incompatible properties in the object of the recognition cannot be arbitarily ruled out simply because it is not obvious. Even in the flame the coexistence of incompatibles as explained above is not easily detected. But if such is the case then the coexistence could be a validly established one or it could be the coexistence of those whose incompatible nature has been established or finally it could be such that neither it nor its incompatible nature

has been established. The first alternative cannot be maintained as it has already been shown to be untenable earlier (competence and incompetence are shown to be compatible with each other). The second alternative too is not maintainable because the perceptible properties which are known to be coexistent are not known to be incompatible with each other. The possibility of there being such imperceptible properties is ruled out by the fact that when for example the absence of the effect is seen at a place the corresponding absence of the cause is also seen at that place (so that the coexistence of the cause and the absence of the effect is never seen). Lastly the third alternative is also untenable as there cannot occur any kind of doubt regarding properties whose nature, incompatibility etc. are all unknown. If such a doubt occurred nothing would be beyond its purview.

Now while discussing recognition, the non-Buddhist contends that the defining property of the object of recognition namely, 'not being endowed with incompatible properties' could be used as middle term to prove the non-diversification (or identity) of a thing despite the diversity of the times of its occurrence. The qualification 'despite the diversity of the times of its occurrence' is introduced into the body of the major term in the inference to exclude the momentary entity from the scope of the major term. The momentary entity has no internal diversity and so the inference would be afflicted by the fallacy of 'proving the already proved'. The concomitance which is the basis of the inference is like this: 'Whatever is not endowed with incompatible properties despite there being a certain diversity in things (related to it) is not diversified despite this diversity as, for instance the atom is not diversified despite its being conjoined with many other atoms. The above inference is free from fallacies. If everything were momentary there cannot be any uniformity or valid cognition of uniformity anywhere. How then can any kind of concomitance be ascertained? Without this the Buddhist cannot have the concomitance needed for his inference of universal momentariness. The very possibility of the cognition of concomitance disproves momentariness which is sought to be proved on the basis of the latter. All the different means of cognition like perception, inference and verbal testimony are effective only if they have as their objects the general features or properties of things. For example words denote objects meant by them because they are conventionally associated with certain properties characteristic of those objects. Middle terms in inferences lead to the inference of the major terms only because they are generically related to the latter. In perception too we apprehend things under their generic character.

The positive proof for nonmomentariness or durability of things based on the defining characteristic of recognition is not—as it may

appear—a new proof. The co-existence of incompatible properties which has been the pivot of Buddhist arguments all along is here taken as finally disproved by the non-Buddhist and so on the basis of the non-co-existence of incompatible properties in things their durability is sought to be established. Thus it is only a rehash of the earlier counter-argument of the non-Buddhist.

Discussion of the Doctrine of Apoha

Having discussed in detail and refuted the doctrine of universal momentariness the author now turns to the related Buddhist doctrine of Apoha which denies the reality of universals as objects of cognition. Universals are regarded by the non-Buddhist as eternal and inherent in different individuals similar in nature. As mentioned above everyone of the valid means of cognition has universals — along with the individuals characterised by them — as its objects. If the universals are proved to be real all the labour exerted by the Buddhist to defend momentariness would be wasted. So now the replacements for universals suggested by the Buddhists are being taken up for consideration. The first replacement or alternative for universals is 'fiction' which means that the universal is just an imaginary or fictitious entity. This alternative is obviously untenable as it is counterintuitive. No experience testifies to the fictitious character of the universal appearing to characterise the objects experienced. Even if experiences are supposed to apprehend a fictitious entity like the universal, the apprehension would not serve any purpose. Certainly nobody would seek to have experience of unreal objects or be disposed to act in relation to them. The Buddhist may urge against this objection that what is called 'universal' is nothing but 'the exclusion of the other' and exclusion being of the nature of absence it is simply fictitious in nature. However the absence cannot be simply dismissed as a nonentity. Also the cognition of the absolute exclusion of the other cannot prompt anybody to move towards the object characterised by the exclusion. Besides the testimony of perceptual and non-perceptual experiences favours the positive and not the negative character of the objects of the experiences. While perceiving or inferring the fire on the mountain one does not have the introspective cognition that one is cognising the absence of the non-fire on the mountain. Even if the object is cognised as endowed with a negative character that is unreal how can the cognition lead to any success in activity when the object of it cannot be real? Could it then be urged that mere exclusion devoid of its fictional character appears in the cognition of things? No! This cannot be the case as the introspective consciousness of cognition has the form. 'I know the pot' and not 'I know some thing other than the non-pot. It may be

contended that although exclusion is not directly the object of the determinate cognition yet the thing that is the object is by its nature excludent of everything other than itself and since exclusion characterises the excluder it is necessarily involved as object in the cognition. This is just like the involvement of the generic character of things in their determinate coginition. Things are endowed by generic characters and so the cognitions which apprehends things also apprehend these characters. This contention can be upheld only if it is held that positive entities appear in their cognitions under the aspect of (other) exclusion or as other-excluders. But this is really not the case. The determinate cognition of a thing does not apprehend exclusion either as a primary or a secondary object related somehow to the primary object. If despite this fact exclusion is taken to be the primary object of determinate cognition then any object could be cognised by any cognition. Besides no purpose would be served by the cognition of exclusion. Nobody is prompted to any activity directed towards an object simply by the cognition of the other-exclusive character of the latter.

It has further to be noted here that the Buddhist cannot take the exclusion of the other to mean 'the exclusion of the other also'. A pot for example does not exclude (generically) another pot which is different from it. It is 'the exclusion of the other alone' which is to be taken as the meaning of the above expression. But this is nothing other than the generic essence of the excluding thing. It may be urged against this that if in the verbal cognition generated by the word 'cow' for example the exclusion of non-cows like the horse etc. is not included as object then the utterance of the word 'cow' along with the word 'bring' may prompt the hearer to bring even a horse. This contention can be upheld only if the positive meaning of the word 'cow' is identifiable with any thing other than the cow. There is no need to include other-exclusions in the meanings of words. Everything is itself and not anything else. If exclusion were necessary to restrict the denotations of words then exclusion itself would have to be excluded from its locus as well as the counterpositive. Also each exclusion would need to be excluded from all other exclusions. This process cannot be stopped at any stage and thus there would result infinite regress. If the regress is sought to be avoided by treating exclusion as sui generis (which is not possible as the counterpositive as well as the locus of the exclusion help define it) then the positive entity too can be taken as generically definable (if not as sui generis). The Buddhist may argue against this that exclusion has no form as one genus is not characterised by another genus in the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika view. Exclusion may be considered as self-excluded or sui generis like the generic universal itself. The positive entity however has form and it is the same as exclusion. Thus when the

positive is cognised its form, the exclusion is also cognised. This argument is easy to meet. The positive endowed with exclusion as form cannot be unreal as the unreal has no form. It cannot be a real (with the form) because the real cannot have a form which is unreal nor can it be the object of the determinate cognition which is supposed to be false by the Buddhist. The positive entity has therefore to be the object of the indeterminate cognition only but as such it cannot have any form as it must be a self-defined entity. Moreover the inclusion of exclusion in the meaning of a word does not serve any purpose. The positive meaning of a word like 'cow' is sufficient to draw the attention of the hearer of the word towards the cow if it is present before him. Even if some other animal is present along with the cow its difference from the cow is enough to turn away the hearer's attention from it.

Some Buddhist scholars like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrtī treat the determinate cognition as concerned with the exclusion of the other alone (and so to be false) but Gñanaśrī is of the view that even the positive entity is apprehended in the determinate cognition but the negative element namely the exclusion of the other is also apprehended as subsidiary to the positive content. Without exclusion qualifying the positive content the cognition cannot be determinate, that is, the cognition of a certain entity qualified by a certain quality is nothing but the cognition of the exclusion of the qualified from those which are not qualified. For example in the verbal cognition produced by the Sanskrit word 'Indivara' the blueness as characterising the lotus appears as its positive qualification but the resulting exclusion of the non-blue lotuses from the scope of the denotation of the word gets automatically included within the denotation. It cannot be separated from the positive denotation of the word. This view does not ignore the positive meaning of words and the positive content of all determinate cognitions. There is therefore partial agreement between the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist on the nature of determinate cognition. But it needs to be pointed out against the view that although the qualifier and the qualified appear as objects in determinate cognition the qualificatory nature of the qualifier which consists in the exclusion of the unqualified from the qualified entities cannot appear in the cognition. Only when the determinate cognition has taken place the qualifying nature of the qualifier can be known. Could one urge against this that unless the qualifying nature of the qualified in the qualificatory cognition is apprehended this cognition cannot be distinguished from the collective cognition of the contents of the determinate cognition of a man holding a stick (for example). The contents of both qualificatory and the collective cognitions are the same viz, a man, a stick and the conjunction between them. What appears to distinguish the former from the latter is the additional content, the qualifying character of the

stick appearing in the determinate cognition. But this is really not the case. In the collective cognition the different contents do not appear as related with each other. It is also not clear what exactly Gñanaśrī means by saying that exclusion is included as a subsidiary element within the meaning of a word.

It is not possible to contend against this that only the exclusion of something other than a cow appears in the cow — cognition for, then even a tree could be the object of this cognition. Everything other than a cow is not excluded by the cow-cognition because all non-cows cannot be individually cognised and their general cognition as 'certain things' would not be of any use in the exclusive cognition of the cow. The non-cows have therefore to be known as all those that are other than the cow. In this cognition cowness is necessarily involved in the capacity of the determinant of the counterpositiveness relating to the exclusion and so the appearance of the positive real in the determinate cognition cannot be denied. If one says against this that cowness is the same as the difference from that which is different from the cow then there arises the fallacy of circularity. This difficulty is expressed in a verse in this manner! 'Only when the cow is cognised it can be negated but the cow is the negation of this negation. So there is mutual dependence between the cognitions of the cow and the non-cow!' The conventional meaning of the word 'cow' for example is grasped from a statement like 'that which excludes the non-cow is meant by the word 'cow'. But this statement itself conveys its meaning to the hearer only after he has grasped the meaning of the word 'cow' as it occurs in the statement itself and this involves circularity. Even the meaning — elucudatory — statement like 'The meaning of the word 'cow' is cow' involves circularity. But if the meaning of the word is supposed to be communicable by the utterance of the word 'cow' or the sentence. 'This is cow' in the presence of a cow there does not occur any circularity in explanation. Even the exclusion of the non-cow may be supposed to be visibly present to a person and his audience when the former utters the word 'cow'. Thus Gñanaśrī has sought to remove the circularity vitiating the cognition of the meaning of words. But the difficulty posed by the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika does not concern the explanation of the meaning of words. It concerns the possibility of determinate cognition regarding which Gñanaśrī has nothing significant to say. The fallacy of circularity can be presented in a slightly different way too. The exclusion of the non-cow is known only if the non-cow is known and this is known if the meanings of words like 'buffalo' etc. which designate animals other than the cow are known. The meanings of these words are 'the animals which exclude the non-buffaloes etc.', which are other than cows. Thus the meanings of the words 'cow' and 'buffalo' etc. cannot be known unless each of them is known. This circularly can be avoided if it is

stipulated that for the cognition of the meaning of the word 'cow' only the cognition of things other than the cow is necessary, not the cognition of the meanings of the words designating these things. Even from actual usage of a word in the presence of the thing meant by the word its meaning can be understood. There is no need to bring in another word or its meaning to communicate the meaning of a certain word.

So far the Buddhist tried to equate the universal with the exclusion of others but the nature of this exclusion could not be satisfactorily explained by him. Now he suggests that the universal is positive but fictitious in nature. The obvious objection to this is that what is positive cannot be fictitious. Otherwise there would be different types of fictitious entities. If the universal is supposed to be fictitious despite its positivity- simply because it excludes the other then the momentary real too could be treated as unreal as it too excludes what is other than it. If exclusion of everything is taken to be the character of the unreal then even the said positivity of the universal would have to be the object of exclusion by the latter. Thus the universal would cease to be either positive or negative. It may be suggested by the Buddhist in defence of the above view that positivity is imposed upon the universal which is fictious. But this is unacceptable. The positive that is momentary and real cannot be the object of any determinate cognition. The universal that is such an object is an unreal and so it cannot be positive in nature.

It may be asked, 'Let there be no imposition of positivity on the socalled universal, yet can't the usage of positivity (or reality) be explained simply on the basis of the non-cognition of the difference of the real (momentary) and the unreal (universal)?' The reply is that this would be possible if the two appeared under a common form — the real as devoid of reality and the unreal devoid of its negative fictitiousness. But if each of these appeared under its own form how can there be non-cognition of their difference? These are self-distinguished. In the absence of any real common form an imaginary common form also cannot be supposed to be the basis of the imposition. Even for such an imposition non-cognition of the difference of the real and the unreal is needed.

As a matter of fact it is the form common to different individual entities that is apprehended in the determinate cognition. The unreal cannot be this form as it cannot be uniformly present at different times and in different individual loci (being unreal). It cannot also be imagined to be uniform as imagination — a mental occurrence — is also a momentary entity and as such it cannot be conducive to the non-momentary existence of anything. The uniformity may perhaps be taken to be imposed provided it is known to be actually present elsewhere.

But the Buddhist does not admit this. He may however explain the appearance of uniformity on the basis of the non-apprehension of the mutual differences of the unreal objects of the determinate cognition. He may then have to explain whether the difference of the unreal is a real content or a content whose non-existence is real or one which is imposed or whose non-existence is imposed or one which is itself unreal or is not coexistent with the unreals ? The Buddhist cannot say that the difference is real for then the supposedly unreal loci of the difference will be turned into reals. He cannot espouse the second alternative and say that the non-existence of the difference is real because this would entail that the unreals are not different from each other and so they have uniform appearance. The third alternative that the difference is imposed, also cannot be entertained because the imposed difference cannot remain uncognised. Imposition is a kind of cognition. If the non-existence of the difference is said to be the object of imposition then obviously the difference turns out to be real. If however an unreal non-cognition of the difference is supposed to engender the imposition of non-difference then such a non-difference being available everywhere the imposition would be a universal phenomenon. The cognition of difference could be supposed to oppose the cognition of the unreal non-difference in cases where real difference obtains and thus the imposition of non-difference in such cases may be denied. This being the rule determining the cognition of non-difference the non-cognition of the unreal difference cannot lead to the imposition of non-difference. According to this rule if an objet like silver is cognised as something other than silver then the difference from silver as characterising nacre etc. is imposed upon the silver and thus the false cognition of silver as other than silver may be supposed to arise. Likewise the hare's horn and the tortoise's hair are cognised as different from each other because the real horn and hair as the respective objects of the imposition of the relationship with the hare and the tortoise respectively are cognised as really different from each other. The last of the above-mentioned alternatives that the noncognition of any real or unreal difference of certain things is conducive to the cognition of non-difference of things other than these is simply ruled out as such non-cognition may be present even where the cognition of difference is present.

Is there any inferential proof for the doctrine of apoha ? Inferences like, 'whatever is the object of affirmation and negation or is not destructible despite the destruction or non-destruction of its material cause is of the nature of the exclusion of the other' or 'whatever is the cause of uniformity — cognition with regard to things which are quite unlike each other is of the nature of the exclusion of the other' are inferences which are both vitiated by the fallacy of absent major. What

is perceptually testified to be positive in nature cannot be proved to be otherwise by any inference. The supposedly unreal universal is not accessible to any means of cognition. Inference can have access only to the real. Of course if a real is apprehended by perception under one character it may be inferred as endowed with another character. But the unreal cannot be inferred at all. Moreover the middle terms in the inferences formulated above are not concomitant with the major viz., 'being of the nature of exclusion of the other'. The universal cannot be an object of both the affirmative and negative cognitions. If somehow it is shown to be the object of negative cognition it can be shown to be the object of affirmative cognition too and thus it could be proved to be both positive and negative in nature. One may here object that if the universal is positive in nature the verb of affirmation used in referring to it would be redundant and render the reference tantologous. But this predicament afflicts the negativist view also. So it has to be admitted that the affirmative and negative verbs associated with a subject in a sentence connote respectively the presence and absence of some property other than the generic universal in the subject or the necessity of the presence and absence of these if these are otherwise indicated. Thus both the verbs are meaningful. Even if the universal is held to be a purely positive entity both the functions hold good of the subject endowed with the universal. This is not possible if the universal were a fictitious entity. No property can coexist with a fictitious entity or be ascribable to it. On the above view the word 'cow' for example is designative only of the individual endowed with cowness but such an individual may be situated in a distant place and at a different time and so it cannot fulfill by itself the expectation of a person seeking some definite result (from the individual). So this person wants to know definite facts about the cow. This desire for information is gratified when the information is provided that there is in the cowshed a beautiful cow with black eyes, udders like a jar and a large bell round its neck. These qualities are generally ascribed to the cow and sometimes the ascription is characterised as necessary. The verb 'is' used in association with the subject term 'cow' refers generally to this ascription or necessity of the ascription.

Certain important points are involved in the foregoing arguments for and against the doctrines of apoha. The universal is generally regarded as the basis of the cognitions of uniformity as well as exclusion. When we know a tree as a tree we know it as similar in nature to all other trees (and identifiable as 'tree') and also dissimilar in nature to things other than a tree. The Buddhist takes cognisance of the exclusion — function or the exclusive character of the universal and regards it as common to all individuals supposed to be endowed by the universal. Perhaps his hunch is that the function of inclusion or subsumption is a form of

exclusion itself and so it need not be considered as distinct from the latter. An advantage in denying the inclusive character of universals is that exclusion being a kind of negation and negation being a non-entity the separate reality of universals can be discarded on this view. This does not mean that like inclusion exclusion also is sacrificed by the Buddhist. What he means by the denial of the reality of exclusion is that exclusion as a property characterising the excluding entity is non-existent. The cow for example excludes the non-cow by its very nature but there is nothing like exclusion differing from the cow.

It is not quite convincing for the Non-Buddhist to say that the universal is experienced along with the individuals but the exclusive nature of the latter is not. What Gñanaśrī says on this point is worth serious consideration. According to Gñanaśrī, other-exclusion is built into the very being of the individual cognised. Indirectly this view is conceded by the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika in its theory that distinctness is a quality common to all substances. Every substance is by nature distinct from all other substances. The only difference between this theory and the theory of apoha is that according to the former distinctness is a quality while according to the latter distinctness or exclusion is negation which is itself a non-entity.

There remains the objection to this theory that the real cannot be endowed with the unreal exclusion and so it cannot appear in the determinate cognition. If the unreal exclusion alone appeared as the object of the determinate cognition no useful purpose would be served by this cognition. Nobody seeks to obtain or turn towards an unreal entity. This objection is easy to meet. Even the cognition of the unreal sometimes leads to the obtaining of the real. The usual Buddhist illustration of this is the securing of a shining stone by a person who mistaking the splendour of the stone for the stone approached the stone to secure it. The unreal can even appear as the form of the real without actually characterising it but the Buddhist is not obliged to admit that the unreal exclusion appears as the form of the real in the determinate cognition.

There is one difficulty in the notion of the exclusion of the other which the author for all his penetrating critique of the notion has not clearly brought out. The difficulty concerns the elucidation of the term 'other'. Is it 'other than the individual' or 'other than a class of individuals ?' The self-contained discrete individual alone being the real for the Buddhist, a word like 'cow' (denoting any one of a class of cows) would have to denote a single individual cow if the first meaning of 'other' is taken. If the second meaning is taken, immediately the question would arise as to how there can be a class of individuals differing radically from one another. In the absence of the universal the individuals subsumable under the universal cannot be considered

together even with the help of the motion of the exclusion of the other. An individual cow excludes not only other individual cows but also all non-cows. So the Buddhist will have to admit that the exclusion of each other by the members of the class—so called—is of a different type (or level) than the exclusion by all the members of one class of all the members of other classes. This implies that between the individual members of the same class (so-called) there obtains some relationship over and above the negative relationship of exclusion. This relationship cannot be imaginary, conceptual or an imposed one. An individual of one class does not form a class with an individual of an entirely different class. There has to be something palpably common to different individuals to make them constitute a class. This does not mean that all classes are natural kinds. Classifications could be artificial but even these are grounded on some natural common element running through the classified entities. The theory of apoha thus seems to have relegated to the background the main function of universals, namely inclusion or bringing together of certain individuals under a common form, and brought to the fore its subsidiary function of exclusion of others by an individual or a group of individuals.

One more important point that needs serious consideration in connection with the author's defence of the reality of universals is this. If the universal connoted by a word refers to or signifies the existence of the thing characterised by it then the statement formed by the word in association with the word 'exists' should become tautologous. Contrariwise the statement formed by a noun coupled with the verb denoting non-existence would become self-contradictory. This is the Buddhist's objection to the reality (and positivity) of universals. The author says in reply to this objection that the universal does not specify the existence of that in which it inheres. Nor does it help identify the individual that is denoted in a general way by a word like 'cow'. In a statement like 'Bring a cow' the word 'a cow' stands for any cow. This statement can be meaningfully made by a person even if there is no cow nearby or anywhere at all. The words 'a cow' have therefore to be understood as meaning 'any cow' past or present. The verb associated with the word 'cow' in the sentence indicates the spatio-temporal position of the cow whereby the cow acquires existential status. So it is quite meaningfull to use the verb denoting existence with a noun. Not only there is no tautology in making the existential statement, the statement would not be meaningful unless existence is regarded as a predicate of the subject in the statement. This makes it clear that for things to be and to exist are quite different from each other. Being constitutes the essence (the generic essence generally) of a thing while existence is its ocurrence at different times and places. It is not surprising that the Buddhist does not distinguish essence and existence

from each other. The real for him is self-defined and so it has no essence apart from itself. It has no existence (in space and time) either as it is absolutely discrete and momentary. The western philosophical view that existence is not a predicate is ruled out by the above clarification of the author that being or the generic universal is different from existence.

From the foregoing discussion we have found that the inferential proofs adduced by the Buddhist to establish the negative character of universals are riddled by fallacies. Gñanaśrī has tried to avoid these fallacies in his inference in which he has put the cognition of the universal as the minor term. Whether the universal is positive or negative the cognition of it cannot be denied to be real and positive in nature. Gñanaśrī however has failed to realise that a cognition is defined by its object and if the object is positive the cognition cannot be concerned with both the positive and the negative. If the universal is negative and unreal there cannot be any cognition of it (in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view). If it is the momentary real there cannot be any determinate cognition of it.

The middle term in the above inference is 'Not appearing to be concerned with both the existence and the non existence of a certain thing' and the corresponding major term is 'Not having the said thing as its object'. Now if the property of being concerned with both the existence and the non-existence of a thing is the same as the property of not having the thing as its object then the middle conflates with the major and therefore there is no inference. However the middle can be so defined as to avoid this conflation. One definition equates the property with the property of 'being produced both in the presence as well as in the absence of objects' and another definition identifies the said property with the property of 'not apprehending either the existence or the non-existence of objects. The first of these definitions is of no use. According to the Buddhist the determinate cognition does not depend upon any real object and even an object which is not productive of its cognition can be its object. The unreal object though inproductive of anything becomes the object of the illusory cognition according to the Buddhist theory. Thus the middle is found to be absent in the minor. As to the second definition it suffers from the fallacy of conflation with the major pointed out above.

Another possible mode of definition of the middle which may help avoid conflation is to equate the said property with the property of engendering desire for the existence or non-existence of the object or the property of engendering desire regarding the spatio-temporally-determined existence of the object. Both these definitions are untenable. The cow-cognition for example does not have the horse as its object but it does not engender any desire for the general or

particular existence or non-existence of the horse. Certainly no cognition would ever engender desire regarding an entity which is not its object at all. The idea underlying these definitions of the middle term appears to be this that a cognition does not produce any desire for the existence or nonexistence of the thing which it directly apprehends. It cannot be urged against this that the cognition which is determinate does not apprehend the existence or non-existence of the entity whose qualified or determined nature it apprehends. If the qualifications are not different from the qualified the qualified entity cannot remain unapprehended by the cognition. But even if the qualifications are different from the qualified there is no rule that what apprehends the former does not apprehend the latter. The cognition can quite well apprehend both the qualifications (existence and nonexistence) and the qualified entity even if they were quite different from each other. Perhaps it may be maintained against this contention that there certainly is the rule that what does not apprehend the properties of a thing does not apprehend the thing. The cow-cognition does not apprehend the horseness of a horse with the result that it does not apprehend the horse also. The cow cognition does not apprehend even properties like blueness belonging to the cow. So the cognition cannot apprehend the cow. The possibility of the cognition of some properties of the cow when some other properties of the cow remain uncognised can be maintained if there were different causes for these cognitions and non-cognitions. If such a diversity of causes is maintained the diversity of the cause of these causes and the causes of these causes and so on would also have to be maintained. This infinite regress can be easily avoided if the cognition of a thing and of all its properties is regarded as caused by the same causal conditions. On this assumption either there will arise cognition of a thing endowed with all its properties or there will not arise the cognition either of the thing or its properties.

This argument is easily met. When the thing and its properties are ontically different from each other there is no point in regarding their cognitions to be simultaneous at all. Also it is not necessary to hold that all the properties of a thing must be known before a thing is known. It is simply not possible to cognise all the properties of a thing. If it were so the thing will always remain uncognised.

The Buddhist's argument has taken here a curious turn. The Buddhist does admit that the indeterminate cognition apprehends the thing by itself without any of its properties which are unreal impositions upon it. The determinate cognition apprehends the thing as endowed with the properties and so it is false. So it is not true in the Buddhist view that only that which apprehends all the properties of a thing apprehends it. The rule in fact is that only what does not apprehend the

properties apprehends the bare thing on which properties are imposed. If however existence and nonexistence are taken as properties of things then perhaps it can be argued that the determinate cognition does not apprehend the thing (to which it refers) because it does not apprehend the existence or nonexistence of the thing. But then the indeterminate cognition too would cease to have the thing as its object as it does not apprehend the existence or nonexistence of the thing.

A likely criticism of the above view might be that if because of the difference of a thing and its properties the thing is not cognised along with all its properties whenever it is cognised then even in determinate cognition a thing should be cognisable as devoid of its properties. Not only this. If a thing is determinately cognised in any kind of cognition then any of the innumerable properties characterising the thing should be cognised with it in its cognition. This criticism is answered by the Non-Buddhist by pointing out that it is not the case that for a certain property or properties to be cognised in the cognition of a thing it is enough that the thing is associated with the former. Different types of cognition like inference, verbal testimony, analogy etc. lead to the cognition of those entities or properties only that are related by specific relations to the things that are cognised by them. The rule determining the relation between the cognition of a thing and its properties applicable to all kinds of cognitions is this. The property or properties without whose knowledge the thing endowed with them is not knowable, are necessarily known along with the thing. In inference for example the major term is inferred as having invariable concomitance with the middle term. So unless this property of concomitance with the middle is known the major term cannot be inferentially known. In verbal cognition a word denotes the thing meant by it only when the conventional relationship of the word with its denoted is cognised. So without the cognition of the convention the conventional meaning of the word cannot be cognised. In perceptual cognition however the perceptual object is presented to the senses only under certain modes or as characterised by certain properties (except in the indeterminate cognition). So the perceptual object is perceived only as endowed with the mode or property that characterises it. But not all properties characterising a thing are its natural properties. Only one or two properties inhering in a thing could be regarded as natural. For example rationnality and animality are the natural and essential properties of man but two-leggedness is not such a property although every man (except one who has no legs or lost one leg) is two-legged. If it is asked why the various properties that are perceptibly present in a perceptual object like a tree are not all perceived when the tree is perceived by a person, the answer is that the person is not attending to all the properties present. Even perceptual objectivity of an object is

determined by sense-object-contact, mind-sense-contact etc. which are the essential conditions of perceptual cognition.

Turning round the Buddhist now advances a slightly different argument to prove his point. He pinpoints the self-defined, distinct and discrete character of the perceptual object as distinguished from that of the inferential object which appears as distinguished from dissimilar objects but not distinguished from similar ones. On the basis of this distinction the Buddhist maintains that 'that which is common to being and non-being must be concerned only with the exclusion of the other'. The distinction cannot be treated as merely cognitive produced by causal diversity. The very objects of the cognitions (not just the forms of the cognition) seem to be distinct in nature. So it can be urged that the determinate cognition is concerned not with the selfdefined real object but with the exclusion of the other.

This argument is easily met. The concomitance between diversity of cognition and diversity of the corresponding objects which is the basis of the argument does not hold in the case of the cognitions of variegated and non-variegated surfaces of the same piece of cloth which is variegated on one side and just plain on the other. The same piece of cloth appears as blue or variegated to the same person at different times and to different persons at the same time. It may be contended against this that the cognitions of the cloth by different persons or the same person apprehending the blueness of the cloth are not opposed to each other while those apprehending its variegatedness and nonvariegatedness respectively are mutually opposed because the forms determining the objectivity of the objects of the cognitions in the first case are identical while those in the second case are different. But then in the case of perceptual and nonperceptual cognitions too it can be contended that so far as the individual object with its generic property is concerned both perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions apprehend the same object while in respect of the spatio-temporal determinations of the object only perception can be said to apprehend them as in non-perceptual cognitions the object appears only under its generic form. If it is now asked how on the view of the selfsameness of the objects of both perceptual and nonperceptual cognitions the familiar distinction of vividness and hariness of the experienced objects is to be explained the simple answer would be that vividness depends upon the apprehension of a large number and haziness upon the perception of a limited number of the properties of the perceived object. A cognition does not become less vivid or hazy because it is rendered objectless. If one is rash enough to say against this that even in the cognition of haziness of distant objects no real object is apprehended then the intuitive evidence of introspection testifying to the veridicity of the cognition can be cited to prove the objectivity of the

cognition. The nonperception of certain properties of an object would entail the non-perception of the object only if the object and its properties were identical with each other but this is really not the case. The cognitions that arise successively as one approaches an object from a distance apprehend the same object under the properties of (for example) reality, substantiality, earthiness etc. If any one of these cognitions is singled out as veridical it can be done only on the supposed ground that the real object is apprehended by this cognition alone not by others. But what is the justification for saying so ? It cannot be that the object as divested of all its properties appears in the selected cognition. If the object were identical with all its properties then the last object in the series of successive objects as one approaches it from a distance cannot be a real one as those that precede it are also not real.

Pursuing the argument the Buddhist makes the retort that even if different properties inhere in a perceived object it appears only under that property which is connected with some significant activity. So a thing appearing as a real, as a substance, as an earthy object (as viewed from different distances) is connected with a specific significant activity only as a tree and not as a substance or as an earthy object. So the peception of the thing as a three may alone be treated as real. But this retort is not acceptable. If the thing is not only a tree but a real, an earthy substance etc. how can it be denied that the significant activity is not connected with an earthy substance (so that earthiness or substantiality of the thing should remain unapprehended)? It cannot be contended against this that since no significant activity has a complex cause every significant activity must have a single cause only. So all the different properties characterising a thing cannot produce any activity together. But this contention is wrong. No product results from a single cause. Only a collacation of causes can produce an effect. Besides a thing as endowed with different properties can quite well produce different effects corresponding to its different properties. For example a thing as real is productive of its cognition, as a substance it is productive of its conjunction with some other thing, as an earthy object it is productive of its earthy qualities and so on. Thus the various properties of a thing being connected with different activities all of these should be apprehended as characterising it when it is apprehended.

Now a different line of attack is being adopted by the Buddhist. He says that perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions differ because they are themselves immediate and mediate respectively. Their difference is not caused by the immediacy or mediacy of their respective objects as even the properties of immediacy and mediacy could be mediately or immediately cognised. If this happened then these properties themselves would have to be characterised by mediacy and immediacy

depending upon the way they are cognised. Again the second level properties also may be supposed to be characterised by the third level properties of their kind thus giving rise to an infinite regress. To avoid this regress it is best to treat the cognitions themselves as immediate or mediate.

The reply to this argument needs some clarifications. Mediacy and immediacy of cognitions are not determined by the different natures of their respective objects. The cognitions of a pot and a piece of cloth for example may both be immediate if caused by the senses even if these objects differ in nature from each other. The same object like a pot or a cloth may also have different types of cognition like perception and inference cognising it. Even the Buddhist admits that the mediate cognition of an object may be either inferential or verbal depending upon the different conditions producing them. Differences of the natures of the cognitive objects do not determine the difference of the natures of their cognitions. That the cognitive differences are not accidental and also not due to objective differences is proved by the fact that the properties of mediacy and immediacy do not appear in cognitions just as the objects of the cognitious do. Only in the introspective cognitions of the cognitions having the forms, 'I infer, I perceive, I have verbal cognition etc.' do the perceptual, inferential etc. properties belonging to the different cognitions appear. This sums up the non-Buddhist argument against the first middle term of the inference for apoha. As to the second middle term mentioned earlier the non-Buddhist now argues that even a positive entity like the generic universal can be the basis of the usage of similarity regarding different entities. Such a usage cannot be based on diversity of properties (belonging to the entities nor can it be based on the absence of relation with diverse entities). Only the relation of one with many can be the genuine basis of the usage.

So far the Buddhist's attempt has been to show that the properties appearing as characterising an object in its cognition do not really characterise it and so the determinate cognition of objects is false. This attempt is foiled by the opponent by pointing out that vagueness or definiteness of cognitions is not due to the different types of (real or unreal) objects appearing in the cognitions. The objects of both kinds of cognitions are alike in nature. It is due to the apprehension of larger or smaller number of properties of things that some cognitions of them are definite while others are vague. This rejoinder of the opponent is however not quite correct. In the N.V. view the hazy indefinite cognition of an object does not apprehend any property of the object as characterising it. The object, its properties and their relations are apprehended as unconnected in the indefinite or indeterminate cognition according to the N.V. view. So there is a basic difference

between the objects of the two kinds of cognition even according to N.V.

It may now be contended that apoha or exclusion as involved in a determinate cognition of the real gives rise to action directed towards it. There may be four different forms of this involvement. The first is by way of characterising the real (indeterminate entity). This is ruled out by the Buddhist's view that no determinate cognition apprehends the real. The second kind of involvement is through the identity of the apoha with the real. This too is ruled out by the fact that the real being the unique individual its conventional relationship with words can never be known and so its verbal cognition can never arise. Any other true general cognition of the unique individual is impossible to have. The apoha and the individual are diametrically opposed to each other in nature and so they cannot be apprehended together either in the determinate or the indeterminate cognition. Perhaps a third form of involvement of the apoha viz. the noncognition of the difference between the individual and the apoha could be defended against the above objections. It may be urged that the apoha remaining undistinguished from the individual leads to the cognition of the individual that is real. This alternative is untenable. Just as the individual with which a particular apoha is concerned may remain undistinguished from it so other individuals too may remain undistinguished from it. Thus the cow-concept or the exclusion of noncows may be undifferentiated from the horse. One could meet this difficulty by saying that the exclusion is undistinguished only from that real whose indeterminate cognition precedes its cognition. But then if the distinction is real it cannot characterise the exclusion which is unreal. If the distinction is regarded as identical with the distinct then no counterpositive can be taken to determine its nature so that an exclusion could relate to every real. But if no distinction is supposed to characterise an exclusion (as it is unreal) it would follow that the exclusion is distinguished from every real. It may however be urged against this that an exclusion appears as if it has a distinctive nature only in relation to the real whose indeterminate cognition does not precede it. This would imply that in relation to the real whose indeterminate cognition precedes the cognition of a particular exclusion the exclusion does not appear to have any nature with the result that either the exclusion doesn't appear (or is cognised) at all or appears as devoid of any nature. In either case there cannot arise any verbal cognition of or urge to act in relation to the real. The most serious difficulty however in the above view is that the same exclusion cannot be taken to be endowed with a nature of its own in relation to one kind of real and as absolutely natureless in relation to another kind of real. Moreover the nonapprehension of the distinction of an

unknown entity or an entity which is known to be devoid of any nature (like the 'exclusion' in the Buddhist view) cannot prompt any action towards anything. If it did then even the cognition that 'this is a fictitious entity' could lead to action towads the fictitious entity.

The fourth form of involvement of exclusion is emergence from the transcendental urge for the real. According to the Buddhist an urge is not a durable impression of an experience left behind by it. One experience resulting from another is itself the urge for the object of the experience. Now in an experience — sequence a yellow experience may follow a blue experience and so it should produce the urge for the blue. If it is replied that only a determinate cognition disposes one to act and the object of the act is that which is apprehended by the indeterminate cognition then the rejoinder to the reply would be that any indeterminate cognition may indirectly generate any determinate cognition. As to direct generation, even verbal and inferential cognitions cannot be directly generated by any indeterminate cognition as some determinate cognition has to precede the latter before they are generated.

The Buddhist may counter this rejoinder by urging that the necessary co-objectivity of determinate and indeterminate cognitions and the resulting disposition for action towards the object can be explained on the ground that the determinate cognition acts as the instrument of the indeterminate cognition. To be the instrument of the indeterminate cognition means to be co-objective with the indeterminate cognition or to be the basis of the false imposition of the character of the indeterminate cognition. But since the objects of the two kinds of cognition are of different nature the first mode of instrumentality cannot be maintained. The second too is not maintainable because in the Buddhist view every cognition is self-cognitive and as such it cannot be the subject of any false imposition and mistaken for what it is not. Even the object of the determinate cognition cannot be imposed upon as it is known to be (as per the Buddhist) a conceptual construct or a fictitious entity. Granting per impossible that either the determinate cognition or its object is the subject of a false imposition the restriction of the disposition to act cannot be satisfactorily explained because the generic property of 'being an indeterminate cognition' which is sought to be imposed is common to all indeterminate cognitions. So such an imposition cannot ensure that a certain determinate cognition like that of the 'blue' will prompt action only towards the blue object and not any other.

Could it then be the veridical character of the indeterminate cognition that is imposed on the determinate (so that even if it is false by nature it is mistaken as true)? If it is so then the imposition may involve veridicity itself or the exclusion of everything other than

veridicity or the veridicity as involving the real object of the veridical cognition or the exclusion of the real object of the latter. The first alternative is simply untenable as veridicity is a general property common to all veridical cognitions. The result of the imposition of such a general property would be that the determinate cognition of yellow for example may prompt one even towards the blue object. The exclusion of things other than veridicity is also a general property and its imposition also suffers the same fate as the above. If veridicity involving the self-defined real as object is supposed to be imposed upon the determinate cognition then the latter would come to have the real itself as its object. Further veridicity cannot involve any exclusion which is unreal. Besides the unreal can appear as real only if the determinate cognition had the unreal as its object. But the Buddhist maintains that it is the real which appears as unreal in the determinate cognition.

The instrumentality of the determinate cognition cannot also be explained in terms of the non-apprehension of the difference of the former from the indeterminate cognition or the objects of the former and of the indeterminate cognition. As explained earlier the determinate cognition as cognition is selfconscious and so it is distinctly known. The object of this cognition is however false and so there cannot be a real difference of the unreal object. Could then the immediacy characteristic of the indeterminate cognition as imposable upon the mediate determinate cognition be taken to constitute the latter's instrumentality ? No ! This too is not acceptable. In relation to their own being as object all cognitions are immediate, that is to say every cognition is directly self-cognitive. If the immediacy characterising the object of the indeterminate cognition is sought to be imposed upon the object of the determinate cognition then this immediacy not involving any real object may dispose one towards any other object as immediacy is common to both real and conceptual objects. It is also not the case that the objects of the two kinds of cognition have identical loci or are endowed with identical properties or natures because of which the determinate cognition could be supposed to be the instrument of the indeterminate cognition. There is nothing common to real and unreal objects. Even exclusion cannot be such a property as it is itself unreal. It cannot characterise the real.

Gñanaśrī the great Buddhist scholar has argued on this point thus. He says that a determinate cognition causes one to be disposed towards the real just by its very nature. There is no rational explanation for this phenomenon. The determinate cognition inherits this nature from its causes only. The non-Buddhist reply to this argument is that without coming in contact with the real no cognition can produce any disposition towards it. If there is any relationship between the two it

must be a natural one or be of the nature of the causation of usage in relation to the real. The natural relationship is the cognitive relationship of cognition and its object. Usage however cannot be the basis of any relationship because it is usage itself pertaining to objectivity that is being sought to be explained. Usage cannot be explained by usage.

The point of the non-Buddhist's criticism of Gñanaśrī's argument is that the causality of cognition, volition and conation is based on the fact that these have an identical entity as their object and the fact that there is no proof for admitting any special nature in the determinate cognition. It cannot be denied that the determinate cognition and the volition produced by it must be directed towards the same object. It cannot be the case that the determinate cognition has for its object an unreal entity and the volition generated by it has a real entity as its object.

It may here be asked if it is necessary for a cognition to be connected with the object towards which it may produce disposition of the cogniser. Isn't it the case that a cause produces a non-existent future effect without coming in contact with it ? The answer to this is that even the causality of cognition in respect of the unconnected real must be regulated by a property which determines the positive and negative association of the cognition with the real. If it were not so then even the cognition of flame may turn one towards water. Could it be urged against this that any determinate cognition whose form determines the capacity to burn is the cause of action or disposition towards real fire and thus either a generic or an adventitious property like cognitionness determines the causality of the cognition ? No! If this were so then the cognition of flame would not turn one towards the sparkle of a diamond-cluster appearing as bright as fire because such a cognition has capacity to impel one towards fire only. Of course the sparkle of diamonds appears in the cognition under the form of fire (or as fire) but its capacity to induce action does certainly not depend upon its appearance. If it did then the determinate cognition of fire (the unreal) would not produce the urge towards the real fire. So it must be admitted that the real appears in determinate cognition or it has to be denied that the fire-cognition (referred to above) causes the urge towards the non-fire. By this rejoinder stands rebutted the view that the identity of form of the object of cognition and that of the urge to action is the determinant of the relation of cognition and the real . There can be urge for action even in relation to that object which is not endowed with a desirable form common to itself and the cognitive object. For example fireness is not common to fire and sparkle. Fireness though desired is not present in the sparkle. Some form which is not desired may be common to both but then a person desiring a silver-piece and

having the cognition ' this substance is silver' should turn even to iron which is a substance. The view of the identity of form of cognition and its object upheld by Gñanaśrī and other Buddhists may be sustained somehow within the idealistic theory but within realism it doesn't make any sense at all. Cognition and its object are as opposed in nature as light and darkness. As such quite different causal collocations must be respectively productive of them. The difference of cognition and the cognised cannot be compared to that of cognition, pleasure, pain etc. which are all mental states produced by identical causal conditions with certain special conditions included in the latter and determining the differences of the states. External realities like smoke etc. are produced by external realities like fire but the cognition of smoke which is internal reality is not produced by fire. This shows that cognition and its object have different causes and so they cannot be endowed with an identical form.

The thesis of the identity of form of cognition and its object suffers from yet another defect. If for example blueness as a generic property is the form of the blue object it would exclude the blue-cognition. If it characterised the blue-cognition the blue object would then be excluded by it. But if the property or form were common both to the blue object and the blue-cognition then it would overlap the property of cognitionness as the two while coming together in the blue-cognition would exclude each other in the yellow cognition and the yellow-object. If the cognitive form itself is regarded as the object of the cognition of which it is the form then not being productive of any significant activity the form would not be sought after as a desirable object by anybody. The form may perhaps be illusorily viewed as objective (objectivity being imposed upon it) but as every cognition is self-cognition in the Buddhist view the form of cognition cannot be misperceived (as objective). The external real also cannot be misperceived in the cognition as the determinate cognition has nothing to do with the real in the Buddhist view. In the case of the example of the urge for the splendor when the diamond is sought after it is the identification of the splendor with the diamond engendered by their close proximity that produces the urge for the wrong object. But between the concept (or form) and the real there is neither proximity nor similarity for the two to be confused with each other. It is to be noted here that if cognition is supposed to be endowed with the form of the object cognised then the reality of the object apart from the cognition cannot be guaranteed. The occurence of the different forms in the cognition may even be accidental as is the case with the form of hair appearing to an epileptic person. If the object is known to be real on the basis of its cognition there is no need to accept the reality of the form of the object over and above the cognition. So if the form is real there is no object (or the

necessity to admit the reality of the object) and if the object is real its so-called form is not real. The well-known criterion of the production of significant activity cannot be trotted out against the above to establish the reality of the external real over and above the reality of the cognitive form. Even the production of significant activity cannot but be some kind of form. The reality of the external entity is also not provable because significant activities pertaining to different external entities cannot be established unless these entities themselves are established. Moreover like the unobjective form of a nonexistent object (like the hair-form appearing to an epileptic) there could occur the form of some significant activity issuing from some transcendental urge but having no objective basis This disproves the assumed concomitance of significant- activity- production and reality.

The Buddhist tried in the above arguments to explain how the determinate cognition which is unveridical can dispose and lead one towards the real. He introduces the concept of the common form of the cognition and the real for this purpose. But this lands him in the position of one forced to deny the very reality of anything other than cognition. Now the Buddhist advances the view that the self-defined momentary entity itself is the object of cognition but it being unique in nature it has to assume a general form in order to be the object of verbal contention, perception etc. This it does through the indirect relation of the exclusion of the other. Just as an individual cow for example excludes non-cows all cows exclude noncows. Thus exclusion becomes the general form of all cows. Now the question, arises, 'what is a non-cow?' If 'non-cow' stands for that which is different from a certain cow then all cows differing from the particular cow would, like cloth tree etc. be non-cows. Besides a horse would also turn out to be a cow as it excludes a buffalo which is different from a particular cow. This contingency can be avoided by elaborating the exclusion as the exclusion of everything excluding that which is characterised by cowness. Here the cowness may either be common to all cows or different from individual to individual. On the former alternative the universal is established. If the second alternative is adopted then cowness not being a general property it would be the old negative property viz. the exclusion of the non-cow. Here again the exclusion may be either the exclusion of some noncow or all non-cows. On the former alternative even a horse can be the excluder of the non-cow. On the latter alternative everything other than every cow would have to be excluded. But such an exclusion cannot be known by anyone other than an omniscient being. Could then 'non-cow' be interpreted as 'that which is devoid of some property (or properties) characterising the 'cow' or 'that which is devoid of all properties characterising the cow?' On the first interpretation even a cow would have to be treated as non-

cow while no object whatever can be a 'non-cow' according to the second interpretation. Knowability is one of the properties characterising the cow but no object is devoid of it.

Dharmakīrtī the great Buddhist logician argues against the above criticism that though individuals may differ from each other they may be endowed with a common form. This however is not correct as each individual has characteristics which are incompatible with those of others. There is no real identity of form among different individuals. If the form is identical with the individuals then it cannot be one and common to all of them. But if the form is different from and common to the individuals then it must be the same as the generic universal. Dharmakīrtī has countered this objection thus. The hypothetical universal is not needed for explaining the conceptual cognition of things or the uniformity-usage regarding them. If universals are supposed to account for the uniformity-usage with regard to different individuals then a series of universals would be called for to account for the uniformity-usage with regard to the universals themselves. There will also be required a universal to determine the capacity in certain things, another universal to determine the inherence of the latter in those things and so on. Thus there will be precipitated the fallacy of infinite regress if the universal is postulated to account for any uniformity-usage. So it is maintained by Dharmakīrtī that the individuals themselves may be supposed to engender the uniformity-usage with regard to themselves.

The non-Buddhist's rejoinder to this argument is that just as different individuals may be supposed to engender the uniformity (or identity)-usage so, like the Advatic Brahman, each individual may be taken to give rise to diversity-usage too with the result that every individual may then come to be regarded as many. The fact of the matter is that if capacity differs from individual to individual then it cannot produce usage pertaining to uniformity or identity; on the other hand if capacity is common to certain individuals then there is no point in denying the reality of the perceptually-established universal.

Against this rejoinder it may be contended by the Buddhist that if different individuals did not give rise to the uniformity-(or identity) usage then even different universals would not give rise to identity-usage even with regard to themselves. Even universals like potness, treeness, etc. are uniformly called universals! This is possible only if some universal is supposed to be common to all universals or the universals themselves are taken to engender the identity-usage. This contention however is baseless as an authentic identity-usage regarding universals as different as potness, treeness etc. is not acceptable at all. The truth in the matter is this. All universals are eternal and inherent in the individuals of a class and this property of inherence characterising the

universals is not itself a universal. If however the uniformity (or identity-usage in regard to different individuals is regarded as false then the diversity-usage with regard to them could also be treated as false as the Advaitin maintains. The usage cannot be grounded on the difference of the significant activities of the different individuals because even the significant activities would have to be differentiated on the basis of their own respective significant activities if there could be any. If therefore the diversity of the activities is treated as false then the diversity of individuals would also have to be treated as false. This would land the Buddhist in idealism (which denies the reality of the objective universe itself). If driven to desperation the Buddhist is prepared to deny all external reality and treat all cognitions of difference as illusory he cannot without the admission of the universal explain the illusory nature of the illusory cognition. Typical causal conditions of the illusory cognition have got to be admitted and this entails the admission of universals. If typical effects can be supposed to arise even without typical causes then any seed for example can give rise to any seedling. There would then be no need for the Buddhist to postulate the properties of 'immediate productivity' as inhering in the different causes productive of different seedlings. Without the admission of common generic properties causal relationship holding between different individual causes and their effects cannot also be established. Nor can there take place any inference which is based on the generic concommitance of the middle and major terms.

Perhaps there may be contrary evidence opposed to the reality of universals. (If positive evidence supporting the opposite view of apoha cannot be sustained). But if in reality there is such evidence then it may be opposed either to the universal itself or its cognition. If it is the first then it may be either of the nature of the non-cognition of the universal or the cognition of the universal as endowed with mutually-incompatible properties. The first of the latter alternatives cannot be accepted at all. None can say that the universal is never known as it is the very nature of the known uniformity of individuals forming different classes that is being enqured into: Perhaps the Buddhist can say against this that the appearance of the universal in the determinate cognition which is false is not denied by him. It is only in the veridical perceptual cognition that the apprehension of the universal which is fictitious is denied by him. In his view only those persons who depend upon the general verbal convention maintain the reality of the universal. But such a view is simply untenable as even in the absence of the knowledge of verbal convention universals are cognised. If some transcendental urge only is regarded as leading to the cognition of the universal even when the objects of the verbal conventions are not of one type then the different meanings of the word 'cow' namely the heaven, the eye, the

water, the arrow etc. of the Sanskrit word 'गो' would be cognised as endowed with a common universal. Instead of admitting this it is certainly far more sensible to admit that the different individual cows meant by the word 'cow' are endowed with the universal cowness. In the case of different things meant by the identical word 'cow', if there is supposed to be a common cognition of the former it will be only under the common forms of being denoted by the word 'cow'. In the case of the cows however the common form is just cowness as even a person unaware of the conventional meaning of the word 'cow' knows cows as cows. That even the indeterminate cognition has the universal as its object as does the determinate is proved by the fact that the objects of both the cognitions are the same and not different from each other, that the object of the determinate cognition is the real and that the nature of this object is not determined by words, transcendental urges etc. It is from the objects that their cognition (veridical) arises.

A careful consideration of the above controversy concerning the universal between the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist will show that the Buddhist is not seeking to defend a totally indefensible position as appears at first sight. It is true that any set of different things cannot give rise to the cognition of uniformity or identity with regard to themselves. There has to be some property common to them all. But to every set of things there is possible to have some common property like thinghood, knowability etc. but these properties are not looked upon as generic universals. Of course these are properties common to different individuals and as such they are not acceptable to the Buddhists. The Buddhist may deny that there has got to be something common to different entities for them to give rise to the notion of a common nature or property. He could account for the genesis of the notion of the common property or universal simply on the basis of some inexplicable transcendental urges.

Now some minor objection to the theory of universal may be considered and rejected. The first such objection is that if the universal is present everywhere it should manifest itself between two individuals in which it inheres. This objection is easily answered. The individual which manifests the universal (being the necessary locus of the former) is not available in the space between two individuals and so despite its presence there the universal is not manifested there. Also being eternal the universal does not go out of existence with the destruction of one individual and before the origination of a new individual (which is its inheree). When one or more individual inherees of a universal are destroyed the universal ceases to be manifested in them.

The second objection to universals is that if the universal is as different from its locus as a berry placed in a pot is perceptibly different from it then the universal should be perceptible as such. This objection

too is not difficult to meet. If being perceptible as different is being perceptible at a place different from that of the inheree then we have to maintain that this is impossible because the place of manifestation of the universal is its inheree itself.

Coming back to the second alternative mentioned earlier which is opposed to the universal we find that all objections connected with this alternative can be disposed of in the same manner as those opposed to the reality of the composite entity. There is no appearance of coexistence of incompatible properties in the universal. Just as the composite entity is supposed to inhere neither partly nor wholly but only by its nature in each of its parts, so the universal also may be regarded as inherent by its very nature in each of its individual inherees. Still one may ask, 'how can a universal enter into relationship with an individual yet to be born when it can not move on from the individual it inheres in or is not born with?' The proper answer to this question is that although the universal already exists at the place where an individual [inheree] is born yet it is manifested at the place only if the individual is [born] at the place. Again one may ask, 'why is it that only certain individuals are endowed with a certain universal and not other individuals?' The right answer to the question is that it is by nature that certain individuals of a certain type are endowed with a certain universal only. Individual inherees of different universals are born as connected with certain universals characteristic of them. The absence of movement in the universal does not prevent it from inhering in an individual. The movement of the individual or its coming into or going out of being are by themselves sufficient to make the universal characterise the individual. Can the universal inhere in the space between its two individual inherees? No! the space is not the inheree of the universal characteristic of the individuals which encompass the space. Would then the universal be non-inherent in the non-existent? No, The future individual not being present it does not manifest the universal. The relation of inherence being eternal the inherence of the universal which also is an eternal entity will be present in a non-existent entity simply because it cannot ever be absent. Yet inherence as qualified by a certain individual need not be eternally present. Unless the individual is present the qualified universal cannot be present. The nonexistence of the universal when the individual inheree of it is nonexistent means only the nonrelationship of the eternally-existent universal with the non-existent individual. Although the universal is present everywhere and always yet the coming into and going out of being of the individuals characterised by the universal gives rise to usages like, 'The cow exists, the cow does not exist', and so on. Just as in the presence of Chaitra it can be said that 'This is Chaitra holding or not holding the stick' depending upon the fact that Chaitra does or

does not hold the stick, so it may be in the case of universls. It may be noted here that the author is unncessarily exercised over the spurious difficulty raised by the Buddhist that the universal should make its appearance even in the space between two individual objects. The Nyāya Vaiśēṣika school does not maintain that the universal is a ubiquitous entity. Perhaps by the spatial relation (called 'daisika' relation) the universal may be supposed to be ubiquitous yet by the inherence relation it can exist only in its inherees. As to the objection that the universal cannot characterise a past or a future object without having movement the simple answer would be that though a universal is always there its inherence which is a peculiar relation—is revealed only when its objective-relatum comes into being. It may again be asked, 'If the individual and the universal are radically different in nature how can they coexist in mutual relationship?' The answer to this is that differents can quite well coexist and be mutually related although there is no invariable concomitance between these. It is natural for certain things though different from each other to be mutually related. This cannot be said of the uniformity-cognition or uniformity-usage. There has to be a common property among different individuals to account for the uniformity-cognition with regard to them.

Now we may take up the second of the two main positive objections to the universal referred to earlier by the Buddhist. This objection is directed against the possibility of the cognition of the universal. According to this objection the universal cannot be cognised because there is no cause for this cognition. But there are causes for this cognition and so the objection cannot be sustained on this ground. The second ground of the objection is the apparent coexistence of the incompatible properties of mediacy and immediacy in the cognition of the universal. The universal being both perceptible and also inferrible the cognition of the universal appears to be both mediate and immediate. But this is not correct. The sensory cognition of the universal is immediate not mediate. The third ground of the objection is that the cognition of the universal is not veridical because only object (or thing) cognitions are veridical. This too is not tenable as the cognition of the universal is, as stated above, sensory in character. If despite its immediacy the universal-cognition is not regarded as sensory or sense-generated because even without sense-object-contact the determinate cognition of fictitious entities like hare's horn etc. does arise then even the indeterminate cognition can be so regarded. The phantasy which is the determinate cognition of his beloved and is experienced by the love-born person is not produced by sense-object-contact. It is not the indeterminateness of the cognition that determines its sensory character. The imaginative projection by the lovelorn person of his beloved on the pillar facing him for example is an indeterminate

cognition although it is not sense-generated.

As a last resonrt it may be maintained by the Buddhist that the doctrine of apoha though irrational and baseless may be upheld for the noble purpose of the realisation that words cannot denote reals nor can inference apprehend them as they are absolutely particular in nature and these modes of cognition apprehend objects only conceptually. All dealing with the world therefore is conducted only through 'apoha'. On realising that word and inferences cannot apprehend the real the mind will desist from all external manipulation of things and fall back upon itself so that all falsehood along with the craving therefor would be dissipated and the immediate instinctive realisation of the truth of universal soullessness would be realised.

All this exhortation however is baseless. Even the Buddhist scriptures describing all this cannot be depended upon to tell us the truth as the Buddhist himself has disowned the truth of verbal cognition.

The last of the foregoing arguments against the universal deserves more serious consideration than the author has given it. It is true that immediacy of a cognition is determined by its sensory origin. The cognitive phantacy of the lovelorn person which makes him project the image of his beloved on a pillar is immediate but not (wholly) sensedetermined. The universal cognition may therefore be immediate without being sensegenerated. But it is to be noted that even in the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣika view the indeterminate cognition does not apprehend the universal as characterising the individual. Only in the determinate cognition the universal appears as the character of the individual. Regarding the verbal cognition what the Buddhist says above is obviously contrary to his own avowed position. Even inference is not a valid cognition for the Buddhist as the object of inference is a conceptualised entity. Yet inference is supposed to lead us toward the truth. Verbal cognition too in a similar manner can help us attain truth through the cognition (which may be false) of the conventional meaning of words. There is no reason therefore to deny the common meaning, both connotative and denotative of words.

In this first section the author has discussed threadbare the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and apoha or 'other exclusion' (as the real nature of the universal). The rejection of the universal as the common property of different individuals of the same class entails the rejection of all properties generic and non-generic. According to Buddhism the real is the absolute particular and so it is sui generis. There is nothing common even to two real entities and there is also no relation between any two reals. This doctrine is rejected by the non-Buddhists. The main point of the doctrine of apoha is the idea that there are no natural kinds and there are also no similars in the world. Everything is selfcontained and—in the strict sense unlike every other thing. If really

there is some property common to different things then they cannot be absolutely different from each other. Either they would be totally are partly identical with each other if a property present in one is also present in the other. Differents however cannot be partly identical. Difference and identity are absolutely incompatible. Every philosophical school other than the Buddhist subscribes to the motion of partial difference and identity. Only the Buddhist school advocates the doctrine of absolute difference. It is natural therefore for this school to deny the reality of the universal or any other common property. But the school is not able to define the apoha or 'other-exclusion' by which it replaces the universal. As was explained earlier the difference between the cow and the noncow for example cannot be defined without bringing in the cow-universal or the universal characterising the noncows. The generic difference which differentials only all non-cows from cows is quite different from the difference of one cow from another cow and without the generic difference otherness in relation to a class of entities cannot be explained.

The Nyāya-Buddhism polemics on momentariness turns mainly on one point viz; whether a single thing can be endowed with incompatible properties at different moments during its existence. Production, non-production, capacity for production and absence of such capacity, collocation with causal conditions and absence of this etc. are such incompatible properties. In the Nyāya view these pairs of properties are not absolutely incompatible. They are only relatively incompatible. A thing cannot be productive and non-productive at the same moment although at different moments during its existence it may be both without forfeiting its identity. The Buddhist however does not regard the incompatibility as relative. In order to secure absoluteness for the incompatibility the Buddhist brings in the concept of nature. A thing is productive or non-productive by its very nature. If production is the nature of a thing it will retain this nature throughout its existence. It will continually be productive; similarly if a thing is unproductive of a certain effect by its very nature it can never be productive of that effect. Nyāya does not subscribe to this staccato concept of nature. According to it a thing though productive of a certain effect by nature may or may not produce the effect if auxiliary causal conditions are or are not available to it. Such a view of things' natures appears counterintuitive and to bring out the counterintuitive character of the view the Buddhist forces Nyāya to narrow down its conception of nature. Nyāya is asked to specify if obtaining auxiliary causal conditions is natural for a productive thing. If this is not natural then perhaps the conjunction with the causal conditions may be natural so that no sooner a thing came into being than it becomes ready for production. Obviously Nyāya does not thus circumscribe and narrow down its concept of nature. In

its view the natures of different things are interconnected. A mango seed for example is productive by nature of the mango-seedling only if sunlight, water, air etc. which help the seed to burgeon into the seedling are each of them productive by nature of their respective effects. Production is always a joint venture. Different natures of different entities come into play in the joint venture. But the pecularity of the joint venture consists in the fact that even the individual causal contribution in the venture depends upon the contribution of all the rest. So even a partial effect cannot be isolated as what a particular cause by itself is capable of producing. This is rather a puzzling view which Nyāya is forced to uphold.

But does Buddhism with its theory of the single momentary cause fare any better in this respect? The momentary cause is also productive and non-productive, productive of its own momentary effect at a particular spot but non-productive of that effect at another spot. Thus incompatible properties appear to characteries even the momentary cause. If to ward off this incompatibility the productivity attributed to the momentary cause is pinpointed as to its temporal, spatial and other characteristics then Nyāya too can so hedge in the productivity of its nonmomentary cause as to make the attribution of non-production of the specific effect to the cause impossible. What comes out from the sustained arguments and counterarguments of the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians on the nature of cansation is the divergent conceptions of the nature of things that these schools subscribe to.

In the next section we are presented with another and a revolutionary conception of reality advocated by the Yogaācarā-school of Buddhists along with its detailed criticism.

Discussion of the Doctrine of the Denial of External Reality of the Yogācāra Idealism

The denial of external reality advocated by the Buddhists, of the Yogācāra school may mean either the denial of the difference between external reality and its cognition [or consciousness] or the dissimilarity between the two or finally the denial of the reality of anything outside consciousness. Taking up the first of these three meanings an inference can be set up with the help of the middle term 'coappearance' [of cognition and the cognised object] to prove the nondifference of cognition and external reality. But the prefix 'co' occurring in the body of the middle term suggests difference of the cognised object and the cognition and this difference is directly opposed to 'non difference' which is the major term in the inference. If the middle term is interpreted to mean 'non-objectivity in relation to the cognition which is non-apprehensive of cognition' then both the external object and its

cognition being cognisable by the same cognition [as cognition is self-cognitive in the Buddhist view] the reinterpreted middle term can go along with the major term. But the inference may not accord with the N.V. position because N.V. does not admit self-cognitivity of cognitions. The cognition which cognises objects in the N.V. view is always non-self-apprehensive. If 'cognition' is taken as the minor and non-difference from objects as the major term then too the above middle term would not accord with the N.V. position as a cognition not cognising the object like one produced by the word 'cognition' has cognition alone as its object. This difficulty can be overcome by assuming self-luminosity of cognitions but N.V. would not agree to it. The only way out is to use the word 'cognition' to mean 'that which has some object cognitively related to it'

The second middle term suggested for the inference is 'being the object of cognition' and the third suggested middle term is 'being the object of a particular type of cognition like perception'. Now while it is being inferred that all objects are nondifferent from their cognition, difference and its counter-positive not being identical with each other cognition cannot be identical with its difference but this difference is an object and as such it is included within the minor term of the inference. Moreover if cognition and the cognised are one how can there be inference as inference is based on the difference of its terms and their difference from itself? Further if a cognition having mutually-incompatible objects like blue, yellow, etc.were non-different from these objects it would cease to be a single cognition as it would forfelt its identity. If the cognition did not apprehend the objects it would not be endowed with their forms. And since all cognitions are self-cognitive the cognition with mutually-incompatible entities as objects cannot be unaware of the incompatibility of the objective forms.

Answering these objections Ratnakīrti, a great Buddhist scholar says that the significant-activity-production-criterion of reality [as maintained by the Buddhists] is applicable only to entities other than consciousness as they are usually distinguished from each other and as the desires and actions prompted by them and relating to these entities are also distinguished from each other. But consciousesnesses are not mutually distinguished. Each of them cognises only itself. It is not aware even of its difference from other consciousensses. Each consciousnesses is self-determined and self-luminous. As another great Buddhist savant Gñanaśrī says, 'All difference and identity are reckoned on the basis of the spatio-temporal differences relating to different things but in the case of consciousness where is such a basis?' Dharmakīrti, the celebrated Buddhist logician voices the same idea when he says that, 'consciousness is not differentiated or destroyed by anything other than itself. The distinction of self and not-self is an imposition upon

consciousness'.

All these Buddhist assertions are simply unacceptable. If cognitions of things do not differ despite the difference of the things [that are their respective objects] then it follows that the latter lose their mutual incompatibility or the difference resulting from the incompatibility as soon as they are apprehended by the cognitions. The first alternative is simply untenable. The incompatibility or opposition of things consists in the fact that the presence and absence of one of them is pervaded by the absence or presence of the other [or others]. So such positively and negatively opposed entities can never go together. It may be contended against this that even the opposition [of things] as an object is [as the object] identical with its cognition; so there is no point in maintaining its separate existence. If really the very fact of opposition is reduced to nullity then there cannot be any opposition of views; cognitions of different things would cease to be opposed to each other so that there would then be left only one cognition cognising everything or nothing. May it be urged against this that in the case of external entities there is the criterion of the production of different significant activities to differentiate them but this criterion is inapplicable to cognitions? No! such a discrimination between the objects and their cognitions is not justified because it is not the above criterion but the apparent coexistence in things of incompatible properties that is the real basis of the diversity of the latter. Even significant activities are distinguished from each other only if they appear to be endowed with incompatible properties. A significant activity is not distinguished from antoher on the basis of its own significant activity if at all there could be one. Moreover just as in the case of external things there is the diversity of their significant activities so in the case of cognitions too there is the diversity of their respective objects differentiating them. One may object to this on the ground that although things like blue and yellow are not productive of each other's significant activities yet one and the same cognition does comprehend blue, yellow etc. together. So there is no differentiatio of cognition according to the difference of the objects cognised. This objection however is based on misunderstanding. Even in cognition there obtains restriction. In the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow it is not the case that the blue appears as yellow or vice versa. If objective restriction were absent from cognitions then even cognition and noncognition would cease to be mutually exclusive. It can then be maintained for example that what is not cognised is cognised. The horse for example which is not cognised may be said to be cognised (as an uncognised entity). If cognition and noncognition have to be mutually distinguished we have to admit that cognition does not appear as non-cognition or noncognition as cognition. Similarly in the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow by the same cognition

the blue form of the cognition does not appear as the yellow form or the yellow form as the blue form. The form being identical with the cognition it characterises, its diversity necessarily diversifies the cognition. In the simulatneous cognition the form appearing in the cognition is a single complex one consisting of different things taken together.

Against this explanation of cognitive diversity the Buddhist may argue that in cognition there is no possibility of differentiation. The forms of cognitions are cognised by the cognitions themselves. It is not the case for example that the blue-form of the simultaneous cognition of blue and yellow is cognised through the yellow cognition only and vice-versa. Of course the variegated form of blue mixed with yellow is quite different from the separate blue and yellow forms, so it does not cause any differentiation in the cognition of the variegated colour. Thus the cogniser of the cognitive forms—even if they be many—is the very cognition that is endowed with the forms. The N.V.'s rejoinder to the argument is that such non-differentiation can be shown to be applicable to external objects also. Neither individually nor generically the external objects could be supposed to be differentiable. If individual differentiation of externals is suggested then the differentiator may be a single person or different persons. But since the external objects like blue, yellow etc. are momentary they cannot be both cognised and differentiated by the same person beacuse for these processes to take place one after another the things will have to exist for more than two moments. It cannot also be the case that the different entities cognised by one person are differentiated at the very moment of their cognition by another person. Firstly it is doubtful if such a thing always happens and secondly in the case of cognitions too such differentiation is possible to have. If it is contended that the cognitive relationship excludes difference of the relata (namely the cogniser and the cognised) and so a cognition cannot be the object of another differntiang cognition then there results the fallacy of circular argument as the nondifference of the cognition and its object is sought to be proved on the basis of the non-differentiability of cognitions and this is sought to be established on the basis of the nondifference of cognitions and their objects. Moreover if the cognitive relation is supposed to exclude difference how can the blue, the yellow etc. cognised together be mutually differentiated? If the different cognitions of blue, yellow etc. are supposed to differentiate them then these cognitions cannot be different from these objects. This means that these two cognitions, their two objects and the cognitions of the blue and yellow together will all be one and the same. It may also be asked whether the cognition of the absence of differentiation cognises difference or not. If it does then it follows that that which is different from cognition is cognised by it. If

however it does not then the cognition having a bare absence as its object (as the counterpositive of the absence viz, the difference not being cognised) the nondifference of cognition from its objects cannot be validly inferred. The actual absence of differentiation though concomitant with nondifference cannot lead to the inference. It can be asked whether the knowledge of this very fact has this very fact as its object or not. If it does then the fact must differ from the knowledge. If it does not then the concomitance remains unknown. Moreover if generic differences of external entities are regarded as cognisable there is no reason why such differences in cognition are to be regarded as uncognisable. The ground for admitting diversity in cognised objects—viz, the apparent coexistence of incompatible properties, is the same for the external reality as well as its cognition. If one denies this ground (for cognitive diversity) it may be either because one denies the incompatibility of blueness, yellowness etc. (as appearing in their simultaneous cognition) or the presence of the incompatibility in the cognition or its appearance in any cognition. The first is simply ruled out as blueness, yellowness etc. are known to exclude each other. The second denial means that the cognition is not characterised by blueness, yellowness etc. which implies that what is other than cognition is its object. The third denial is ruled out by the fact that the self-cognition of cognition which is supposed to establish its identity does itself establish its diversity.

So far the Buddhist has been concerned to maintain the idealistic nature of external objects along with the diversity of the cognitive forms which in his view replace the multiplicity of external objects. Even the forms are not quite different from the cognition in which they appear. The denial even of the apparent diversity of external reality will not do as the diversity is a commonsensical fact. If this apparent diversity is admitted (because of differences of significant activities pertaining to different reals) then on the same ground diversity of cognitive forms also can be maintained. The activities themselves would need to be differentiated by means of their own respective significant activities if there could be any, since there cannot be such a series of significant activity the real differentiator cannot be anything but the principle of the apparent coexistence of imcompatible properties. This principle is applicable both to external reals and consiousness.

It may be urged by the Buddhist that the socalled external entities being unreal there cannot be real coappearance of incompatibles in the cognition. The cognition will be absolutely formless and so whether the blue-form, yellow-form etc. are real or unreal in either case the cognition cannot be non-different with them. Thus the earlier inference will be afflicted by the fallacy of the absent major term. As a result the co-appearance of cognition and its object—which is nonexistent—cannot be a middle term in the inference of non-difference. Of course coappearance

can be defined as 'being cognised by that which has the co-appearing thing as its object' and this definition does not require the co-appearing things to be mutually different. But invariable comcomitance cannot be defined without importing difference into it. For a thing to be invariably concomitant with another it is to be uncognisable by any cognition not cognising its relation with another' but this involves difference as well as relation of the two things. The Buddhist denies both real difference and also the cognition of difference. Perhaps the Buddhist may urge against this that not all differences are unreal. The difference that may appear in indeterminate cognitions is not unreal although that appearing in determinate cognitions between the cognised and the cognition is unreal. This defence however is not sustainable. A difference appearing even in the inderminate cognition may either be different or non-different from the cognition in which it appears. If different then cognition must be different from the cognised. If it is not different then the cognition which is a real (though an unveridical) entity is identical with the difference and so the difference too must be real. The Buddhist may defend his position against this rejoinder by maintaining that the unreal difference appears in the determinate and not in the indeterminate cognitions. For the determinate cognition to cognise the difference is to engender usage pertaining to the difference cognised. But usage here if different from cognition cannot be real. It may however be regarded as some kind of cognition itself but then how to restrict its relationship to certain objects only ? (Different usages pertain to different objects). If the different causes of the different usages are taken to be the determinants of the usage-restriction this means that the relationship of determinate cognition and the nonexistent difference which is its object is causally determined. But for all this bezarre admission the Buddhist is not prepared to admit the cognitive relationship between the indeterminate cognition and a real difference. The point of the Buddhist contention here is that although there is no difference between indeterminate cognition (which alone is veridical) and its objects yet there can be usage pertaining to this non-existent difference as there are usages regarding illusory entities. The opponent's point against this is that usage is also a kind of cognition and it is determinate. If this can be supposed to be related to a particular but unreal difference even the indeterminate cognition can be cognitively related to a real difference.

Ratnakīrti the welknown Buddhist Logician argues against the above that difference of the objects of the cognition can be maintained if difference is treated as content in its own right. But this is not the case. Difference too like the object may be regarded as the form of the cognition cognising it. But difference being a relational entity its cognition involves the cognition of its relata namely its counterpositive and its locus (these being its determinants). So a cognition has to cognise

all these relata in order to cognise the difference. But how can one and the same cognition be identical with all these in order to be endowed with them as its different forms ? One may say that there are not many forms here but one variegated form consisting of many contents which do not separately constitute the forms of the cognition. But if this is so then the blue and yellow for example which are respectively the counterpositive and the loci of the difference would not figure as the forms of the cognition. The variegated form is quite different from these which are only its constituents.

Against this rejoinder the Buddhist may take recourse to exclusions to account for the cognition of difference. The blue- exclusion differs from the yellow-exclusion and it is these exclusions that apppear in cognitions as different objects (or the difference of the objects). This means that the cognition of the difference of objects (and the cognition of different objects too) is illusory because the exclusions are unreal and these being identical with their cognition the cognition too cannot be real. If exclusions are different from their cognition they cannot be its objects. If the cognition is therefore illusory then either its own form or something other than it would appear in it. If it is the former then cognition is sure to be diversified. But if the latter is true then there is no cognition of the exclusions. (Even the illusory cognition is not itself an unreality although its object is unreal). Could the difference or diversity be just the qualifier of the cognition without being the qualificand ? (Which the determinate cognition is. In an illusory cognition even the real appears as qualified by an unreal character without losing its real nature. So cognition may appear as endowed with unreal diversity without forfeiting its real nature. But such a retort would not do. The qualifier qualifies the qualificand and cognition is here the qualificand. If the unreal qualifies the cognition it cannot be real.

Gñānsrī, the great Buddhist savant arguing against the cognition-object-difference-view says that there is no process which cognition initiates in the object so that it could be related with the latter. In present objects it is conceivable that their cognition initiates some process but how can there be any process (or change) effected in past and future objects which too are cognised by cognitions ? Moreover this hypothetical process is not invariably present so that it could determine the cognitive relationship. Neither the generic nor the individual character of the objects, determines their relationship with cognitions. If it were so then an object simply by virtue of being endowed with potness or its specific nature could be the object of any and every cognition. Nor is cognition as cognition related by the cognitive relation to every object. Thus cognition and its object cannot be different from each other according to Gñānsrī. Gñānasrī however forgets that the difficulties pointed out by him in the cognitive-relation-view beset his view too. In that view cognition is self

cognitive. How can it be so without initiating some process or producing some change in itself ? If simply by virtue of being a cognition it is self-cognitive it can cognise any other cognition and if any cognition as cognition is cognised by itself it could as well be cognised by any cognition other than itself.

Gñānsrī's reply to these objections is that cognition is mere consciousness or senitience. This senitient nature of it is known as self-consciousness. But being self-conscious cognition cannot fail to be other-conscious too. If cognition is neither self-conscious nor other-conscious but is just sentience then the external object too may be taken to be what it is. If there is any evidence against the reality of the external object it may speak against its own object or against anything whatsoever. In either case other-cognition of cognition is established as evidence itself is some form of cognition and so if it is veridical it proves its other-cognitiveness or its own unreality. Gñānsrī meets this objection by urging that the variegated cognition is neither different nor non-different fromthe forms. But then if none of these two opposed properties can be affirmed of the variegated neither can be denied of it. If however both are denied of the cognition there will be nothing to distinguish this view from the Jain doctrine of probabilism. In case difference, nondifference and the absence of each of these are sought to be denied of the variegated simply because it is called variegated then each of the denials implying its opposite, the four denials may even result in four affirmations (of difference, non-difference and the absence of each of these in respect of the cognition. Further it may be asked whether the variegated cognition is cognised as devoid of the four properties or not. Since significant reference is made to the four properties it cannot be said that they are not cognised (and therefore they do not characterise the cognition). But to say that they are cognised is to say that they are identical with the cognition because cognisidness requires non-difference with cognition and this entails the diversity of the cognition. Without the counterpositives and the loci of the difference, non-difference etc. being cognised the latter cannot be cognised. How then can the variegated cognition be cognised ?

Against these objections Gñānasrī's rejoinder is to the effect that although the difference or nondifference of objects and their cognition cannot be indisputably maintained yet it cannot be denied that as objects they are all revealed and this revealedness is the ground of their being identical with cognition. But how the object can be identical with its cognition without affecting its unitary character (if there are many objects simultaneously revealed in a single cognition) is the main issue which this rejoinder does not tackle at all.

So far the first of the three alternative interpretations of the doctrine of the denial of external reality was discussed threadbare and rejected. It may here be noted that in this interpretation the reality of the external objects

is not denied. 'Both it and its cognition are regarded as real. The external object is real as the form of its cognition'; what is denied is the difference between the form or the object and the cognition. The form and the cognition endowed with the form are one and the same. The form appears from within the cognition and is brought into being by the transcendental dispositions lying hidden in the reservoir-cognitions (which give rise to ordinary objective cognitions). There is no objective causality for cognitions. The forms appearing in the cognitions are projected as external objects by the cognitions. The weakness of such a position is quite obvious. The simultaneous apprehension of many different entities by the same cognition is almost impossible to explain on this view. Even if the multiplicity of external objects is denied the multiplicity of their forms cannot be denied and then the multiplicity of the cognition bearing the forms also cannot be denied. The Buddhist has tried various strategies (by way of defining the cognisedness of the object in terms of its non-difference from cognition, its revealness etc.) to meet this difficulty but none seems to have succeeded. The Achille's heel of the socalled 'variegated' object concoted out of the different individual objects like blue,yellow etc. simultaneously cognised by an identical cognition brings out the utter weakness of the Buddhist position.

But there is a point in the Buddhist defence of the 'variegated' as the object of cognition. It could be urged that when two or more objects are apprehended by a single cognition it is not the different objects but their conjunction or coexistence—which may be called variegation—that is cognised. Of course difference being a relative entity its cognition depends upon the cognition of its counterpositive and locus. But it is not necessary that the same cognition which cognises the difference should cognise its relata also. Since the cognition of the relata is the cause of the cognition of the relative term the former has to precede the latter. So it is not quite correct to say that one and the same cognition should have difference along with its two relata as its objects. A particular difference with its unique character by itself could be apprehended by a single cognition. Similarly difference, non-difference and the respective absences of these may remain uncognised yet the absence of all these-a unique entity-could well be cognised.

The second interpretation of the denial of external reality being considered.

Now the second alternative mentioned at the begining of this section is being taken up for detailed consideration. According to this alternative the external object has generic similarity to its cognition because it is cognised by it. But if generic similarity to cognition of an object determines its cognisedness then all cognitions and all objects being alike

any object may be cognised by any cognition. Thus there will not be any restriction of the cognitive relation. If the generically similar is also identical then no cognition will cognise anything but itself. If sense-object-contact is supposed to determine the cognitive relationship then even external objects can have this relationship. Moreover self-consciousness of cognition would be rendered inpossible for the Buddhist as no sense-object-contact precedes self-consciousness and there cannot be any contact of the sense with consciousness. One may argue in favour of the generic-similarity-view that if the cognised object were inert by nature it cannot be revealed by cognition but the argument can be countered on the ground that just as for the N.V. cognition not being self-conscious is insentient in relation to itself so for the Buddhist too cognition not being other-cognitive is insentient in relation to all external entities.

Against the above objection the generic-similrity view can perhaps be defended if similarity of causal collocations is introduced as qualification of the cognition-object-similarity. If for example the cognitions of blue, yellow etc. arise simultaneously by being generated by similar causes they may then be taken as cognisant of themselves as also of each other and their objects and thus the emergence of varigated cognition can be explained. Thus the similar material cause as the special determinant or the causal collocation as the general determinant of the relationship of different cognitions and their respective objects may be maintained. This view will be acceptable even to the non-Buddhist because even the cognition of objects external to cognition is determined by its general as well as special causal collocations.

The second interpretation of the non-externality-view is summarily rejected here because the generic similarity of objects and their respective cognitions which can restrict the object-cogniton-relation is impossible to define without entailing the fallacy of circularity. For example the blue object is apprehended by the blue-cognition and not by the yellow-cognition (unless it is a collective cognition of blue and yellow). On what basis can we say that the blue object alone is generically similar to the blue-cognition (but the yellow object is not)? If being cognised by the blue-cognition is supposed to be the ground of the said similarity then the ground of this cognisedness would have to be explained. Can anything other than generic similarity of the blue object and the blue-cognition be regarded as such a ground? Besides anything can be taken to be generically similar to anything else. Being, knowability etc. are properties which are universal and so everything as a being or knowable is similar to everything else.

The third interpretation of the external-object-denial considered.

According to the third interpretation of the doctrine of the denial of the

external object the cognised is fictituous because—as has already been shown—the cognised cannot be treated as different or nondifferent from its cognition N.V.'s rejoinder to this is to ask whether absence or impossibility of defining the nature of the cognised entails simply the non-cognition of the latter or its non- existence itself. On the first alternative even this denial of the cognised becomes invalid as the cognition of the cognised as the subject of the denial becomes impossible. If the second alternative is adopted and the reality of the cognised is sought to be denied because it cannot be defined then it would follow that only if the cognised is real it cannot be defined. This means that if the cognised is unreal it can be defined. But it has been shown that neither the reality nor the unreality of the cognised entails its définability. If this is so why stress the unreality of the cognised? If the admission of the reality and difference from cognition of the cognised makes any cognition to have any entity whatsoever as its object then the opposite view also leads to the same prediaement. Could the cognised be defined as the object of the usage engendered by its cognition ? If it could then the specific realition of a particular cognition with the usage relating to a particular object will have to be accounted for on the basis of the specific causal collocation relating to the cognition. Now only if the usage is real its object will be sought after and obtained. The object of real usage cannot be an unreal entity. But if the usage itself is unreal nothing can produce it and then the definition becomes simply unworkable.

Driven to desperation by the above sustained criticism the Buddhist may urge that the world's reality is simply unthikable. If this is so can there be any thought or knowledge ? Even the truth that nothing can be known cannot be known. However if this itself can be known for certain how can there be universal confusion or ignorance ? Moreover if all thinking is subject to criticism there will be no point in engaging in any thinking activity. Perhaps the need of thinking may be defended by the Buddhist on the ground that thinking leads to the cessation of all activity resulting in quiescence. But if thinking is supposed to result in the cessation of all activity and also the denial of all truth it cannot lead to the gratification of any desire or the removal of suffering. It won't do to say against this that suffering too is irrational like other things and so it need not be treated as rejectable or undesirable. But if there is nothing to be gained by means of the thinking activity why should one engage in it ? If the thwarting of undesirable activities is supposed to be the result of thinking even desirable activities or goals would be thwarted by the thinking whose conclusion is sheer irritionality of the world. Gñānasrī says about this that by means of intallectual analysis the nature of things cannot be determined; on account of this fact things are described as ineffable and devoid of any nature. But there is no reason for Gñānasrī to rush to such a sweeping conclusion. A few definitions of things' nature may fail but from

this one need not conclude that things are simply undefinable. What is to be gained by arriving at the conclusion that the world is not definable or knowable? Perhaps shallow intellect may be the cause of the Buddhist's inablity to define things? If stretching the irritonality-thesis to its furthest limit in a fit of daredevilry the Buddhist were to maintain (as his academic brethrn Madhyamika does) that sheer empliness or nothingness is the ultimate truth then he may be asked to adduce some proof for the thesis. If he aduces any proof that itself will contradict his thesis as the proof at least is there. If intellect itself is the proof then nothingness and the world would be objects of the proof which again contradicts the thesis. If something other than intellect constitutes the proof there has to be some proof for this proof too which in its turn needs another proof to establish it. Thus there results infinite regress. If however nothingness is supposed to be self-revealed (without needing any proof) then there is not much to distinguish this thesis from that of the Vedantin. According to the Vedantin Brahman as pure experience is the only reality that is there. The world of multiple objects is an illusory appearance of Brahman conjured up by maya or the primal ignorance which projects all kinds of differences on the ineffable identity of pure experience (which is the same as Brahman). Nothingness cannot be the ultimate truth in this view as according to it the basis of all apparent multiplicity is the reality of absolute experience illusorily related to the illusory world. This view is comparatively easy to refute and it is mentioned here because of its partial similarity to the thesis of nothingness advocated by the Buddhist. That thesis has almost been refuted. If experience is real and not nothing it must have an object different from itself. The determinant of the relationship of experience and its object is the property which characterises the experience or both the experience and its object if the object is regarded as real (as in the N.V. view). This is so because if there is no experience or cognition but the object is there the cognitive relationship does not come into being. An object is not always cognised. In the Buddhist view the object being only the form of its cognition the determinant of the cognitive relation characterises both the cognition and its form. In the Vedāntic view experience being eternal and objects non-eternal or unreal the determinant of the illusory cognitive relation has to be regarded as characterising the object only. Experience as Brahman cannot be characterised by anything. In the N.V. view however the cognitive relation is regarded as the special nature of cognition which is the same as the property of pertaining to a particular object and not to any other. A cognition or experience is always the cognition of some object or other, Cognition is by nature revelatory of the object which may be past, present or future. Here a question arises here: 'In the compound cognition of the form, 'x knows some thing and this something is a claypot', since both the cognition (of something) and the claypot are

known the cognitive relationship of the claypot with x's cognition should not remain unknown but this is not the case. The cognition here is known as the cognition of something but the claypot is known as itself'. This difficulty is removed by modifying the definition of the cognitive relation to state that the natures of the objects presented to a compound cognition must be mutually synthesised if they are to be cognised as single. In the above example the claypot appears as claypot and not as something (although it may be referred to as something).

Another question that may be asked here is, 'What is the nature of cognition? Is this nature some property of cognition or the very being of cognition? if it is the first then the object of cognition will itself constitute the nature of its cognition because the cognition is qualified by its relation to its object. This is tantamount to the Buddhist view that cognition is endowed with the objective form. If the second alternative is true the object will be identical with its cognition. Such a view is indistinguishable from idealism (the object is not separable from the being of its cognition)'.

One more question that may be raised here is, 'Is the cognitive relation located in the cognition or in the object? If the former then the object cannot be the locus of this relation. If the latter then even an uncognised object will remain cognised. Moreover in the simultaneous cognition of two or more objects the cognitivity of each of the objects must be taken to be its own. For example if pot and a tree are cognised together the cognitivity of the pot must be distinguished from the cognitivity of the tree. Otherwise the pot would be cognised as the tree and the tree as the pot. But if cognitivity or cognitive relation is identified with the cognition itself then the cognition of a plurality of objects cannot remain unitary.

In reply to the above it is maintained by some logicians that the cognitive relation which is identical with cognition differs from cognition to cognition. The generic property of pot-cognitionness for example is common to all the different pot-cognitions. The difficulty posed by the simultaneous cognition of a plurality of objects referred to above can be overcome by treating the different objects of the cognition as the different locative determinants of the cognitive relation (as is the case with the one inherence-relation relating different relata with each other). The cognition is said to pertain to its object in the sense that it engenders a determinate apprehension of the object having the form 'this object is known'. In the example mentioned earlier namely, 'x knows something and this is a claypot' 'x's cognition does not engender the apprehension that 'the claypot is cognised' so x's cognition cannot be supposed to pertain to the claypot.

In this account of the cognitive relation the generic properties of cognitive objects like potness,treeness etc. form part and parcel of the cognitive relation as the pot,tree etc. as endowed with potness,treeness etc.

constitute the cognitive relation. So the cognition of pot for example cannot be described as the cognition of pot as endowed with potness as potness forms an integral part of the cognitive relation. Besides if cognition, being by nature related to its object is supposed to engender some usage in regard to it, and the capacity to engender appropriate usage is equated with the cognitive relation then a cognition could have the cognitive relation even with its negation. The way out of all these difficulties is to treat cognitivity as a relation different both from cognition and its object. One important reason to hold such a view is that cognitions as cognitions produce desires and efforts only relating to their own objects. The relation of objects to their desires and efforts is always determined by their relations to their cognitions. There is nothing common to cognitions, desires and efforts except their relation to their common objects.

An important question may be raised here. If the cognitive relation determines the volitional and conational relation what of God's desire and effort which are eternal? Further if it is stipulated that the cognition of an object which necessarily precedes a certain desire is what determines the nature of the object of the desire then the desire for cooking may have even 'the causality of the desired' as its object as it is the cognition of the latter that produces the desire for cooking. Also no effort can have cooking as its object as prior to the effort there does not take place the cognition of cooking. And since the cognition preceding desire is gone at the time the effort takes place the desire producing the latter would be deprived of any object at its second moment of occurrence. It may be said against this that the desire is both preceded and followed by different cognitions having the same object as its own but a far better reply would be that both desire and effort are independently concerned with their objects instead of having a borrowed objectivity.

The above discussion seeks to highlight a peculiarity of the cognitive relation which is absent from all other relations. In the N.V. view cognition is always a cognition of some object or other. An objectless (pure) cognition or consciousness is not admitted by N.V. But an object may remain uncognised while the object forms an integral part of its cognition and therefore it may be supposed to constitute the very being of cognition. The same cannot be said of cognition in relation to its object. So strictly speaking cognition cannot be described as having the cognitive relation to its object. Like the living body with its limbs cognition is related to its object.

There is another peculiarity too of the cognitive relation which needs to be noted. As even the non-existent past and future objects are cognised (by cognitions usually described as recollections and expectations respectively) cognition has these nonexistent entities also as part and parcel of itself. How is this possible ? Certain philosophers known as

phenomenologist explain this fact by ascribing to cognition—and even desire, conotion etc.—'intentionality' which makes these mental entities referential by nature (whether there is any referend or not). Some may think that the referend is the content which is a replica of the real object outside cognition but embodied by cognition as a part of itself. But this is not correct. The cognition refers to or intends directly its object. The so-called content may be the medium through which the cognition may make the reference but certainly the content cannot be the real referend for then the cognition would not have anything to do with the real objects in the world. Moreover if the content is taken as the real and direct referend of cognition its relation with the otject-to which it corresponds will be very difficult to explain. Idealists exploit this difficulty to deny the reality of the external world.

The best view to take on this issue is to treat cognition, volition, conation etc. as different types of intentions intending directly objects beyond themselves whether existent or nonexistent. Knowing is one kind of intention, desiring another kind and conation still another. All mental entities may be regarded as so many different types of intentions. When an object is directly present before oneself one can intend it directly. But when it is not so present (but visualised as present) one can intend it indirectly as 'that object' using the remembered image of the (previously-perceived) object (as a transparent medium or guide) to intend or refer to the object. The reference to the object is indirect not because the image of the real object is the direct referend of the cognition but only because it is a medium or guide for the reference (or intention) to succeed.

The Buddhist has questioned the reality of the cognitive relation on the ground that it is unproductive of any result. Unless a socalled entity gives rise to some significant activity or result it is not regarded as real. The relation is also condemned on the ground that its specificity cannot be explained. Both these alleged drawbacks of the cognitive relation are denied by the non-Buddhist by comparing this relation with the relation of causality. The cause is productive of the effect not because it produces some benefit in the effect but because it is endowed with the capacity to do so. Likewise cognition cognises the object without producing any benefit in it. It does so because it is endowed with the capacity to do so. Similarly the specificity of the cognitive relation may be supposed to consist only in the object being endowed with objectivity in relation to the cognition. The causal relation too is specific only because it produces a particular effect and not any other.

It needs to be pointed out here that the author has not represented the position of the Buddhist idealist properly when he puts in his mouth the contention that the world may be irrational, that thinking serves no purpose except to make the thinker to abstain from all activity or desist from ritualistic activities, that emptiness or nothingness is the ultimate

truth about things and so on. An idealist will never advocate universal emptiness as it will go against his own basic tenent that consciousness alone is real. The Madhyamika Buddhists have of course denied the reality of everything including consciousness. They have also denied the validity of any philosophical view about the nature of the world. But this view has to be carefully distinguished from the view presented here on behalf of the idealist that the world is irrational. Further the interlude of Advaitic doctrine in the discussion of the irrationality of the world appears rather queer. There is a good deal of affinity between the Advaitic view that Brahman as absolute consciousness is alone real and the idealistic view. The author has just stated without any serious comment this view while he pours ridicule on the idealistic view. The Advaitin is here represented as criticising the upholder of the emptiness-doctrine but what has this to do with the Buddhist idealism ? On the whole it seems that the author is carried away by his enthusiasm in exposing the absurdity of the Buddhist position to attribute to it views which it does not envisage at all.

The conclusion of the foregoing discussion may be presented thus. In the Buddhist view the cognitive relation as holding between the cognition and its object cannot be entertained because cognition is momentary while its object may be a real or unreal durable object. If the relation characterised the object the cognition of the object bearing relation to it would have to be durable. In the Samkhyan view also the cognitive relation cannot be upheld as cognition is eternal while things (the objects of cognition) are non-eternal. So only the objects will bear the cognitive relation. They may or may not be cognised by the eternal intellect. In the view of idealist Buddhists too the cognitive relation cannot hold of either the cognition or its object as the object is simply nonexistent. What then cognition be related to? It may be contended against this that even the nonexistent socalled external entity could appear in cognition. (isn't the illusory unreal entity revealed in the illusory cogniton?). Now this nonexistence may be understood in three different ways. One is to take it as existence at other times and places. This presupposes the existence of space and time. The second kind of nonexistence is characterlessness. A characterless entity cannot characterise or qualify anything. The third kind of nonexistence is exclusion which if unreal (in the Buddhist view) implies the reality or existence of the excluded. If the excluded is unreal the excluder must be real.

It may be argued against the above that the blue,yellow etc. though unreal have each of them their distinctive characters so even if these and other external entities are regarded as unreal each of them may be taken to have its own distinct character and as such these may characterise the cognition. (Even the unreal hare's horn is distinguished from the sky-lotus or the barren woman's son). But is this distinctive character different or non-different from the unreal character inhering in the unreal? If

different then it must be real and if non-different it too must be unreal.

It may be urged against the above that the unreal appears in cognition as its objective form due to the operation of certain transcendental urges. But it needs to be explained how the utterly formless can appear at all. If formlessness is mere inexplicability as real or unreal how can one think about it ? If some kind of thinking about the formless is possible then it is neither formless nor inexplicable. The upshot of all this discussion is that without admitting objective diversity and subject-object-duality the cognitive relation cannot be properly explained. An example of irrational thinking like the one the Buddhist has been indulging in is presented in this connection by the author. A boorish person visiting the town passes by the king's palace where he sees an elephant standing. Having seen the gigantic animal for the first time the person wonders whether the thing before him is an embodiment of darkness or a rainbearing patch of cloud or some relative of his or lastly the shadow of a real creature. The elephant's snout, legs, tusks, urination, droppings etc. are also mistaken for different things by this person. After some thinking all these speculations are discarded by the visitor in favour of some other ones. Obviously neither the earlier nor the latter speculations of this person are veridical. Similar are the proofs for the irrationality of the world advanced by the Buddhist. If the proofs are not irrational everything is not irrational. But if the proofs are irrational the world cannot be irrational (The proofs are like the boorish person's latter speculations canceling his earlier speculations).

It may be contended (against the above rejoinder) that the proofs for irrationality may be just commonsensical so that absolute truth for them need not be expected. The contention may be justified if the proof and its auxiliaries conform to commonsensical norms. As per these norms syntax, competence, proximity etc. are the essential conditions for the significance of sentences. Syntax is defined by some as the anterior nonexistence of the cognition of the relationship of the meaning of one word-component with another in a sentence. But such a definition of syntax would render the other conditions of significance superfluous. The incompetent and mutually non-proximate words in a sentence would be excluded by the definition of the syntax itself. Besides, anterior non-existence being the common cause of all products syntax defined in terms of anterior non-existence cannot be regarded as the special cause of verbal cognition. The proper definition of suntax would be as the property of the words in a sentence without which they cannot yield connected meaning. Competence is rightly defined as 'the absence of the true cognition of the connection of the meaning of one word being unrelated with the meaning of another word in a sentence. Proximity is defined as the uninterrupted cognition of words in a sentence. All these by themselves are not needed for verbal cognition as in the absence of one or more of these conditions

the erroneous cognition of their presence in the case of certain sentences verbal cognition does arise. It is the cognition of the presence of these conditions that gives rise to verbal cognition. Where the context of the utterance or use of a sentence engenders doubt regarding the presence of any of these conditions, there verbal cognition does not arise. The author qualifies the sentential meaning as 'uncontradicted by any other valid means of cognition'. This seems to be the same as competence but it is different from it as contradiction of the sentential meaning may take place after the verbal cognition has already taken place. Competence however must precede the occurrence of the verbal cognition. A non-syntactic combination of words in a sentence is illustrated by a jumble of words like 'This mountain Devadutta is fair'. A noncompetent combination of words is illustrated by, 'The water-reservour is afire'. 'The mountain Devadutta has eaten afire' is a sentence whose words lack mutual proximity, 'The white "dittha" runs' is a sentence with an ambiguous word -'dittha' which has more than one meaning. 'The hare has horns' conveys meaning which is contradicted by common experience'. 'My mother is barren' is a sentence which is self-contradicted in its meaning. 'I am dumb' is contradicted by its very uttarance as a dumb person cannot make any utterance. 'I do not know this' is contradicted by the very cognition implied by the referential use of 'this'. "The elephant entering my ear trumpets,'present me some medicine" is a sentence which implies what contradicts the very meaning it conveys. If the elephant has entered the ear of a person he cannot hear anything. How can be then be asked to prescribe any medicine ?

The syllogism consists of premises (five in number according to N.V.) which are quite free of all the sentential defects mentioned above. The purpose of syllogistic argument is proof or disproof. For proof we need a middle term which is endowed with the five properties like presence in the minor, presence in the comincor ,absence in the contraminor, absence of any contrary middle term and presence of the major in the minor. A middle endowed with all these five properties and thus having positive and negative concomitance with the major is alone a valid basis of valid inference. The counterfactual conditional precipitating the absence of the middle on the assumption that the major is absent in the minor is an auxiliary of the valid middle term. An instance of a proper counterfactual conditional is like this. 'If water did not quench thirst nobody would drink it'. An improper conditional is like this, 'If,water did not quench thirst it would be colourless'. Disproof which is another function of a syllogism is attempted by means of fallacies which are established, which do not entail contradictory reasons and are concomitant with the proofs of the fallaciousness of the falsified middle term. No fallacy which does not fulfill these conditions can be used for disproof. The fallacy affecting the middle term is deviation. 'Being' is such a middle term in the inference of fire on

the mountain but smoke is there quite a valid middle term. Examples of fallacious middle terms which do not fulfill all the three requirements of being fallacious mentioned above are as follows,' Being beset with the doubt of being afflicted by absolutely unknown conditions' in the inference, 'This smoke does not prove the presence of fire on the mountain' is a kind of disproof which entails its own contradiction. If no condition is known no doubt can arise about it. 'Being endowed by the property of being' in the above inference is another middle term not concomitant with disproof as it is not the case that every object is such as cannot be the ground for the presence of fire on the mountain. 'To be opposed to the presence of fire in its locus' is the third kind of fallacious middle term which is not established. The opposition of smoke to the presence of fire in its locus is not established at all. Thus as valid middle terms have to be concomitant with their major terms so the fallacy afflicting invalid middle terms must be concomitant with the disproof of the major as it is by means of them that the presence of the major in the minor is disproved.

If the above mentioned commonsensical conventions relating to syllogistic inferences and the fallacies afflicting them are scrupulously followed then all the negative theses of the Buddhist stand rebutted. They imply their own negations and thus prove self-contradictory. For example if the thesis as one of the negated things is unreal then the contradictory of the thesis is real. If thesis is unreal then at least one thing namely the thesis is real. Perhaps the empirical reality of positive theses may be maintained while denying their ultimate or reflective reality. But since a thesis is only a kind of reflection its reality implies the unreality of the thesis itself. If reflection is unreal it cannot imply the unreality of everything which is stated by the thesis.

Moreover the thesis of universal negation cannot be asserted because for this assertion to be possible its counterpositive must be real and this fact contradicts the thesis. One may contend against this that for the assertion of the negation the mere cognition of its counterpositive and not its reality is required. But then this cognition itself would have to be real. Besides this cognition would testify to the reality of its object-the counterpositive. If this cognition is supposed to be false then it must be falsified by a valid cognition depending upon it or one not depending upon it or by a cognition which itself is false (and falsifiable by another cognition). The first is not possible. The inferential cognition of something being not warm is not commonly taken to contradict the perceptual cognition of warmth of the same thing. Without warmth being known its opposite-coldness-cannot be known. The second alternative is simply untenable. A contradictory valid cognition of negation can certainly take place without the counterpositive of the negation being cognised. The third alternative is ruled out by the very fact that a false

cognition cannot falsify a thesis of which it is contradictory. Besides the contradicting cognition cannot have pure negation as its object as then nothing would be negated by it. If the negation of the real is the object of the cognition it cannot negate the real absolutely, being itself dependent upon the cognition of the real.

Could some spontaneous perception prove the unreality of the world ? No! In order to do so the perception itself has to be real and veridical. Mere undefined adverse contingency also cannot be the nature of the world-devying cognition for what is a contingency for the non-Buddhist is not so for the Buddhist.

There are also fallacies in the negative inferences of the Buddhist as every one of the middle terms in the inferences implies propositions which contradict its own major promise. For example the unreal cannot be the middle term in any inference, so it must be a real which is universally denied in the major premise of the inference. Similarly in the second inference the middle term must be true so the major premise that 'nothing is true' (in the inference) is false. In the third inference the cognition of the middle is necessary for inference and so an active agent which is denied in the major premise of the inference. The irrational also cannot be a middle term and so the rational middle term would contradict its major premise denying rationality of every thing. Other middle terms also presuppose the reality of what they negate because if the counterpositive is unreal there cannot be a negation of it and if it is real there cannot be absolute negation of it. Further an accusative (of cognition) is either an object or an entity bearing the fruit produced by an action or an entity which bears the fruit determining the meaning of a verb. The first is undeniable as every cognition has a real object (in the N.V. view). The second too is undeniable as the entity cognised bears the fruit produced by the action (prompted by the cognition in the N.V.view). The third also cannot be denied as then even an unknown entity would have to play the role of the middle term.

Like the middle terms the examples also are riddled by the above-mentioned fallacies and so they too have to be dis-carded. If the snake in the rope, the hare's horn etc. were real, true etc., then the examples would be bereft of the major term unreality, untruth etc. Moreover if nothing is real true etc. there cannot be unreality untruth etc.

From the above it may appear that the Buddhist's arguments seeking to prove the unrality of the (objective) world are quite flimsy and therefore the author need not have bothered to enticise then. There is however a point which the Buddhist has highlighted by means of his arguments. The distinction between the real and the unreal in the world is commonly taken to be based on experience. The real is experienced while the unreal is not. We do not see the skylotus anywhere while blue lotuses are seen in ponds. But we do see the nonexistent silver in the shell and imagine the

lotus blooming in the sky. This seeing and imagining are also experiences. How then can we distinguish these from the so called veridical experiences? It is by means of the experiences of these experiences called introspection (or retrospection)? But these too are sometimes found to be alike in the cases of veridical and non-veridical experiences. There is really no basic and intrinsic distinction between the (socalled) veridical and non-veridical experiences. So the commonly-accepted distinction between the respective objects of these experiences also has no genuine basis. Thus the idealist (Buddhist) can prove the unreality of all external entities. Even the Advaita Vedantin has exploited a similar argument to cast doubt on the reality of the world. The waking experience in which the world is cognised is no different from the dream-experience in which an exact replica of the objective world is cognised. So long as the dream lasts not the slightest doubt arises regarding the objective reality of the dream-world. So waking and dreaming being quite alike as experiences their respective objects also must be alike. So goes the Advaitic argument against the reality of common objects. The only difference between this and the above Buddhist argument is that the Buddhist denies only the external objects while the Advaitin denies everything other than Brahman the absolute. But in the arguments presented in the text by Udayana on behalf of the Buddhist even experience are denied to be real. There is the inference that 'Nothing is real as it is of the nature of experience like the experience of the snake in the rope in which the unreality even of experience is attempted to be extablished. Here it should be noted that it is not the truth of the illusory experience that is denied. Having thus failed by means of his negative arguments to prove the unreality of the world the Buddhist now turns to positive arguments to disprove the reality of the world which appears to be composed of gross and subtle objects. There are neither gross nor subtle objects as the notions of grossness and subtlity are riddled with contradiction. The principle of the nonidentity of what appears to be endowed with incompatible properties is as heretofore the main basis of the positive arguments of the Buddhist. If a commonly-perceptible entity is proved to be neither gross nor subtle nor of any other conceivable appearance then all perceptions become suspect so that only objectless cognitions can be treated as real. The argument for the unreality of the composite entity seeks to disprove all commonly-recognised properties of the composite successively. Thus the composite entity cannot be independent of others for then it would be like space. It cannot also be other-dependent for then it cannot be either producible or unproducible. If it already exists before the causal operation (to produce it) takes place then there is no need for this operation and therefore the composite is not producible at all. If on the other hand the conposite is non-existent when the causal operation takes place then as non-existent a certain composite like the claypot being exactly like another non-existent

say, a piece of cloth (to be woven) the causes of the claypot should be able to produce even the cloth. Since this too is not the case the cloth as the composite is neither real nor unreal. The composite cannot also be a unitary entity for then it would not appear as endowed with many different attributes like colour, odour, feel etc. A single entity cannot be conglomeration a of many attributes. Nor can the composite be of a multiple nature for then multiplicity or diversity would have to be taken to constitute unity. The composite cannot also be either ubiquitous or limited in space. It is not the first because it has movements. It cannot also be the second because that implies that the composite exists or is real at one place and does not exist at another place or is not real at other places. But one and the same thing cannot be both real and unreal. All these objections against the reality of the composite are riddled with fallacies. If, for example grossness is not assertible of the composite then subtlety must be assertible of it as these two are mutually opposed properties and the composite being a perceptible and tangible entity it cannot be simply propertyless. Also none of the middle terms in the inference of the Buddhist (seeking to prove the unreality of the composite) can be concomitant with its major term because if the major, middle and minor terms are real there is left no ground for controversy.

The Advaitin also denies the reality of all external objects. His denial is based on the denial of the reality of the category of difference itself. So the arguments for this denial are presented here for consideration. the first argument for the denial is that the socalled difference cannot be defined and so it is not real. If difference is real it may either be identical with its locus or be a characteristic property of it. If it is the first then the usage that 'the pot is different' (which means that the pot is not the same as the difference) will be falsified. If however difference is different from the locus then we can say that in the cognition of a pot (for example) potness as characterising the pot appears while in the cognition of difference 'potness' as characterised by 'potnessness' appears and thus the cognitions can be diffrentiated from one another. But then the expression, 'The locus of potness is different' would turn out to the tautological on this view as the subject and predicate in the expresion are the same. The N.V. tries to meet these objections to the reality of difference by maintaining that difference is an object of knowledge. If the very knowledge of difference is denied then this denial itself will be rendered false. For a significant denial of difference to be possible difference as the counter-positive of the denial has to be an object of cognition. Not only this; if there is no difference of debaters about difference even the debate cannot proceed.

It is objected that if difference is the property of its locus then there must be a second difference characterising the first and differentiating it. This second would need a third difference to characterise and

differentiate it. Thus there areises infinite regress. But this regress can be stopped if we stop with the first difference itself treating it as self differentiated. But the object like the pot-that is different (from something else) cannot thus be self-differentiated. Besides difference is a genuine object of cognition. In the face of such uninpeachable evidence if the admission of difference entails regress it cannot be treated as an objection to the admission.

It may here be urged that it is mutual negation which is the object of difference-cognition. The fallacy of self-dependence may be trotted out against this view (as the cognitions of difference and mutual negation seem to require each other). This fallacy can be avoided if the locus and the counter-positive are viewed in their capacity as locus and counterpositive and—not as things different from these—as the cause of difference-knowledge. If the locus is known as characterised by a property not determining counterpositivity and the counterpositive is similarly known as characterised by a property not determining locusness then the mutual difference of the entities which are respectively the counterpositive and the locus of the difference are known. The mere knowledge of the counterpositive does not give rise to difference-knowledge as this knowledge is needed for the knowledge of all kinds of negation. The knowledge of any counterpositive and any locus is of no use for the knowledge of a specific negation. But if the counterpositive and the locus are specified as those pertaining to the difference whose knowledge they are supposed to engender then there arises the fallacy of self-dependence. So the knowledge of the locus as characterised by a properly not known to characterise the counterpositive and the similar knowledge of the counterpositive as characterised by a property not known to characterise the locus are to be regarded as the cause of the difference knowledge.

The ungrammatical character of the coordinate use of the word is also a proof against the identity-view of difference. Sometimes such a coordinate use also is made with a specific object in view. Ordinarily nobody uses the word 'difference' for example in sentences like 'Bring the pot' or in explaining the identity of an object and difference.

Having thus established the reality of difference the author proceeds to explain and justify the three different conceptions of difference suggested in the above discussion. These are: own nature, of a thing, mutual negation of different things and a property incompatible with one's nature. All these three conceptions are acceptable but which of these is applicable to a certain object depends upon the nature of that object. In the case of negation the admission of one negation residing in another negation and this in a third one and so on leads to infinite regress. So the second of the above conceptions is not applicable to negation. The third conception is also inapplicable to negation if the property not residing in the counterpositive is supposed to be generic universal. No generic

universal can inhere in negations (in the N.V. view). So the cognition of difference in negation can satisfactorily be accounted for by admitting the residence in it of a negation diferent from it without admitting a third negation resident in the second negation. Among the three categories of reality namely, the universal the specificity (called Viśeṣa in Sanskrit) and the relation of inherence, only the first two forms of difference are present, there being no property resident in any one of these. Among the the three categories viz, substance, attributes and movements all forms of difference are present as each of them is applicable to them. For example we say, 'This is a piece of cloth not a pot and it is a thing woven of threads'; 'This is an odour not colour and it is fragrant; 'This is motion not upward throw and it is oblique!' The definitions of these three types of difference are as follows: 'The appearence of a thing as itself and not as other than itself' 'is the nature of intrinsic difference. Being the object of the uncountradicted cognition of negation generated by a word which is coordinate with the word devoting the locus of the negation' is the nature of mutual negation. Difference as opposition in nature is 'just incompatibility in nature'! This consists in the 'noncoexistence of incompatible properties.

Regarding the difference of universals etc. it has been stated above that there are not any properties constituting the differnces of these entities but can't the very definitions of these entities be regarded as their respective properties? Even difference of universal, specificity etc. has to be determined on the basis of their being endowed with incompatible properties. But since there aren't generic properties resident in these entities these are to be defined only in terms of what they are or their functions. It may here be asked, 'How can difference be the nature of things? ' If at all difference can consititute the nature of a thing there can never be doubt or illusion regarding the nondifference of one thing from another. Perhaps this difficulty can be met by the explanation that although difference is known the difference-nature of the latter may remain unknown. This means that differnce although known may remain unknown as difference. (It may be mistaken for something else). This difference-nature may be defined as the property of being the object of a cognition which does not apprehend the counterprositive of the difference. When a thing is cognised as different from another both it and the other thing are not cognised together (or as non-different . The different thing is apprehended as the locus of difference while the thing from which the thing differs is apprehended as the counterpositive of the difference). But this property could be no other than the third kind of difference mentioned above. This difference cannot be the nature of things because differences as negations have counterpositives whereas positive entities have nothing to do with counterpositives. Mutual negation also cannot be the nature of difference (as stated above). The knowledge

of this negation depends upon the knowledge of its counterpositive and locus. But these latter are to be known as conterpositive and locus respectively of a particular negation in order to yield the knowledge of the difference; otherewise the knowledge of the counterpositive and locus by themselves would always bring in its wake the knowledge of difference which would prevent the occurrence of illusion on any occasion. Nothing would ever be mistaken for another as the knowledge of the counterpositive always preceded difference-knowledge. Moreover if different incompatible properties are not themselves endowed with incompatible properties they themselve cannot be incompatible. And whatever be the nature of difference if it resides in a locus which if already different then the difference of the different may be due to the differentiating difference or some other difference. If the former is true then there aries the fallacy of self-dependence. And if the latter is true there arises infinite regress as every difference would have to be explained by some other difference.

All these difficulties can be removed if difference is taken as the object of the cognition opposed to the identity-cognition. An object like pot is by itself the object of a cognition opposed to the cognition of its non-difference from things other than itself. Difference is related to the counterpositive but not identical with it. The nature of a pot for example does not include anything within itself. Yet when the nature of the pot is sought to be elucidated vis- a-vis other things it assumes the form of difference. If this difference remains somehow unknown then there arise doubt and illusion about the identity of things. The mutual-negation-view of difference can also be defended against the above objections. To cognise mutual negation or the difference of one thing from another what is needed is the cognition of only the nature of these two things. The objections to the third version of difference can be got over if incompatible properites are supposed to be self-differentiated (instead of admitting a series of differences to differentiate one difference by another). The last of the above objection can be sidetracked (in this version of difference) if the different locus of difference is regarded as not already differentiated but deemed to be differentiable. If therefore one asks, 'where is difference present?' The proper answer is 'whiere the difference is validly cognised?

The author defines mutual negations in such a way that it subsumes even anterior and posterior negations of things as they coexist with their counter-positives in the parts of the thing (to which they relate). If the co-existence is qualified as (eternal) the two negations can be eliminated (as they are non-eternal) but then even the absolute negation of a thing would be covered by the definition as a non-pervasive absolute negations coexists with its counterpositive. The contact of a monkey and its absence both exist in a tree only a branch of which is sat upon by the monkey. This

difficulty can be overcome by the stipulation that the negation coexisting at the same time with its counterpositive is its mutual negation. Alternatively a negation which never resides in its counterpositve may be said to be its mutual negation. The mutual negation of time however exists in time which is its counterpositive but this existance in time is quite different in nature from ordinary existence; it is what is called 'occurrence.

A logically satisfactory way of distinguishing mutual negation from absolute negation is to say that while the relation of identity determines the counterpositiveness pertaining to the mutual negation quite other relations like conjunction, inherence etc. determine the counterpositivity pertaining to the absolute negations. So mutual negation may also be regarded as one whose counterpositivity is determined by a property characteristic of a single object. It is so because it is generally an individual that is taken to be other than or non-identical with another individual or class of individuals. Perhaps the mutual negation expressed by the sentence. 'This pot is different from the one located in the house' could be cited as one whose counterpositivity is not determined by an individualised property. Here location appears to be such a determinant. But strictly speaking here too only an individualised property namely the potness as coexistent with a particular location is the determinant of counterpositivity.

It may here be asked whether the absolute negation of the property characterising a thing can do duty for the mutual negation of the thing. It would seem to do so because when for example a red pot is denied to be black it is not denied to be a pot. It cannot be urged against this that the mutual negation of things can likewise be supposed to replace the absolute negation of the properly characteristic of one thing upon another. If it did so then there can never occur the nonpervasive negation of a properly in a thing as a thing can never differ from itself. The right answer to the question is that the difference between the two types of negation is intuitive and so it cannot be discarded.

Raghunātha Śiromani, one of the commentators of Ātmatattvaviveka and a great logician holds the view that difference is a special type of the locus-located relation which may be regarded either as identical with or different from its relata. A thing may be said to be located in itself by the relation of identity and in its various loci by relations like conjunction, inherence etc. Since everything other than itself will not be located in it by the identity-relation the former can be regarded as the counterpositive of the absences located in the thing and identical with it. The absolute absence of a thing however can be located in the thig itself (as it may be located in loci bereft of the thing). Thus the absolute absence of a thing will also be its counterpositive. Regarding mutual negation Raghunatha's view is that this type of negation resides in positive entities, in negations

other than itself and also in itself. There are different types of negations like absolute negations, mutual negations,relational negations etc. However the different negations of things like pot,cloth etc. cannot themselves be regarded as of the nature of difference because these are located in each other (for example the absence of cloth is located in the absence of pot and the absence of pot is located in the absence of cloth). So these absences would have to differ even from themselves if they were the same as difference. If these absences were not located in each other there cannot occur the cognition that the absences are other than pot and cloth respectively. It may be urged against this that the said absences are different even from the pot and the cloth so that the cognition referred to would not be prevented from arising. But such an asumption would lead to the unfavourable contingency that the locus of cloth where there is absence of pot, to have also the absence of cloth located in it as the absence of pot is not identical with cloth. Thus it is more sensible to accept an infinity of differences differing from one another. Correspondingly innumerable mutual negations and as many negations of the negations may also be accepted.

Regarding mutual negation some thinkers hold the view that the absolute negation of the property determining the counterpositivity of a socalled mutual negation is itself that negation. This view however leads to the undesirable consequence (referred to above) that the socalled mutual negation of an entity characterised by a nonpervasive entity like the contact of an object would turn out to be nonpervasive. For instance if the contact of a monkey with the tree on which it is sitting is nonpervasive its absence too is nonpervasive; so the mutual negation of the tree as qualified by the monkey's contact should also be nonpervasive. This contingency can be avoided by regarding the absolute negation of some pervasive property concommitant with the nonpervasive property under consideration as the nature of the above mutual negation. But this assumption leads to another difficulty. Referring to the floor with pot we say, 'This is not pot', but on the above view we should be able to say that, 'There is no pot on the floor', as this would mean that there is the absolute absence of potness on the floor. Likewise if we say referring to potness that 'there is no potness in potness we should also be able to say that 'potness is not potness' as according to the above view the expression would mean that 'potness is not potnessness'. This difficulty can be overcome by stipulating that (for example) the negation of pot is mutual negation in relation to anything other than pot while it is absolute negation in relation to itself. If this is not admitted then a pot being the locus of its own absolute negation it would be different from itself. A further stipulation has also to be made that (for example) if the absolute absence of pot differs from the similar absence of cloth the difference has the latter as its counterpositive. Otherwise if there is no pot on the floor

the absence of cloth also will not be there (the two absences of the absences of pot and cloth respectively being non-different).

The aforementioned definition of mutual negation suffers from a difficulty in the case of 'satta' a generic universal supposed to be common to substance, attributes and motions. This universal being itself a real its absolute absence cannot be located in itself and thus the definition of mutual negation covers an instance of absolute negation also. It may be contended against this objection that in the case of the absolute negation the counterpositive exists in its locus by a certain relation which is negated by the absolute negation. In the case of the mutual negation on the other hand the counterpositive has the identity-relation with its locus which is negated by the negation. In the case of 'satta' its absolute negation does not negate its selfidentity as the occurrence of 'satta' in itself (as admitted above) is determined by a relation different from identity.

The anterior negation mentioned above may be defined as the negation which coexists with all the things that do not exist with its counterpositive. The posterior negation can be defined by the contradictory of the definition of the anterior negation.

So far we have stated and discussed various views regarding the natures of difference, mutual negation and absolute negation as advanced by different thinkers as also the view of the author. It may first be noted here that the term 'absolute negation '(English for the Sanskrit term 'Attyantabhava')' is just a misnomer. The negation of a pot for example at a place where it does not exist at a certain time is called 'the absolute negation of the pot at that place. If the pot is nonexistent at the place only by a certain relation and at a certain time how can the said negation be absolute ? Those who use the adjective 'absolute' to describe the negation also admit that the negation is determined in its counterpositivity by a certain relation so that it can even coexist with the former in a locus where the latter exists bya different relation. As absolute the negation should negate its counterpositive totally and therefore it should be present everywhere but this is not the case. One may defend the usage on the ground that normally it is only the absence of the conjunction of a thing in a location that is meant by the absolutenes of the negation. Absence by any other relation like inherence is not commonly meant by absolute negation. When we say for example 'that the pot is not here ' it is only the conjunctive absence of the pot at the indicated locus that is meant, not the absence of the inherence of the pot. So when the pot is present on the floor no one says that the pot is absent there keeping the inherence-relation of the pot in view. Even with regard to the presence of a thing it is the conjunctive relation of the thing that is usually taken into consideration. One rarely says that 'the pot exists in the potshereds', although there obtains the inherence-relation between the pot and the potsherds . So inherence and other relations may be distinguished from

the conjunctive relation as those that do not determine locatedness of anything anywhere . But there may be exceptions to this rule. We say referring to a house for instance,' The house stands near the road'. What kind of relation of the house to the road 'stand'? is signified here by the verb? Could it be just conjunction? If it could then (like the removal of the pot from the floor on which it is placed) removal of the house from the road without dismantling it should be possible. The point is that the relation of the house to the road cannot be what it seems to be, that is, conjuction. It must be regarded as inherence, which therefore may be treated as locatedness-determinant. Similarly in the expression, 'There are a mumber of organs in the living body' it is only the inherence-relation by which the limbs are indicated to be located in the body. 'I shall be there in time' is another expression wich refers to the relation of temporality by means of which different objects and events may be taken to be located in time. The demoustratives 'here', 'there' etc. refer to the spatial relation as the determinant of locatedness.

Moreover as has been explained above conjunction or contact being a nonpervasive relation the conjunctive absence of a thing cannot be regarded as absoute. Even while the monkey is perched on a certain branch of a tree we can say that 'the monkey is not sitting here on the tree' keeping some other branch of the tree in view. It would therefore be more appropriate to describe all negations whose counterpositivity is determined by some relation or other as relational regations. In fact there is a dichotomous classification of negations as relational and mutual. But there does not seem to be any justification for treating mutual negation as other than relational in this classification unless mutual negation is identified with difference. The counterpositivity of mutual negation is determined, as we have seen above, by the identity-relation. So all negations whose counterpositivity is determined by some relation or other can be called 'relational'. Only anterior and posterior negations are left out from the category of relational negations. An Indian logician may ask here, 'What kind of negation is the negation of the sky ?' In the view of a large section of Indian logicians the sky is not located in anything by any relation. So no relation can be supposed to determine the counter-positivity of the sky negation. This is why this negation is treated as universal (or locatively absolute). There can be other kinds of negations also which are not sttrictly relational. For example, a negation cannot be supposed to have conjunctive relation with anything. Only positive (substantive) entities are related by this relation. So the conjunctive absence of certain negations is also universal (or locatively absolute). Conjunction cannot be taken to be the determining relation of the counterpositivity relating to this absence or negation of negation. Only that relation is the determinant of counterpositivty by which the counterpositive term is located in some thing and excludes its negation

from that thing. Since negation is not conjoined with anything it does not exclude its negation at all so that the latter is universally present.

The above question can be satisfactorily answered if a new category of universal negations is invented and different types of universal negations—two of which are mentioned above—may be included in this category. Some universal negations are relational like the negation of neation by conjunctive relation while others are simply nonrelational.

In the text difference is described as the very nature of a thing. One objection to this notion of difference has been considered above. There is another objection to this notion which is more serious. Can N.V. admit that the nature of an entity consists in its difference from other things? If it can then it would be inpossible to know this nature as there are infinitely numerous things from which a given thing would need to be differentiated. The same being the case with everything there will result the fallacy of circularity in the attempt to know the nature of anything whatsoever. In fact even to ascertain the difference of a thing from other things the positive nature of that thing has first to be known because it is only by means of the cognition of this nature that difference of the thing from other things is inferentially (or perceptually) established.

The third form of difference mentioned by the author also seems questionable as it is not different from the first. The generic or specific property which is perceived to be inherent in a thing and is recognised as incompatible wilth the natures of other things is nothing other than the own nature of a thing. That the property of a thing is non-inherent in other things is known only after the property is identified as the thing's nature. So we are left only with the second type of difference, which is mutual negation.

Raghunātha Śiroman is of the view that difference can be viewed as a special kind of relation between one thing and another as referred to above. The Sanskrit words प्रतियोगी and अनुयोगी have been used to describe the relation ('प्रतियोगी–अनुयोगी भाव'). As is wellknown the words प्रतियोगी and अनुयोगी are used in two different senses in Sanskrit. In one sense the words stand for the counterpositive and its relatum the negation. In the other sense the words stand for the epistemic qualifier and the epistemically-qualified. If the counterpositive of a negation is regarded as the latter's qualifier then the two could be treated as related by the qualifier-qualified relation. But experience does not support this view. We do not have the cognition of a negation say the absence of pot as qualified by pot, just as we cognise the floor as qualified by the presence of the pot. Similarly there is no cognition to vouchsafe the qualifier-qualified-relationship between two different things even if difference is treated as the relation relating them. If difference (too) is regarded as relation then there will not be different things at all. Moreover to say that difference as a relation between two things is identical with either of its two relata implies that a

thing is different from itself. For example a pot and a tree being different from each other are related by the difference-relation which is identical with the pot. So the pot is different from itself. The same can be said of the tree too. If difference can be viewed as a relation, mutual negation and absolute negations also can be so viewed.

As we have already seen it is not quite correct to view difference as the nature of a thing. If difference from things other than itself constituted the intrinsic nature of a pot then everything else would form part and parcel of the being of the pot. This is the multi-aspected-thing-view of the Jains. N.V. is totally opposed to this view according to which everything is radically different from every other. Ontologically everything is what it is. It may as well be the only thing in the world. But epistemically a thing differs from other things. The cognising or identifying of a thing as 'so and so' makes necessary indirect reference to other things. When a pot is identified as pot, that is as an individual characterised by potness there is involved reference to other individuals belonging to the genus 'potness'. Potness cannot be a genus without there being many individuals characterised by this genus. This fact is perhaps the basis of the Buddhist doctrine of 'apoha' according to which the generic universal is nothing but the exclusion of the other. The mistake in this theory consists in overlooking the fact that exclusion of the other is only the negative part of identifying a thing the positive part being the cognition of the intrinsic nature of the thing.

This raises the question whether, if there were a single thing in the universe it could be identified at all, if not as 'so and so' then simply as 'this' or 'that'. One may be inclined to reply in the negative to this question on the ground that identification is not possible with a single thing as there has to be there at least a second thing namely the individual identifier and prhaps a third thing also namely the identifying cognition. Thus for the simplest identification to take place at least three things are needed. The Advaitin however may dispute this point. According to him the identity-cognition involved in recognition does not involve anything but the pure identity of the recognised thing. In the stock example usually cited by the Advaitins namely, 'This is the same Devadutta as seen previously' the identity of Devadutta as bereft of his past and present distinctive characteristics is alone cognised. Of course the cogniser is there but his individuality is not objectively involved in the act of recognition. If even subjective involvement of other things in the cognition is to be avoided then self-consciousness can be taken as the model of pure difference-less cognition. Here the cognised and the cogniser or one and even the cognition is not different from either. But is there identification at all in self-consciousness ?

To answer this question properly we have to draw a clear distinction between object-identification and self-identification. As explained above

object-identification involves an unavoidable other-reference but this cannot be said of self identification. As the Advaitins explain it, it is only by denying every kind of reference to others that one is able to realise self-identity. In the strict sense there is neither identification nor realisation in self-realisation. Identity itself is identification as it emerges after the submergence of all other-references. This is why this identity is not assertible or expressible. 'I am' therefore is a degenerate expression which does not properly convey the felt but non-propositional self-identity. 'This is I' 'I am here' etc. however are not expressions as degenerate as 'I am' is, because unconsciously identifying oneself with one's body one refers to its spatial and other limitations.

Turning now to the foregoing discussion on negations it has to be mde clear that contrary to what most of the commentators have said the second of the three notions of difference referred above cannot be experientially certified. Also mutual negation is not mutual at all. There is no experience like 'The pot is characterised by the socalled mutual negation of the tree'. There is also no one negation which can be regarded as mutual in the sense that it has both the differents as its counterpositives. The diffreence from pot for example is not the same as the difference from tree. The differences are different. Moreover identity is not a relation which determines locatedness (called in Sanskrit अनुयोगिता). Nothing is supposed to be located in itself by the socalled identity-relation although everything is regarded as self-identical. Relations which are not locatedness-determinants are not regarded as determinants of counterpositivity. If however the absence or negation of the sky—which is not regarded as related by any locatedness-determining relation to anything whatsoever—is regarded as universal then even non-locatedness-determining relations could be taken as determinants of counterpositivity. We leave the matter here as there are serious differences of opinion among Indian logicians as to whether a particular relation alone or every possible relation is to be regarded as the determinant of the counterpositivity of universal negations.

The Buddhist unfazed by the above detailed criticism of his arguments against the reality of the composite, directs now his arguments against part-whole-relationship obtaining within the structure of the composite. The parts are part and parcel of the composite whole. So they cannot be different from it. If so how is it that in a large-sized composite entity when some parts are perceived some remain unperceived. This invests the whole with the incompatible properties of being and not being cognised at the same time. N.V.'s reply to this fresh objection is simple. The parts of a whole are simply parts and not the whole itself, as the hands in a human body are just hands and not the body itself. So there is no possibility of incompatibles' coexistence in the instance, if one part is taken to be cognised while the other part remains uncognised. The whole appears

here to be both cognised and uncognised because the characteristics of parts are unwittingly transferred to the whole. It may here be asked. 'If the part and whole are different and therefore their respective dimensions (as large or small, larger or smaller and so on) are also different then despite a part of the whole composite entity remaining unseen if it is covered up, the whole should be visible'. This question is easy to answer. The whole is generally taken to be visible when its dimension is seen to be distributed over a large area of its surface or parts. The whole expanse of the whole is not caught in one glance and yet there arises the feeling that the whole is seen when the major portion of it is seen. A sort of mental equation needs to be established between the observed dimension of the whole and the dimensions of the parts for the feeling referred to, to arise.

What is true of cognition and noncognition as well as being and not being covered up, of parts is also true of movement in a part or parts and its absence in the whole. It is not necessary that when some part or parts of the composite are moving the whole also should be moving. The cow sitting quietly may go on flicking flies by its tail. Of course certain movements of the parts of a whole are simply destructive of the whole as when the withering of the petals of a flower results in the withering of the flower itself. But not all movements of parts are like this. Some movemets are simply confined to the moving part or parts. Such movements result, as every movement does, in the disjunction of the parts from the surrounding space if not of all the parts from each other which is productive of destruction.

Modifying slightly the above view it can also be said that the movement of parts is sometimes imposed upon the whole so that when the parts are moving the whole also appears as moving. This does not imply that even when the parts are not moving the whole would appear as moving or when the parts are both moving and unmoving the whole would appear both moving and unmoving. If there is disruption in the locus of the whole as happens in water in which the moon is reflected, then depending upon the movement of one part and nonmovement of another the whole orb of the moon may appear both moving and nonmoving. In the body however when one limb appears moving and another unmoving the two do not appear as disrupted from each other, so the body does not appear both moving and nonmoving. It may be contended against this that since the body can be unmoving even while the limbs are moving the body and the limbs should be able to exist unconnected with each other. 'This contention goes against the contender's (the Buddhist's) own position as in the view of momentariness of reals the parts and the whole which are momentary cannot exist unconnected with each other. So to exist they will have to last at least two moments. Perhaps the example of waterdripping wet-cloth may be cited to illustrate the unconnected co-occurrence of moving parts and unmoving whole. But then the example of yarns and the

cloth may be cited to illustrate the connected existence of moving parts and unmoving whole. So it cannot be definitely asserted that movement of parts and nonmovement of the whole do not go along with connected existence.

It is evident from the above arguments and counterarguments that the Buddhist seeks to prove the presence of incompatible properties in the composite by taking the help of the discontinuity of certain attributes appearing in the parts and in the whole. If parts are part and parcel of the whole then all the attributes of the parts should appear in the whole. If not the same, at least attributes similar to those of the parts should appear in the whole. This is more or less the view of N.V. In the case of movement however we observe discrepancy as moving and unmoving parts appear to coesist in the whole without disturbing its immobility. But it is not necessary that all the attributes of the parts should be similar to those of the whole as parts are not the whole itself. This discontinuity between the parts and the whole is sought to be exploited by the Buddhists to maintain that the socalled parts are not parts at all of the whole N.V. admits the discontinuity (in certain respects) but according to it this does not prevent the connected existence of parts and the whole. The contrary example of the water-dripping cloth cited by the Buddhist is not quite appropriate. Firstly the relation of water and the wet cloth is not that of parts and the whole. Secondly even if the relation of part and whole is supposed to obtain here the water drops separated from the wet cloth and falling on the ground cannot be taken to be the parts of the whole. They are just like the limb of a body amputated from it and lying away from it.

A different kind of incompatibility based on another pair of attributes of the parts is now trotted out as a retort to the above rejoinder by the Buddhist. If a pot is partly red and partly some other colour it cannot be a single entity its (apparent) attributes being incompatible in nature. The non-Buddhist's rejoinder to this is that the composite in this case is of no colour and so the cognition that it is red or is not red are both illusory. (Alternatively it can be said that the composite is of variegated colour. Such a solution to the problem has been suggested earlier). The Buddhist may argue against this that even if the cooccurrence of red and its opposite in the composite is denied the apparant cooccurrence of the contact of reddening material and its absence in the composite cannot be denied. And this proves the diversity of the composite. To this the non-Buddhist's rejoinder is that he had squarely met the argument earlier in refuting the Buddhist's charges that a cause accompanied by auxiliaries cannot be the same as when it is unaccompanied by them. There it was clarified that even with regard to the momentary atomic entities it has to be admitted that under different aspects they may be endowed with mutually-opposed characteristics. This clarification applies here too. The contact of the reddening material may be supposed to be both present

and absent in the cloth under different determining conditions.

Objecting to the above the Buddhist may deny the very reality of contact. Like the cognition that 'This is the alphabet A' (for example) the apparent object of which is the particular alphabet, but the generic property of the latter namely 'Aness' is the real object, so even cognition of contact may have the uninterrupted succession of things or the absence of any temporal interval amongst them as the real object. But in the absence of an evidence to the contrary the experiential testimony in favour of the reality of contact cannot be discarded.

Another of the foregoing objections against the reality of the composite adduced by the Buddhist is easily disposed of. Existence at one place and existence at another of the same composite entity are adduced as incompatible with each other but mere existence and non-existence cannot be treated as mutually contradictory. Existence at one place excludes nonexistence at the same place but this does not at all conflict with existence at other places. One and the same thing can exist at many places at different times.

A variant of the above objection is that the composite cannot exist in its parts wholly or partly. The first is not possible because then the composite being differrent from the parts its existence would be confined to a single part and the parts other than this would be bereft of the whole. The second too is not possible because the composite is not constituted of parts so that it could be scattered in its different parts. This objection can be met by viewing the relation of the composite and its parts on the analogy of the conjunction of different atoms with one another. If partless atoms can be mutually conjoined the composite and the parts also can be mutually related by the inherence-relation.

One more ground for occurence of incompatibles in the composite is the presence in it of variegated colour. Variegated colour is not this or that particular colour. If it is a plurality of colours then it cannot be supposed to permeate the composite entity. Colour is not a non-pervasive attribute like contact. On this account it cannot be maintained that the composite has no colour at all although it is visible because its parts are visible. If the parts also are variegated then like the whole they also will have to be treated as devoid of colour and their visibility explained on the basis of the visibility of the parts of these parts. This difficulty would be repeated in the parts of parts, the parts of parts of parts and so on. This incompatibility can be got over by regarding variegatedness as a special type of property which is manifested in the composite if its parts possess different colours. Sometimes it is the colour of a certain part of the composite which stands out oversiadowing the colour of the composite. In the case of the triad there is no possibility of the part of the triad being visible (as the dyad is too small to be visible). So it is the colour of light that is imposed upon the triad when it looks variegated. Here a technical

point may be raised. If a cloth is woven out of threads each of which is of variegated colour how can it be regaarded as of variegated colour when the parts are of the same single colour namely, the variegated colour, (since the variegated colour is viewed as a special colour and not just a combination of colours)? If the variegatedness of the composite is supposed to be due to the different colours of the parts of parts of the cloth then even the visibility of the composite may be supposed to be the remote product of the coloured parts of parts. Thus the composite may even be viewed as colourless. One answer to this difficulty is that the different colours of the parts of parts may be taken to be the colour of the composite. A second answer is that just as a variegated composite produced by blue and white parts is different from one produced by yellow and red parts so a variegated composite produced by parts which are also variegated may be taken to be a special type of variegated entity but that for all variegated colours of the composite entity only the colours of its parts are needed as cause. As a matter of fact the variegated colour has been taken to be a special type of single colour quite different from its constituent colours. So there should not be any difficulty in accounting for the variegated colour of the composite by the variegated colour of its parts. There is no need to take recourse to the colour of the parts of parts for the explanation.

Having failed to prove the disunity of the composite the Buddhist now tries to show that the composite cannot come into being at all. Only when the ultimate particles of matter come together the gross composite entity comes into being by the comjunction of gradually larger and larger parts. But the basic particles themselves cannot be conjoined with each other because of the difficulty mentioned earlier in the case of the inherence of the composite in its parts. One atom cannot conjoin with another atom wholly are partly. The first cannot be the case because having conjoined with one atom wholly it cannot conjoin with any other atom at all. The second too cannot be the case because the atom is partless.

This objection can be met easily. Conjunction of an atom with other atoms can be conceived on the analogy of the relation of cognition with its objects. If there is a cognition of many different objects in their collectivity then the cognition is related to each of the objects in the same manner. Cognition being partless it cannot be distributed over the different objects. Even in the idealist view the question of how cognition cognises its objects or forms cannot be brushed aside. If the reals are not there, there are the unreals which can be illusorily cognised. If the illusory cognition has two or more unreal entities like the sky-lotus and the barren woman's son as its object how is it to be cognitively related to them ? The proper answer to this question as well as the above question is that just as cognition is related to each one of its objects in its capacity of cognition so every atom is related to other atoms only in its capacity of an atom and not

as wholly or partly.

There is a point worth noting here in the Buddhist's objection. Contact is known to have spatial extension. Even the contact of an atom cannot be devoid of extention even though it may be extremely minute. Now when the conjoining and the conjoined atoms are partless and have therefore the minutest spatial dimension their conjunction will result in the merger of the conjuncts in each other with the result that the joint spatial dimension of the conjoined atoms will not exceed the spatial dimension of the single atom. If the Buddhist's objection is about the possibility of the conjunction of a single atom with many other atoms then it is easy to answer it. There is no need to admit such a conjunction. The composite structure of the gross object can well be explained on the basis of the successive generation of dyads, triads etc. which are entities having parts.

All the foregoing arguments against the reality of the atom are adducible against cognition as stated above. Like the atoms cognition also can be proved to be composite as it has simultaneous cognitive relation with different objects. If this proof is rendered invalid by an inference opposed to it then the proof for the compositeness of the atom too can be shown to be invalid.

If cognition too is denied reality on account of the supposed inexplicability of its relation to its objects (as the atoms are denied) then we land into the camp of the Madhyamikas. But if there is no cognition or consciousness there are no inferences to prove anything. However there can be illusions of nonexistent things; so common usages about inferences and the terms and premises in the inferences can be illusorily sustained. But even for the illusiory usage there has to be the illusory cognition whose reality (not truth) as cognition cannot be denied. If the illusion itself is only illusorily real then there would have to be a real second illusion. The reality of this cannot be denied. This itself is the consciousness whose reality is undeniable.

It is now contended that as both reality and unreality are observed in the illusory objects of illusion only its empirical reality and not absolute reality should be maintained. But then in the absence of clinching evidence neither reality nor its opposite can be denied in the object. If reality is denied even the opposite of it cannot be there because if it is unreal it cannot cause opposition. Only the cooccurrence of these two needs to be denied. Thus the Mādhyamika's denial of the reality of consciousness does itself need to be cognised. There cannot be absolute negation of consciousness. Even by the denial of the causal relationship universal emptiness cannot be upheld. At least the intellectual attempt to deny the causal relationship must be treated as a real cause. The preexistence of the effect can very well be denied but the production of the non-pre- existent effect cannot be denied as it is testified by perception itself. To prove that a thing is not produced because it is nonexistent

before its production is to invite the fallacy of deviation of the middle term. One's own statement nonexistent before one's autterance of it is brought into being by one's utterance of it.

The above digression into the statement of the nihilism of the Mādhyamika doctrine and its rejection—as has been done earlier too by the author—has not much relevance to the criticism of idealism. It is a bit puzzling why the author should line up the Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika and hold the former responsible for the drawbacks of the latter.

Now a fresh objection is trotted out against the composite. It is urged that there is no composite but just a congeries of atoms. If perceptual testimony is adduced in favour of the unitary reality of the gross composite entity it is then contended that it is the aggregation of the atoms that produces the cognition of grossness. But here it has to be clarified whether the said aggregation is the same as the entities in aggregation or different from them. If it is the former then each atom not being gross the aggregate cannot be gross. If the aggregation is not the same then we have the gross itself in the form of the aggregation. Perhaps it may be urged against this that the scattering of atoms in the space or their spread-out character creates the illusion of grossness. But if this is so then this scattering in the space may be grossness itself or it may be a special type of dimension. It cannot be the first. The different points in space are nothing but atoms for the Buddhists. So if these atoms are cognised as many and also as points in space then neither oneness nor the property of being the occupant of the space can be imposed upon them because no other occupant of the spatial points is cognised. If however the atoms themselves are imposed as one and as occupants then they cannot be cognised as many and as points of space. So the atoms cannot be cognised as occupying many different points. Could it be urged in support of the above that the atoms of the pot—for example—are the occupants and the atoms of the floor on which the pot is placed are the points of space occupied ? No! This is not tenable. The cognition of unity and grossness even in the floor needs to be accounted for. If every such cognition is sought to be explained by the assumption of innumerable clusters of atoms related amongst themselves as points of space and occupants of these then in darkness where a pot—for example—is only tactually apprehended, its grossness and unity will remain unapprehended as no point of space other than the pot itself is cognisable in darkness. If however the abovementioned scattering is a special dimension it cannot inhere in single atoms and so the composite entity would have to be admitted. If this dimension is supposed to inhere collectively in more than one or two atoms then the cognition that 'these atoms are gross' would turn out to be veridical.

The experienced unitary character of the gross entity may perhaps be explained thus. First unity is imposed upon the cluster of the atoms

constituting the different parts of the whole and then this unity is apprehended as coexistent with the grossness of the whole. This explanation ignores the diversity of the parts and the atom's constituting them. The gross entity appears as one despite the diversified appearance of the parts of a whole like the different limbs of the body. The cognition of the unitary character of the whole goes along with the cognition of the diversity of the parts. One may say against this that grossness as apprehended by some determinate cognition appears in the socalled gross objects. Even such grossness must be either a totally unreal entity, a cognitive construct or something real. If totally unreal the grossness cannot be cognised at all. If it is a cognitive construct appearing in a determinate cognition, this appearance of it would require its appearance in another cognition and that again in another. This would result in infinite regress. If lastly grossness is real then the object which appears endowed with grossness must necessarily be real.

Grossness cannot be equated with plurality as many atoms lying at intervals from one another would not be gross. If the atoms are required to be uninterruptedly close to each other then in the Buddhist view of the nature of the structure of a thing there cannot be such closeness. The atoms of different qualities jostle with each other in the structure of every material substance.

It is now contended that the gross may be perceptible but different from the composite entity. The non-Buddhists regard the composite as a durable entity but the view now set forth is that the gross is a momentary entity. The first difficulty in this view is that according to momentarism the cause and the effect cannot coexist the first of these being required to preexist the second but the parts and the gross product are definitely cognised as coexisting. It may here be opined that the parts go out of existence as soon as their effect comes into existene and so the two cannot be perceived together at all. But when the product is destroyed the regeneration of the parts has got to be admitted as otherwise these parts would not produce—as per the theory of momentariness—a series of similar parts every moment. Now this series of parts and the whole are both the products of the same material parts which is not possible in the case of material entities. It may be contended against this that the cause of the whole is different from the first causal term in a series of terms coming into being successively and constituting the unity of the perceptual object. But there is no ground for making such a distinction. Besides the parts as the cause of the whole do not go out of existence when the whole comes into being in every instance of producttion. If the seed is found rotting when it gives rise to a shoot, then in the case of the production of the pot the clay remains intact when the pot is fashioned out of it.

When grossness is proved non-momentariness of the gross entity which is presupposed by grossness is also proved. Of course when grossness is

perceived nonmomentariness is not perceived. But by means of inference the nonmomentariness of the gross can easily be established. The inference is like this,'The parts productive of the pot for example are contemporaneous with their products because they are the material cause of the latter' or 'The knower is different from the senses because it is the same object that is apprehended both by seeing and touching'. Here the knower is proved to be real by means of the middle term, as a substantive entity differing from its attributes. If a contrary inference like, 'Whatever is real is partless as is cognition and real is the pot, is trotted out to prove the partlessness of the composite the inference can be countered by an inference like, 'Whatever is real has parts and real is cognition'. But both these inferences are fallacious as their contraries are not contradictable. Moreover if the above is an inference and not a counterfactual conditional then either nongross entities like colour or gross entities like pot are the minor terms in the inference and thus various fallacies would afflict the inference. An unreal minor term is however available for all inference's but then even the inference of fragrance in the sky-lotus would be justified.

Now the above inference is being defended in a different manner. This may be explained thus. In the inference of fire on the mountain if the fieryness of the mountain is known the inference would be afflicted by the fallacy of proving the already proved. If the mountain is known to be devoid of fire then the fallacy of absent major would afflict the inference. So it has to be maintained that the mountain as mountain is the monor term in the inference; similarly we can say that the congeries of atoms not known as such but cognised as pot are the minor term in the inference. There is another difficulty also in treating the mountain as minor term that nobody knows whether the mountain is a transformation or illusory manifestation of Brahman if the Vedantic doctrine is taken into consideration. The reply to this defence is that the Vedantic view does not turn the mountain into something other than itself. If it is an unreal mountain it remains as such. It is not changed into say an unreal smoke. Even in dreams we have regular inferences based upon the distinction of relative truth and untruth. So if it is the gross entity that is denoted by the word 'pot' it alone is the minor term. Potness is not something common to atomic and gross entities. Even exclusion of the other taken as the meaning of the word is not common to both atomic and gross entities.

The above criticism of the inference may be countered by the suggestion that the inference is meant only for those persons who may have some doubt regarding the composite nature of the thing meant by words like 'pot'. Knowledgeable people may not have doubt on this matter but common people may have but then these common people apprehend only the gross entity. So the fallacies in the inference pointed out above cannot be ignored. If the cognition of grossness which common people

have is false then this itself must be proved, not the partlessness of the gross entity. If however the falseness of the object of this cognition is sought to be proved then the middle term 'reality' will be inconsistent with the major term. If on the other hand the falsehood of the cognition of grossness is sought to be proved by means of the middle term 'reality' then there would result the fallacy of deviation. The conclusion therefore is that inference takes place only in such a minor whose minorness-determinant is not incompatible with the major.

Moreover if the aforementioned thesis is a counterfactual conditional of the form, 'If the pot is real it would be partless', then the negative conclusion to be arrived at from this conditional would be,'The pot is not partless, which means that it is a composite entity and so it is not real'. Here the major term 'compositeness' is riddled with the three different fallacies mentioned above. In fact for the Buddhist compositeness is a non-instantiable term and may even be denied to be real. Although it is not so for the non-Buddhist his admission of the instantiability of the term cannot be exploited for his own purpose by the Buddhist. Only a counterfactual conditional can be set forth by a disputant taking the opponent's admission of the reality of the antecedent of the conditional as the ground for the conclusion.

The positive proof for the reality and unity of the composite is the absence of the appearance of coexistent incompatibles in it. It could be urged against this that since the reality of the external entity is ever doubtful the reality of the gross entity cannot be envisaged at all. This dubious character of the external object may have been engendered (if at all) by the impossibility to distinguish truth from untruth. If this is so because every cognition is true then this conflicts with the fact that one's awareness of one's misperception of something cannot be treated as either true or false. If it is the first then there is the fact of misperception. Which falsifies cognition. If it is the second then the awareness itself is admitted to be false. Thus neither every cognition is true nor every cognition is false.

It may be argued against the view that the denial of mistaken cognition is not possible without admitting the reality of the mistaken cognition, that what is denied in the denial of the mistaken cognition is its indeterminateness, that is to say, the qualification of its object by some property not inhering in it. No cognition is determinate. The socalled illusory cognition is only the cognition of the real entity accompanied with the cognition of the unreal entity. The illusory cognition is supposed to produce inclination towards the undesired unreal because the non-cognition of the difference between the real and the unreal is also there to engender the inclination. Now this non-cognition of difference may be the non-cognition of a difference existing somewhere or characterising the object of inclination or it may be the non-cognised difference itself. If it is

the first then it may be either non-cognition itself or the absence of the cognition of difference. On the first alternative the non- cognition of difference from both the desired as well as the undesired being present on the occasion of the cognition of shell as silver there should result both inclination as well as disinclination towards the shell. On the second alternative the cognition of difference which is opposed to its absence turns out to be the cause of disinclination but this leads to the acceptance of determinate erroneous and veridical cognitions.

On the second view referred to above, only if two things differ the cognition of their difference is productive of inclination towards the qualificand of difference. Such a view conflicts with the inclination one has towards the real silver on perceiving a piece of real silver. There is no real difference there between the given and silver. The point of the argument is that there is no real difference between the given and the desired. Another difficulty in the above view pointed out by Raghunatha Siromani is this . If the shell and silver are simultaneously misperceived as silver and shell respectively then both these will together turn out to be objects of inclination and disinclination. Silver is different from shell and shell is different from silver and there are also non-cognitions of the differences of silver from shell and shell from silver. The difficulty may be removed by the stipulation that the object sought after must not be different from the desired object under whose form it appears and similarly the object sought to be avoided should not be different from the undesired object under whose form it appears. The above difficulty however remains and so the erroneous cognition has got to be admitted. It may be asked, 'As in the case of inclination' noncognition of difference both from the desired and the undesired are present so even before illusion both these being present why do not the cognitions of both difference and nondifference arise?' The answer is that mere noncognition is not sufficient for the production of these cognitions. Special causal collocations are needed for both of them like certain defects for the imposition of nondifference and the absence of defects for the cognition of difference. However if difference is cognised nondifference cannot be imposed. The rule is that defects accompanied by the noncognition of difference cause the illusion or imposition of difference and similarly for the imposition of nondifference. But nowhere both difference and nondifference constitute the truth so that they could be cognised simultaneously.

Turning now to the second of the two alternatives mentioned earlier the non-Buddhist says that the distinction of true and false cannot be denied on the ground that all cognitions are false. If the cognition that 'a certain cognition is mistaken' is true then every cognition cannot be false. If it is not true then the objects of it, namely the mistaken cognition would not be true so that there would be a true cognition. Thus on either

alternative the reply will be inconsistent.

The foregoing discussion seems to be infected by a serious drawback. The idealist's supposed contention that external entities may ever be of questionable reality is sought to be based on either of two opposite assumptions namely, that everything is real or nothing is real. On either of these assumptions the distinction of real and unreal is rendered meaningless. But how does either assumption support universal seepticism (regarding external reality)? On either assumption there results the definite cognition of reality or unreality but not the doubt whether anything objective is real or not. Absolute scepticism can never be based on any kind of definite knowledge.

The first assumption that everything is real and therefore all cognitions are valid cognitions is rather unduly combined here by the author with a wellknown epistemological doctrine of Prabhakara the protagonist of a Mīmānsā school. Prabhākara does not admit the fact of error or illusion because according to him only the real is cognised by all cognitions. Other Indian philosophers also hold that the real alone is cognised but they do not deny determinate cognition. Prabhākara denies determinate cognition to deny the erroneous character of the socalled illusory cognition. However the Buddhist's view is diametrically opposed to this view. According to it even the absolutely unreal can be the object of enoneous cognition. It is rather puzzling that the auther should represent the Buddhist as dallying with a view which he is known to be totally opposed to.

Having established the validity and invalidity of veridical and false cognitions respectively the author now takes up the very important epistemological issue as to whether validity and invalidity are known by the very cognition which they characterise or by some other cognition. Related to this issue is the issue of the causes of the genesis of these properties in cognitions. N.V. is of the view that both cognitive validity and invalidity are ascertainable by cognitions other than the cognition which these properties characterise. Mīmansīsts although divided among themselves regarding the nature of other-validation of cognition are in broad agreement on the view that validity is known intrinsically while invalidity is ascertaniable only extrinsically. Vedānta is in agreement withh Mīmānsā on this view. In discussing this issue we shall first correctly define the terms that will be involved in the formulation of the problem to be discussed. The first such term is 'self-cognised'. This term cannot be taken to mean to be cognised by every cognitionn which cognises the cognitive nature of the cognised'. The cognition which cognises the invalidity of a cognition does not cognise (necessarily) its validity. Every cognition cognising the cognitive nature of a cognitionn does not cognise its validity. But without cognising the cognitive nature of a cognition its invalidity (and validity too) cannot be cognised. So the term 'self-cognised' should

be defined thus. 'A cognition is self-cognised if it is cognised by the cognition which does not cognise its invalidity but cognises itself'. Another slightly different way to define self-validity is to equate it with 'being the object of a cognition which is not produced by the cognition having the valid cognition as its object'. If the validity of a cognition were cognised by a cognition following it and generated by it then it would not be self-cognised because the cognition cognising it is produced by it. This way of defining 'self-cognisedness covers all the three Mimānsist variants of the self-cognitivity-view. The proposition to be debated on the issue may be formulated thus. 'Do all the cansal collocations producing the cognition of cognition produce the cognition of its validity too? 'Do all cognitions. cognise validity too?', 'Is cognition the object of a cognition which does not cognise validity?' and so on. These formulations suffer from the fallacy of over extensiveness as the indeterminiate cognition or the cognition produced by uttering the word 'cognition' or the invalidity-cognition does not produce the cognition of validity. So the formulation has to be slightly altered to read like this. 'Is or is not validity the object of all non-recollective cognitions which do not cognise invalidity and which have determinate objects? (specifically) 'Is or is not the validity of this pot-cognition or any other object-cognition the object of itself?'

The non-Buddhist N.V. objects to the self-validity-view on the ground that if cognition does not cognise itself it cannot cognise its validity (which is a property characteristic of it). Ccognition may in certain respects-resemble light but it cannot be luminous like light. One does have the reflective or introspective cognition of one's own cognition (or its occurrence) but this by itself does not prove that cognition is by nature self-luminous. The reflective or introspective cognition (that one has of a cognition) may be quite other than the latter. The purpose of cognition is quite well served without the cognition being self-cognitive. The cognitions of God and perhaps of the yogin too at the highest stage of his mental development are of course self-cognitve but the same cannot be said of the cognitions of humans as sense-object-contact is needed for human cognitions. A cognition and the cognition of this cognition would need different sense- object- contacts for their occurence.

Dharmakirti the great Buddhist savant has made the famous remark about cognition that 'if cognition were not self-luminous or self-revealed it would not reveal its object'. In the original Sanskrit version of this remark the word उपलंभ is used which means both genesis and cognition. If the first meaning is taken then the remark means that the object-cognition comes into being only when its cognition comes into being, that is to say the objective cognition is produced by self-cogniton which means that the cognition is not produced if it is uncognised Even self-cognition cannot come into being without being cognised and thus no cognition can come into being.

If the second meanning of the Sanskrit word is taken then the remark gives rise to the fallacy of proving the already proved as it is only the cognised which is the object of cognition. This does not imply that the object is not cognised if there is no cognition of this cognition. Neither this cognition of cognition nor any usage about it is needed for the cognition of or any usage about the object of cognition to take place. If evrything has to be an object of cognition there is God's omniscience to take cognisance of every thing. Since there is no necessity that every cognition has to be cognised there cannot result any infinite regress by admitting the possibility of some cognitions being cognised while many others remain uncognised. The mind is certainly related indirectly to every cognition but it is indirectly related to other states also. Mere relationship of mind cannot bring a cognition within the ken of mind and make it the object of some cognition. If an inference like, 'A cognition cannot be the object of another cognition because it is an activity of the same generic type as another cognition, any action of the same type as another action cannot be the object of that action as one cutting action is not the object of another cutting action,' is set forth to disprove the possibility of the cognition of one cognition by another, the inference is simply fallacious. Even the thesis that a cognitionn is not the object of another cognition which is sought to be established by means of the inference, establishes the extrinsic cognition of cognition. The cognition which is the minor term in the inference becomes the object of the cognition 'of not being such an object' by the very formulation of the thesis. Besides the cognition of one person's cognitionn by the same person's reflective and recollective cognitions entails the fallacy of absent major in the inference. The example viz, the cutting action—if not the object of another cutting action—is also not the object of itself. Thus if self-objectivity of cognitions is sought to be inferred the example cannot be the locus of the major term.

It may be contended that following common unreflective usage cognition may be regarded as self-cognitive while in relation to external objects it may be either perceptual or non-perceptual. The self-cognitivity of cognition may be taken to be determined by its causal collocation itself but its other-cognitivity cannot be so determined. But if perception is a special type of cognition differing from non-perceptual cognitions then cognitionn cannot be regarded perceptual in nature in relation both to itself and its object. The objects of cognition may be perceptually cognised with the help of sense-contact, but cognition itself cannot be so cognised (for want of any appropriate sense-cognition-contact).

The above point in a commentary is well taken. The self-cognition of cognition cannot be nonperceptual if the cognition (of the object) happens to be perceptual. But the self-cognition canot be perceptual either. It could be taken to be caused by mental contact (indirect) and

thus regarded as introspective. But it should be noted that cognition is not regarded even by self-cognitivists as waiting to cognise objects in order to cognise itself. It is regarded as simultaneously object-cognitive and self-cognitive. Besides one and the same cognition cannot be both introspective and non-introspective.

Having thus disposed of the first view that cognitional validity is known by the cognition to which the validity belongs the author now turns to the second view mentioned above. It is the view that validity is cognised by the reflective cognition or by the inference based on the knownness of the cognitive object. Only in relation to desire, aversion etc. cognition which is other than these is needed to sustain relevant usages. Such a view is logically indefensible because as mentioned above-cognitionn cannot have the kind of contact with the senses to qualify to be the object of sensory cognition in relation to itself. Even for the transcendental perception by means of the transcendental contact of universalisation, sensory contact with the object is necessary, God's knowledge of course is directly self-cognitive. Even if introspective cognition of cognition is admitted it cannot be supposed to yield foolproof cognition of validity. Even false cognitions are falsely cognised as valid. If they did not do so then false cognitions would not lead to any activity. Of course cognition of cognition may sometimes reveal the valid nature of the cgnition which is its object and this should be sufficient for prompting activity. But in important matters we need definite knowledge which cannot be ensured by the cognition of cognition. The possibility of doubt regarding the validity cannot be removed by the cognition of cognition. If some other cogniton is sought to establish the validity then the doubt could shift to the validity of this cognition itself. Unless this cognition is validated it cannot validate the validity of the objective cognition. So for this another cogniton will have to be secured. This process cannot end at any stage unless some inferential proof is obtained to establish the validity. This shows that reflective cognition or inference based on the apparent knownness of objects cannot help establish cognitive validity.

It may be contended against this rejoinder of the non-Buddhist that cognition of cognition although not capable of confirming the validity of the object-cognition it can certainly reveal it. But then what purpose would this mere revelation serve? It cannot provide guidance for confident activity (by removing all possible doubts about the validity). The reflective cogniton can apprehend the objectivity of the cognition which is its object but objectivity is not validity. Unless the object of the objective cognition appeared in the cognition as endowed with a property which really characterised it the latter cannot be valid and it is this that has to be cognised by the reflective cognition if it were to confirm the validity of the object- cognition. (A valid cognition is defined as a cognition in which the qualifier inheres in the qualificand). The mere awareness of a cognition

(or cognitive occurrence) does not and cannot apprehend its validity . Cognitions which have become familiar because of their repeated occurrence in one's experiences are recognised as valid on the basis of inference. For example referring to the first ever cognition of an earthy object one may have an inference like this. 'This cognition has an earthy entity as its object because it has an odorous entity as the qualificand and earthiness as the qualifier just like a similar earlier cognition'. Thus the memory of the concomitance of the middle and major terms experienced earlier leads to the fresh inference which establishes the validity of the cognition which is the minor term in the inference. The followers of the school of Mīmānsā (There are three eminent representatives of Mīmānsā school namely Kumarila Bhatta, Murari Missa and Prabhākara (nicknamed as Guru because he is supposed to have excelled his teacher Kumarila in the sharpness of his intellect) maintain that knowledge being the subtle activity of the mind is imperceptible. The occurrence of knowledge in the mind is inferred on the basis of the perception of the property of knownness (which is the same as the familiar look) of the object perceived. The secondary cognition of an object apprehends it as endowed with knownness that is to say, as endowed with the property of knowness inhering in it. Thus the validity of cognition is known by the secondary cognition itself. To know the knowness of an object is to know the object as given, that is as it is structured or characterised.

Murari Misra, the protagonist of a great school of Mīmānsā about which our knowledge is very limited holds the reflective cognition to be the cogniser of the validity of its object-cognition. The qualificand and the qualifier in the object-cognition appear as qualificand and qualifier respectively in the object-cognition when it is apprehended by the reflective cognition. To cognise the object- cognition is to cognise it as objective which is the same as to cognise it as having a certain qualificand as related to a certain qualifier. Mere cognitive character of the object-cognition divorced from the structured object is not apprehended by the reflective cognition.

The N.V. view differs from both these views. According to it the cognition of the objectivity of the object-cognition by the reflective cognition is not by itself adequate to confirm the validity of the former. For example if I first have the perception of the form, 'This is a pot' and thereafter I become aware of this perception, and have the cognition of the form, 'I perceive the pot', I apprehend the qualificand pot as characterised by potness. This apprehension is not the same as the apprehension of the pot as pot. Even something other than pot could be perceived as pot. Both false and veridical cognitions are structured. To apprehend this structure is not to apprehend the actual presence of the qualifier in the qualificand although the two together (in their epistemic relationship) constitute the structure of the object-cognition. Thus the

N.V. view differes from the view of Misra.

An impartial survey of the three views shows that the views of Bhatia and Misra represent rather forced pleas in support of the self-validation doctrine. It is rather paradoxical for Bhatia to say that cognition which is not perceptible or introspectible is an inferred entity and when it is inferred its validity is directly cognised. How can there be direct cognition of cognitive validity when cognition itself is not directly cognised? Further the knowness of the object is supposed to lead to the inference of cognition and its validity and this knowness is understood in terms of the epistemic structure of the object of cognition. It is not regarded as an unanalysable property of the object. If so then in the cognition of the knowness of the object the validity of the cognition also happens to be cognised because validity consists in nothing but the object of the cognition having a certain structure. If the bare object bereft of its characterising property is involved in its knowness then the cognition and its validity inferred on the basis of the knowness cannot amount to the cognition of full-fledged cognitive validity. Of course Bhatta has espoused the theory of the inferribility of cognition mainly to avoid the admission of the idealistic theory of self-consciousness of cognition which is fraught with serious consequences for realism. But the cognitive-inferribility theory lands Bhatta into the camp of the upholders of external validity theory. To say that when cognition is inferred its validity is cognised of itself as characterising the cognition is tantamount to saying that cognitive validity is inferred. There are many other drawbacks in the view of Bhatta but we have considered here only that drawback of it which brings it in line with N.V.theory of external validity.

Misra's view is not much different from that of N.V. If to know a cognition is to cognise its qualificand as epistemically determined by its qualifier then knowing a cognition as false and knowing it as true would not be different from each other. In both kinds of cognition the epistemic determination of the qualificand by the qualifier is involved. Even N.V. admits this fact. What it does not admit is that the qualifier though epistemically related to the qualificand is actually related to it.

N.V.'s view sounds quite commensensical. To know a cognition or to cognise it truly is to cognise its nature as an objective cognition. This entails that the cognition cognised is not devoid of an object but not that the object of the cognition is endowed with the property which appears to qualify it in its cognition.

It may here be asked, 'Does'nt even the inferential determination of cognition lead to infinite regress?' No! The regress cannot be due to the necessity of the validation of the earlier cognition by similarity to which the new cognition is validated because the earlier cognition is already known to be valid. Of course the regress may arise if the validity of the inference itself is called into question but there is no necessity to ascertain

the validity of the inference itself. The inference is just like the cognition of an object which does not need to be validated in order to apprehend its object. But then how are the cognitions of the minor and middle terms in the inference to be validated ? A false minor or middle term certainly does not yield a valid inference. The answer to this question is that in the inference of the validity of cognition no dualily of validity and invalidity is involved. In this inference cognition is the minor term and validity is the major term. There is no scope for any doubt to penetrate the inference. But where in the cognition of the middle and minor term the duality of truth and falsehood is involved (if the cognition of these terms is of the nature of doubt), there the truth of the cognition is not determinable without another inference. The above inference however is concerned wholly with the validity of the minor term which is determined simply by the noncognition of the invalidity of the cognition (sought to be validated). It is an established fact that a cognition apprehending a cognition with its property does'nt involve any duality of truth and falsehood. If there is determinate cognition it will be the cognition of the cognition as endowed with its characteristic property. If the validity of the cognition of cognition is called into question then inferential cognition of this second cognition will have to be invoked to validate it. But generally such doubts are never raised. They are not commonsensical and therefore they do not pose any logical problem. It may here be asked, 'How is it to be determined that the reflective cognition of the validity of the objective cognition involves only validity and not invalidity as the qualifier of the cognitive qualificand so that there is left no scope for doubt or error regarding the validity of the objective cognition once the reflective cognition of it has arisen ? The answer to the question is that when all reflective cognitions as such are known to be valid and thus the general concomitance of validity and the property of being a reflective cognition is extablished then the validity of the cognitions of the minor,middle terms etc. in the inference gets automatically established. However the infinite regress can be completely eliminated by adopting the above strategy. The doubt regarding validity is supposed to be eliminated by the absence of any property which is coexistent with both validity and invalidity in the objective cognition. The presence of a distinctive property (coesistent with validity) in the objective cognition may also be the cause of elimmating doubt about validity. But it may here be urged that there is the property of 'being a cognition' which is coesistent with both validity and invalidity as cognitions may be both valid and invalid. The second cause of the elimination of regress is the cognition of the distinctive property of validity itself. The inferential cognition of validity depends upon the cognitions of minor, middle terms etc. If these cognitions are suspected to be invalid another inference would be needed to remove the suspicion. Thus the infinite regress is simply unavoidable.

Now the author adduces certain counterfactual conditionals to support the concomitance of validity and the property of being a reflective cognition. These are :

1 'If the cognition of the minor or the qualificand in the inference were false it would be either objectless or have a false object.

2. If the reflective cognition is invalid it would not apprehend the objective character of the cognition which is its object, for nothing other than cognition is objective.

3. If a cognition similar to the cognition of the presence of the pervader where the pervaded is present turned out to be invalid then concomitance would have no legs to stand upon.

4. Only if there is nondeviation there can be negation of it as it is dependent upon the latter'.

According to one commentator the last conditional has reference to the property of veridical cognition which excludes its illusoriness. So the conditional argument would actually be like this, 'If being reflective cognition were not concomitant with the nature of a cognition which excluded the property of illusoriness then there being no property which excluded illusoriness even non-concomitance would be left without any basis. So if there are illusions there must be something which is real and which appears in some state of consciousness which is opposed in nature to illusions'. This is the cognition occurring in the waking state. These two opposed states can be easily distinguished. Illusions, dreams etc. are cognitive states which have accidental internal coherence combined with the absence of the continuity of agent, action, instrument, space and time appearing in them. As against these the cognitions characteristic of the waking state are such that some contents in them are sometimes cancelled and the continuity of their different contents is accidental.

From the above discussion of the problem of infinite regress it appears that in the author's view infinite regress does not arise in every case of validity-cognition. Every such case is not vulnerable to doubt or distortion. The reflective or introspective cognition of a certain cognition-say of the presence of the middle in the minor in an inference-either perceptual or inferential—can have only the validity of the object-cognition as its object. There cannot be a reflective or introspective cognition of the form 'I do not know the pot as pot'. Only a positive objective cognition appears in the reflective or introspective cognition. All such cognitions are veridical according to the author. The veridical character of these cognitions is first generally established and on the basis of it the veridicity of a certain instance of the introspective or reflective cognition is ascertained. But is it not possible to have a false cognition of cognition? For example if the dust-storm is mistaken for smoke by a person he may have an introspective cognition of the form, 'I know that there is fire yonder because there is smoke'. But this awareness of cognition is false in respect of the property

cognised in the object-cognition. How in the face of this contrary evidence the author says emphatically that validity is concomitant with the nature of introspective cognition is a puzzle. This does not imply that the N.V. view of extrinsic validity of cognition cannot escape the fallacy of infinite regress. It certainly can unless every cognition as cognition has to be apprehended by a cognition validated by a cognition other than itself.

An upholder of universal scepticism may argue against the above that every cognition could be suspect as its validity is liable to be questioned. No cognition of cognition-unless itself irrevocably validated can validate the cognition which is its object. But irrevocable validation is not possible in the case of any cognition. Udayana flatly denies the possibility of doubt of validity in the case of the cognition which is the object of reflection. He says that no cognition can fail to apprehend its qualificand. Even in illusory cognition say that of the shell as silver, the qualificand of the cognition is shell which is certainly the object of the illusion though under the form of silver. A non-entity cannot be the qualificand even in the illusory cognition. About silverness there may be difference of opinion as to whether it is real or unreal or how it appears in the illusion. The important point that Udayana stresses here is that no cognition, determinate, indeterminate or of the nature of doubt can be absolutely unveridical. Even for a doubt to occur the subject (or qualificand) of the doubt as also the doubted properties or qualifiers have to be definitely known prior to the doubt. One cannot doubt whether the mountain has fire unless one definitely knows that there is a mountain and that presence or absence of fire are facts. This rules out the possibility of universal scepticism. If even the qualificand of the doubt is not definitely known as for example when, unable to identify a youder object one asks, 'Is it a tree or a man?' It is true that the qualificand is not known to the doubter. But for the doubt to be raised the qualificand of the doubt has to be identified as 'this' in reference to which alone the doubt can be significant. So if the validity of cognition is to be called in question there has to be some definite reason for it other than universal scepticism. Certainty is the base from which even doubts take off. If there is some reason for the doubt either the reason may be faulty or the doubt a spurious one. It is not difficult to find out what the truth in the matter is. Thus the external-validity-theory can be well defended against the objections usually levelled against it.

The defence and clarification of the N.V. view so far given should not be equated with the pragmatic certification of knowledge which some Nyaya logicians appear to endorse. If for instance, observing a vast glimmering sheet of water at a distance in a desert one ran after it one would be disillusioned to find that the sheet continually receded from him so that one could not quench his thirst by means of it. But an example contrary to this is that of the gratification of hunger a starved beggar may

experience in his dream by enjoying a dream feast. The dream-enjoyment is also an experience which vouchsafes the reality of the feast for the duration of the dream. The dream is dissipated soon as one wakes up but everything experienced in the dream is not dissipated. At least the image of the feast which was retained by the beggar's mind was certainly there to be transformed into an adhoc objective experience. The partial error of the dream-experience is corrected by the waking-experience. In this way one experience or cognition is corrected by another experience coming after it. But not every cognition or experience can be subjected to doubt. There is nothing like the logical as distinguished from the real possibility of doubt (regarding the validity of a cognition).

It may be pointed out here that the notion of the logical doubt which is widely prevalent in modern philosophy and which has been exploited to its extreme by Desartes is simply indefensible. A logical doubt is no doubt at all. When a person is looking at a tree in broad daylight with eyes which have no defect his perceptual cognition of the tree is absolutely veridical. There is no reason whatsoever for doubting the veracity of the cognition. The socalled logical doubt exploits the epistemic possibilities like, say the tree being not a real tree but an exact painting of a tree or the reflection of a tree standing not in front of the percipient and so on. If any of these possibilities is entertained the perception of the tree would be suspect but then the perception of the painting of the tree elsewhere by this or some other person would have to be treated as beyond suspicion. As was stated above even doubt needs the support of indubitable knowledge. Total and absolute doubt about anything is simply inconceiable.

However the external-validity-theory has to be taken with some qualification. The cognition which is taken to validate an object-cognition (or the cognition of this cognition) is generally so regarded because it leads to successful activity. The feeling of gratification resulting from successful activity ultimately clinches the issue of the veracity or otherwise of the cognition. This feeling or experience has therefore to be distinguished from other (cognitive) experiences and treated as beyond all suspicion. The illusory gratification enjoyed sometimes in dreams cannot be equated with this self-certifying gratification of the waking state. Here at last we come upon an exception to the external-validity-theory unless feeling is regarded as a noncognitive but conscious mental state.

The author concludes the long discussion and rejection of the idealistic doctrine of the Yogacaras by maintaining the truth of the realistic doctrine of realism as advocated by N.V. The idealistic view can be upheld if things in the external world were only various or different in nature. They could then be regarded as so many different forms of cognition appearing from within it (although their irregular appearance cannot be satisfactorily explained by the internal causation of consciousness). But things are not only different but many of them are mutually opposed in nature (and so

incompatible in character). This fact is simply inexplicable on the idealistic theory.

But does the realistic theory explain the fact satisfactorily? An identical cognition is supposed to cognise contrary colours like blue and red or objects opposed in nature like water and fire simultaneously without affecting the contrariety or opposition of the colours and the objects. If this is possible can't an identical cognition be endowed with contrary forms? An identical property like existence is related to objects diametrically opposed in nature mutually simply because these objects are, besides being mutually opposed—also mutually alike in respect of their being existents. Cognition may be like 'existence' which can be taken as equally related to entities incompatible in nature. The incompatibility of the forms (the blue-form, the yellow-form etc.) can be supposed to obtain only in respect of their inherence in concrete entities (in the realistic view) but not when they are taken as forms of cognition. Just as in the realist view one cognition can have many different and mutually-opposed entities as its objects endowed with a single cognitivity in relation to the cognition so one cognition can quite well be supposed to be endowed with many different and contrary forms. One may even say that as forms of cognition the blue and yellow or water and fire are not opposed to each other. Only regarded as attributes or substances these are mutually opposed. Thus it is not very difficult to put up a cogent defence of idealism.

Section III

The theory that qualities and the substances in which they are supposed to inhere are not different from each other is now being taken up for detailed critical consideration. This theory is also opposed to the N.V. view of self as a permanent substantive entity differing from all its qualities many of which like pleasure, pain, cognition, desire etc. are of two moments' duration only. In its state of release the self is totally bereft of its specific qualities viz, pleasure, pain, cognition etc. The author starts the discussion of the above theory with the argument that since through different sensory cognitions an identical reality is felt to be cognised there must be a common locus of the different qualities sensed by different sense organs. This cognition of the identical entity cannot have different entities, a combination of different entities, a composite entity, the form of entities or the unreal as its object for the reasons detailed below.

Firstly the identity-cognition cannot have colour or feel or smell as its object as these are different from one another and so there being no single entity cognisable by the identity-cognition it is sure to be falsified. May it be urged against this that colour, feel etc. are all the same although the generic properties characterising these are different? According to this

view one and the same entity will be visible as colour and tangible as feel. But if this is so then the properties of these qualities cannot be incompatible with each other nor can they be inaccessible to more than one sense-organ when the qualities endowed by them are not so. Thus even a blind person should be able to see if colour and feel are identical. Also the words 'blue' and 'earth' for example would become synonynous and 'water' and 'light' representing the qualities of feel and colour would become identical with earth representing smell. Of course the unfavourable contingency of colourness being cognisable when the feel is cognised can be avoided if it is argued that unlike colour and feel these properties are cognised only by the senses which are commonly supposed to sense the entieis endowed by them. The clinching argument against this view is that if these properties coexisted they would be afflicted by the defect of overlapping as they coexist in earth while existing separately in light and air. Similarly blueness and potness would also become overlapping. Further when a clay-pot is baked red it is not colourness that underges change nor is it the pot which remains recognisably the same. And the same pot could be partly red and partly blue which is not possible if the genera blueness and potness cohered in the pot. There is also the undisputed testimony of experience that colour is not feel nor feel colour.

Secondly the alleged combination may be supposed to be due to coexistence, contemporaneity, coeffectuality or cocausality. Even this view suffers from the foregoing objection that the identity-cognition cannot be explained as the entities supposed to be combined are not cognised by the same sense. Here the very possibility of the combination is being questioned. If qualities are supposed to be combined because they have a common material cause then on the Buddhist view the combination would be excluded. According to this view colour for example does not have the claypot as its material cause;colour is caused by colour, feel by feel and so on. The physical locus of the object pot may perhaps be regarded as the basis of the combination as a whole. But on the Buddhist view a physical object is just a combination of the qualities it is commonly supposed to be endowed with. So the floor on which a pot, which is a combination of colour,feel etc., is placed may be supposed to engender the combination of colour, feel etc. But here it must be noted that the pot or its colour is seen to occupy the floor which too is colour because it is seen. But the eye cannot feel. So only colour may here be taken both as the locus and the located. If these two are touched then the floor as touch and the pot as touch would alone be perceived as the locus and the located. It is possible to view both these entities as a combination of all the qualities that are there but then it was to explain the nature of combination that the idea of a unitary locus was put forward. Now the idea of combination itself is being used to explain the unitary character of the locus. Thus this procedure involves circularity. Besides the locus too can be a combination

only if it too has a single locus. So there is sure to arise infinite regress in this explanation.

Since colour, feel etc. are not sensed by a single sense-organ these cannot be combined even on the basis of their contemporaneity. There is no reason for combination on this basis. If such a combination were valid then an ass and a camel also could be taken to form a combination because they exist at the same time. If the cognition of difference of these is supposed to be preventive of their combination then in the instant case too the combination cannot take place. Colour,feel etc. are certainly cognised as different from one another.

There being no common effect of all the qualities they cannot be combined even on the basis of coeffectuality. The usual effects are not unitary but multiple in nature as each of these is according to Buddhists a conglomeration of qualities. There is also no proof that each single quality constitutive of any object is the product of a conbination of qualities. Even cocausality cannot be the basis of the combination. There has to be some cause for the combination otherwise even things in different times and places would get combined. As to the third suggested basis of combination it is quite acceptable to the opponent. Substance itself is the entity other than the qualities and their inheree as per the N.V. view. It may be urged against this that the substantive locus of qualities is not real as it is not caussally effective. But there is no evidence against the causality of the substantive entity. The various arguments adduced by the Buddhist so far are directed only at the durability and the grossness of substance which are maintained by N.V. So even if a momentary atomic entity endowed with various qualities is regarded as real the admission will be immune to the critical arguments of the Buddhst. Since experience certifies the reality of substances endowed with qualities the arguments cannot violate the testimony of experience.

The advocate of non-difference of qualities and substance may trot out another argument in his defence. He may urge that co- cognition or non-cognition by what does not cognise the other is the proof that qualities and their socalled substantive loci are one. This however is not correct. With the eyes closed an object is tactually sensed but not visualised. Certainly touchness and colourness do not coexist so that if the colour is not seen the touch also is not felt. Of course the visual cognition of the conch is possible even in the absence of the visual cognition of its whiteness. Some other colour like yellow has to be seen in the conch if it is to be visible. One can say that yellowness is imposed on the whiteness of the conch when it is illusorily cognised as yellow. But if the illusion of the yellow conch could be explained as the cognition of the conch itself as endowed with yellowness and not of the colour of the conch then the aforementioned cocognition cannot be maintained. It is also a fact that the generic property-colourness-is not cognisable when the colour is not

cognised yet it is not the same as the coloured substance. Moreover if the property and the colour are regarded as one then the above-mentioned relationship amounts to noncognition if a particular colour is not cognised. This obviously does not hold of the conch illusorily cognised as yellow. So finally, unable to defend the necessity of the co-cognition of qualities and their substantive loci by any means the advocate of non-difference contends that a new object describable as of this or that colour comes into being every moment so that at no moment the socalled object and its colour are seen as separated. This is proved wrong by the fact that if the conch were really yellow nobody would see it as white.

If bilateral cocognition of qualities and their loci is proof of their identity even the colour of a pot and the light surrounding it should be cognisable as identical. If occupancy of the same place is an additional condition for identity then body and consciousness should be one. If the noncognition of the other is also needed for the identity this too is available in the case of body and consciousness. In consciousness the body is not cognised. Of course a person may cognise another person's body devoid of consciousness but if the body is a momentary entity such a cognition is not possible. Moreover cocognition, coexistence etc. can go along with the (internal) diversity of a thing if it is endowed with incompatible properties. This incompatibility does not pertain to exclusions only. In the cognition of a 'blue lotus' it is the blue and the lotus which are cognised as identical not the respective exclusions. The cognition is not reduced to a pure identity-cognition because blueness and lotusness are different. Even if the generic property and the individuals characterised by it are different they can appear together. Of course in cognitions like 'this is not a cow ' even exclusion is cognised.

Further if qualities were the same as the substances endowed with them then from near or far substantive entities or things should be seen as alike. Only if these are mutually different the vivid and hazy perceptions of things at different distances can be satisfactorily accounted for. If fewer qualities of things are perceived the perception of it (as endowed with the qualities) is hazy otherwise it is vivid. The upholder of the non-difference-view treats—for this very reason—vividness and haziness themselves as the qualities of things but relative to persons situated at different distances from them. This will not do. If both these qualities are present in the perceived thing why should one see only one and not the other of these two qualities ? Nor does the thing change with change of place as it is recognised to be the same from place to place.

It may here be contended that the specificity of the determinate cognition is dependent upon that of the indeterminate cognition because the indeterminate cognition preceding a determinate cognition is the ruling cognition in relation to the latter. The reply to this contention is that the space and the spatial object must be treated alike as

indeterminately cognisable. If the spatial object is cognised as vivid or hazy space too would be so cognised. The indeterminate cognition of an object cannot be said to be absolutely vivid. The Buddhist may urge against the above that an object is fully cognised only by its indeterminate cognition not by the determinate. But there is no basis for such a discrimination. There has to be a cause why what is indeterminately cognised cannot be determinately cognised. It cannot be the non-evocation of the urge for such cognition after the indeterminate cognition has taken place. If after perceiving an object as endowed with all its properties the percipient receded to a long distance from the object he does not have direct perception of the latter despite having recollection of his earlier perception of it. There is present the urge for the cognition as there is recollection but it is not followed by the cognition.

If even in the absence of the determinate cognition of an object with all the qualities and properties its indeterminate cognition is considered possible then it should be considered possible for everyone to know everything at all times although he or she does not know it determinately. If the determinate cognition is supposed to be opposed to the indeterminte then no cognition of anything would be dependable. It may be said against this that only if there is a cognition contradictory of a determinate cognition the latter may be regarded as opposed to the indeterminate cognition. Not all determinate cognitious need be opposed to the indeterminate. This retort is not applicable in the present case. For example in an object located at some distance from a percipient the conjunction and disjunction of the frontal and backward portions of the object which are located in the visible and invisible parts of the object, are not themselves supposed to be visible and yet the object is indeterminately seen. Why doesn't then the determinate cognition of the object as characterised by the said conjunction and disjunction arise ? The proper answer to this is that if all the components of the content of a determinate cognition are separatly cognised in the indeterminate cognition the latter as mutually related are determinately cognised.

The main points stressed in the above criticism of the non- difference-theory of the Buddhists may be elaborated thus. According to the Buddhist a substance is nothing but a configuration (of the Gestaltic type) of qualities like colour, feel, smell etc. which are commonly regarded as inherent in the substance. The qualities are in fact neither inherent in any entity nor are they associated with one another by any relation. Yet the sensing of the qualities one after another or the sensing of one or more qualities accompanied by the recollection of the previous sensation of other qualities gives rise to the (impression or) idea of the substance as the locus of the qualities. So substance is just a conceptual construct. It is a logically dispensable entity. This view is criticised by the non- Buddhist on two counts namely that the idea of the substance cannot be equated with

the idea of the combination of the sensations of different qualities and that the cognition of the qualities and that of the substance are not concomitant with each other. Only if there is invariable cocognition of qualities and their supposed substantive locus these can be supposed to be non-different from each other. Neither of these alternatives is logically sustainable. Firstly, the very idea of the combination of the sensation or the sensed (and even recollected) qualities is contrary to the Buddhist theory of momentariness. Every sensation lasts only a single moment. When the next sensation arises the earlier sensation is gone for good. Besides what is there to determine the combination of a certain quality with other qualities whose sensations occur successively or one after another? For example a particular colour supposed to belong to a pot and a certain feel supposed to belong to a piece of cloth sensed one after another are not combined with each other to yield the sensation or idea of either the pot or the cloth. The particular colour and the particular feel are not taken to be combinable. The Buddhist cannot give any reason for this. The author considers several suggestible reasons like cocausality, co-effectuality, contemporanity, co- existence etc. for the combination of different sensed qualities. The rejection of all these reasons proves that no quality can combine with any other quality let alone the qualities belonging to the same (identical) object.

Further what would be the nature of this combination if it ever took place at all? The qualities are not supposed to come together in any object. Nor are they sensed together so that they could be said to be cognitively held together by the same sensation. There is also nothing common to the qualities (like a generic property under which they could be subsumed). The aggregation of the qualities also does not make any sense. All the individual members of an aggregate are supposed to be located at a particular place but this is not true of the qualities. Unless the idea of the particular substantive entity like the claypot or the tree is presupposed the combination of the particular qualities belonging to the latter cannot be identified at all. A claypot and a tree may have generically the same green colour. The specific green colour belonging to the claypot however differs from that belonging to the tree. This difference cannot be pinpointed without specifying the greens as belonging respectively to the claypot and the tree. The modern empiricist defines substance as the permanent possibility of sensations. There cannot be a more confused definition than this of a substance. If the substance is sought to be done away with by means of this definition then what this definition seems to suggest is that commonly the word 'substance' is used to refer to that which gives rise to the expectation of some sensation or other. Will this definition help identify a particular substance or distinguish it from another substance?

Besides the non-differentist has to admit the obvious distinction

between the sensation of a quality and that of the substance endowed with the quality. Observing the colour of a tree (and attending to it only) one may say,'This is green colour'. Again, with the same observation but now turning one's attention to the tree one may say,'The tree is green'. These two sensory cognitions have different entities as their objects. Though the same word 'green' is used in both the expressions the context reveals unmistakably that the word stands for two different things namely the green colour and the green-coloured object in the two expressions. That the object is not a construct of the combination of its qualities is evident from the fact that it is referrible here as 'the green tree ! Even the mere 'green' colour is found here sufficient to describe the tree. Moreover if there is combination of greenness and other qualities, it would be odd to use the word 'green' to refer to the combination. Further the tree is green all over, it has the touch-quality all over and the same is the case for all its other qualities. What meaning can then be assigned to the notion of combination of the qualities ?

It has been asked, 'If it is not the qualities of colour, feel etc. what is there to constitute the being of the substance ? If there is something over and above these qualities in the being of the substance it should be describable or identifiable as such and such or be perceptible as different from the qualities'. To this question there are two answers. The demand for the description of the substance is indirectly the demand to specify the qualities in terms of which alone anything happens to be described. But when all the qualities of a thing have already been specified how can there be a further specification of qualities ? The being of the substance cannot be described but it can be identified by means of simple ostension or reference (though this too involves a kind of egocentric description). The second answer to the above question is this. Just as the green colour or the softness of touch and other qualities are identifiable as those that are endowed with their respective characteristic properties like 'greenness' 'softness' etc. so the substance is also identifiable as that which is characterised by its generic and specific properties. This is the only proper way to identify an entity. As a matter of fact the substance is identifiable both as the possessor of its various qualities and as characterised by its genus while any of the qualities is identifiable only by means of its characteristic genus—unless it is sought to be descirbed as the quality belonging to a particular substance.

Strictly speaking there is perfect parallellism between the identification of sensory qualities and that of the substance. We have to make here the distinction between general and special identification. A specimen of green colour is identified as 'green' simply by the observation of the generic property of greenness inhering in it. But if the green is to be identified as the colour of a certain tree or some other specific object then the reference to that object as the possessor of that colour is unavoidable

(as individual specimens of greenness differ from one green object to another). Just similar is the case of the green object, say a particular tree. To identify this tree simply as tree, only its class-characteristic—the treeness—needs to be specified. If however the tree is to be singled out as a particular tree then the particular green colour which inherens in it has to be referred to as the colour- specimen which no other tree or object is endowed with. It is therefore absolutely wrong to say—as some western empiricists have done—that the substance is a 'tertium quid' or 'something I know not what '. If the sensory quality is known the sobstance endowed with it is also known. In fact the substance is known with the knowledge of each sensory quality inhering in it. We can go even a step further and say (slightly against what was said earlier) that there cannot arise sensory cognition of any quality without involving the substance possessing it. Thus the sensation of colour is simultaneously the sensation of the coloured substance. What is true of colour is true of all other qualities. There is no sensation of colour by itself (as is stated above). When one has the sensory cognition in reference to a particular colour as green what one really cognises is the colouring object endowed with the property of greenness. When a certain thing is given with the coating of this greening object it looks green. Even the different shades of green are identified as such only as characterising particular objects. If the percipient's attention is focussed on the quality and not on the substance endowed with it it is the quality as belonging to the substance that will be the primary object of cognition. On the other hand if it is the object which is focussed upon by the percipient then the quality or qualities belonging to the object will act as a transparent medium through which the object will be cognised as 'the object possessing the quality or qualities. The perception is complex or determinate. The object—that is the centre of attention is the epistemic qualificand and the qualities—the epistemic qualifier in the cognition. The qualifierness of the qualities in the cognition renders them as secondary objects in the cognition of the object endowed with the qualities. The reverse is the case in the cognition in which qualities being the centre of attention become the qualificand and their relation of inherence to the substance the qualifier (epistemically) in the cognition.

This explanation of the nature of the cognitions helps us easily to resolve the spurions problem of the relation of sensedata over which western empisicists like Russel, Moore, Broad and other thinkers racked their brains for years without arriving at any satisfactory explanation of the problem. The root cause of the appearance of the problem where there was none was the illegitimate and arbitrary assumption unanimonsly upheld by all empiricists that the substantive entity is a logical construction out of sensedata which alone are directly sensed. This assumption could not be indicated satisfactorily by providing a rigorous

logical account of the construction from out of sensedata, of the perceived object because no statement about the sensedata could be found to be equivalent to the statement about the perceived object. This is just a commonsensical fact. The realtion between sensedata and the object is not logical at all. The relation is epistemological and variable. Sometimes the cognition of a single sense datum produces the vivid cognition of the object characterised by the latter and sometimes many sensedata are needed to be cognised before the object is cognised. This is more or less a psychological matter which cannot be logically constructed.

It may here be asked, 'Granting that no quality is ever sensorily cognised by itself (as it is dependent both ontically and epistemically upon the substance in which it inheres) why should not the substance which is the owner of the qualities and as such not dependent upon them be sensorily (or even otherwise) cognised by itself ? Isn't it the nonavailability of the cognition of the bare object that is the basis for regarding the object as a logical construction out of sensedata ? One may perhaps say in reply to the question that if the object is never bereft of its qualities it cannot be cognised by itself. But this is not the position of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika thinkers. According to them the substance being the material cause of its qualities (and every cause being the immediate antecedent of its effect) it has to preexist its effect (at least by one moment). So in the moment of its origination the substance has to exist as devoid of any of its qualities. It is therefore not impossible to cognise the substance without any of its qualities in its moment of origination. If such a cognition took place it will not be a determinate cognition (with qualities as qualifiers and the substance as the qualificand). 'But couldn't there arise at the moment of origination the cognition of the substance as qualified by its generic property only?' There are two answers to this question. Even for the cognition of the bare substance sense-contact with it is needed. But this contact with it cannot take place unless it comes into being. The sense-contact occurs (for the first time) at the second moment of the existence of the substance when it becomes endowed with its qualities. In such a condition it is impossible to cognise the bare substance. The second answer to the question is that all sensory cognition of substances is supposed to depend upon their perceptible size and manifest or vivid form or colour. In the moment of origination these qualities are absent in the substance, so it cannot then be sensed.

The second aforementioned ground for nondifference of qualities and substances is the invariable cocognition of substances and their qualities. As we have seen above the substtance totally bereft of all its qualities or qualities apart or dissociated from their substantive loci are never experienced. As a general rule it is true but no particular quality of any substance can be supposed to be invariably cocognitive with the latter. Every quality in a substance (which is non-eternal) is subject to change. So

even the combination of qualities of a substance is changeable. Thus neither single qualities nor a combination of them can be cocognitive with the substance. Moreover cocognition can at best prove only the relatedness of qualities and substance and not their identity or nondifference.

In the last three sections the author has discussed and rejected almost all the important doctrines that the different schools of Buddhism like the Yogācāra, the Sautrāntikas and the Śūnyavādins have upheld. These doctrines are not directly opposed to the doctrine of self as the N.V. school has maintained it . Yet indirectly all the rejected doctrines contradict the N.V. conception of self as an eternal substance endowed with certain qualities from which it gets completely freed in the state of redemption. In the next and last section of this treatise the author takes up for consideration a doctrine which directly contradicts the reality of self. It is the doctrine that there is no self because it is not known or knowable.

Section IV

The discussion of the doctrine of the noncognition of self

The proof that there is no self because it is not cognised at all is now being critically considered. The first and obvious criticism of this proof is that this very denial of self is the cognition of self as the counterpositive of the denial. If non-cognition of what is intrinsically cognisable is put up as the middle term in the proof to avert this difficulty then two other difficulties would beset the proof. First, noncognition by each and every person cannot be established and if therefore noncognition by oneself (the Buddhist) is taken as the middle term then, there being innumerable things unknown to the Buddhist, this middle term would deviate from the major term (nonexistence). Secondly, the middle term cannot be acceptable to the Buddhist himself as he does not regard the self as cognisable. The self for him is neither real nor cognisable. To the nonBuddhist of course the self is real and cognisable but his view cannot be the basis of the Buddhist's proof. The major, middle and minor term in the (inferential) proof adduced by the Buddhist must all be acceptable to him. He cannot criticise his opponent's view of self by means of a middle term which he himself treats as unreal. Besides unless the self is cognised by all or a few persons it cannot be regarded as cognisable. So cognisability and absolute noncognition cannot go together.

It has here to be noted that the above proof is of the nature of positive inference. If it were a counterfactual conditional the Buddhist would not have been required to either affirm its autecedent or deny its consequent. The truth of both these propositions is taken to be conceded by the

opponent only and the conclusion following from them is of the nature of an unfavourable contingency for the opponent. If there is no proof to deny the cognition of self there is unimpeachable positive evidance too in support of the reality of self-cognition. The testimony of non-recollective, non-verbal, non- inferenial and immediate internal perception of self is itself the proof that the self is cognised by every person as one's own being. This pereception cannot be an objectless phantasy projected by some inexplicable and transcendental urge of the mind. If this can be said of self-cognition it can be said of the object-cognition too (and thus the reality of the objects too can be denied). Self-cognition may be of the nature of valid or invalid perception. If it is the first then the indeterminate cognition on which it (the determinate perceptral cognition) is based must have a real object. If however the cognition is invalid, there has then to be the indeternimiate (valid) cognition of the object which is mispercevied. So in either case it cannot be denied that there is a real object which is apprehended in self-cognition. Of course the object of self-cognition is not external but on this account it cannot be denied to be real. Objects of internal cognition are as real as are pleasure, pain, aversion etc. which are apprehended only by the mind.

The materialist may contend that the body or the different senses or their combination is the real object of self-cognition. It is some one of these that is very often referred to as the self. But this is not correct. Any body or any combiniation of senses pertaining to any body cannot be and is not regarded as the object of his self-cognition by a person. The body or the senses have to be one's own. What does the expression, 'One's own' mean here? It means non-diference from oneself. If so then even the body cannot be the self as its difference from the latter is quite evident.

Could then consciousness itself and not the body,senses etc. be the self? If this were the case then it will have to be explained if the same consciousness is both the knowing activity and the knower or the agent of this activity or these are different from each other. The first cannot be the case as the same entity cannot be its own material cause. The self is always expeienced as the agent of knowing and as different from it. Perhaps one may urge against this that like the blue, the yellow etc. the socalled self is nothing but the form of the cognition which is supposed to be of the nature of self-cognition. But it has already been shown earlier that the objective form (or the object) is different from its cognition. The same can be said about self-hood too. The self cannot be identified with the cognition of which it is taken to be the form. One may urge against this retort that the cognition which prceedes and produces the cognition of self is that which appears as self. This is in fact the second alternative referred to above (that consciousness as knowing has to be differentiated from consciousness as knower). But since the blue-cognition, yellow-cognition etc. are the material causes of self- cognition the objects of these

objective cognitions will appear as objects in the self-cognition too. In the Buddhist view the form and the formed entity are identical. So if the blue-cognition has the form of self, then this form must also appear in self-cognition. It may be urged against this that the material cause of a cognition is a beginningless and endless series of cognitions differing from the series of objective cognitions (which are called 'motivating cognitions in the Buddhist terminology while the former is called 'storehouse-consciousness'). This view comes perilously near to the N.V. vieew of self according to which the self is the agent of cognitions though endowed with them as its qualities. The only difference between this view and the Buddhist riew is that N.V. does not regard the self as identical with cognitions or the cognition-series and according to it the self is an eternal and inchanging entity.

The crux of the above criticism of the Buddhist view of self is the fact of the irreducibility of the experienced distinction between the cogniising activity and the cognitive agent of this activity. The earlier cognition in a series cannot be treated as the agent of the later one in the series. (alt..ough it is the cause of the later) because the agent of the cognition is also its inherent locus. In the Buddhist view everything being momentary the cognition that is the agent does not last till the cognition arises. So the agent connot have anything to do with the cognition of which he is the agent. Besides the erlier cognition like the later one in the series has only the external entity as its object. The self does not appear in any of the cognitions as object. So none of these can explain the self- cognitive character of self-cognition. If this difficulty is sought to be avoided by regarding the self as a conceptual construct out of the fact of the causality of the earlier cognition in relation to the later cognition in the series then another more serious difficulty arises. If we take a series of three successive cognitions the second cognition in the series will be the agent in relation to the third but what will be the status of the first in relation to the second? It has to be the agent of the agent or the cogniser of the cogniser (in relation to the third cognition). If the series were an extended one comprising a large number of successive cognitions every term in the series except the last one will be of the nature of cogniser or agent. It cannot be a cognition. But cognising the cogniser or the agent of a cognition would not ensure the cognition of the object which is other than the latter. Except in the idealist view the object is not the same as its cognition. Besides no purpose would be served by cognising the cogniser in a cognition-series. Even if the cognition itself is the cogniser the object is quite different from cognitions and so it would remain uncognised till the last cognition in the series emerges. Another important point in the non-Buddhist criticism of the no-self-theory is that the body with the senseorgous cannot be taken as the object of any self-cognition. Different selves are cognised as intimately attached to different bodies. The body is

felt to be one's own by the self before there arises any self-feeling in it. Somehow the self-feeling has to precede the feeling of embodiedness.(of the self). But the body is not presented to the self as one among many different bodies to be appropriated as one's own. The relation between the body and the self is more or less a one-sided one. The self may sometimes feel dissociated from the body (or major portions of it or bereft of the feeling of embodiedness but the body cannot be felt as devoid of self-feeling. The felt body is always the body of some self or appropriated by some self. But as such it is only appropriated or owned by but not absolutely identical with the self. This fact explains why the attempt of many contemporary empiricist philosophers to derive the concept of self from the experiences associated with the body are bound to fail. The self-feeling or self-awareness in a gross or subtle form precedes bodily awareness and even the feeling of embodiedness is derivative from self-awareness. So no bodily experience or expriences can help explain self-awareness.

So far the proofs adduced for the reality of self by the non-Buddhist have been mainly negative. They sought to show that the body, the senses, the intellect or the form of cognition cannot be a substitute for the reality of self. Now the Buddhist demands a positive inferential proof which alone can clinch the issue in favour of the non-Buddhist. Such a proof is based on the experience of recognition which is usually of the form, 'I who saw this sometime back am touching it now'. Any and every cognitive experience cannot be the basis of self-inference as many such experiences are detected to be illusory (like that of the continued identity of the flame). The recognition that the causal experience and the effect-experience belong to the same sequence also cannot provide a basis for the inference of the identity of self. The experiences being different there is nothing to be recognised as identical in them or beyond them. The sequence of the experiences may be said to be identical but this need not lead to the inference of a common and (durable or) identical cause for the earlier and later experiences which constitute the sequence. Besides in the Buddhist view a cause-effect-sequence is nothing over and above the necessary occurence of the successive terms in the sequence at their respective moments of origination. There is therefore nothing to be recognised as the same in the sequence. Even if it were, the sequence would not be regarded as the self by the non- Buddhist. So we come back to the above-mentioned recognition of oneself being the agent of experiences occurring at different moments. The earlier experience is remembered while the later experience is (actually) being enjoyed at the same moment, which is not possible if both the experiences did not have the same agent. Even mere remembering is not possible without a durable agent to refer back to the past from its present temporal vantage-point. Of course reference to the past without there being any real past can be

accounted for on the assumption that the reference may be illusory. Don't we have dream-experience of a long passage of time within even a few minutes of sleep? But not every case of remembering can be suspected to be illusory. There have to be some veridical instances of remembering for the illusory ones to be so identified. Perhaps the Buddhist may explain the reflective certification of the occurrence of genuine reference to the past by maintaining self-consciousness of all kinds of cognition. But reference to itself involved in the self-consciousness of remembering cannot deprive it of its reference to the past. Only if the different experiences occurring one after another are regarded as the experiences of the same being, the recognition in respect of them can be satisfactorily explained. Can one say that it is the relation of material causality (and effectuality) obtaining among the successive experiences that accounts for recognition ? No ! In the non-Buddhist view such a relation does not hold among experiences. No experience is supposed to inhere in any other experience. Even in the Buddhist view an experience is not taken to be the material cause of any other experience. Of course if material causality is not distinguished from effecient causality (as is the case among some Buddhists) the above contention can be upheld. But then it must be made clear if the causality is direct or indirect. It cannot be the first because even experiences long past are revived and recognised as one's own. It cannot be the second too. The enlightenment acquired by a disciple on listening to his master's learned discourse must be recognisable as the master's as well as the disciple's simply because there obtains an indirect causal link between the teachings of the master and the knowledge of the disciple. The fact is that both the proximate and remote experiences (of oneself) are owned by a person. They are owned not because they are direct or indirect. It is also not the case that every experience of oneself either direct or indirect is owned by one-self. Many proximate experiences of oneself are totally forgotten and many remote experiences are vividly remembered. The internal (efficient) causality of the experiences may have something to do with some of them being revived (and owned) or not revived (or not owned). Generally an experience has to be one's own in order to be recognised as such. Unless therefore there is an unchanging entity to which the experiences actually belong they cannot be owned by it although an experience may be mistakenly apprehended as one's own.

The Buddhist argues against the above that (material) causal relationship coupled with non-cognition of difference of the causally-related entities could be supposed to lead to recognition (of identity). In the case of the cognitions of the teacher and the taught the difference-cognition is quite obvious. So the two cannot be recognised as identical. But the successive cognitions of the same person are also cognised as different from one another so that they cannot be recognised as identical or belonging to the same person. If the successive cognitions are regarded

as nondifferent as cognitions then the cognitions of the disciple cannot be distinguished from that of the teacher. In fact all cognitions would be rendered nondifferent with the result that everyone would be able to share everybody else's cognitions. Perhaps the non-cognition of the difference of the body with which the cognitions are associated may be taken to be the basis of the recognition. In the above case the bodies of the teacher and the taught being different the possibility of recognition can be warded off. But even one's own body undergoes changes from moment to moment. Its diversity cannot remain unnoticed even by oneself. So in the absence of the noncognition of bodily difference one's self-identity will remain uncognised. If however difference is different specific property then a child which is very hazily aware of its present body cannot consciously connect its present body with its body of the previous incarnation. Thus the child cannot be able to recollect the experiences of its previous body with the result that it would not be able to make the sucking movements of its mouth for sucking its mother's milk. Contrariwise a posthumous child may remember even the experiences of its father (whom it has never seen) because the difference between its body and its father's body (which is the cause of its generation) is not knwon to it at all. Material causality cannot also be understood as generic similarity of the cause and the effect. Such a similarity does not obtain between the pot and the potsherds or the yarn and the cloth although these are known to be related by the relation of material causality. If coexistence of things is taken to relate them causally then even in the momentarist view the cause and the effect cannot coexist as each one being momentary cannot, exist with the other either at the same place or the same moment. In the nonmomentarist view coexistence or co-occurrence of cause and effect cannot always be ensured. Besides, the body and consciousness are supposed to coexist and so they would have to be treated as cause and effect if even imaginary co-existence is taken to connect things causally. In the above it is stated that the newborn child's sucking reflex which enables it to suck its mother's breast is due to the revival of the impressions of the experience of gratifying its hunger by sucking its mother's breast which the child must have had in its previous birth. This is a stock argument for reincarnation adduced by Indian plilosophers. A modern thinker would not attach much importance to this argument although he cannot explain satisfactorily the purposive and well-directed character of certain basic bodily reflexes. They are absolutely essential for self-preservation and they are directly aimed at fullfilling some important physiological need. How did the body acquire the habit of acting according to the reflex ? Feeling hungry is intrinsic to the living body but a particular type of activity cannot also be regarded as intrinsic to the living body. The sucking reflex cannot be regarded similar to the involuntary movement of a limb of the body to avoid fire or any other

object causing some umpleasant sensation. The sucking-reflex has a special character. It is not just thrusting the mouth towards the breast. It is holding the breast-nipple in the mouth and pressing it in a certain way. This is just like a learned activity but is not al all learned. There is some inner urge which prompts the child to pucker its lips so that they can suck milk from the breast. This urge is equated with prenatal impressions or what are called 'Sanskarās' by Indian philosophers. Buddhists talk of innumerable types of Sanskarās like those that predispose us to treat things as similar when they are utterly dissimilar, to regard things as durable when they are momentary, to postulate generic or specific properties common to different things when they are quite unlike each other and so on. The important difference between the views of the Buddhists and other Indian philosophers on this subject consists in the fact that while the activities, cognitions etc. prompted by inner urges are mostly subjective for the Buddhist they are mostly objective for other Indian philosophers.

So far (material) causal relationship supposed to hold between certain entities like cognitions and taken to be the basis of the recognition of identity with regard to them was critically considered. The two main types of this relationship were however not mentioned above. These are: One based on the similarity of entities (recognised as the cause and the effect) and another based on the transformation of the nature of one entity into another. The first kind of causal relationship is supposed to hold between entities which constitute a continuous series. The second kind of causal relation obtains between entities of which one is the transformation of another and therefore is not continuous with it in nature. A series of momentary pots coming into and passing out of being one after another-instantiate the first kind of causation while the rotting of the seed sown in the soil for sprouting instantiates the second kind of causation. 'The objection to the first is that although the cause and the effect may be alike the cognition of identity (or recognition) relating to them cannot be non-erroneous. Moreover the potsherds and the pot whose causal relation is of the first type are not like each other. Besides the definiendum of either kind is not covered by the definition of the other kind.

Again, taking up the second kind of relationship it may be asked: 'How is it ascertained that cinders for example are the transformation of the fireword which is the original object? Can't the cinders be the transformation of fire itself ? Is it not so because cinders come into being as the result of the burning of firewood? Well ! One can even say that cinders result from fire with which firewood is associated. If despite this cinders are supposed to result from the burning of fuel only the reason is the certain knowledge that an earthy objects like cinder can have only an earthy object like firewood as its material cause? And the basis of the certain knowledge is the conviction that the causality of continuously

occurring momentary entities is determined by similarity. This similarity however does not consist either in generic identity or coexistence. Both have already been shown to be untenable. Perhaps it may be the fact of belonging to the same series (for both the cause and the effect). But this membership of the same series cannot be other than the generation of the latter by the earlier entity in the series. Now as per the Buddhist account of causation the collocation of causal conditions is the cause of which the conglomeration of the partial effects (constituting the total effect) is the real effect. If membership in a series is defined as above then the colour of a pot, which is one of the causal conditions for the production of a similar colour of the pot (of the next moment), could be supposed to be productive also of the smell of the pot (as both colour and smell belong to identical series). This contingency can be avoided if generation here is understood as material causation. In the cited case the colour is the material cause of colour alone while it is the efficient cause of qualities other than colour supposed to inhere in the pot. Thus similarity may be understood in terms of the relationship of material causality of the similars. But this is tantamount to explaining material causality by material causation itself.

Now for a brief review of the author's defence of the N.V. view of moksa vis-a-vis the Vedāntic and some other views. Amoung all the Indian philosophical schools N.V. and the Sautrantika are the only two schools which have upheld views regarding the nature of the ultimate destiny or summum bonum of man which are apparently most unappealing. The Buddhist view which equates human destiny with the utter extinction of human personality or self is of course absolutely uncommonsensical. But N.V. which claims to be a commonsensical (and critical) philosophy cannot afford to ride roughshod over commonsense by treating moksa, the final condition of man's spiritual development as an absolutely inert, insentient and negative condition. We have to see if such a view can be justified and shown to be not quite unattractive. We have also to see how this view compares with the view say, of Advaita Vedānta which is considered by all schools to be teleologically most attractive.

We may first take into consideration the fact that N.V.'s view of release is partly determined by the peculiar metaphysical doctrines it has had to accept for presenting a logically consistent realistic view of the world. One such doctrine states that the self is a substance and as such it is endowed with and is the material cause of all its general and special qualities (like pleasure, pain, desire, avession, residual impressions, conation, merit & demerit).

Qualities inhere in their substantive locus and are also caused by them. As such their origination is preceded by at least one moment by the substantive cause. Thus the substance has to preexist its qualities and it may even survive them. This means that the qualities of a substances may

undergo change, that is one quality may fade or disappear, being replaced by another, similar or dessimilar to it, without the substantive inherce of the qualities being destroyed. For example a claypot just fashioned out of welt clay is dark grey in colour but on being baked in the furnace it turns into a hard clay-utencil endowed with red-colour. The colour, smell and touch of the claypot all change as the result of baking. Thus we see many (special) qualities of a substance undergoing radical change while the substantial locus of the qualities remains the same. If such partial replacement of qualities in a substance is possible their total replacement or even complete distruction in certain special conditions is conceivable. Such special condition is the attainment of release by the self when the self is completely dissociated from the body-mind-complex which constitutes its personality. If the qualities belonged to the self alone they would not be dissipated even in rlease. For example there are certain general qualities like number, measure or dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction which characteris the self like all other substances. They do not need the help of any other entity to appear in the self. Such is not the case of cognition, conation, desire etc. which depend upon the comming together of the living body, the senses and the mind for their manifestation in the self. In the disembodied state of the self, when the self is transsnigrating or even the state of sleep these qualities of the self remain dormant. So in the state of release the self can be and is absolutely bereft of all its special qualities although its general qualities cling to it externally. If there is no pain in the state of release pleasure or happiness also is not there in this state as all these qualities require self-mind-contact in çertain parts of the body for their manifestation. The self being ubiquitous it can always remain in contact with the body if it exists and the mind (which is eternal) but the contact with the mind in the special ports of the body cannot be available to the self at all times. The self is not sentient by nature in N.V. view. Sentience or consicousness is only a quality and as such it cannot be identical with the self it inheres in. The Vedāntins adopt the substantialist view about consciousness which they identiify with the self. If consciousness were identified with the self then the distinction between the individual self and the universal self that is God would be very difficult to maintain for N.V. If the individual lself is consciousness God cannot be regarded as anything other than consciousness. There would then be no ground for treating these consciousnesses as radically different from each other. If two different conscious substances are admitted, one embodied and the other unembodied then the absence of consciousness in the state of sleep will be very difficult to explain. The embodied consciousness being always present in the living body the conditon of sleep would never arise in the body . Besides the cognition of things both external and internal to the body would require the postulation of a different kind of consciousness to

explain their occurrence in the embodied consciousness of the self. The relation of the consciousness to desire, pain etc. without which the self cannot have these qualities would render the self always conscious. This would render the occurrrence of unconscious desire, pleasure, pain etc. simply impossible . Moreover the testimony of common experiences expressed by statements like,'I desire, I have pain, I know etc.' clearly testifies the qualitative character of cognition, conation etc. Thus on these various grounds N.V. regards the self as a substance different from consciousness and endowed with it as its quality whose emergence in it is engendered by mind-body-contact with it. When in the state of release this special contact is absent the self is divested of all its special qualities. So absolute absence of pain without its being followed by the emergence of happiness (supreme or otherwise) is the nature of release according to N.V.

Can such a view of release be appealing ? In the absence of happiness of any kind and in any quantity can the mere absence of pain be supremely desirable and be the supreme intrinsic value for man ? N.V.'s answer to the question is is 'yes' because pain is intrinsically undesirable and so its elimniation the most desirable condition for the self. Even what we take to be pleasurable in a certain condition may seem painful if the condition changes. In the state of hunger a sweet and tasty dish would strike us as extremely pleasurable but in the condition of satiety the same dhsh would seem revolting. The causes of pleasure and pain may be identical things but the sensations of pleasure and pain are quite different from and opposed to each other. So the sensation of pain can never be desired by any person. Even saddists and masochists cannot be regarded as the desirers of the pain-sensation. By means of the mortification of his body the saddist no doubt hurts his body but this bodily hurt engenders in the saddist's mind the sensation of pleasure just as the slimming of his corpulment body as a result of the shedding of its excess fact makes the overweight person happy. Thus pain, whatever its cause is intruisically hateful and is desired to be avoided. Even pleasure in excess may be painful. Continuous self-indulgence or an orgy of pleasure also may cause pain. But just as every kind of pain sensation is hateful, every kind of pleasure cannot be said to be desired even if the subjectivity of pleasure is recognised. Even to a hungry man a dish of his liking may not bring pleasure if he is kind- hearted and finds that many less fortunate persons around him are starved to death. A quite wealthy person may feel himself less fortunate and so unhappy if he finds tat his neighbour is far wealthier than he. Of course this relativity-as in the case of pain- characterises the relative causes of pleasure which may not remain the same in different conditions. But what this relativity suggests is that there cannot be supreme happiness which would remain so eternally without suffering any dilution because of its comparision with some other happiness superior to

it in some respect. Every sensation of happiiiness attained by any person can be turned into unhappiness (or comparative unhappiness) simply by the thought of the person enjoying it that there are types of happiness superior even to his own. There may or may not exist such more superior happiness. Moreover even a person in possession of a comparatively inferior type of happiness may be able to transform it into supreme happiness simply by thinking that his happiness is supreme and no other person enjoys happiness of similar quallity. The craving for more and more and higher and higher types of happiness in man is quite natural and unavoidable and also the consequent feeling of not being in possession of supreme happiness. Even the knowledge of the fact that one's happiness has beginning is enough to contaminate it with pain for some persons.

It may here be asked, 'Granting that the absence of pain as the object of desire has an edge over happiness regarded as such an object can it be maintained that we aim at avoidance of pain in all our endovours or even in our most serious endovours. We seem to aim at achievement of objects like, name, money, prossessions, means of comfort and so on. These when obtained bring happiness or help us avoid pain but the latter is rarely the direct object of our endaivours . This queston may be answered by a counterquestion, namely 'Why do we seek to obtain various things ?'. Is it not because we feel a lack or deficiency of things ?. If some of us are unhappy for want of these things many do not feel their lack in the least. What this variation in wants suggests is that people do not want to suffer from the sense of lack (of whatever it may be) which is the main cause of pain. Things obtained by means of effort help remove the sense of lack for some time. So even though removal of pain is not the direct object of all endaevour it is certainly sought after by us. It is really the pain caused by the lack of a thing that prompts us to seek the thing and secure it. This is why a man—even lacking all the means of comfort—does not suffer from the sense of lack for them if he does not care to obtain them.

Having said so much in support of the N.V. view of the summun bonum we have to confess that we cannot defend the contention of N.V. that the self is divested of coguition too in the state of release as it is then divested of pleasure, pain etc. This contention logically follows no doubt from the basic metaphysical position of N.V. that cognition, pleasure, pain etc. arise only from the body- mind-contact which ceases to exist after the self is dissociated from the body. But to avoid the predicament of equating the highest state of self with a stone-like state of insentience it is necessary to admit intrinsic sentience in self which is ever associated with it. This sentience has nothing to do with any object. It is self- lumiosity like that of light and it is admitted by Advaita as well as a certain school of Mīmansa. But the admission of self-consciousness in self brings in its wake many difficulties which may land N.V. directly into idealism. The self-conscious

self would be conscious of itself as conscious or desirous etc. of objects so that the self- consciousness of self would be conscious of consciousness, desire etc. also which characterise the self. The bare self cannot be supposed to be the object of self-counsciousness as the self is always endowed with some state or other. Now if consciousness is cognised by self- consciousness the reality of objects apart from consciousness could be called into question and thus idealism would be precipitated. There is therefore no way out for N.V. through the admission of intrinsic sentience in self.

Despite this shortcomming N.V. has an advantage over the Advaitic theory of self as well as the Sāmkhyam theory of Puruṣa. According to Advaita the individual self is the unreal appearence of the universal self engendered by the imposition of the condition of *māyā* on the latter. This appearance is sublated by the revelation of the true nature of Brahman the universal self. This revelation of Brahman is the ultimate goal of human existence according to Vedānta. The individual self does not retain its existence once the revelation has taken place. There is no self left to enjoy the revelation. The individual self is replaced by the universal self as soon as the revelation has occured .Can any individual (self) hanker after such a self-annihilating state of revelation or existential change. Change partial or near-total in one's being can be entertained. Such a change does not affect one's identity. One remains oneself despite the change. But in the Advaitic view the individual's identity as the individual self gets totlally dissipated once Brahman-realisation has taken place. Is it conceivable that anybody, even the most lowly and and suffering person would like to surrender his or her identity itself for attaining the totally different identiity of Brahmanhood however beatific it may be ? N.V.'s selfhood of the released self dissociated from all its specific qualities would appear to any sensible person far preferable to such an absolute loss of selfhood held out as the highest perfection by Advaita.

The Sāmkhyan view of the released self is not very attractive either. As the penultimate verse of the *Sāmkhya kārikā* states, the realisation resulting from the continuous practice of meditation is negative in form like, 'I am not, nothing is mine, and I do not exist.' Obviously the being of the individual self gets subtlated in the state of release according to this account. The author of the *kārikā* does not bother to tell us how the distinctive charcter of each Puruṣa is preserved after release when the very basis of its individuality is cancelled. The individual Puruṣa is exhorted by the *kārikā* to strive for the attainment of such an individuated state of existence in which too his distintive nature is somehow preserved. This is inconsistent both logically and teleologically. N.V. fares far better than these two schools in respect of upholding the inviolability and ultimacy of the identity of the individual.

An important epistemic teleological point may be raised here. It is

opined by N.V. thinkers that the individual self attains liberation as a result of acquiring inferential conviction that it is quite different in nature from every other object. The liberation that succeeds this conviction consists, according to N.V. in the divestation of the self from all its specific qualities including cognition. But the cognition that it (the self) is other than everything else is an absolutely true cognition and as such it cannot be expected to taint the self though inhering in its liberated condition. How can it then be maintained that the self is bereft of all cognitions too in liberation ? A similar point can be raised about the Advaitic concept of leberation too. The mental mode which leads to the dissolution of the individual self into the universal self embodies the truth that the world is mere appearance. Is such a truth-embodying mental mode too dissipated in the state of liberation ? Advantic's answer to the question is an unqualified 'yes'. The said dissipation is like the Witgensteinian move of kicking away the ladder after one has climbed beyond it by means of it. The Advaitic metaphor for the move is that of the extinction of fire itself after it has consumed the fuel that helped kindle it.

There is however an important difference between the Advaitic and N.V. denials of continuity between the preliberative and the liberated condition. In the Advaitic view the dissipation of the mental mode leading to liberation results in the revelation of Brahman the absolute reality. The knowledge yielded by the mental mode is limited (although it is concerned with the llimited character of everything other than Brahman) while Brahman-knowledge is unlimited. In the N.V. view on the other hand the preliberative condition of the self is that of an agent having discriminative knowledge which is completely wiped out in the condition of liberation. A question can therefore be asked of N.V. which cannot be asked of Advaita. The question is whether the self possessing discriminative knowledge is superior to the self deprived of this and all other knowledge. If it is, how can self-leberation be the supremely desirable condition ?

The answer of N.V. to this, though not quite satisfactory, is still worth considering. In the view of N.V., attainment of self-hood by the self by the rejection of not-self is of far greater importance than self-consciousness or other-consciousness. In the empirical condition the self does not remain its own self as it is falsely identlfied with body, mind, senses and their appartenances, withdrawal from all these is certainly a great achivement, Knowledge of the fact of this withdrawal or knowledge of oneself is not a great advantage to the self. In this connection it may be noted that in the N.V. view none of the mental states like desire, pleasure, pain, aversion, is self-conscious. Not only this even cognition is not self-conscious. So that unless a cognition is cognised by another cognition it will remain totally unknown. But despite this it can cognise its objects which is its main function. So the self-also may remain unknown as also devoid of the

knowldege of any object in the released state without forfeiting its selfhood. The desirability of such a state is of course hard but not quite impossible to defend. Isn't the sleep-state quite desirable to an extremely tired person? The state of release may be partly compared to the state of sound sleep in which no cognition whatsoever except perhaps the tactual sensation of the body obtains. Of course the residual impressions of experiences that have occurred prior to falling asleep characterise the self during the sleep state. But this can't be the case with the self in release because all the so-called mental states with their residual impressions are wiped out with the last cognition leading to release. This is all that can be said in favour of the N.V. conception of release. Whether it compares favourably or unfavourably with the alternative conceptions propounded by other schools has to be decided by carefully analysing the teleological and axiological factors involved in them. However this much can certainy be maintained that the N.V. conception is teleologically far superior to that of the Hinayana Buddhist Schools according to which the self which is a compound of several socalled mental factors, simply disintegrates leaving behind nothing but the separate states. These too have only momentary existence so that they go out of existance within the very next moment of their coming out of the configuration which constituted the identity of the self.

In this connection a serious anomcaly in the N.V. conception of self which has not attracted the attention of any ancient or modern scholar of Indian philosophy needs to be taken account of. As is welknown, God and the embodied self are the two kinds of self- substances admitted by the N.V. school. God is the unique self, eternal, ubiquitous, omniscient, omnivolent and omnipotent with all these qualities being eternal in nature. The individual selves are infinitely numerous, eternal and ubiquitous and endowed with pain, aversion, merit, demerit and residual impressions in addition to cognition, emotion and conation each of which is not only non-eternal but has existence for two moments only. They are all fleeting in nature though not absolutely momentary as the Buddhists think. Every apparently durable mental state is a series of similar states of two- momentary duration. The term 'mental state' used here is to be taken in the sense of a state induced in the self by the mind's contact with it in a particular region in the body. Although the self is the owner and the locus of the states, only the mind can induce any state in the self by its contact with different parts of the body. Both mind and the body therefore determine the emergence of the socalled mental states in the self.

Just the reverse is the position in the case of the corresponding qualities in God or the highest self. God has no pain, aversion, residual impression, merit or demerit. Only universal and eternal cognition, desire and will characterise God as his qualities. There is therefore no question of their origination and disappearance at any time and being caused or

determined by anything. Like God their locus, they are eternally existent.

Now it must be noted that the proof for the existence of God propounded by N.V. is based on the experience of the agency of self in all the voluntary activites of the body it inhabits. Without a conscious agency moving the body-which in itself is unconscious-the body cannot move and therefore it cannot make any other thing move by itself. So, just as the movements and the activities of insentient things in the world require the sentient agency of the self to propel them so, it is argued that, the world as a whole also requires the agency of God to initiate the activity that results in its origination. This agency of God is conscious. It determines the causality of God's desire and effort directed towords the creation of the world. Thus there is a great deal of parallelism between the empirical creativity of individual self in relation to particular objects and divine creativity of events in the world or the universe as a whole. There is however one important divergence between the two kinds of creativity. In the case of the individual selves, their consciousnesses give rise to their desires and these desires give rise to their efforts. This is the fact which determines the co-objectivity of cognition, emotion and connation in the case of the individual self. God's knowledge,desire and will are not subject to origination and destruction. They are eternal. Yet all of them have the same objects or more precisely, corresponding objects. This co-objectivity of them is alone interdetermined i.e. to say the fact of divine desire and effort having the same object is due to the fact that the divine knowledge has the same object. There is not any causal relation between knowledge, emotion and effort pertaining to God.

Thus we see that in establishing inferentially God's creativity omniscience, omnipotence and omnivonition it is mainly the known facts about the individual self that are used as inferential middle- terms. If this is so then for the individual self God-hood or some condition approximating God-hood should be deemed to be the ideal condition to achieve as the highest goal of its existence. In all other schools of Indian philosophy the ideal of the existence of the human self is considered to be the attainment of divinity itself or a divine-like status.

The Advaita school in fact goes to the extent of maintaining that in reality the human or individual self is the universal self itself. Only because of the veil of Maya the individual self feels itself to be a limited, empirical being separated from other such beings. No sooner is the viel of Maya lifted than the real hidden universal nature of the individual soul is manifested and as a result the false appearance of individuality is gone. In the strict sense nothing has to be achieved by the individual self. It is only the false appearance of non-achievement or more precisely non-universality that is to be got rid by the individual self. In the school of Rāmānuja's Vedānta the ultimate goal of the individual self is the attainment of near-divine status of itself. Due to ignorance the individual

self does not realise that it forms a part and parcel of the divine being which is immanent in the whole universe. The self and the world are, according to Rāmānuja, the attributes of God the ultimate substance. Thus there is definite enhancement of the spiritual status of the individual self when it realises its true nature. Even in the Sāmkhyan philosophy of dualism we find that the ultimate spiritual destiny of the self or 'puruṣa' is freedom from bondage to the world of prakrti in which puruṣa gets somehow enmeshed on account of his false identification with the prakrti. In the free state prusa is freed of all the taint acquired through its unholy collusion with prakriti. In the Mīmānsā school of stark realism also, the spiritual destiny of the self is considered to be much superior to its mundane status. Only the N.V. school has conceived the ultimate destiny or the highest spiritual status of the individual self to be such that it appears like a lowering even of its mundane status. As we have already seen, the freed self is devoid of all the special attributes as compared to God, the universal self. The freed self stands nowhere. God is described by N.V. school as ever freed, omniscient, omnipotent, omnivolent,creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. Even the minutest part of this glory of God does not come to the individual self even after it is liberated from bondage. Can we say definitely that the self really gains anything by being liberated ? If divine knowledge, will and feeling could be eternal couldn't at least the knowledge of self be eternal though mistaken to be non-eternal? It is argued by the author that God being without any body this knowledge, will etc. are eternal while our knowledge will etc which depend upon our body must be non-eternal. But then it may be asked, how can God, being devoid of a body perform all bodily functions like creating the world, which require the support of the body ?'. This question has been discussed threadbare by the author and he has convincingly answered it by maintaining that it is possible for God to create the world without the help of any body although for imparting the knowledge of the scriptures at the start of each creation God has to incarnate himself as an embodied person. Can't the same thing be said of the individual self also ? Can't the individual self also carry out all the bodily functions without the help of the body ? If it can why regard the body as one of the determinats of the cognition, connation, etc. taking place in the self ? Perhaps one may say that whether the self can act without the body or not it is in fact embodied and so the body does determine the occurrence of its qualities.

But the mere association of the body with the self cannot be taken as a convincing proof that the body is a determinant of the self's qualities. Even space and time are associated with all selves but they are not such determinants. Unless it is established that the association of the body and the self is so intimate that in the disembodied state the self cannot manifest its qualities it is difficult to prove that the bodily association is essential for the experiences of the self. In many states of higher

consciousness the body-awareness is not felt to be present at all.

But whether the body is or is not needed to the self for acquiring its qualities it seems to be experientially certified that these qualities are transitory in nature. Pleasure, pain, desire, cognition etc. do not appear to last long. One may perhaps say that these ephemeral qualities are adventitious to the self, being imposed upon it by the mind or the mind-body-association or some other unknown condition. The self in itself may however be-like God-endowed with eternal consciousness, will, conation etc. In the state of release the self becomes free of all impositions so that its intrinsic qualities get then fully manifested. Such a view can be maintained by N.V. but then what distinction would be left between the individual self and God ? Both will be eternal and endowed with eternal qualities. If the universal scope of God's knowledge, will etc. and the limited scope of self's knowledge, will etc. are treated as the basis of the distinction between God and the individual selves then this basis itself may be called into question. The limitations of self's knowledge will etc. may also be regarded as unreal impositions on self's innately universal knowledge, will etc. In that case the law of parsimony would require the rejection of the separate reality of the individual self. The admission of God with His eternal, universal knowledge, will and effort can by itself suffice to explain the infinite diversity of the experiences of the (supposedly) different individual selves. But being committed to the commonsensical standpoint N.V. cannot treat the empirical diversity of individual selves as mere illusory appearance as Advaita does. The fleeting nature of self's qualities is also an empirical fact which N.V. cannot disavow. In view of this the omniscience, omnipotence and omnivolence of the eternal God is sure to appear to the self of limited knowledge, will and effort as an extremely tantalising ideal which it can never attain with all the spiritual development it can bring about in its existential status. Not only this. As we have already seen, liberation appears to bring about rather a kind of degeneration in the status of the self. The inert, insentient self is definitely inferior to the knowing, willing and acting self of day-to-day-life.

Even if the N.V. did not insist on the totally (special) quality- less character of the self in the liberated state it would be hard but to it to explain that the self can attain a superior kind of condition in the disembodied state. The limited consciousness that the self enjoys as the result of its embodiedness cannot be improved upon when the body falls off. In fact the very possibility of consciousness or any other special quality emerging in the disembodied self gets jeopardised.

The author has argued extensively against the general philosophical view that supreme happiness is the highest goal of existence. He says that excessive greed for happiness cannot but result in misery. One cannot have too much of happiness. Even the happiest man could be miserable simply because of the thought that there is another man who is equally

happy. Further it is not within the competence of an individual self to secure supreme happiness and that too in the absence of the body which is absolutely essential for engendering happiness. But, elimination of suffering once for all is possible if the body that is the efficient cause of all experiences is got rid of.

This argument is not convincing enough. The removal of suffering is not always brought about by the removal of the causes of suffering. Some sufferings are due to the lack of the necessities of life or means of comfort. The pangs of hunger are caused by the biological need for nutrition which can be assuaged only by consuming palatable food. The suffering caused,for example by headache is not quite of this kind as it is not due to any lack of the body. Such sufferings which are of the nature of inflictions can be got rid of simply by the removal of their causes. But the sufferings caused or provoked by wants or needs cannot be removed unless the wants or needs are satisfied. The bodily needs may disappear (though not absolutely as the residual impressions left behind by them are sure to cling to the mind) but the needs of the mind cannot disappear unless they are satisfied. This means that absolute cessation of suffering which the N.V. regards as the ultimate goal of existence, is not likely to be attained by completely discarding happiness. N.V. has tried to refute the desirability and attractiveness of happiness by describing all kinds of happiness in very lurid terms. 'The worldly life is simply miserable, even what is experienced as happiness is not so because it is preceded or followed immediately or mediately by unhappiness; the other-worldly life too is fraught with misery ; absolute happiness is mere illusion'. This is the N.V. view. But if this is true then God too must be unhappy as His happiness cannot escape some of the defects that invariably infect human happiness.

It may be noted in this connection that if N.V. does not deny the possibility of the enjoyment of happiness by the individual self then the absolute absence of pain accompanied with the enjoyment of some happiness (which is not tainted with pain) is sure to be superior in quality to mere absence of pain. It is another thing if N.V. denies that there can be pure (unmixed with pain) happiness . One may say against this that happiness is, like all other special qualities of the self-epheral and so it cannot characterise the self in the state of release. Like pain, happiness also must be absent in the released self. This is true. But then why pick out the absence of pain as the essence of release when pain, happiness, cognition, conation etc. are all absent in release ? The only reason to choose the absence of pain to define release seems to be to create the impression that release is the most desirable state which it does not seem to be.

An important consideration that appears to support the above conclusion is that if the total absence of pain were accompanied by utter indifference (to pleasure and pain), an emotion which is different both

from pain and pleasure, release marked by such a state cannot on any account be described as a desirable state. A painless person can be indifferent to everything and yet be grievously lacking in the attainment of the goal of his life.

Glossary of Sanskrit Terms

Āsatti	Proximity of words in a sentence
Anupalaṃbha	Non cognition
Ākṣepa	Inclusion, Subsumption, Objection
Anityatva	Non eternity, Perishability
Atiprasaṅga	Overextension, A phalacy of too wide definition or deviating middle term in an inference
Akarana-svabhāva	Unproductive nature
Ākasṃika	Accidental, Occasional
Ananyathāsiddha	Other than the ineffective or otherwise effective meaning necessary
Aviséṣa	Nondifference
Āpadakatva	Property of entailing undesirable conclusion
Asādhāraṇa	Uncommon, Peculiar to an individual
Adhyāsa	Illusion, Appearing
Anvaya	Presence, Positive Association
Ayogavyavaccheda	Exclusion of absence or disjunction
Atyantāyogavyavasecheda	Exclusion of absolute absence or disjunction
Anyayogavyavaccheda	Exclusion of the conjunction with or the presence of the other
Abhrānṭa	Nonillusory
Anubhava	Cognition, Experience, Sensory Cognition
Anaikāntika	Deviant middle term, an over extensive middle
Avyāpyavrtti	Non pervasive occurrence or locatedness
Āropyam	That which is imposed upon the real
Aropaviṣaya	The object of imposition
Atiśaya	Excellence, Beneficial change or effect
Asrayāsiddhi	The falacy of unknown or unestablished minor term in an inference
Anyathākhyāti	The theory of illusion according to which the cognition of one thing appearing under the generic character of another is illusion
Asatkhyāti	The Buddhist theory of illusion according to which the unreal appears in the illusion
Anugata-vyavahāra	Uniformity usage
Apoha	Other exclusion
Ākaṇksā	Syntax
Aniyata	Irregular
Anupapatti	Inexplicability, Irrationality

Ahamāspada	Having the 'I' form
Ālaya Vignāna	Reservoir-Consciousness
Anavasthā	Infinite regress
Adhikaraṇatā	Locusness
Adhyavasāya	Imposition, Conceptual cognition
Anyavyāvrtti	Exclusion of the other
Avacchedaka	Logical determinant
Avacchedya	Logically determined
Asprišati	Not having as object
Aṃsāṃsibhāva	The component-composite relation
Anuyogi	Qualificand
Abhinnajatiya	Of the same genus
Bādha	Negation, Rejection, Absence of the major term in the minor
Bāhyārtha	External object
Ekarasatā	Similarity
Iteretarāsraya	Mutually-dependant
Iteretarabhāva	Mutual negation or difference
Jalpa	Sophistry
Kathā	Discussion
Kādacitkatva	Occasionality
Kālpanika	Conceptual, Imaginary
Karanatva	Productivity
Kālatyayāpadiṣta	The falacy of absent major term
Loukika	Commonsensical
Parāparbhāva	The relation of includer and included
Partiyogitā	Counter-positiveness relating to negation
Pratibandha	Invariable concomitance
Pratibandhaka	Obstructer
Pratikṣepa	Exclusion
Prasaṅga	An unfavourable contingency, A conditional statement, A counter-factual conditional
Prasanghetu	The middle term in an inference having conditional statements as premises
Prayojaka	Indirect causal determinant
Pratiṣedha	Negation, Opposition
Prakāra	Epistemic qualifier
Prāgabhāva	Antirior absence of a thing (before its genesis)
Pradhvaṃsa	Destructive absence
Prātisvika	Peculiar to an individual
Pravartti	Inclination, urge, disposition
Pratyāsatti	Relation
Pratyasanna	Readily available
Pravartti Vigñana	Motivating consciousness or external objects

	regarded as forms of consciousness
Prabandha	Continuity
Pratipatti	Cognition
Pratyakalita	Mutual involvement
Pratyaya	Cognition, Concept
Sahakāri-Sākalya	Collocation of auxiliary conditions
Sandigdhāsiddha	The falacy of doubtful occurrence of the middle term in the minor in an inference
Samavadhāna	Collocation
Svabhāvahetu	Nature of thing as a middle term
Sahopalambha	Cocognition
Svarupakrta	Intrinsic
Sāvadhi	Delimited
Saṃketa	Convention
Samaya	Verbal convention
Svalakṣaṇa	Self-defined
Sālaksanya	Having similar nature
Siṣādhayiṣa	The desire to infer
Savibhāgasantati	Uninterrupted series
Samanādhikaraṇa	Coexistant, Coordinate
Sāmarthya	Competence, Immediate productivity
Upādāna	Material cause
Upādeya	The inherent effect
Vidhi	Affirmation
Vyāsedha	Negation
Vikalpa	Determinate Cognition, Concept
Viparyaya	Negation, Negative conclusion, Denying the consequernt in a conditional inference
Vyāvrtti	Exclusion
Vyabhicāra	Deviation, A falacy of the middle term in an inference
Vyapadeśa	Nomenclature, Designation
Vyavahāra	Usage
Vyāpti	Pervasion, Invariable concommitance
Vyatireka	Absence, Negative association
Vyāpāra	Process
Viṣaya-Viṣayi Bhāva	Relation of object and subject
Vikalpārudha	Conceptual
Yougapadya	Simultaneity